In praise of the null hypothesis statistical test.

Jacob Cohen (see record 1995-12080-001) raised a number of questions about the logic and information value of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Specifically, he suggested that: (1) The NHST does not tell us what we want to know; (2) the null hypothesis is always false; and (3) the NHST lacks logical integrity. It is the author's view that although there may be good reasons to give up the NHST, these particular points made by Cohen are not among those reasons. When addressing these points, the author also attempts to demonstrate the elegance and usefulness of the NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Model fitting: A better approach.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) defending the logic and practice of null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST). It is argued that model fitting provides an approach to data analysis that is more appropriate to the cognitive needs of the researcher than is NHST. Model fitting combines the NHST ability to falsify hypotheses with the parameter-estimation characteristic of confidence intervals in an approach that is simpler to learn, understand, and use. Effect size estimation is central to the approach, and power calculations are vastly simplified relative to NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The inscrutable null hypothesis.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) praising the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Hagen's praise of the NHST may be supported on purely technical grounds but it is unfortunate if it prolongs primary reliance on NHST to evaluate quantitative difference and equivalence given the prominent human factors problem of widespread and intractable interpretation errors. Alternative methods are available for these purposes that are far less subject to misinterpretation. The science of psychology can openly benefit by supplementing, if not replacing, NHST practices with these methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why chance is a good theory.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author states that Krueger carelessly included a dubious claim that weakened at least some of his contentions: that the widespread use of NHST represents a ubiquitous ignorance of its logical pitfalls. Contrary to Krueger's claims, the current author believes that within a larger causal framework, the null hypothesis remains the best theory available. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In criticism of the null hypothesis statistical test.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) in praise of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). NHST, is, in fact, a probabilistic imitation of modus tollens (or of the mathematical procedure of proof by contradiction). However, once the reasoning is made probabilistic, the inference is no longer valid. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fisher's fallacy and NHST's flawed logic.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author contends that the underlying philosophical problems with NHST are considerably more complicated and serious than Krueger seemed to realize. Hofman describes how the logic of NHST is based on a misapplication of deductive sylogistic reasoning, because probabilistic statements are incompatible with the rules of deductive reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Significance testing: Is there something Better?

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) supporting use of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Hagen did an admirable job of reminding readers that the NHST represents a brilliant and useful innovation, but does not offer a strong case for its continued use as the primary inferential strategy in psychology. The question is not "Is it useless?" but "Is there something better?" Popular opinion holds that interval estimation represents a superior strategy to NHST in many ways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What are the fundamental facts of a comparison of two treatments' outcomes?

Responds to comments by Stefan G. Hofmann (see record 2011-19228-003), Edward A. Wise (see record 2011-19228-004), Michael J. Lambert (see record 2011-19228-005), and William H. Gottdiener (see record 2011-19228-006) on the authors original article "Statistical significance testing and clinical trials" (see record 2011-19228-002). The original article is one very narrowly focused effort at studying the implications of relying on the null hypothesis significance test (NHST) for determining which psychotherapy randomized clinical trial (RCT) findings to take seriously for clinical purposes. Although there are several approaches for faulting the NHST, the matter is important and complicated enough to justify dealing, in detail, with one approach at a time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

In praise of value judgments in null hypothesis testing…and of "accepting" the null hypothesis.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) on null hypothesis testing. Hagen's article is constrained to the logic of deduction from an already formulated null hypothesis and the scientific conclusions that are validly drawn from one statistical decision or another. It is argued that subjective value judgment preceding the construction of the null hypothesis is an obscure precursor of the scientific logic of null hypothesis testing and that subsequent actions taken in professional practice as a result of failure to reject the null hypothesis constitutes its acceptance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bayes rules.

Responds to the F. Schmidt and J. Hunter (see record 2002-10575-012), J. L. Brand (see record 2002-10575-013), R. K. Guenther (see record 2002-10575-014), K. A. Markus (see record 2002-10575-015), and S. G. Hofmann (see record 2002-10575-016) comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Krueger responds to each of the criticisms in turn. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the importance of letter pairs in reading-parafoveal processing is not the only view: Reply to Inhoff, Radach, Eiter, and Skelly (2003).

D. Briihl and A. W. Inhoff (1995; see record 1995-20036-001) found that exterior letter pairs showed no privileged status in reading when letter pairs were presented as parafoveal primes. However, T. R. Jordan, S. M. Thomas, G. R. Patching, and K. C. Scott-Brown (2003; see record 2003-07955-013) used a paradigm that (a) allowed letter pairs to exert influence at any point in the reading process, (b) overcame problems with the stimulus manipulations used by Briihl and Inhoff (1995), and (c) revealed a privileged status for exterior letter pairs in reading. A. W. Inhoff, R. Radach, B. M. Eiter, and M. Skelly (2003; see record 2003-07955-014) made a number of claims about the Jordan, Thomas, et al. study, most of which focus on parafoveal processing. This article addresses these claims and points out that although studies that use parafoveal previews provide an important contribution, other techniques and paradigms are required to reveal the full role of letter pairs in reading. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are there benefits from NHST?

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The validity and accuracy of significance testing is addressed by the current author. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the logic and purpose of significance testing.

There has been much recent attention given to the problems involved with the traditional approach to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Many have suggested that, perhaps, NHST should be abandoned altogether in favor of other bases for conclusions such as confidence intervals and effect size estimates (e.g., F. L. Schmidt; see record 83-24994) . The purposes of this article are to (a) review the function that data analysis is supposed to serve in the social sciences, (b) examine the ways in which these functions are performed by NHST, (c) examine the case against NHST, and (d) evaluate interval-based estimation as an alternative to NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond objectivity and subjectivity.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author comments on the general treatment of objectivity and subjectivity that underlies Krueger's review. Despite repeated appeals to a pragmatic basis for NHST, Krueger seems to have missed a key implication of a pragmatic view of scientific inference in this regard. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The question remains: Is deception acceptable?

Responds to comments by A. J. Kimmel, J. H. Korn, and A. Br?der (see records 1998-04417-018, 1998-04417-019, and 1998-04417-020, respectively) on the authors' original article (see record 1997-04731-011) regarding the use of deception in psychological research. Whether there has been a recent decline in the use of deception is irrelevant. Even if its use is less frequent and less dramatic than in the past, deception can strongly affect the reputation of individual labs and the profession, thus contaminating the participant pool. Whether deception is a bad thing methodologically is open to dispute. The authors hold that deception significantly influences the behavior of participants, whereas Kimmel and Br?der do not. It is noted that Ortmann and Hertwig's definition of deception does not coincide with that intimated by Br?der. Not telling participants the purpose of an experiment is not necessarily deception; telling participants things that are not true necessarily is. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An example of Bayesian hypothesis testing: The perception of rotary motion in depth.

Illustrates the Bayesian method of employing likelihood ratios in an analysis of an experiment reported by W. A. Hershberger (see 41:7), supposedly disconfirming a theory proposed by R. H. Day and R. P. Power (see 39:4). The original experiment produced results significant at the .02 level when using a 1-tailed test. It is shown that, by interpreting these results as evidence against the null hypothesis, one is making strong assumptions that should be recognized. The Bayesian analysis suggests that the null hypothesis is not discredited nearly as much as is suggested by the classical significance level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Much Ado About the Null Hypothesis.

Comments on the original article by W. Edwards et al. (see record 1964-00040-001) regarding Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research. Edwards has charged that classical statistics, in contrast to Bayesian statistics, is always violently biased against the null hypothesis. Edwards has advised the conservative classical investigator that he should, therefore, always identify his theory with the null hypothesis, so as to minimize specious claims for theoretical support. This paper reinterprets the so-called bias in terms of differential assumptions about the nature of the alternatives which must be considered; its main purpose, however, is to point out that insensitive experiments, in contrast to sensitive ones, are always biased for, rather than against, the null hypothesis. It is this 2nd bias (which exists independently of the 1st) that prompts the conservative investigator not to identify his theory with the null hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

You proved our point better than we did: A reply to our critics.

Responds to comments by P. W. Thayer and J. W. Kalat, N. R. Kuncel et al, J. Ruscio, C. E. Miller et al, M. Roznowski, R. B. Darlington, T. P. Melchert, T. Andre and S. Hegland, and D. G. Cornell (see records 1998-01669-005; 1998-01669-006; 1998-01669-007; 1998-01669-008; 1998-01669-009; 1998-01669-010; 1998-01669-011; 1998-01669-012; and 1998-01669-013, respectively) on the article by R. J. Sternberg and W. M. Williams (see record 1997-04591-002) regarding the empirical validity of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) in predicting graduate student performance in psychology. The authors reply to local statistical issues raised by the comments, including restriction of range, studying only students admitted in part on the basis of the GRE, unreliability of criteria, students who speak English as a second language, compensation, and failure rates. Global issues are then addressed. It is concluded that existing tests and use of tests have value, but they are not the best they can be. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In praise of brilliance: Where that praise really belongs.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) praising the null hypothesis statistical test. In sum, Hagen argued that "it is unlikely that we will ever be able to divorce ourselves from that [statistical test] logic even if someday we decide we want to". However, notwithstanding this representation, psychology can alter its behavior if psychologists deem such changes prudent and wise. If it is decided that statistical tests do not evaluate either result importance or result replicability, psychologists can report information that is relevant to these 2 concerns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The earth is round (p?

Cohen  Jacob 《Canadian Metallurgical Quarterly》1995,50(12):1103