Computational intelligence in economics and finance: Carrying on the legacy of Herbert Simon

This is an editorial guide for the special issue on computational intelligence (CI) in economics and finance. A historical introduction to the background is given. This research paradigm is traced back to Herbert Simon, who, as a founder of artificial intelligence, pioneered the applications of AI to economics. The move from the classical AI to CI indicates a continuation of the legacy of Herbert Simon. Computational intelligence has proved to be a constructive foundation for economics. In responding to what Herbert Simon referred as procedural rationality, our study of bounded rationality has been enriched by bringing autonomous agents into the economic analysis.     

有限理性模型在游戏智能决策中的研究与应用*

为了让游戏NPC能够学习和模拟玩家在游戏中的策略和行为方式,在基于模型的智能决策方法基础上,结合行为决策理论中的有限理性模型提出了一种新的游戏智能方法.该方法分别从有限理性模型的两个核心原则——有限理性和满意准则来改进过去的方法在感知和决策过程中所面对的问题,从而使得游戏NPC行为决策方式更加人性化.最后,通过在Starcraft平台上与其他方法的对抗性实验来进一步验证该方法的优势.     

动态服务的数据交换模型研究*

数据交换是解决信息孤岛问题的实用方法,但如何实施灵活有效的数据交换一直是研究的难点.基于此,提出了动态服务的数据交换方式来克服原有单一、固定的交换缺点.依据交换系统的现状,首先给出了静态服务库、动态服务库和静态交换系统、动态交换系统的概念;然后提出了动态服务的交换模型,并给出了交换的方法、原则和实现过程.最后,结合具体的应用实例,验证了模型的灵活性和有效性.     

Examining the use of status quo bias perspective in IS research: need for re‐conceptualizing and incorporating biases

Kim & Kankanhalli introduced status quo bias perspective (SQBP) to help understand information systems (hereinafter IS) users' resistance behaviour. Since then, scholars have widely referred to the theoretical perspective to understand user resistance to and adoption of new IS and information and communication technologies (hereinafter ICT). However, our analysis found that while adopting SQBP, researchers focused primarily on rational cost‐and‐benefit analysis, rather than on the fundamental tenet of SQBP that highlights ‘bias’ in users' decision‐making on account of their cognitive limitations that lead to bounded rationality. In addition, some of the key constructs used in SQBP were not properly interpreted or were oversimplified in their operationalization. This research note aims to provide guidance for utilizing and analysing SQBP and its constructs for future IS user resistance/adoption research. Because SQBP provides unique insights into ‘bias’ in human decision‐making in its presentation of bounded rationality, accurate interpretation of its concepts and their investigation can help better understand the different sources of user resistance derived from the status quo bias during new IS and ICT implementation. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd     

投资项目多目标协同经济评价研究

在传统项目经济评价中,评价主体在详细说明和明确规定的环境下进行效益“最大化”投资决策。然而在现实生活中,评价主体的理性是有局限性的,评价维度呈现多元化,且最终的投资选择需要各维度的协同。从有限理性理论视角,引入功效系数,分别计算确定性信息、风险信息和完全不确定信息三个维度有限理性经济评价协同度,并建立了对互斥型以及独立型投资项目组合经济评价协调度模型;最后应用微粒群算法,以独立项目组合经济评价为例,介绍了有限理性项目多目标协同模型的求解,对传统项目经济评价理论作了有意义的探索和改进。     

基于有限理性的个体出行路径选择进化博弈

首先,从出行者的信息集和理性层次的差异两个方面给出两种改进的“最优反应动态”模型,并将其应用于一个算例,得到了与利用复制者动态方程所求得的进化稳定策略一致的结果;然后,为验证结论的普遍性,将出行者和路径数量扩充,构造了相应的算法,并将此算法及其复制者动态方程应用于一个规模较大的路网;最后,将不同机制下的实验结果进行了比较,并对其实际意义进行了分析．     

Strategic Decision‐making in a New Millennium: The Contribution from Hybrid Decision‐making Modes

Empirical studies have provided scope for examining strategic decision‐making behaviours under a range of conditions including those involving environmental ‘jolts’ to expectations, and multiple‐decision activities. Effective decision‐making under turbulent conditions repeatedly involved a hybrid of rational and cybernetic (or experimental information‐seeking) behaviours. This was unpredicted. We have labelled this new mode Promethean rationality. A second hybrid mode was identified, under a more restricted range of conditions, and characterised as Confucian rationality combining rationality with appeal to ‘expert knowledge’. Inspection of a real‐life decision making case under an environmental jolt revealed preliminary evidence of Promethean rationality. The implications are the more valuable as in the rise of a new century, the environment around decision makers becomes more turbulent.     

Computability,complexity and economics

Herbert Simon advocates that economists should study procedureal rationality instead of substantive rationality. One approach for studying procedural rationality is to consider algorithmic representations of procedures, which can then be studied using the concepts of computability and complexity. For some time, game theorists have considered the issue of computability and have employed automata to study bounded rationality. Outside game theory very little research has been performed. Very simple examples of the traditional economic optimization models can require transfinite computations. The impact of procedural rationality on economics depends on the computational resources available to economic agents.     

考虑排污权交易的有限理性企业博弈模型研究

在有限理性基础上建立寡头垄断博弈模型,将其引入到排污权市场中,同时考虑了生产成本、污染治理成本、排污权交易价格的影响,使该模型更符合实际。将不同理性层次,不同结构的非线性成本函数,不完全信息等因素引入到博弈模型中,对改进后的模型的演化过程进行分析,找出博弈均衡点,并分析其稳定性。由于具有有限理性的双寡头Cournot博弈模型会产生丰富的动力学行为,因此对其进行数据模拟后并对混沌现象进行分析。在此基础上,运用延迟反馈控制法对寡头垄断博弈模型的混沌控制进行了解析分析,结果表明选择合适的控制因子可使模型稳定在Nash均衡。     

The impact of cognitive machines on complex decisions and organizational change

Humans and organizations have limitations of computational capacity and information management. Such constraints are synonymous with bounded rationality. Therefore, in order to extend the human and organizational boundaries to more advanced models of cognition, this research proposes concepts of cognitive machines in organizations. From a micro point of view, what makes this research distinct is that, beyond people, it includes in the list of participants of the organization the cognitive machines. From a macro point of view, this paper relies on the premise that cognitive machines can improve the cognitive abilities of the organization. From such perspectives, it presents rationale and principles of a class of cognitive machines with capabilities to carry out complex cognitive tasks in organizations. It also introduces analyses of the cognitive machines in organizations through theories of bounded rationality, economic decision-making, and conflict resolution. The analyses indicate that these machines can solve or reduce intra-individual and group dysfunctional conflicts which arise from decision-making processes in the organization, and thus they can improve the degree of organizational cognition. From all these backgrounds, this research outlines implications of cognitive machines for organizations.     

Quantifying bounded rationality: Managerial behaviour and the Smith predictor

The concept of bounded rationality in decision-making and research on its relation to aggregate system dynamics is briefly recalled. By recasting the well-known beer game as a Smith predictor control system, a natural measure of the level of bounded rationality in the decision-making process is derived. The results herein do accord with those of the original beer game paper. In addition, they engender a new interpretation of an important model parameter as a direct measure of the level of bounded rationality inherent in decision-making. A stability analysis is then employed to support and qualify the assertion that the level of bounded rationality can adversely affect the aggregate dynamic behaviour of such supply chains. The analytical basis of these calculations enables the quantification of the potential cost improvements resulting from more desirable supply-chain dynamics. These follow from reduced volatility through improved decision-making in the supply chain. This approach is designed to inform the strategic investment decision to purchase computational aids in order to overcome the level of bounded rationality in the system.     

A Comparative Study of Game Theoretic and Evolutionary Models of Bargaining for Software Agents

Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behavior uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality is common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponents strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer.     

Rational Task Analysis: A Methodology to Benchmark Bounded Rationality

How can we study bounded rationality? We answer this question by proposing rational task analysis (RTA)—a systematic approach that prevents experimental researchers from drawing premature conclusions regarding the (ir-)rationality of agents. RTA is a methodology and perspective that is anchored in the notion of bounded rationality and aids in the unbiased interpretation of results and the design of more conclusive experimental paradigms. RTA focuses on concrete tasks as the primary interface between agents and environments and requires explicating essential task elements, specifying rational norms, and bracketing the range of possible performance, before contrasting various benchmarks with actual performance. After describing RTA’s core components we illustrate its use in three case studies that examine human memory updating, multitasking behavior, and melioration. We discuss RTA’s characteristic elements and limitations by comparing it to related approaches. We conclude that RTA provides a useful tool to render the study of bounded rationality more transparent and less prone to theoretical confusion.     

Computational Economics als wirtschaftsinformatischer Beitrag zu einer interdisziplinären Netzwerktheorie

Standards provide for compatibility and can therefore constitute networks. A possible contribution of the discipline of IS is transcending traditional economic network analysis by incorporating an interdisciplinary view on networks with economic utility maximization and an agent-based computational economics (ACE) approach. In doing so, the complex dynamics in networks occasioned by the existence of network effects and socially situated agents with bounded rationality can be modelled using computational laboratories. This provides an important step towards evaluating and develop alternative socioeconomic structures with regard to their effects on individual behavior and social welfare.     

一类开放DAI系统的动态行为研究

本文针对Ｒｏｓｅｎｓｃｈｅｉｎ合理主体理论中的静态性、局部性等缺陷以及Ｈｕｂｅｒｍａｎ的计算生态学理论中缺乏对单主体的描述等不足加以改进，在对系统进行合理性假设的基础上，引入系统中合理主体与系统的相互作用，进而研究了开放系统的动态性．     

A framework for meta-level control in multi-agent systems

Sophisticated agents operating in open environments must make decisions that efficiently trade off the use of their limited resources between dynamic deliberative actions and domain actions. This is the meta-level control problem for agents operating in resource-bounded multi-agent environments. Control activities involve decisions on when to invoke and the amount to effort to put into scheduling and coordination of domain activities. The focus of this paper is how to make effective meta-level control decisions. We show that meta-level control with bounded computational overhead allows complex agents to solve problems more efficiently than current approaches in dynamic open multi-agent environments. The meta-level control approach that we present is based on the decision-theoretic use of an abstract representation of the agent state. This abstraction concisely captures critical information necessary for decision making while bounding the cost of meta-level control and is appropriate for use in automatically learning the meta-level control policies.     

Satisficing Equilibria: A Non-Classical Theory of Games and Decisions

Satisficing, or being good enough, is the fundamental obligation of rational decision makers. We cannot rationally choose an option, even when we do not know of anything better, unless we know it is good enough. Unfortunately, we are not often in the position of knowing that there could be no better option, and hence that the option must be good enough. A complete search through all logical possibilities is often impractical, particularly in multi-agent contexts, due to excessive computational difficulty, modeling complexity, and uncertainty. It can be equally impractical, if it is even possible, to determine the cost of the additional required search to find an option that is good enough. In a departure from the traditional notion of satisficing as a species of bounded rationality, satisficing is here redefined in terms of a notion of intrinsic rationality. Epistemic utility theory serves as the philosophical foundation of a new praxeological decision-making paradigm of satisficing equilibria that is applicable to both single- and multiple-agent scenarios. All interagent relationships are modeled by an interdependence function that explicitly accommodates both self and group interest, from which multilateral and unilateral selectability and rejectability mass functions can be derived and compared via the praxeic likelihood ratio test.     

RATIONALITY AND ITS ROLES IN REASONING

The economic theory of rationality promises to equal mathematical logic in its importance for the mechanization of reasoning. We survey the growing literature on how the basic notions of probability, utility, and rational choice, coupled with practical limitations on information and resources, influence the design and analysis of reasoning and representation systems.     

The impact of fuzziness in social choice paradoxes

Since Arrow’s main theorem showed the impossibility of a rational procedure in group decision making, many variations in restrictions and objectives have been introduced in order to find out the limits of such a negative result. But so far all those results are often presented as a proof of the great expected difficulties we always shall find pursuing a joint group decision from different individual opinions, if we pursue rational and ethical procedures. In this paper we shall review some of the alternative approaches fuzzy sets theory allows, showing among other things that the main assumption of Arrow’s model, not being made explicit in his famous theorem, was its underlying binary logic (a crisp definition is implied in preferences, consistency, liberty, equality, consensus and every concept or piece of information). Moreover, we shall also point out that focusing the problem on the choice issue can be also misleading, at least when dealing with human behaviour.