In "defense" of defense mechanisms: A reply to Locke's comments.

A previous article by E. A. Locke (see PA, Vol. 49: Issue 1) raised 4 questions regarding the defense mechanism study of H. R. Bobbitt and O. Behling. In the present article these authors reply to Locke's questions and reiterate the idiosyncratic nature of F. Herzberg's definition of defense mechanisms and the need for further research in terms of the protection of one's self-concept as a defense mechanism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene (1992).

Responds to S. B. Greene's (see record 1992-15270-001) argument that assertions of the form "None of the A are in the same place as some of the C" are difficult for Ss to generate and that this explains the results of multiply quantified reasoning without having to invoke mental models or deductive reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see record 1990-03501-001). This article shows (1) that the phenomenon fails to explain most of the principal results; (2) that, far from undermining the theory of mental models, it can actually be explained by the theory; and (3) that the best available account of the results is that Ss both reason and rely on mental models to do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of dissonance theory: Reply to Chapanis and Chapanis.

This paper evaluates the critical review of the dissonance literature by Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) and concludes that these authors, for the most part, do not accomplish what they purport to, i.e, the presentation of alternative explanations of the findings they deal with. The "methodological inadequacies" discussed by the Chapanises are viewed as acceptable procedures and necessary components of the inductive process. An alternative explanation for the popularity of dissonance theory is offered and the current status of the model is reconsidered. (20 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A test of Piaget's theory of moral judgment.

Tested Piaget's theory that children's moral development is a function of their peer group experiences and age. 48 8-yr-old children, in 16 cohesive and 16 low-cohesive groups of 3, competed for prizes on 4 paper-and-pencil tasks, unaware that their cheating could be detected. The procedure was repeated with 48 5 yr. olds. Prior social experience was inferred from sociometric data. Findings are: (a) 5 yr. olds cheated significantly more than 8 yr. olds, supporting Piaget's belief that moral autonomy increases between ages 5 and 8; (b) at age 8, but not at age 5, cheating was an inverse function of the degree of cohesiveness, supporting Piaget's theory that group ties produce moral autonomy at age 8, but not at age 5; and (c) prior social experience bore a significant inverse relationship to cheating at age 8, but not at age 5, supporting Piaget's theory that such experience is the principal factor responsible for moral autonomy at age 8, but not at age 5. (French summary) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Another example of a paradigm clash: A reply to Bixenstine's "criticisms."

Responds to V. E. Bixenstine's (1977) critique of W. W. Tryon's (see record 1977-04654-001) article on models of behavior disorder. The formal analysis paradigm from which Tryon operated is restated, and the way in which Bixenstine operated from the different phenomenology paradigm is demonstrated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of Arnold's theory of emotion.

Criticizes M. L. Goldstein's (see 42:4) review of Arnold's theory of emotion because he disregards her major work (1960) and misinterprets her 1950 version. His assumption that a theory must be couched in objectivist terms to be testable is untenable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning theory and schizophrenia: A reply to a comment.

In reply to de Mille's (see 34: 4667) criticisms, studies are discussed which support the author's theoretical position. Concession is made that some confusion is possible in the use of "generalization." A clarification is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In support of responsible advocacy: A reply to Hatch.

Replies to an article by the US Senator, O. G. Hatch (see record 1983-11524-001), that criticized the field of psychology for undermining the American values of religion, marriage, and family life. The article also criticized the American Psychological Association's pro-ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) stand. It is contended that Hatch wants psychologists to be objective and scientific, but not to offend, and that his anti-ERA stand could weaken existing legislation prohibiting sex discrimination. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hermeneutic inquiry: Response to criticisms.

In this response to the criticisms of R. L. Russell (see record 1988-15663-001) and B. B. Barratt and T. S. Sloan (see record 1988-15649-001) on the present author's article (see record 1985-10720-001), he addresses 4 major points: hermeneutics of everydayness vs deep hermeneutics, grounding in language vs grounding in action, ontological vs ontical hermeneutics, and directing and correcting interpretation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning theory and behavior therapy: A reply to Rachman and Eysenck.

The importance of distinguishing between learning theory, the practice of behavior therapy, and the effectiveness of treatment is stressed. Rachman and Eysenck's reply (see 40:5) presents no new evidence to remedy the inadequacies of the learning theory espoused by the behavior-therapy group. The claim that behavior-therapy techniques are "based on" learning theory is countermanded by the prior existence of the techniques as well as by the great dissimilarity between what goes on in behavior therapy and in most learning experiments. Finally, the additional references cited by Rachman and Eysenck are reviewed. They are either not relevant to the issues under discussion or are fully subject to the biases discussed in our original paper. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correlation between genetically matched groups versus reliability theory: A reply to Jensen.

Argues that A. Jensen's (see record 1971-09170-001) proposal for interpreting phenotypes as direct proportional measures of phenotype variance attributable to trait heritability would lead to an overestimation of variance attributable to genetic factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The BSRI and gender schema theory: A reply to Spence and Helmreich.

In their comment on gender schema theory, J. T. Spence and R. L. Helmreich (see PA, Vol 66:00000) discuss neither gender schema theory itself nor the data that are presented as evidence for the theory. Contrary to their contention, (a) there is no logical contradiction in using the 2-dimensional Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) for research on the unidimensional concept of gender-schematic processing because the BSRI is only a tool for identifying sex-typed individuals; and (b) the evidence indicates that the BSRI taps different things for different people. (9 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Has feature integration theory come unglued? A reply to Tsal.

Y. Tsal (see record 1989-31807-001) presented a critical review of feature integration theory (FIT) and of a number of studies that have purported to show a direct relationship between focal attention and the perception of illusory conjunctions. Conceptual difficulties with the theory are highlighted, and Tsal concluded that the reviewed studies have not provided sufficient empirical support. We argue that neither Tsal's conceptual criticism nor his empirical ones are convincing enough to warrant rejection of FIT and that he has not suggested an obvious and unique theoretical alternative that inspires an appropriate empirical test. A problem for FIT that Tsal did not raise is discussed. That is, the visual primitives assumed by the theory are not clearly specified or related to known neurophysiological or psychophysical evidence concerning early vision. Nevertheless, we conclude that FIT remains a viable theoretical framework. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple testing and Type I errors: A reply in defense of multifactor designs.

Comments on R. Udolf and B. Raymond's (1973) article on multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and confidence levels. Keselman argues that their article is a cursory and misleading presentation of the problem of the relationship between multiple testing and the Type I level of significance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of deception.

Comments that A. Ortmann and R. Hertwig's (see record 1997-04731-011) call to outlaw the use of all forms of deception in psychological research is both methodologically unsound and ethically misguided. Deception procedures differ so much in the nature and degree of deception used that even the harshest critic would be hard-pressed to state unequivocally that all deception is unacceptable. When the methodological requirements of an investigation lead the researcher to conclude that the only way a study can be carried out is by using deceptive tactics, the decision to deceive necessarily results in additional ethical responsibilities for the researcher, and the degree of deception should be held at a level that does not exceed what is required by the research. An absolute rule prohibiting the use of deception in all psychological research would have the egregious consequence of preventing researchers from carrying out a wide range of important studies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of measurement.

Argues that criticism of psychological tests is misplaced and ignores the major advantages of objective measurement. Professionally prepared multiple-choice tests are efficient yet searching. Tests achieve their power through aggregation and consequently indicate general tendencies, which are valid for aggregate behavioral tendencies. The apparent precision of numerical scores fosters an overdependence on test scores that must be resisted. Quantitative measurement can provide an indication of social problems. For example, large ethnic differences in average test scores are probably not the result of test bias but probably indicate the extent of educational disadvantage experienced by minorities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of simplicity.

Suggests that criticisms of the basis of auto-instructional programming misperceive the role ot the stimulus–response (S–R) model of learning when they fail to acknowledge that the principles of programmed instruction were derived from the S–R model. (0 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of freedom.

Comments on B. Schwartz's (see record 2000-13324-008) discussion of excessive personal freedom, autonomy, self-determination, and life satisfaction and meaning. A positive psychology, according to Schwartz, must constrain "tyranny of choice" (p. 81), and psychologists should "deemphasize freedom" because "American society has created an excess of freedom" (p. 79). R. Solomon suggests that a positive psychology for the 21st century must enhance and facilitate the creation of freedom, not undo it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of controversy.

Discovering truth is not the sole agenda for every scientist. The rewards of achieving paradigm hegemony are huge and serve to justify all manner of strategies and tactics. In this issue and some that have preceded it, scientific paradigm clashes have been brought into the bright light of public scrutiny. I believe a science that is critical progresses faster than one driven solely by induction. Debate is undeniably a part of science, one from which spectators (practitioners and researchers) benefit. A greater understanding of each position is made easier by a direct and clear statement of that position and of what its proponents view as problems with the opposing paradigm. It is not expected that those who read an extreme position will adopt it; however, they may come to understand it better and draw their own conclusions accordingly. Controversy, properly understood and used, can serve the scientific community by sharpening the focus on the true issues where research is most vital to further our understanding of human behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)