On the specificity of face cognition compared with general cognitive functioning across adult age.

Face cognition is considered a specific human ability, clearly differentiable from general cognitive functioning. Its specificity is primarily supported by cognitive-experimental and neuroimaging research, but recently also from an individual differences perspective. However, no comprehensive behavioral data are available, which would allow estimating lifespan changes of the covariance structure of face-cognition abilities and general cognitive functioning as well as age-differences in face cognition after accounting for interindividual variability in general cognition. The present study aimed to fill this gap. In an age-heterogeneous (18–82 years) sample of 448 adults, we found no factorial dedifferentiation between face cognition and general cognition. Age-related differences in face memory were still salient after taking into account changes in general cognitive functioning. Face cognition thus remains a specific human ability compared with general cognition, even until old age. We discuss implications for models of cognitive aging and suggest that it is necessary to include more explicitly special social abilities in those models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science.

Reviews the book, Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science by Zenon W. Pylyshyn (see record 1986-97211-000). Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of mind based on a computational conception of mind. Computation and cognition is a presentation of Zenon Pylyshyn's position on just what a computational conception of mind is and should be. In the course of the exegesis, the basic, often implicit, assumptions of cognitive science are revealed, and the enterprise as a whole is placed on firm ground. The book is difficult but important. The reviewer cannot recommend it to the intelligent layman. However, it is a book that should be read by cognitive scientists and others with a deep interest in the possibility of a computational view of mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The challenge from biology to cognitive science.

Concepts from cognitive science have largely replaced behaviorist concepts as the primary explanatory tools of contemporary psychology. However, cognitive science is not without its critics and shortcomings. It would therefore be a mistake for psychologists to uncritically accept cognitive science as it uncritically accepted the logical positivism that undergirded behaviorism for so many decades. Effective philosophical criticisms of cognitive science have been offered by Searle (1980) and Dreyfus (1979). In this paper I will present difficulties with cognitive science that arise from the science of biology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes.

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The mind’s we: Contextualism in cognitive psychology.

Reviews the book, The mind's we: Contextualism in cognitive psychology by Diane Gillespie (1992). In this text the author has both expanded on several of the key insights previously outlined in the critical literature and provided a congenial introductory text for the newcomer; a text to serve as a conceptual bridge between traditional cognitive psychological approaches and their newly emergent contextualist alternatives. As stated in her preface, Gillespie's purpose in preparing this book was to "bring together the work of psychologists who are interested in telling the contextualist story of cognition" and to "reveal and strengthen their insights and perspectives" (p. xiv). Given the philosophical range and theoretical diversity of those interested in telling such a story, the task is certainly a formidable one, but it is nonetheless one that she accomplishes with a commendable degree of elegance. Gillespie clearly articulates the diverse work of a large number of psychological theorists into a coherent and meaningful account that will do much toward imposing order on a field that is, by its very nature, somewhat scattered and contentious. Each of the book's six chapters proceeds carefully through a detailed and representative historical and conceptual analysis of traditional mechanistic approaches to human cognition prior to advancing their contextualist critiques and alternatives. Through a systematic analysis of the manner in which this "contextualist story" has arisen within the mechanistic milieu of traditional scientific psychology, she is able to clarify both the implications and relative merits and liabilities of two, quite often antithetical, conceptualizations of human cognitive phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

émotion et cognition incarnée: La dimension motrice des réponses verbales ?oui? et ?non?.

Theories of embodied cognition make the hypothesis that all cognitive operations, including high-level ones, are fundamentally rooted in the current state of the body and in the sensory-motor systems of the brain. Related experimental work has been concerned solely with the link between automatic cognitive processes and motor responses. This link has never been supposed to result from the production of verbal responses, such as the responses “yes” and “no.” However, a great many tasks require a verbal response along with a motor response. In this study, we have demonstrated that cognitive and automatic evaluation of the valence of words involves a close link with the motor responses of “pull” and “push”, as well as the verbal responses “yes” and “no” when the task requires answering “yes” or “no” whether there is the letter “a” in a word. Moreover, the results obtained show that the verbal responses “yes” and “no” interact with the motor responses of “pull” and “push”. This interaction supports the idea that positive and negative verbal responses present a motor component, as contemplated in embodied cognition theories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Barsalou, 2008). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Introduction to the special section on cognitive processes and psychotherapy.

Theoretical models featuring cognitive processes have played a fundamental role in advancing knowledge of psychopathology and its treatment and have emphasized the importance of cognition in psychotherapy. Recognition of the importance of cognition in psychotherapy has led to a number of questions that are addressed by the articles in this special section of the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. Cognitive therapy is well represented in the articles in this special section, but therapeutic procedures that do not represent typical cognitive therapy are also examined. The articles in this special section focus on homework in the modification of cognition, cognition in the treatment of anxiety in adults and in children, change in depressive cognitions in children, cognition and rapid change in the treatment of depression, and the role of cognition in the treatment and prevention of depression that is recurrent. Examination of these types of questions holds the possibility of advances in existing treatments and the possibility of innovations in new treatments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the phenomena of "opposite speech."

"It is the purpose of this paper to consider 'opposite speech' within the categories of a theory of the development of cognition—a theory concerned with general, formal properties of cognitive activity, obtaining in phylogenesis, ontogenesis, cultural evolution, psychopathology, etc. The fundamental principle of this comparative developmental approach to cognition is that wherever development occurs, it proceeds from a relatively global and undifferentiated state to one of increasing differentiation, articulation, and integration… ." Several lines of evidence are cited. Two relevant experiments are discussed. They suggest "that the processes underlying 'opposite speech' occur not only in a few schizophrenics employing a strange means to avoid anxiety or to express hostility, but may be found in any individual, characteristically or momentarily operating under conditions conducive to a primitivization of the level of symbolic articulation and organization of experience." 28 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Cognition as intuitive statistics.

Reviews the book, Cognition as intuitive statistics by Gerd Gigerenzer and David J. Murray (see record 1987-97295-000). Psychologists tend to think of their statistical methods simply as neutral tools. The use of a particular statistical technique is not supposed to influence one's psychological theorizing. Methods and theories are entirely different things, just like facts and theories are quite different. These sharp distinctions are generally accepted as articles of faith. They are not empirically based but are part of the philosophical legacy of positivism which continues to have a strong hold on our discipline. According to this philosophy methods and facts are both supposed to be theory-neutral, so that they can be used to test the claims of rival theories. Now, the post-positivist phase in the philosophy of science has been going on for long enough to have had some effect on the rhetoric, if not on the practice, of psychological investigation. In particular, the distinction between theories and facts is not likely to be insisted upon as dogmatically as it was in the heyday of logical positivism. But the parallel distinction between theories and methods has seldom been explicitly questioned in psychology. Gigerenzer and Murray's book goes a long way towards filling this gap. Their thesis is that after psychologists came to take a specific statistical methodology for granted in their research they began to base their theoretical models of human cognition on the psychologists' own statistical practice. Gigerenzer and Murray illustrate their general thesis by drawing on examples from four areas of psychological research: signal detection theory, perception, memory and thinking. In each case they combine a broad historical account with a detailed critical assessment of some contemporary work. The value of such an approach is that it opens up a refreshing new perspective on the research literature in these fields, making visible fundamental assumptions which normally remain hidden. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

New perspectives on the effects of action on perceptual and cognitive development.

This special section was motivated by a resurgence in the view that it is impossible to investigate perceptual and cognitive development without considering how it is affected by, and intertwined with, infants' and children's action in the world. This view has long been foundational to the field, yet contemporary investigations of the effects of acting on cognition and perception have been limited. The research showcased in this section indicates that this trend is changing as researchers consider anew the ways in which cognition derives structure from action. The work presented here illustrates the breadth of these potential effects across ages and domains of development, and it highlights the breadth of methods that can be recruited to investigate them. This new research focus provides insight for the mechanisms by which action affects perception and cognition and at the same time reveals that much remains to be learned. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Activities, self-referent memory beliefs, and cognitive performance: Evidence for direct and mediated relations.

In this study, the authors investigated the role of activities and self-referent memory beliefs for cognitive performance in a life-span sample. A factor analysis identified 8 activity factors, including Developmental Activities, Experiential Activities, Social Activities, Physical Activities, Technology Use, Watching Television, Games, and Crafts. A second-order general activity factor was significantly related to a general factor of cognitive function as defined by ability tests. Structural regression models suggested that prediction of cognition by activity level was partially mediated by memory beliefs, controlling for age, education, health, and depressive affect. Models adding paths from general and specific activities to aspects of crystallized intelligence suggested additional unique predictive effects for some activities. In alternative models, nonsignificant effects of beliefs on activities were detected when cognition predicted both variables, consistent with the hypothesis that beliefs derive from monitoring cognition and have no influence on activity patterns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A metaphor-enriched social cognition.

Social cognition is the scientific study of the cognitive events underlying social thought and attitudes. Currently, the field's prevailing theoretical perspectives are the traditional schema view and embodied cognition theories. Despite important differences, these perspectives share the seemingly uncontroversial notion that people interpret and evaluate a given social stimulus using knowledge about similar stimuli. However, research in cognitive linguistics (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) suggests that people construe the world in large part through conceptual metaphors, which enable them to understand abstract concepts using knowledge of superficially dissimilar, typically more concrete concepts. Drawing on these perspectives, we propose that social cognition can and should be enriched by an explicit recognition that conceptual metaphor is a unique cognitive mechanism that shapes social thought and attitudes. To advance this metaphor-enriched perspective, we introduce the metaphoric transfer strategy as a means of empirically assessing whether metaphors influence social information processing in ways that are distinct from the operation of schemas alone. We then distinguish conceptual metaphor from embodied simulation—the mechanism posited by embodied cognition theories—and introduce the alternate source strategy as a means of empirically teasing apart these mechanisms. Throughout, we buttress our claims with empirical evidence of the influence of metaphors on a wide range of social psychological phenomena. We outline directions for future research on the strength and direction of metaphor use in social information processing. Finally, we mention specific benefits of a metaphor-enriched perspective for integrating and generating social cognitive research and for bridging social cognition with neighboring fields. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Only time will tell: Cross-sectional studies offer no solution to the age–brain–cognition triangle: Comment on Salthouse (2011).

Salthouse (2011) critically reviewed cross-sectional and longitudinal relations among adult age, brain structure, and cognition (ABC) and identified problems in interpretation of the extant literature. His review, however, missed several important points. First, there is enough disparity among the measures of brain structure and cognitive performance to question the uniformity of B and C vertices of the ABC triangle. Second, age differences and age changes in brain and cognition are often nonlinear. Third, variances and correlations among measures of brain and cognition frequently vary with age. Fourth, cross-sectional comparisons among competing models of ABC associations cannot disambiguate competing hypotheses about the structure and the range of directed and reciprocal relations between changes in brain and behavior. We offer the following conclusions, based on these observations. First, individual differences among younger adults are not useful for understanding the aging of brain and behavior. Second, only multivariate longitudinal studies, age-comparative experimental interventions, and a combination of the two will deliver us from the predicaments of the ABC triangle described by Salthouse. Mediation models of cross-sectional data represent age-related differences in target variables but fail to approximate time-dependent relations; thus, they do not elucidate the dimensions and dynamics of cognitive aging. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Primacy of Cognition in Schizophrenia.

Cognitive tasks and concepts are used increasingly in schizophrenia science and treatment. Recent meta-analyses show that across a spectrum of research domains only cognitive measures distinguish a majority of schizophrenia patients from healthy people. Average effect sizes derived from common clinical tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning are twice as large as those obtained in structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies. Chronic stress, genes, brain disturbances, task structure, gender, and sociocultural background may all enhance the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. At the same time, disease heterogeneity and the presence of endophenotypes and subtypes within the patient population may place upper limits on the strength of any specific cognitive finding. Schizophrenia is a complex biobehavioral disorder that manifests itself primarily in cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Coherence in thought and action.

Reviews the book, Coherence in thought and action by Paul Thagard (see record 2001-16098-000). This volume is a comprehensive presentation of the latest work of Paul Thagard and his research group on coherence theory, an area of inquiry to which the author has made ground-breaking contributions for over a decade. Coherence theory is a peculiar synthesis of philosophy and cognitive science that approaches problems in terms of the satisfaction of multiple constraints within networks of highly interconnected elements. The main aim of the present work is to extend the reach of coherence theory beyond its usual applications in cognition and epistemology to questions of ontology, ethics, politics, emotion, social consensus, and probabilistic reasoning. Thagard makes a persuasive if not wholly convincing argument that all of these domains can be thought about in roughly similar ways. Despite the complexity of the issues it treats, this is not at all a difficult book to read. Thagard has the knack for explaining difficult ideas in readily understandable language. However, his frequent crossing of disciplinary boundaries makes it a challenging task at times to evaluate his theory. Is it primarily a theory of human cognition, of philosophical epistemology, or is it mainly intended as a new procedure for addressing philosophical questions? It is perhaps all of these at once. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Application of stochastic modeling to the assessment of group and individual differences in cognitive functioning.

This article begins with a guiding schema of relations among cognitive science, clinical science, and assessment technology. Emphasis is placed on stochastic modeling of cognitive processes. Basic models are adjusted so as to parsimoniously accommodate performance deviations occurring with psychopathology. Modified portions of models indicate functions affected by disorder, whereas portions remaining intact indicate spared functions. Findings from clinical cognitive science are applied to the individual case using Bayesian procedures. Methods are instantiated with respect to cognitive psychopathology of paranoid schizophrenia. The authors address observations and issues arising from this application, including integration of these methods with current assessment practices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distributed creativity: How collective creations emerge from collaboration.

Creativity is often considered to be a mental process that occurs within a person’s head. In this article, we analyze a group creative process: One that generates a creative product, but one in which no single participant’s contribution determines the result. We analyze a series of 5 theater performances that were improvisationally developed in rehearsal by a theater group; over the course of these 5 performances, a collaborative creation emerged from the improvised dialogues of the group. We argue that in cases of creativity such as this one, it is inaccurate to describe creativity as a purely mental process; rather, this case represents a nonindividualistic creative process that we refer to as distributed creativity. We chose this term by analogy with studies of distributed cognition, which are well established in cognitive science, but have not yet had a substantial impact on creativity research. Our study demonstrates a methodology that can be used to study distributed creative processes, provides a theoretical framework to explain these processes, and contributes to our understanding of how collaboration contributes to creativity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)