奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约

研究政府奖惩机制下闭环供应链的成本共担-利润共享契约,分别建立集中式决策情形和分散式决策情形下的奖惩机制下有无成本共担-利润共享契约的闭环供应链决策模型.研究表明:随着政府奖惩力度的提高,产品的零售价降低,回购价、回收率和回收商的利润均提高,但制造商的利润与目标回收率有关;随着回收商成本共担比例和分享利润比例的提高,零售价提高,但总小于无契约的情形,回收率降低,但总大于无契约的情形;回购价随着回收商成本共担比例的提高而提高,随着其利润分享比例的提高而降低;制造商总能从成本共担-利润共享契约中获益,而当成本共担比例适中、利润共享比例较大时,回收商才愿意接受该契约,此时,成本共担-利润共享契约生效且能够协调闭环供应链.     

考虑电商平台信用支付促销的供应链协调研究

考虑到我国越来越多的电商平台为消费者提供基于互联网的信用支付策略作为重要的促销手段,构建了二级供应链中促销努力水平影响消费者需求的函数,研究其定价和促销努力水平协调问题。利用Stackelberg博弈分析供应链主体间的最优决策,并与集中模式下进行对比分析,为了促使电商平台提高促销努力水平,构建了“成本共担-收益共享”契约达到供应链协调的目的。通过数值分析证明：“成本共担-收益共享”契约对电商平台的促销努力水平具有显著的提升作用;促销努力水平弹性系数对于促销努力水平具有一定的影响,在一定区间内,增加促销努力水平弹性系数将使供应链各企业的利润增加,一旦促销努力弹性系数超过一个临界值就会使得供应链各主体的利益受损。     

考虑公平关切的服务供应链协调契约

针对服务集成商公平关切行为, 建立了服务提供商和服务集成商的博弈模型, 分析论证了批发价契约无法实现服务供应链协调的问题, 探讨了“成本共担+收入共享” 组合式契约协调的有效性. 研究结果表明, 成本共担契约和收入共享契约都无法实现服务供应链的协调, 而组合式契约不仅能有效协调服务供应链, 且协调具有一定柔性, 但随着服务集成商公平关切程度的增加, 服务提供商与服务集成商的协调空间变小, 协调柔性减弱, 且对服务提供商更不利.     

基于混合契约的生鲜电商供应链协调策略

考虑到生鲜电商平台销售过程中保鲜努力水平和促销努力水平对消费者需求的影响,构建保鲜努力水平和促销努力水平共同影响下的消费者需求函数,研究由单一生鲜供应商和单一生鲜电商平台构成的二级生鲜电商供应链协调问题.根据模型比较不同决策模式下的生鲜产品最优定价、最优保鲜努力水平、最优促销努力水平和生鲜电商供应链成员收益等,发现合作能够提升供应链成员的收益,因此构建“收益共享-成本共担”的混合契约协调供应链,并讨论混合契约实施的条件.研究结果表明:混合契约对生鲜电商平台保鲜努力水平和促销努力水平的提升具有正向影响;努力水平弹性系数对于努力水平存在不同程度的影响,在一定范围内,随着努力水平弹性系数的增加,成员收益也在不断增加,当超过最优值后,弹性系数的提升会造成成员收益受损.最后采用算例验证混合契约对于生鲜电商供应链协调的有效性.     

需求依赖减排水平和价格的供应链决策与协调机制

针对由一个低碳产品制造商与一个零售商组成的供应链, 考虑需求同时受减排水平和销售价格的影响, 分别研究寄售契约、收益共享契约以及收益共享与减排成本共担3 种契约下供应链企业的优化决策, 并进一步探讨当需求的确定部分为和式、随机部分服从均匀分布时的供应链系统的最优决策. 从理论上证明了制造商与零售商之间的合作利于促进减排水平的提升, 也利于供应链系统期望总利润的增加. 最后, 探讨了不同参数对协调供应链绩效的影响.

     

考虑风险规避和谈判权力的农产品供应链绿色投资机制

研究风险规避的农户和风险中性的销售商组成的农产品供应链,在集中式决策和分散式决策下绿色投资的最优决策问题.考虑两类成本共担契约,分别为一般成本共担契约和考虑谈判权力的讨价还价的成本共担契约;同时,分析风险规避和谈判权力对相关决策变量的影响.结果表明:在分散式供应链中,风险规避与绿色投资水平负相关,而在两类契约中,两者正相关.两类契约都有利于供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用的提高.在双方谈判的成本共担契约中,成本分担比例和绿色投资水平分别与谈判权力和风险规避正相关;在满足一定条件时,供应链绿色投资水平高于集中式供应链的相应值;供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用可同时高于一般成本共担契约中的相应值.投资成本系数对供应链绿色投资水平和期望效用有负向影响.     

赊销背景下的供应链收入共享契约

在供应商向存在资金约束的销售商提供赊销的背景下,分别探讨了批发价格契约和收入共享契约对二级供应链的协调问题.研究发现,批发价格契约无法协调存在赊销的供应链,当销售商的初始资金满足一定条件时,赊销背景下的收入共享契约能够实现存在资金约束供应链的自愿协调.收入共享契约下,共享比例随销售商初始资金的增大而增大,批发价格则随之增大而减小.最后通过数值算例对结论进行了验证.     

考虑生产能力约束和销售成本递增情形下的供应链协调研究

制造商的生产能力受到限制时,单位产品生产成本会随产量的提高而增加;订货量增加时,零售商会尽力实现自己的销售目标.销售成本会增加,此情形下收益共享契约无法实现供应链的完美协调.鉴于此,通过对契约模型修订,研究发现单位产品生产成本增加时,制造商会提高批发价格.但会主动替零售商承担一部分递增的销售成本,且承担比例与其分享零售...     

考虑质量控制和损失规避的供应链协调研究

研究质量控制和各成员均损失规避背景下的供应链协调问题,应用损失规避效应函数刻画制造商和零售商的损失规避行为,通过分析比较分散决策和集中决策两种模式下的最优策略,引入批发价格-质量成本分担契约构建供应链协调模型,研究表明,该契约能够使质量控制与损失规避背景下的供应链实现协调.通过算例对损失规避程度、产品合格率和销售价格等参数进行灵敏度分析,揭示了损失规避和质量控制等因素与最优产品质量水平、最优订货量以及供应链效用之间的关系.     

基于CVaR的闭环供应链优化与协调决策研究

利用条件风险值理论研究具有风险规避特性的闭环供应链的优化与协调问题.首先,建立了随机市场需求下由单个风险规避零售商与单个风险规避制造商组成的两阶闭环供应链的条件风险值模型,以及基于条件风险值的收益共享费用共担契约下的最优订购量和最优批发价格决策模型;然后在对模型进行分析的基础上,揭示了制造商和零售商的风险规避水平对最优订购量、批发价格、条件风险值及闭环供应链协调的影响;最后通过一个算例验证了所得的结论.     

Contract efficiency for a decentralized supply chain in the presence of quality improvement

In this paper, we study a joint pricing and product quality decision problem in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Although the manufacturer decides the product quality with an associated cost, the retailer decides the retail price. We aim to study and compare different contract formats for this decentralized supply chain. There is a trade‐off in the choice of contracts: simpler format contract (with a few parameters) is less complicated, but the contract efficiency is low. We start with the simplest one‐parameter contract: a wholesale price contract that serves as the benchmark. We then study how contract efficiency can be improved by adding one more parameter. Specifically, we consider three two‐parameter contracts that are commonly used in reality: two‐part tariff contract, revenue‐sharing contract, and effort cost sharing contract. We find that the contract efficiency is improved under all the three contracts, but in different ways: the improvement in contract efficiency under each of them dominates the other two when manufacturer's quality improvement effectiveness is relatively low, moderate, and high, respectively. Furthermore, through numerical examples, we find that under some cases, a choice from these three two‐parameter contracts can achieve a close‐to‐perfect efficiency (>85%). Finally, we investigate whether a combination of the three two‐parameter contracts can achieve coordination. Interestingly, we find that only the combination of effort cost sharing contract and revenue‐sharing contract can achieve coordination, whereas combinations of either of them and two‐part tariff contract cannot.     

Contract analysis: A performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains

Coordination is regarded as key in managing dependencies between distinctive members of a supply chain through the benefits of coordination mechanisms. Such coordination mechanisms are contracts, implemented to increase total supply chain profit, reduce costs and share risk among supply chain members. However, by contract implementation the retailer is constrained in his purchase by bearing the entire risk of holding the inventory (wholesale price contract) or by limited risk allocated to the supplier (buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts). By implementing an advanced purchase system the risk of inventory is fairly divided between the supplier and the retailer. In order to observe inventory implications on the supply chain bottom line, this article is directed towards the evaluation of performance measures and supply chain profit behavior under buyback, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility and advanced purchase discount contracts versus no coordination and wholesale price systems.     

成本分担机制下考虑品牌商誉的三级绿色供应链微分博弈

考虑产品绿色度和品牌商誉的动态性,引入价格加成系数刻画采购价格、批发价格和销售价格三者之间的关系,采用微分博弈研究由供应商、制造商和零售商组成的三级绿色供应链的投资策略与协调问题.探讨并对比分析集中决策模型、无成本分担契约的分散决策模型和有成本分担契约的分散决策模型的均衡结果,设计双边成本分担契约对供应链进行协调.研究表明:产品绿色度的最优轨迹具有两种变化趋势,由产品绿色度初始值和稳态值的大小关系决定;品牌商誉的最优轨迹具有3种变化趋势,由品牌商誉初始值和稳态值的大小关系决定;集中决策模型最优,有成本分担契约的分散决策模型对绿色供应链的帕累托改进有限,而在一定条件下,双边成本分担契约可以完全协调绿色供应链.此外,双边成本分担契约的成立条件和协调性与价格加成系数有关.     

Optimal lead time policy for short life cycle products under Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion

The lead time reduction problem in a supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer for short life cycle products is studied in this paper. Lead time can be reduced by additional crashing cost to enhance forecast accuracy of uncertain demand. Under Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion, the effects of decision maker’s risk aversion and additional crashing cost for lead time reduction on optimal decisions are analyzed. Moreover, a revenue sharing contract is proposed to achieve supply chain coordination. The results suggest that when the retailer is more risk-averse and when forecast error is larger, the retailer tends to select a shorter lead time despite the higher wholesale price charged by the manufacturer. However, if the retailer is mildly risk-averse and the forecast error is small, he might not select to shorten the lead time because of associated additional crashing cost. Thus, the retailer should carefully balance the benefit against the cost of lead time reduction. In addition, we find lead time reduction is conductive to improving supply chain efficiency compared to the case without lead time reduction. Revenue sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination and Pareto improvement for both supply chain agents. The improved utilities increase as the decision maker is more risk-averse and the forecast error is higher.     

供应链协同创新中知识转移的收益共享机制

研究由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的二级供应链协同创新中的知识转移问题,分析了分散决策、集中决策、普通收益共享决策和议价条件下的收益共享决策时四种情形对供应链协同创新中知识转移决策的影响,比较了四种决策情况下的相关变量的大小和在不同知识吸收能力下的变化规律。结果发现：收益共享契约机制可显著提高供应链协同创新中的知识转移数量,有利于提高供应链的整体利润,还有助于降低产品零售价格、批发价格等,并且议价条件下的收益共享契约机制比普通的收益共享契约机制效果更为明显。研究表明收益共享契约机制能够有效地促进供应链企业间的协同创新,同时供应链企业间的知识吸收能力也会影响到供应链协同创新的效率。     

考虑生活垃圾可利用率的闭环供应链差别定价决策

基于可回收垃圾的可利用程度与消费者对其再制品的偏好性不同的实际情况,建立闭环供应链的差别定价模型,从而分析闭环供应链总利润随废品可利用率和消费者偏好的变化规律。结果发现,当再制品和残值单位总价值大于新产品的单位成本价格偏好时,总利润随着消费者偏好系数的增大而增大。但在分散决策情形下,会造成各企业节点之间效率的流失。据此,提出以集中决策下的均衡结果作为标准,建立了一种协调契约收益共享机制。最后通过算例分析,得到收益共享比例的具体取值范围,实现了供应链中各节点之间的有效协调。     

考虑风险容忍度的双渠道绿色供应链运营决策及协调研究

针对双渠道绿色供应链,在考虑各方不同风险容忍度的基础上,构建以制造商为主导的供应链博弈模型,利用均值方差法分析集中式决策和批发价格契约下参与方的运营决策和期望利润,并设计协调契约.研究发现:在批发价格契约下,产品绿色度与制造商风险容忍度正相关,与零售商风险容忍度无关;最优零售价格均与双方风险容忍度正相关,且线上价格基准系数与直销价格负相关,与零售价格正相关;当绿色产品对消费者需求影响较大时,零售商的期望利润与制造商风险容忍度正相关.带有转移支付的反向收益共享与成本分担组合契约可实现双渠道绿色供应链的协调.