Gender differences in moral reasoning: A comparison of the use of justice and care orientations.

Examined the adequacy of L. Kohlberg's (1971) cognitive-developmental model as a representation of female moral reasoning. Specifically, the claims of C. Gilligan (1982) that there are 2 conceptions of morality—one described as a morality of justice, on which Kohlberg's scheme is based, and one described as a morality of care, seen by Gilligan as more representative of female thinking about moral conflict—were studied. 101 male and 101 female undergraduates filled out a self-report questionnaire on moral dilemmas they had experienced. They then rated their use of both justice and care orientations in resolving those dilemmas. Ss also completed the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory and semantic differential items. The use of the 2 orientations was examined in relationship to S gender, sex role, and perceptions of the 2 orientations. Few significant differences were obtained, except that female Ss were more consistent in their use of a care orientation and male Ss were more consistent in their use of a justice orientation. More feminine males were more likely to report the use of a care orientation than less feminine males. Male and female reasoning about moral conflict is examined in the light of these 2 perspectives, and the relationship of sex roles to endorsement of each perspective is discussed. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stimulating transitions in moral reasoning as a function of stage of cognitive development.

Examined L. Kohlberg's proposition that cognitive development is necessary though not sufficient for moral development. The specific hypothesis tested, in a pre–posttest control group design involving 44 female adolescents (mean age 16.2 yrs), was that Moral Stage 3 Ss who have attained "early basic formal operations" are more susceptible to attempts to stimulate moral development than Stage 3 Ss who have attained only "beginning formal operations" and lack the cognitive prerequisites for moral transitions. A series of pretests (verbal reasoning and logico-physical problems, and Moral Judgment Interview) was used to obtain Ss who met the appropriate cognitive and moral criteria. The treatment exposed Ss to Stage 4 reasoning in individual role-playing situations. A moral judgment posttest followed 1 wk later. Results confirm the hypothesis, thus providing evidence for the proposition that cognitive development is necessary for moral reasoning development. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Modification of moral judgment through role playing.

Studied 42 male and 54 female undergraduates to examine the impact of actual role playing on the change of moral judgment maturity (as assessed by L. Kohlberg in 1969). Ss showed both immediate and delayed increases in moral judgment maturity when role playing a moral dilemma against an opponent who employed reasoning above the S's initially assessed stage. Change scores exceeded those of control groups who either performed extraneous tasks or who passively received role-playing arguments. More change was exhibited by Ss at the lower stages. The flexibility of S's responses during role playing was associated with immediate but not delayed change in moral judgment maturity. Ss did not show greater change in response to reasoning 1 stage higher than their own (vs 2 stages higher or 1 stage lower) as had been previously observed by E. Turiel (see record 1966-07567-001). No sex differences were observed in initial stages or in amount of change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding moral thought: Effects on moral reasoning and decision making.

89 16–18 yr olds' understanding of processes involved in moral reasoning and decision making was examined in relation to the Ss' level of moral reasoning, extent of prudential concerns, and consistency of decision making. Four qualitatively different levels of understanding of moral thought were identified. These levels were related to moral scores in 2 dilemmas: one involving a fictitious other and the other involving the self as protagonist. Ss with less understanding of moral thought were more likely to demonstrate lower moral scores and more prudential concerns in each perspective and to make a different decision (often prudentially rather than morally based) in the self-perspective. Ss who changed their decision in the self-perspective demonstrated lower self-perspective moral scores than Ss who demonstrated decision consistency. It is suggested that Ss with less understanding of the processes involved in moral thought are more likely to use moral reasons in the service of decisions they want to make for prudential reasons. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From the scene to the crime: The effect of alcohol and social context on moral judgment.

Forty men and women were given the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) while drinking in a natural setting and were asked a series of questions about whether they should and would drive impaired. In a second testing in an academic context, these subjects were given an alternate form of the MJI and were asked whether they drove on the previous occasion. Forty additional men and women completed the MJI in an academic context and responded to the impaired driving questions hypothetically. Results revealed that Ss scored lower on moral maturity in the social drinking contexts than in the academic contexts, especially when highly intoxicated. Ss responding hypothetically attributed more moral integrity to themselves than to others, indicating they would not drive impaired. The self-righteousness of these attributions was apparent in the behavior of Ss who drove to the social drinking settings—all but 1 drove home, however impaired. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral judgment and moral action: A reanalysis of Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968) Free Speech Movement data.

Data from Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968) study of the relation of moral reasoning to sitting-in during the Free Speech Movement protest at the University of California in 1964 was reanalyzed using the current moral judgment scoring system. The original authors had found a bimodal pattern. In their study, more than half of the subjects who reasoned at both the lowest and highest levels of moral development sat in compared with 11% of the subjects reasoning at the middle level. Results of the current reanalysis show a monotonic pattern. At each higher stage of moral reasoning represented in the sample, a greater proportion of subjects sat in (i.e., Stage 3, 10%, Stage 3/4, 31%, Stage 4, 44%, Stage 4/5, 73%). Although moral stage was the most theoretically important correlate of sitting in, it was not the largest. Political identification, deontic choice, and moral type were even more strongly related to sitting in than was moral stage. An effect of sex on moral stage was found but there was no sex effect on sitting in or on the Stage?×?Sitting-In interaction. The data are discussed in terms of a more general model of moral reasoning and moral action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of controversy on cognitive perspective taking.

Theorists have posited that controversy among peers in which a person is forced to take the perspectives of others is vital for cognitive and moral development. There is no direct evidence, however, relating controversy and perspective taking. In the present study, 30 undergraduates expressed an opinion about a moral issue and discussed their opinion and reasoning with a confederate (an undergraduate) who always used social order (Kohlberg Stage 4) reasoning. In the controversy condition, the confederate had the opposing opinion and in the no-controversy condition, the same opinion. Compared to those in the no-controversy condition, Ss in the controversy condition indicated more accurate understanding of the structure of the confederate's reasoning than did those in the no-controversy condition. Ss in the no-controversy condition, however, rated that they believed they understood the other's reasoning more than did those in the controversy condition. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral development in Bahamian school children: A 3-year examination of Kohlberg's stages of moral development.

Interviewed 426 Bahamian male and female school children aged 8–17 yrs over a 3-yr period utilizing L. Kohlberg's (1969) moral dilemmas to test the hypotheses of cultural universality and the age relatedness of the Kohlberg stage sequence in the development of moral reasoning. Longitudinal, cross-sectional, and sequential strategies were utilized. Results indicate a general upward stage movement within and between age groups. There was an advance in moral reasoning across subsequent cohorts at the same ages. There was little evidence of any sex differences, and no individuals reasoned beyond Stage 3. Results are interpreted as supporting the hypotheses. The major source of change was due to time-of-testing effects. There was additional developmental change influenced by age and cohort factors. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of social-moral reasoning among Kibbutz adolescents: A longitudinal cross-cultural study.

Studied the development of social-moral judgments in 92 Israeli kibbutz adolescents (64 of whom were interviewed longitudinally over 2–9 yrs from ages 12 yrs to 24–25 yrs) from the perspective of L. Kohlberg's theory (1958, 1981) of moral judgment development. The study evaluated the validity of Kohlberg's model and moral judgment interview in a cross-cultural context. In addition, it assessed the cultural uniqueness of social-moral reasoning among kibbutzniks. Findings support the validity of Kohlberg's structural-developmental understanding of moral judgment. Stage change was found to be upward, gradual, and without significant regressions. Analyses showed internal consistency of the stages as operationally defined in the standardized scoring manual. The distribution of stage scores among Ss, overall, was unusually high when compared to the results of parallel studies in the US and Turkey. The most important cultural variation involved the use of Stages 4/5 and 5 (global stage and postconventional stage). While all the stages were present among Ss, not all elements of kibbutz postconventional reasoning were present in Kohlberg's model or scoring manual (e.g., the communal emphasis and collective moral principles). (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Facilitation of sociomoral reasoning in delinquents.

An intervention involving 60 incarcerated juvenile delinquents (ages 14–18 yrs) yielded significant gains in sociomoral reasoning that were attributable to a dilemma-discussions treatment. The treatment consisted of 8 weekly small-group discussions of sociomoral dilemmas. Ss were pretested on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM) and the Dilemma Decisions Survey and were assigned to either consensus dilemma-discussion, nonconsensus dilemma-discussion, or no-discussion groups. Pretest results show that Ss initially differed in both sociomoral stage and dilemma opinion. Of the dilemma-discussions Ss, 87.5% were pretested at Modal Stage 2 on the SRM and shifted to Modal Stage 3 on the posttest, whereas only 14.3% of the Modal Stage 2 control Ss did so. Pretest Modal Stage 3 Ss remained at Stage 3 on the posttest. Across the experimental groups, no difference was found between groups where a consensus was required for the discussion and groups having no consensus requirement. Investigations of the possible in-program and postrelease behavioral ramifications of the dilemma-discussions treatment are recommended. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sex guilt and premarital sexual experiences of college students.

Investigated the relationship of sex guilt as a personality disposition to reports of previous sexual experiences, feelings following participation, or reasons for nonparticipation, and pre- and postmarital sexual standards for 60 male and 76 female undergraduates. Sex guilt was negatively correlated with the level of intimacy of premarital sexual experiences, and guilty Ss had less permissive premarital standards. The more guilty females gave moral beliefs as their reason for not participating in intercourse or more intimate forms of petting; the more guilty males reported that moral beliefs, respect for the girl, and fear of pregnancy or disease were their reasons for nonparticipation in intercourse or oral-genital relations. (15 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of protagonist's sex on assessing gender differences in moral reasoning.

355 high school and college students completed J. R. Rest's Defining Issues Test in either its traditional format (all male protagonists) or an experimental format (all female protagonists). Analysis showed expected and significant age and participants' sex effects, but no effects due to protagonist's sex (form). Findings contradict charges of a sex bias due to using only male protagonists in assessing moral reasoning. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Family patterns of moral judgment during adolescence and early adulthood.

Family patterns of moral reasoning were compared in a cross-sectional sample from the Oakland Growth Study (H. E. Jones, 1939a, 1939b) and a longitudinal sample from L. Kohlberg's (1958) study of moral judgment development. The 221 offspring in the 2 samples (121 male and 100 female) ranged from 10 to 33 yrs old. Age, sex, cognitive stage, IQ, SES, and education were controlled in the data analyses. There were consistent family patterns of moral reasoning in the 2 samples when both sex and background variables were controlled. Developmental patterns indicated that, during adolescence, parent moral judgment was related to offspring moral reasoning but was a stronger predictor of moral judgment among girls than boys. During young adulthood, fathers' moral judgment and education were the strongest predictors of both sons' and daughters' moral reasoning. However, education, not parent moral reasoning, limited the moral stage attained by adult offspring. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential effects of self-disclosing versus self-involving counselor statements across counselor–client gender pairings.

60 male and 60 female undergraduates listened to 1 of 8 audiotaped recordings of a counseling interview between either an experienced male or female counselor and a male client, for male Ss, or a female client, for female Ss. One half of the male and female Ss heard a tape containing counselor self-disclosure statements; the other half heard a tape containing counselor self-involving statements. Ss rated counselors' expertness, attractiveness, and trustworthiness, and generated written responses to each self-disclosing or self-involving counselor statement. Across all counselor–client gender pairings, self-involving counselors were rated as significantly more expert, attractive, and trustworthy than were self-disclosing counselors. Further, client responses to self-disclosing counselor statements contained significantly more questions about the counselors, were significantly longer responses, and were significantly more likely to be phrased in the past or future rather than in the present tense. Finally, client responses to the self-involving counselor statements contained significantly more client self-referents. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relationship between moral reasoning and political orientation.

Previous findings indicating a relationship between moral reasoning and political orientation have been interpreted as reflecting the influence of the level of moral maturity on political attitudes. The present study investigated the alternative possibility that individual differences in adult moral reasoning reflect differences in content of politico-moral idealogy. 73 undergraduates, defining themselves politically as left wing, moderate, or right wing, completed a measure of moral reasoning (Defining Issues Test), once from their own perspective and once from the point of view of either a conservative or a radical. Left-wingers achieved significantly higher scores on principled moral reasoning than did the other 2 groups. However, both right-wing and moderate Ss significantly increased their principled-reasoning scores if they responded as a radical. Results support the view that variations in adult moral reasoning are a function of political position rather than development status. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)