The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics are monotonic. Much recent research in AI has been devoted to the attempt to develop nonmonotonic logics. After some motivational material, we give four formal proofs that there can be no nonmonotonic consequence relation that is characterized by universal constraints on rational belief structures. In other words, a nonmonotonic consequence relation that corresponds to universal principles of rational belief is impossible. We show that the nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning is a function of the way we use logic, not a function of the logic we use. We give several examples of how nonmonotonic reasoning systems may be based on monotonic logics.     

On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions

Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.     

Conditionals,Counterfactuals, and Rational Reasoning: An Experimental Study on Basic Principles

We present a unified approach for investigating rational reasoning about basic argument forms involving indicative conditionals, counterfactuals, and basic quantified statements within coherence-based probability logic. After introducing the rationality framework, we present an interactive view on the relation between normative and empirical work. Then, we report a new experiment which shows that people interpret indicative conditionals and counterfactuals by coherent conditional probability assertions and negate conditionals by negating their consequents. The data support the conditional probability interpretation of conditionals and the narrow-scope reading of the negation of conditionals. Finally, we argue that coherent conditional probabilities are important for probabilistic analyses of conditionals, nonmonotonic reasoning, quantified statements, and paradoxes.     

Process and Policy: Resource-Bounded NonDemonstrative Reasoning

This paper investigates the appropriateness of formal dialectics as a basis for nonmonotonic reasoning and defeasible reasoning that takes computational limits seriously. Rules that can come into conflict should be regarded as policies, which are inputs to deliberative processes. Dialectical protocols are appropriate for such deliberations when resources are bounded and search is serial.
AI, it is claimed here, is now perfectly positioned to correct many misconceptions about reasoning that have resulted from mathematical logic's enormous success in this century: among them, (1) that all reasons are demonstrative, (2) that rational belief is constrained, not constructed, and (3) that process and disputation are not essential to reasoning. AI mainly provides new impetus to formalize the alternative (but older) conception of reasoning, and AI provides mechanisms with which to create compelling formalism that describes the control of processes.
The technical contributions here are: the partial justification of dialectic based on controlling search; the observation that nonmonotonic reasoning can be subsumed under certain kinds of dialectics; the portrayal of inference in knowledge bases as policy reasoning; the review of logics of dialogue and proposed extensions; and the preformal and initial formal discussion of aspects and variations of dialectical systems with nondemonstrative reasons.     

System LS: A Three-Tiered Nonmonotonic Reasoning System

In this paper, a formal system of nonmonotonic reasoning is developed, which takes as its inspiration the manner in which some people make logically justifiable conclusions about nonmonotonic reasoning problems. The people, when asked about individuals, compare the logical strength of the arguments relating any sets to which the individual belongs, to other sets. A three-tiered system of rules including rules of System P as well as Transitivity and Monotonicity is developed. The system, known as System LS for logical strength, deals with three levels of non-strict relationships:

• α ₁β  α are normally β ( more than half of the α are β ) ;

       
  
  

Autoepistemic logic of first order and its expressive power

We study the expressive power of first-order autoepistemic logic. We argue that full introspection of rational agents should be carried out by minimizing positive introspection and maximizing negative introspection. Based on full introspection, we propose the maximal well-founded semantics that characterizes autoepistemic reasoning processes of rational agents, and show that breadth of the semantics covers all theories in autoepistemic logic of first order, Moore's AE logic, and Reiter's default logic. Our study demonstrates that the autoepistemic logic of first order is a very powerful framework for nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, deductive databases, and knowledge representation.This research is partially supported by NSERC grant OGP42193.     

非单调推理的研究现状

一、引言 早在1959年,McCart~[1]就发现常识和常识推理很难处理,因为在常识推理中当前得出的结论,可能会由于以后新事实的加入而被取消.这就是所谓的“非单调性”。     

Preorder-based triangle: a modified version of bilattice-based triangle for belief revision in nonmonotonic reasoning

Bilattice-based triangle provides an elegant algebraic structure for reasoning with vague and uncertain information. But the truth and knowledge ordering of intervals in bilattice-based triangle cannot handle repetitive belief revisions which is an essential characteristic of nonmonotonic reasoning. Moreover, the ordering induced over the intervals by the bilattice-based triangle is not sometimes intuitive. In this work, we construct an alternative algebraic structure, namely preorder-based triangle and we formulate proper logical connectives for this. It is also demonstrated that Preorder-based triangle serves to be a better alternative to the bilattice-based triangle for reasoning in application areas, that involve nonmonotonic fuzzy reasoning with uncertain information.     

时序知识图谱表示与推理的研究进展与趋势

知识图谱作为近年来人工智能领域的一大热点研究方向, 已应用于现实中多个领域. 但是随着知识图谱应用场景日益多样化, 人们逐渐发现不随着时间改变而更新的静态知识图谱不能完全适应知识高频更新的场景. 为此, 研究者们提出时序知识图谱的概念, 一种包含时间信息的知识图谱. 对现有所有时序知识图谱表示与推理模型进行整理, 并归纳和建立一个表示与推理模型理论框架. 然后基于此对当前时序表示推理研究进展进行简要介绍分析和未来趋势预测, 以期望帮助研究者开发设计出更为优异的模型.     

Practical Handling of Exception-Tainted Rules and Independence Information in Possibilistic Logic

This paper provides a survey of possibilistic logic as a simple and efficient tool for handling nonmonotonic reasoning, with some emphasis on algorithmic issues. In our previous works, two well-known nonmonotonic systems have been encoded in the possibility theory framework: the preferential inference based on System P, and the rational closure inference proposed by Lehmann and Magidor which relies on System P augmented with a rational monotony postulate. System P is known to provide reasonable but very cautious conclusions, and in particular, preferential inference is blocked by the presence of irrelevant properties. When using Lehmann's rational closure, the inference machinery, which is then more productive, may still remain too cautious, or on the contrary, provide counter -intuitive conclusions. The paper proposes an approach to overcome the cautiousness of System P and the problems encountered by the rational closure inference. This approach takes advantage of (contextual) independence assumptions of the form: the fact that is true (or is false) does not affect the validity of the rule normally if then . The modelling of such independence assumptions is discussed in the possibilistic framework. Moreover, we show that when a counter-intuitive conclusion of a set of defaults can be inferred, it is always possible to repair the set of defaults by adding suitable information so as to produce the desired conclusions and block unsuitable ones.     

A Classification and Survey of Preference Handling Approaches in Nonmonotonic Reasoning

In recent years, there has been a large amount of disparate work concerning the representation and reasoning with qualitative preferential information by means of approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Given the variety of underlying systems, assumptions, motivations, and intuitions, it is difficult to compare or relate one approach with another. Here, we present an overview and classification for approaches to dealing with preference. A set of criteria for classifying approaches is given, followed by a set of desiderata that an approach might be expected to satisfy. A comprehensive set of approaches is subsequently given and classified with respect to these sets of underlying principles.     

Formal Nonmonotonic Theories and Properties of Human Defeasible Reasoning

The knowledge representation and reasoning of both humans and artificial systems often involves conditionals. A conditional connects a consequence which holds given a precondition. It can be easily recognized in natural languages with certain key words, like “if” in English. A vast amount of literature in both fields, both artificial intelligence and psychology, deals with the questions of how such conditionals can be best represented and how these conditionals can model human reasoning. On the other hand, findings in the psychology of reasoning, such as those in the Suppression Task, have led to a paradigm shift from the monotonicity assumptions in human inferences towards nonmonotonic reasoning. Nonmonotonic reasoning is sensitive for information change, that is, inferences are drawn cautiously such that retraction of previous information is not required with the addition of new information. While many formalisms of nonmonotonic reasoning have been proposed in the field of Artificial Intelligence, their capability to model properties of human reasoning has not yet been extensively investigated. In this paper, we analyzed systematically from both a formal and an empirical perspective the power of formal nonmonotonic systems to model (i) possible explicit defeaters, as in the Suppression Task, and (ii) more implicit conditional rules that trigger nonmonotonic reasoning by the keywords in such rules. The results indicated that the classical evaluation for the correctness of inferences has to be extended in the three major aspects (i) regarding the inference system, (ii) the knowledge base, and (iii) possible assumed exceptions for the rule.     

Nonmonotonic logic and temporal projection

Nonmonotonic formal systems have been proposed as an extension to classical first-order logic that will capture the process of human “default reasoning” or “plausible inference” through their inference mechanisms, just as modus ponens provides a model for deductive reasoning. But although the technical properties of these logics have been studied in detail and many examples of human default reasoning have been identified, for the most part these logics have not actually been applied to practical problems to see whether they produce the expected results.We provide axioms for a simple problem in temporal reasoning which has long been identified as a case of default reasoning, thus presumably amenable to representation in nonmonotonic logic. Upon examining the resulting nonmonotonic theories, however, we find that the inferences permitted by the logics are not those we had intended when we wrote the axioms, and in fact are much weaker. This problem is shown to be independent of the logic used; nor does it depend on any particular temporal representation. Upon analyzing the failure we find that the nonmonotonic logics we considered are inherently incapable of representing this kind of default reasoning.The first part of the paper is an expanded version of one that appeared in the 1986 AAAI proceedings. The second part reports on several responses to our result that have appeared since the original paper was published.     

Probabilistic Default Reasoning with Conditional Constraints

We present an approach to reasoning from statistical and subjective knowledge, which is based on a combination of probabilistic reasoning from conditional constraints with approaches to default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. More precisely, we introduce the notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment for conditional constraints, which are probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in system Z, Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, and Geffner's conditional entailment, respectively. We show that the new formalisms have nice properties. In particular, they show a similar behavior as reference-class reasoning in a number of uncontroversial examples. The new formalisms, however, also avoid many drawbacks of reference-class reasoning. More precisely, they can handle complex scenarios and even purely probabilistic subjective knowledge as input. Moreover, conclusions are drawn in a global way from all the available knowledge as a whole. We then show that the new formalisms also have nice general nonmonotonic properties. In detail, the new notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment have similar properties as their classical counterparts. In particular, they all satisfy the rationality postulates proposed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, and they have some general irrelevance and direct inference properties. Moreover, the new notions of z- and lexicographic entailment satisfy the property of rational monotonicity. Furthermore, the new notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment are proper generalizations of both their classical counterparts and the classical notion of logical entailment for conditional constraints. Finally, we provide algorithms for reasoning under the new formalisms, and we analyze its computational complexity.     

A causal approach to nonmonotonic reasoning

We introduce logical formalisms of production and causal inference relations based on input/output logics of Makinson and Van der Torre [J. Philos. Logic 29 (2000) 383–408]. These inference relations will be assigned, however, both standard semantics (giving interpretation to their rules), and natural nonmonotonic semantics based on the principle of explanation closure. The resulting nonmonotonic formalisms will be shown to provide a logical representation of abductive reasoning, and a complete characterization of causal nonmonotonic reasoning from McCain and Turner [Proc. AAAI-97, Providence, RI, 1997, pp. 460–465]. The results of the study suggest production and causal inference as general nonmonotonic formalisms providing an alternative representation for a significant part of nonmonotonic reasoning.     

Proof explanation for a nonmonotonic Semantic Web rules language

In this work, we present the design and implementation of a system for proof explanation in the Semantic Web, based on defeasible reasoning. Trust is a vital feature for Semantic Web. If users (humans and agents) are to use and integrate system answers, they must trust them. Thus, systems should be able to explain their actions, sources, and beliefs. Our system produces automatically proof explanations using a popular logic programming system (XSB), by interpreting the output from the proof’s trace and converting it into a meaningful representation. It also supports an XML representation for agent communication, which is a common scenario in the Semantic Web. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of the system, a RuleML language extension for the representation of a proof explanation, and we give some examples of the system. The system in essence implements a proof layer for nonmonotonic rules on the Semantic Web.