Citations for outstanding lifetime contribution: August 20, 1993.

Presents R. W. Sperry and H. A. Simon with the American Psychological Association citation for outstanding lifetime contribution to psychology. Sperry, the 1st individual trained in psychology to receive the Nobel prize for medicine/physiology, brought forth original and revolutionary concepts, such as his ideas on the mind–brain problem and consciousness. Simon, who was awarded the Nobel prize for economics, made outstanding contributions to organizational theory, the cognitive character of the decision-making process, and the computer metaphor of rational thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Descartes's Regulae, mathematics, and modern psychology: "The noblest example of all" in light of Turing's (1936) On Computable Numbers.

There are surprisingly strong connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. One particular important example can be seen in the Regulae (1628) of Descartes. In "the noblest example of all," he used his new abstract understanding of numbers to demonstrate how the brain can be considered as a symbol machine and how the intellect's algebraic reasoning can be mirrored as operations on this machine. Even though this attempt failed, it is illuminating to explore it because Descartes launched 2 traditions—mechanistic philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics—that would diverge until A. Turing (1936) approached symbolic reasoning in a similar "symbol machine—existence proof" way. Descartes's and Turing's thought experiments, which mark the beginning of modern psychology and cognitive science, respectively, indicate how important the development of mathematics has been for the constitution of the science of mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reconsidering Jung's psychology.

Reconsiders Jung's (1939 [1959]) psychology within an interactionist and interpersonal framework, emphasizing the use of his 2 major concepts (complex and archetype) for understanding nonrational communications between persons. The concepts of complex and archetype provide an exemplary model of the unification of affect and cognition in symbolic imagery and gestural communications. Archetype is compared to J. Bowlby's (1969) concept of human instinct as patterned action and thought in social communications between persons. Contributions of Jung's psychology are highlighted within a historical, conceptual framework: (1) reconstruction of the client's current attitude within the therapeutic domain; (2) individuation as a developmental model for practicing therapy with couples and individuals; and (3) interpretation of the archaic, symbolic aspects of communication, differentiating these from the rational, narrative aspects. The case of a married couple in therapy illustrates this framework. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Premises of interpersonal theory.

Premises of interpersonal theory are elucidated in order to crystallize its foundations and to point up the utility of discussing psychoanalytic theory on the level of premises. In regard to human psychology, interpersonal theory assumes an inextricable interpenetration of biology and external influences. It therefore questions assigning biology or "biologized" concepts predominance in explaining meaning or the contents of the mind. Biology is implicated in many interpersonal concepts, but not in the form implied in such concepts as drive or inherently arising endogenous states. Rather than an unfolding general nature, interpersonal theory assumes an outcome emerging from the interaction of manifold biological potentials with complex social influences. Such a perspective implies further assumptions about human impressibility, social determinism, psycho/social multidimensionality, complexity, and uniqueness. These assumptions lead to a focus on individual psychology, on character, for example, rather than general psychology, and on holistic/field conceptions of causality rather than the causal linkage of relatively isolated dimensions. ... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What Freudians can learn from Jung.

Noting that there has been an increasing sharing of ideas between psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists within the past decade, the authors, all Jungian analysts, survey Jung's clinical theory in an effort to identify areas where psychoanalytic clinicians might find Jung's concepts helpful. They discuss Jung's approach to the dream, his understanding of psychotherapy as a dialectical procedure, and the theory of complexes and archetypes. They also review how Jung's notions of the Self and individuation are used in contemporary Jungian practice. A dream of a man in his mid-30s is presented to illustrate how these formulations can facilitate understanding of the patient and the analytic process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

One person and two person psychologies and the method of psychoanalysis.

The distinction between a monadic theory of mind (a one-person psychology) and a relational theory of mind (a two-person psychology) is crucial in understanding psychoanalytic concepts. However, some psychoanalytic theorists see these two models as essentially complementary whereas others see them as contradictory and irreconcilable. I argue that the artificial distinction between clinical theory and metapsychology obscures the recognition that the most fundamental psychoanalytic clinical concepts and procedures were formulated and historically understood as one-person phenomena. Transference was not conceptualized as an interpersonal event occurring between two people but was rather understood as a process occurring within the mind of the analysand. The article attempts to extricate fundamental clinical concepts from the quasibiological drive theory that has dominated both our metapsychology and our clinical theory, and to reexamine the value of these clinical concepts within a relational, contextual, and intersubjective framework. The article examines the method of free association in order to illustrate the different implications of one-person and two-person psychologies. I propose that a two-person or relational field theory does not need to neglect or minimize the... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Editor’s choices.

Reviews the books, Mind regained by Edward Pols (see record 1998-06466-000); Manifesto of a passionate moderate by Susan Haack (1998); and Mind, meaning and mental disorder: The nature of causal explanation in psychology and psychiatry by Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill (see record 1996-98296-000). In different but equally compelling ways, these three books address central problems in philosophical psychology and offer telling replies to more complacent perspectives on the nature of mind and mental life. The first two of the volumes are by philosophers, the third by authors trained in clinical psychology and psychiatry. In different ways, each of the volumes is at war with simplistic conceptions of explanation; each is also careful to distinguish between the correctives needed and a lapse into relativistic and ultimately skeptical positions on the nature of knowledge itself. All three of these volumes would serve as useful, even essential, texts in advanced courses in theory and philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind. But so would they serve in interesting ways the larger aims of courses in Personality and Abnormal Psychology. Together, these books present encouraging reminders of the importance of conceptual analysis to the development and refinement of Psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Critics and their texts: An approach to Jung's theory of cognition and personality.

A cluster analysis of critics' writings about children's literature led to the conceptualization of 4 discursive styles, parallel to Jung's 4 functions. The styles generally characterize different types of mentality engaged in literary studies. Characteristics of the work and careers of leading representatives from the "Age of Criticism" are used to illustrate the applicability of type theory. The nature of literary controversies, relationships between protagonists, and aspects of the development of thought among various critics of this period may be interpreted in terms of Jung's psychology of knowledge. Further study of types through analysis of discourse and its social and biographical context is recommended. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Philosophy of psychology.

Reviews the book, Philosophy of psychology by Daniel N. Robinson (see record 1985-97596-000). In this book, Robinson offers what might be considered to be four essays in the philosophy of mind. In these essays he has set out to clarify some rather fundamental concepts operative within the mainstream of psychology, and he brings to bear on these the conceptual machinery of philosophical psychology proper. That is, he asks foundational, or meta-psychological, questions about the reigning assumptions in the field. These questions fall into four general areas, or sub-themes, within psychology as a whole, each topic being taken in a separate chapter. These topics will be explored briefly. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self as the feminine principle

In analytical psychology, ego is associated with consciousness and the masculine principle. Although the feminine principle generally characterizes the unconscious, it was not assigned a psychic structure equivalent to the ego. This paper proposes a model of the psyche where self and ego are the major modes of psychic experience. The self as the 'being' mode represents the feminine principle and functions according to primary process; the ego represents 'doing', the masculine principle and secondary process. Feminine and masculine principles are considered to be of equal significance in both men and women and are not limited to gender. Jung's concept of the self is related to the Hindu metaphysical concepts of Atman and Brahman, whose source was the older Aryan nature-oriented, pagan religion. The prominence of self in analytical psychology and its predominantly 'feminine' symbolism can be understood as Jung's reaction to the psychoanalytic emphasis on ego and to Freud's 'patriarchal' orientation. In Kabbalah, a similar development took place when the feminine principle of the Shekinah emerged in a central, redemptive role, as a mythic compensation to the overtly patriarchal Judaic religion. In the proposed model of the psyche neither ego nor self represents the psychic totality. The interplay of both psychic modes/principles constitutes the psyche and the individuation process.     

The origins of cognitive thought.

Words referring to feelings and states of mind were first used to describe behavior or the situations in which behavior occurred. When concurrent bodily states began to be noticed and talked about, the same words were used to describe them. They became the vocabulary of philosophy and then of mentalistic or cognitive psychology. The evidence is to be found in etymology. In this article, examples are given of words that have come to describe the feelings or states of mind that accompany doing, sensing, wanting, waiting, thinking, and several other attributes of mind. The bodily states felt or introspectively observed and described in these ways are the subject of physiology, especially brain science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of How people change.

Reviews the book, How people change by Rebecca Curtis and George Stricker (see record 1991-98045-000). This book, subtitled "Inside and Outside Therapy," brings together knowledgeable and thoughtful people from the practitioner domains of clinical/counseling psychology and similarly scholarly individuals from other areas of psychology (such as industrial/organizational and social psychology). Reading this book called to mind a time when we used to consider psychology a single discipline with areas of specialization, not the fragmented puzzle whose pieces do not appear to fit together. The attempts to integrate the ideas related to behavior change are reminiscent of Dollard and Miller's attempts to blend Freudian theory with the data and methodology of learning theory; Rotter's (1954) attempt to incorporate concepts from both learning theory and Lewinian models of social interaction into a theory for clinical psychology. This book serves as evidence that reports of the demise of an integrated body of knowledge we call psychology have been greatly exaggerated. This work will appeal to the careful, thoughtful reader, one who is interested in extrapolating to the larger issues relevant to the issue of how human behavior changes. Curtis and Stricker, following the trail set by integrationists like C. R. Snyer and John Harvey, are to be commended for their work on this volume and for their own written contributions to it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rehabilitation Psychology, Medical Psychology, Health Psychology, and Behavioral Medicine.

In their recent article, "The Distinctiveness of Rehabilitation Psychology," Shontz and Wright (see record 1981-26520-001) attempt to differentiate rehabilitation psychology from other areas of applied and professional psychology in health settings. Although the authors' historical recounting of early research and theory in rehabilitation psychology is informative, too little emphasis is placed on the relationship between rehabilitation psychology and "mainstream" professional psychology, particularly with regard to its health-setting applications. There appear to be more similarities than differences. The authors' argument runs full circle, namely, that rehabilitation psychology is distinct because of its philosophy, but its philosophy and "principles are valuable to psychologists in many specialties" (p. 919). The notion of involving a patient in his/her care and treatment planning also is not unique to rehabilitation psychology. Shontz and Wright state that rehabilitation psychology is not medical psychology; however, instead of defining medical psychology, they go on to talk about medical care. Medical care is not medical psychology. Further confusion is added by the statement that medical psychology should be a component of rehabilitation psychology. The authors are using medical psychology, health psychology, and behavioral medicine as if they are synonymous, when they are not. Each discipline is made distinct here. Shontz and Wright do not address what the majority of psychologists in rehabilitation do, that is, provide services. In short, although the authors complain about the unfamiliarity of rehabilitation psychology relative to the profession as a whole, their article does little to promote rehabilitation psychology as an area of interest important to professional psychologists in health care and/or rehabilitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The psychology of human possibility and constraint.

Reviews the book, The psychology of human possibility and constraint by J. Martin and J. Sugarman (see record 1999-02336-000). This wide-ranging, compact, dense, yet very readable little book presents many of the key elements of a badly needed, more credible philosophy of social science for academic and professional psychologists. The book gives no specific examples of theories or research findings that might illustrate what is meant by a better kind of "knowledge" or "theory" in psychology, so the reader is left somewhat high and dry concerning this question. Perhaps it is simply the case that these questions about what might be the best kind of social and psychological inquiry and what sense to make of the plethora of theories and findings to date, are difficult, murky, and on the frontier of a hermeneutic reenvisioning of psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.

This article deals with the question of whether human action can be explained empirically by a psychological theory that refers to intentions, expectancies, and evaluations as determinants. In contrast with the majority of action theories in psychology and philosophy, a logical connection between action and intention is defended and, consequently, a causal relationship between action and intention is refuted. This is illustrated by reference to one of the most widely known and applied psychological action theories: the theory of planned behavior (I. Ajzen, 1991). However, the logical-connection argument can be circumvented if the existing research findings are reinterpreted as part of a psychology of intention. This article demonstrates the value of such an approach for future research. However, the final section of the article outlines some further fundamental theoretical difficulties for this perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

John Dewey and early Chicago functionalism.

John Dewey and James Angell are regarded respectively as the founder and systematizer of the Chicago school of functional psychology. The early Chicago school traditionally has been portrayed as a unified theoretical approach based primarily on William James's naturalistic theory of mental processes. It is argued in this article that although the psychology systematized by Angell bore a close affinity to James's naturalism, Dewey's own psychology was based primarily on the neo-Hegelian philosophy of Thomas Hill Green. Through a review of a number of Dewey's major writings, Green's neo-Hegelian philosophy is shown to have influenced Dewey's views on psychological concepts such as reaction, emotion, and perception during the formative period of the Chicago school. The interpretation of Dewey's psychology developed in this article leads to the conclusion that early Chicago functionalism should not be regarded as a unified theoretical approach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The linguistic repudiation of Wundt.

Wilhelm Wundt's influence on the development of linguistics and psychology was pervasive. The foundations for this web of influence on the sciences of mind and language were laid down in Wundt's own research program, which was quite different from other attempts at founding a new psychology, as it was deeply rooted in German philosophy. This resulted in certain gaps in Wundt's conception of mind and language. These gaps provoked a double repudiation of Wundt's theories, by linguists and psychologists. The psychological repudiation has been studied by historians of psychology, and the linguistic repudiation has been studied by historians of linguistics. The intent of this article is to bring the linguistic repudiation to the attention of historians of psychology, especially the one outlined by two important figures in the history of psychology: Karl Bühler and George Mead. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Memory in mind and culture.

Reviews the book, Memory in mind and culture edited by Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (see record 2010-05180-000). This book rides the waves of two recent trends: interdisciplinarity and the effect of mind on culture. First, its psychologist and anthropologist editors deliberately chose an interdisciplinary panel of experts on memory, inviting highly respected psychologists, anthropologists, and historians to review cutting-edge memory research in their area of expertise. For psychologists, the resulting collection not only provides readable reviews of current psychology research in memory but also introduces concepts and issues from other disciplines that may open new avenues for research. Second, the book emphasizes the coconstitution of mind and culture, especially seeking evidence for how our minds structure culture. This unusual perspective is especially well developed in the last chapters of the book (Boyer; Rubin) but shows its influence throughout the book, with some authors exploring new ideas about how basic research on memory processes can connect to the study of culture. In summary, this book provides excellent reviews of up-to-date memory research in psychology—from brain structures to blogs—and also innovatively connects this research to larger questions about human culture. Though the coverage of eminent cognitive psychologists is admirable, I wish the book had included some of the new work by cultural and evolutionary psychologists on the topic. Nevertheless, the book advances the field in important ways, pointing the way to new research and theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Editor’s choices.

Reviews the books, Emotion and peace of mind: From stoic agitation to Christian temptation by Richard Sorabji (2000) and Other minds by Anita Avramides (2001). The two works considered here are deeply serious and composed by scholars who have executed their projects with undeviating integrity. In Emotion and Peace of Mind, based on his Gifford Lectures, Richard Sorabji moves the reader through a veritable course of study on a subject as notoriously protean as it is central to the lived life. The twenty-six chapters range over whole realms of thought on the subject of emotion, beginning with ancient philosophy and reaching the research and theory advanced right now in that congeries of specialties dubbed the brain sciences. Between the covers of this truly estimable work one meets not just the subtle and instructive thought of Seneca and Augustine, Iamblichlus and Epictetus, but insightful commentaries on the work of Damasio, Le Doux, Maclean and others. In all, Emotion and Peace of Mind is a benchmark- volume, an outstanding contribution to the philosophy and psychology of emotion; surely a required work for anyone prepared to approach the subject with the seriousness it demands. The second book of this review, Other Minds, is a work of philosophical rigor and originality, composed by an Oxford tutor who has skillfully shaped other minds with the sharp and sharpening instrument of conceptual analysis. Do computers have minds? Do animals have minds? Are there minds other than my own? And if I know of my own mind in that most basic first-person sense, then clearly there is no other mind that I can thus know. If there is something epistemologically amiss about first-person achievements, then there is surely something suspect about claims to the effect that I know of my mind. If there is nothing less than a required first-person account of minds, then there is something epistemologically suspect about any statement of any other mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Residual subjectivity.

Notes that any effort psychology may make to encompass the fact of subjectivity will oblige it to accept neither (a) a metaphysical subject of experience nor (b) a field of experience that belongs to no individual. But even physicalism in regard to the relation of mind to body must recognize the existence of a certain residual subjectivity. The brain activities that constitute perceptual and other experiences have an immediacy that thoroughly objective concepts do not and cannot cover. But all knowledge about the world (including experiences) is a knowledge of its structural properties. It follows that a thoroughly objective psychology need not omit any mental event, process, or state. But areas of psychology that seek to address the occurrent immediacy of human experiences will not be able to proceed strictly objectively. It is argued specifically that perceptual theory requires reference to the qualitative aspect of immediate experience as representing an essential function in perceptual awareness of the physical environment. (58 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)