Self-serving biases in the attribution process: A reexamination of the fact or fiction question.

Examines the empirical evidence related to the notion of self-serving biases in causal attributions. D. T. Miller and M. Ross's (see record 1975-21041-001) reinterpretations of data that presumably reflect bias are discussed. The studies reviewed show relatively strong support for the causal asymmetry generally cited as evidence for self-serving, or defensive, attributions. Futhermore, a broadened self-serving bias formulation is presented, which suggests that under certain conditions, esteem needs may be best served by making counterdefensive attributions. Conditions that may be expected to elicit defensive or counterdefensive attributions are delineated. (46 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction?

A review of the evidence for and against the proposition that self-serving biases affect attributions of causality indicates that there is little empirical support for the proposition in its most general form. Some support was found for the contention that individuals engage in self-enhancing attributions under conditions of success, but only minimal evidence suggested that individuals engage in self-protective attributions under conditions of failure. Moreover, it was proposed that the self-enhancing effect may not be due to motivational distortion, but rather to the tendency of people to (a) expect their behavior to produce success, (b) discern a closer covariation between behavior and outcomes in the case of increasing success than in the case of constant failure, and (c) misconstrue the meaning of contingency. (60 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Managerial myopia: Self-serving biases in organizational planning.

Recent work indicates that people hold a variety of self-serving biases, believing themselves more capable than they are in fact. Such biases, if extended to the organizational level, would lead to overly optimistic planning for the future. This prediction was tested with 2 groups of management students (37 freshmenn and 35 seniors and with 48 male corporate presidents in 3 studies. Management students consistently overestimated their abilities; in a marketing exercise, they likewise indicated that a hypothetical firm, of which they were sales managers, would quickly overtake established competition. Executive Ss also predicted inordinate success; the latter group, however, moderated projections somewhat if prior planning experience had been unsatisfactory. The importance of managerial myopia to considerations of marketing, resource management, and demarketing is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Bayesian analysis of attribution processes.

Argues that Bayes's theorem is applicable to an analysis of attribution processes. Causal attribution is equated with the likelihood ratio and should therefore be accompanied by revisions in subjective probabilities or beliefs. A review of empirical research supports this view by showing that factors found to influence attribution are also related to the likelihood ratio in Bayes's theorem. Differences in attributions between actor and observer, as well as tendencies toward nonrational attribution, are also discussed from the point of view of a Bayesian information processing model. (53 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Egocentric biases in availability and attribution.

Conducted 5 experiments to assess biases in availability of information in memory and attributions of responsibility for the actions and decisions that occurred during a previous group interaction. The S populations sampled included naturally occurring discussion groups (of undergraduates), 37 married couples, 74 female and 84 male players on intercollegiate basketball teams, and groups of undergraduates assembled in the laboratory. Data provide consistent evidence for egocentric biases in availability and attribution: The S's own contributions to a joint product were more readily available, i.e., more frequently and easily recalled, and Ss accepted more responsibility for a group product than other participants attributed to them. In addition, statements attributed to the self were recalled more accurately and the availability bias was attenuated, though not eliminated, when the group product was negatively evaluated. When another S's contributions were made more available to the S via a selective retrieval process, this S allocated correspondingly more responsibility for the group decisions to the coparticipant. The determinants and pervasiveness of the egocentric biases are considered. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-serving biases in person perception: A reexamination of projection as a mechanism of defense.

Examines the evidence on projection as a mechanism of psychological defense, with emphasis on D. S. Holmes's (see PA, Vols 42:10594 and 62:3649) reviews. In contrast to Holmes's conclusions, it appears that there is strong support for 2 distinct mechanisms: (a) attributive projection in which a self-ascribed undesirable trait is projected onto favorably perceived target persons and (b) classical projection in which an undesirable trait that is denied is projected onto unfavorably perceived target persons. Although there is no research on the effects of classical projection, there is reliable evidence indicating that attributive projection has a stress-reducing effect. A broadened interactional formulation of self-serving biases in person perception is presented, and the implications for future research are discussed. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions?

Examines D. T. Miller's (see record 1980-09658-001) analysis of what constitutes a self-serving attributional bias. It is argued that his delineation of different types of self-serving attributions is not supported by the empirical evidence collected to date and that what previous authors (e.g., D. T. Miller and M. Ross, 1975) have viewed as a perceptual bias in the causal inference process may be better seen as a response bias or as a strategic self-presentation designed to maximize public esteem. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response biases in the MMPI: A sequential analysis.

Conceptions of "response bias" have figured prominently in two dissimilar research areas, psychophysical tasks and assessment techniques. These areas share a common methodological problem—how to assess the contribution of non-content-determined sequential dependencies. A general technique is presented for assessing sequential dependencies in MMPI responses, and in responses to an instructional set to be random in a non-content guessing task. For MMPI responses, the effect of item content clearly overrides any tendency to develop sequential dependencies; response bias is limited to total number of True or False responses. In non-content guessing tasks, sequential dependencies play a major role. This general technique for measuring such biases provides a unifying conceptualization of non-content-determined response patterning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivational biases in the attribution of responsibility for an accident: A meta-analysis of the defensive-attribution hypothesis.

Reviews research concerned with motivational distortion in the attribution of responsibility for an accident. Results of a statistical combination of 22 relevant studies suggested a statistically significant but weak tendency to attribute more responsibility to an accident perpetrator for a severe than for a mild accident. An examination of interacting variables found that, consistent with K. G. Shaver's (see PA, Vol 44:6696 and 44:14405) defensive-attribution hypothesis, when observers were personally and situationally similar to the accident perpetrator, they tended to attribute less responsibility to the perpetrator when accident severity increased. The opposite was the case when the perceiver and the perpetrator were dissimilar. Experiments using stronger S-involving manipulations also appeared more likely to produce evidence in support of the defensive-attribution hypothesis than did experiments with low-involvement manipulations. Results provide an example of how perceiver's self-protective motives influence responsibility attributions. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What's in a name? A Bayesian rethinking of attributional biases in clinical judgment.

In a study performed by E. J. Langer and R. P. Abelson and reanalyzed by C. R. Snyder (see PA, Vols 52:5775 and 58:1911, respectively), a group of psychodynamically oriented clinical psychologists who were falsely told that an interviewee was a patient attributed more maladjustment and person-based problems to him than did clinicians who were told he was a job applicant. Behavior therapists did not show this labeling effect. It is argued that such data are an inadequate basis for criticizing the effects of labeling on diagnostic accuracy, since base rates for maladjustment among patient and nonpatient groups were unexamined. Where such rates differ sharply, the label is an important source of information, and awareness of the label ought to affect the use made of other diagnostic signs. Research on information processing in clinical judgment should directly examine the role of shifting base rates and individuating information. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of memory strength in reality monitoring decisions: evidence from source attribution biases

Reality monitoring of verbal memories was compared with decisions about pictorial memories in this study. Experiment 1 showed an advantage in memory for imagined over perceived words and a bias to respond "perceived" on false alarms. Experiment 2 showed the opposite pattern: an advantage in memory for perceived pictures and a bias to respond "imagined" on false alarms. Participants attribute false alarms to whichever class of memories has the weakest trace strengths. The relative strength of memories of imagined and perceived objects was manipulated in Experiments 3 and 4, yielding changes in source attribution biases that were predicted by the strength heuristic. All 4 experiments generalize the mirror effect (an inverse relationship between patterns of hits and false alarms commonly found on recognition tests) to reality monitoring decisions. Results suggest that under some conditions differences between the strength of memories for perceived and imagined events, rather than differences in qualitative characteristics, are used to infer memory source.     

Stereotype biases: A reconstructive analysis of their role in reconstructive memory.

In an extension of a study by M. Snyder and S. W. Uranowitz (see record 1980-05464-001), Exp I attempted to isolate retrieval from interpretive processes and distinguish between memory for wording and for meaning. 90 undergraduates read a case history, and 1 wk later received a stereotype label followed by a test of recognition memory. Ss showed better memory for items taken verbatim from the case history and were able to discriminate between items in which the heterosexual, neutral, or lesbian alternatives were correct. No differences were found between the 2 memory instructions and no effect was found for the stereotype label. A subsequent replication of the original Snyder and Uranowitz study (Exp II, 90 Ss) also failed to find an effect of the label or for the timing of that label. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-serving interpretations of flattery: Why ingratiation works.

Persons who are flattered are more likely to assign credibility to and like the flatterer than observers, presumably because they are motivated by vanity. In existing studies, however, the difference between targets and observers has been confounded with other variables. The present experiments demonstrate that the target-observer difference in judgments of an ingratiator is not affected by these confounding variables, such as cognitive resources, the motive to like one's interaction partner, or to form an accurate impression, or mood. Results further suggest that, whereas cognitive responses to ingratiation are different among participants with high versus low self-esteem, affective responses and judgments of the ingratiator are not qualified by any personality variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cultural difference in attribution of performance: An integration-theoretical analysis.

F. Heider's (1958) suggestion that Performance?=?Motivation?×?Ability has been empirically confirmed by N. H. Anderson and C. A. Butzin (1974) and by A. Kum et al (1974), using American students as Ss. This multiplying process failed to appear in the present 3 experiments performed with 56 male Indian college students. Contrary to the predicted linear fan pattern, the plot of Motivation?×?Ability effect displayed clear parallelism. An equal-weight averaging rule was able to account for the results obtained in both group and single-S analyses. Perhaps the integration rules underlying achievement judgments are culture-specific, and Indian college students average motivation and ability information in attribution of future scholastic performance. Results illustrate the potential power that information integration theory provides for the cross-cultural study of social perception and cognition. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A principal components analysis of dynamic spatial memory biases.

Research has shown that spatial memory for moving targets is often biased in the direction of implied momentum and implied gravity, suggesting that representations of the subjective experiences of these physical principles contribute to such biases. The present study examined the association between these spatial memory biases. Observers viewed targets that moved horizontally from left to right before disappearing or viewed briefly shown stationary targets. After a target disappeared, observers indicated the vanishing position of the target. Principal components analysis revealed that biases along the horizontal axis of motion loaded on separate components from biases along the vertical axis orthogonal to motion. The findings support the hypothesis that implied momentum and implied gravity biases have unique influences on spatial memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covariation and causal attribution: A Logical Model of the intuitive analysis of variance.

In this article, we present and test a formal model of causal attribution that is true to the original conception of attribution theory formulated by Kelley (1967). The Logical Model specifies precisely how information might be encoded from attributional vignettes and how subjects might consider different causal loci as necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an effect. Predictions are derived for each of the eight information configurations on the basis of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. The model is tested with data from three published experiments and is preferred over a template model of attribution. The Logical Model's limitations are also acknowledged in that responses deviate systematically from its prediction, leading to an analysis of the notion of causality underlying stimulus, person, and circumstance attributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causes and reasons in attribution theory: A conceptual critique.

Argues that although the terms cause and reason have both appeared in the attribution theory literature, they have not been adequately distinguished from each other. With the aid of some recent ideas from the philosophy of mind on the cause–reason distinction, a conceptual critique is undertaken of the way these terms have been used by attribution theorists. Two topics are considered: (a) E. E. Jones and R. E. Nisbett's (1972) ideas on actor–observer differences in causal attributions and (b) A. W. Kruglanski's (1975) criticisms of the internal–external distinction and his own endogenous–exogenous reformulation. The conceptual critique ends in a taxonomy of attributions and a plea for greater precision in the use of the terms cause and reason in this area. (37 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When one cause casts doubt on another: A normative analysis of discounting in causal attribution.

The question of whether lay attributors are biased in their discounting of 1 cause given an alternative cause has not been resolved by decades of research, largely due to the lack of a clear standard for the rational amount of discounting. The authors propose a normative model in which the attributor's causal schemas and discounting inferences are represented in terms of subjective probability. The analysis examines Kelley's (1972b) proposed causal schemas and then other schemas for multiple causes (varying in assumptions about prior probability, sufficiency, correlation, and number of causes) to determine when discounting is rational. It reveals that discounting is implied from most, but not all, possible causal schemas, albeit at varying amounts. Hence, certain patterns of discounting previously interpreted as biases may, in fact, reflect coherent inferences from causal schemas. Results of 2 studies, which measured causal assumptions and inferences, support this interpretation (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bayesian mediation analysis.

In this article, we propose Bayesian analysis of mediation effects. Compared with conventional frequentist mediation analysis, the Bayesian approach has several advantages. First, it allows researchers to incorporate prior information into the mediation analysis, thus potentially improving the efficiency of estimates. Second, under the Bayesian mediation analysis, inference is straightforward and exact, which makes it appealing for studies with small samples. Third, the Bayesian approach is conceptually simpler for multilevel mediation analysis. Simulation studies and analysis of 2 data sets are used to illustrate the proposed methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)