"Clinical psychology training in Canada: Its development, current status, and the prospects for accreditation": Comment on Conway.

Comments on the original article, Clinical psychology training in Canada: Its development, current status, and the prospects for accreditation by John B. Conway (see record 1985-10567-001). I found that Dr. Conway provided me with a good service when he so clearly presented the case for the accreditation of Canadian clinical psychology training programmes. I am sure that many other readers join me in thanking him. My first inclination was to reject his arguments, and to regard the fact that Canadian psychology departments were giving up their academic independence to a trade association as being a prime example of Fromm's escape from freedom. But Dr. Conway's arguments were well founded, and obviously they represent the view of the majority of my colleagues. I had to ask myself a number of questions and, being biased, it was difficult for me to try to be fair in my answers. I have done this and my comments on Dr. Conway's paper will, I hope, reflect a "yes and" rather than a "yes but" approach. If this be so, then it may be a useful exercise, since it bridges a significant difference in basic attitudes within the compass of clinical psychology and I am gratified that, in a real sense, Dr. Conway is coauthor of what I wish to write in this review. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conflict images, national narratives, and external realities.

Replies to comment by G. Rosenwald (see record 2008-05553-014) on the current author's original article (see record 2007-07130-002) which discusses the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and attitude theory. In his comment on my recent article, my erstwhile colleague at the University of Michigan, George Rosenwald, made one valid observation. In my writings and in my practice, I often dwell on the symmetries in the actions and perceptions of conflicting parties. For example, in my discussions of mirror images, I argue that mirror images arise out of the dynamics of the conflict interaction itself, particularly the motivational and cognitive contexts in which parties in conflict generally operate. The remainder of Rosenwald's (2008) comment, unfortunately, is largely irrelevant, because it is based on a misreading of my article and a misconception of the work to which I have dedicated myself since the early 1970s. I wish I could respond more constructively to Rosenwald's (2008) comment, as I tried to do at the beginning of my remarks in explaining my emphasis on symmetries in the actions and perceptions of the parties in conflict. But, unfortunately, most of what he wrote seems to be based on his theoretical model of my views rather than on the external realities of what I actually write, think, and do. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Stagner.

This is written in response to Ross Stagner's comments (see record 2005-11890-003) concerning the publication of books of readings. First, it is my experience that it is far easier to author a book than edit readings. I don't assume that people who write the original articles that finally find themselves in a book of readings are any more creative than the editors. I don't know how much of a reputation any one gets from authorship or editing a readings book. As for "good solid cash" (to use Stagner's words) I have yet to see some and my experience is not unique. I have paid out a considerable amount of money in secretarial fees alone. If I recoup the money I have expended I will be fortunate. As for so-called profits, if I send one copy of the book to each author and his co-author(s) who contributed an article for a book of readings--well, there goes the "good solid cash." Second, there are many articles that are rescued from the scrap pile by a book of readings. My suggestion is that after the editor of a readings book recoups his expenses in preparing the book, copies of the book be sent to clinics or libraries which are on a limited budget. Copies may even be sent to some of the "underprivileged nations." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Self and object in the postmodern world": Response to Gene Bocknek’s letter.

Responds to Gene Bocknek's comments (see record 2009-17405-001) on the author's original article "Self and object in the postmodern world" (see record 1997-04589-001). While acknowledging Bocknek's comments in regard to his original article, the author maintains the position that he cannot find any disagreement between their viewpoints on the features of ego and the self. However, he does acknowledge that there is real disagreement between them on the subject of the intrapsychic versus interpersonal school or the ongoing discussion as to whether psychotherapy concerns a one-person or a two-person psychology. After restating his position on this matter, the author concludes by extending his appreciation to Bocknek for his comments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Erosion of Confidentiality and Privacy.

The recent study on sexism in graduate admissions by Lunneborg and Lillie (see record 1990-57047-001) raised what I believe to be an increasingly frequent ethical problem: the erosion of confidentiality and privacy in the name of data collection. As a departmental chairman, I write perhaps more than my share of letters of recommendation to a variety of graduate schools, agencies, and employers. In nearly every case, the accompanying form or request contains the assurance that the letter and its information will be held "in confidence." It is not my understanding of confidence for "two experienced Testing Bureau raters" to transcribe or code such letters from confidential folders, much less to reproduce one in its entirety in the pages of a journal, complete with disparaging footnote. Perhaps the writer did not mind the surprise of seeing his letter so reproduced; perhaps he did. But I am willing to assume that he had not written it with any such expectation. Continued practices of this nature can only make us increasingly willing to include only the most uncontroversial statements and bland observations in our written responses to requests for recommendations and other information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The reception of my Freud-critique in the psychoanalytic literature": Response to Professor Adolf Grünbaum.

The present is a response to Adolf Grünbaum's outrage (see record 2007-10890-018) at my article (see record 2006-05420-005), and others. Grünbaum challenged my articles with a mixture of ad hominem and ad rem arguments claiming that I misrepresented his ideas about Freud and psychoanalysis. In this response, I propose to disentangle these two classes of arguments and point out factual, textual, methodological, and theoretical errors in Grünbaum's various arguments. I review a number of Freud's passages from his seminal contributions to psychoanalytic method: Studies on Hysteria and The Interpretation of Dreams, and other writings to show that Freud himself did not make explicit another cardinal distinction: that between what he operationally formulated as the psychoanalytic method, procedure, or technique versus the various etiological theories of psychological, that is, emotional disorders. Neither was this distinction honored by Grünbaum, and that is his cardinal error. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Applied psychology in action: Reply to Dr. Wells and to miss Epstein.

Comments on an article by F. L. Wells titled Comment on word meaning (1954) and an article by Mary Epstein titled A note on "the non-directive approach in advertising appeals' (1954); both of these articles comment on the current author's original article (see record 1955-01709-001). The author notes that Dr. Wells is correct in his analysis; the author should have used credulity in his original article. As for Epstein's comments, she is somewhat correct when she says that the non-interference principle is not applicable to advertising. If there were no "interference," there would be no selling. However, doesn't a patient have an attitude towards the therapist at the end of the sessions? Actually, there is no pure example of inferred advertising. In the end, it is the atmosphere created by the advertisement that is important. Direct-inferred, directive-nondirective, are more logical constructs than useful tools. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Screen time: Clinical notes regarding Meissner's (2006) chronically late patient": Reply to commentary by M. H. Spero.

Responds to the comments made by Moshe Halevi Spero (see record 2008-00996-014) on the current author's original article, "Time on my hands: The dilemma of the chronically late patient" (see record 2006-20697-003). First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Spero for his thoughtful, penetrating and thought-provoking commentary on my chronically late patient. Whenever one's efforts elicit such a sensitive and probing reflection, the effect can hardly be anything but gratifying. Spero's reflection brings to bear a deconstructive perspective that effectively captures the uncertainty, ambiguities, and conflicting pressures created in an analytic process that had become abbreviated, fragmented, diffused, frustrated, and constantly hovering seemingly on the brink of disruption. His approach thoughtfully probes the periphery and penumbra of significance surrounding the playing out of events in this analytic process, and his inquiry thus brings into focus a number of salient issues that could not be engaged or whose meaning could not be effectively ascertained because of the dissolute quality of the analytic effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mowrer on "Sin".

Comments on the article "Sin, the lesser of two evils" by O.H. Mower (1960). In a recent issue of the American Psychologist, Hobart Mowrer (see record 1961-03555-001) argues that because "sin" is a stronger word than "wrongdoing" or "irresponsibility" it is better for the "neurotic" individual to admit his "sins" than accept his "wrongdoings." In upholding the concept of individual (if not original) "sin," Mowrer is contending that the "neurotic" individual must, if he is to get "well," accept the following syllogism: (a) sinning is unjustified; (b) I have sinned; (c) therefore, I must justify my existence by acknowledging my sins, changing my ways, and becoming a nonsinner. At first blush, this seems like a perfectly valid syllogism. But, as Mowrer himself suggests, it rarely works in practice. The author contends that with a more objective and realistic restatement of Mowrer's syllogism, the problem of the "neurotic" individual's changing his ineffective and self-defeating behavior is hardly automatically solved; but (by having the definitional concepts of deep worthlessness and severe ego "insult" removed from his philosophic premises) he becomes much more likely resolutely to tackle what Mowrer accurately describes as his moralpsychological difficulties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Jon Mills (2006): An open letter to the members of Division 39.

This letter is an objection to the publication of a series of remarks by Jon Mills in the commentary entitled "A response to my critics" (23 [1]: 197-209, 2006; see record 2006-03254-016). The remarks are ad hominem attacks on the behavior of Jody Davies and myself at a panel at the Division 39 meeting in New York on April 17, 2005. The remarks precede his commentary on three written discussions of a version of the paper presented at the panel that was later published in Psychoanalytic Psychology. Mills claims that all I did from the floor was rant and rave about his criticisms of Stephen Mitchell, attacking him in an ad hominem way without having anything to say substantively about his critique. I object that the editor allowed these remarks to be published despite their vitriolic content and the fact that the reader has no way of checking the accuracy of Mills' representation of what I (and Dr. Davies) said and did. In addition, the letter includes an account of the arguments that I presented at that panel, rebutting Mills' claim that I presented nothing substantive at all. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Casting stones: A reply to Humphreys.

Contends that the critique by L. G. Humphreys (see record 1982-24859-001) of the present author's (see record 1981-06882-001) article is vitiated by the facts that (a) the article he criticizes was an invited position paper and not an original presentation of data, so that detailed statistical testing would have been inappropriate to the purpose of the article; (b) Humphreys commits in his reply some of the "misdeeds" of which he accuses the present author; (c) contrary to Humphrey's assertion, the number of cases in the 3 nonentrenchment experiments (74) is more than adequate for drawing conclusions of the sort made; and (d) Humphreys misinterprets his own z tests. (2 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Leo Rangell and I: Where do we differ?

Leo Rangell (see record 2006-05420-002), in his article on the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, indicates where he feels that I have a differing view, both of present circumstances and of projected directions. Our perspectives do indeed differ, but I feel that his presentation seriously misunderstands and misrepresents my views. I do not feel, as he contends, that all theoretical perspectives have "equal valence and validity." Rather, I have stated that they all claim complete explanatory comprehensiveness on a theoretical level and at least comparable effectiveness on a clinical level, and I feel that we have no scientific warrant at this time for claiming the established greater validity of any one approach over the others. This is not to say that all do have "equal valence and validity." Rangell feels that his preferred approach, which he calls "total composite psychoanalytic theory," is superior (more encompassing and more correct) to the others. I feel that we cannot make judgments about validity at this point in the evolving development of our discipline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On not being heard: Response to Gargiulo (2007) and Mills (2007).

Replies to comments made by G. Gargiulo (see record 2007-16468-013) and J. Mills (see record 2007-16468-014) on the current author's original comments (see record 2007-00135-013) on an article by K. Maroda (see record 2007-00135-012). I stand by the extensive clinical evidence that I have garnered, which indicates that a revised version of Freud's topographic theory is superior to his structural theory as a platform for psychoanalytic understanding and technique. I support my position here by citing some original contributions made by the adaptive approach and then highlight adaptive insights into patients' archetypal, unconscious perceptions of the moral implications of a therapist's use of a home office. I conclude with a discussion of why psychoanalysts have rejected the adaptive approach out of hand. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rejoinder to Burke's review of Organizational behavior.

Responds to Burke's review (see record 2007-04325-001) of the book, "Organizational Behavior: The Psychology of Effective Management (2nd ed.)" by David J. Lawless (1979). Professor Burke's criticisms would be quite appropriate if directed towards a book, treatise, or thesis expounding the author's theories, but I think they fail to appreciate the objectives of a textbook directed primarily to the undergraduate student. I believe that every textbook writer, consciously or not, has to decide the question of whether he/she writes for students or for colleagues. I write for my students, and not for my colleagues, as teacher-administrator and not as researcher. Professor Burke would make me a purist writing for my colleagues and that is not my intent. The textbook writer provides only the framework upon which the good teacher can build, can embellish, and from which to intrigue his or her students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Albee's charges are unsupported: Reply to Hanes.

Replies to the comment made by R. M. Hanes (see record 1990-56906-001) on the article by the current author (see record 197108263-001). Hanes challenged Albee to prove his assertions that White Protestant men hold a disproportionate share of wealth, power, and influence in the US and that any one religious group, race, or sex is more prejudiced than others. ALbee states that everything he has experienced completely supports his biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Judicial determination of children's competency to testify: Should it be abandoned?" Reply to Melton.

In his thought-provoking response to my article (Haugaard, 1988) (see record 1988-16723-001), Melton (1988) (see record 1988-16731-001) presented a number of arguments, several of which warrant comment. I believe that Melton was incorrect in claiming that it was through a misunderstanding of the law—in particular, of the distinction between competency and credibility—that I reached my conclusions about children's competency. A comparison of our definitions of competency indicates that they are quite similar. Over the past decade, Melton's prolific writing has greatly contributed to the knowledge about children's abilities in a number of areas. He has made important contributions in the social science, legal, and public policy fields. I continue to believe, however, that in this area he has credited the limited available data with more power than they deserve. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Dr. Rotgers' Letter.

Replies to the letter by Rotgers (see record 2005-09346-005) on the current author's original article (see record 1981-11085-001). Dr. Rotgers' letter is valuable, since it provides an excellent example of the fact that practice does not always conform to the "black letter" of the law. The current author is pleased to learn that New Jersey legislated their custom, for to rely on custom alone for the recognition of professional psychology is dangerous indeed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Politics and Science: A Combustible Mixture. Comment.

Comments on the article by Crosby et al (see record 2003-03405-003) in which psychological research is brought to bear on an examination of the policy of affirmative action. In their article, Crosby and colleagues cite the current author's paper "The Role of Value in the World of Psychology" (1999; see record 1999-11644-004) to support their contention that "science can never be fully free of values". The current author states that Crosby and colleagues misinterpreted his position. Specifically, the author believes that the question of whether science is value-loaded or value-free is pointless because the scientific enterprise consists of a variety of independent activities. Discussion centers on the implications of the fact/value dichotomy, science and politics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intrapsychic intersubjective conflict and defense in modern Freudian theory: A response to Stolorow (2005).

Stolorow (see record 2005-01622-017) objected to my stating in my discussion of signal anxiety--the modern Freudian notion of conflict--(Shill, see record 2004-11107-008) that intersubjective psychoanalysis does not address conflict "at all." Instead of addressing the issue of intrapsychic conflict, which is the actual focus of my article and the context of my comment, Stolorow counters with his own "vocabulary" of conflict that is confusing and vague. Stolorow rejects the notion of intrapsychically generated conflict and "the intrapsychic" because he focuses exclusively on the intersubjective aspects of conflict and does not consider that, in the last instance, psychological conflict is always internal and intrinsic to the manner in which the mind functions. By contrast, contemporary Freudian conflict theory--signal anxiety theory--is an intrapsychic, intersubjective theory in which the ego rehearses the feared scenario unconsciously in fantasy--intersubjective in nature--and triggers a defensive response aimed at quelling or at least mitigating the signal anxiety being experienced. Signal anxiety is a hypothetical construct and its operation refers to subjectively experienced affect states in an intrapsychic intersubjective conflict. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)