Tobacco control advocates must demand high-quality media campaigns: the California experience

OBJECTIVE: To document efforts on the part of public officials in California to soften the media campaign's attack on the tobacco industry and to analyse strategies to counter those efforts on the part of tobacco control advocates. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with programme participants, direct observation, written materials, and media stories. In addition, internal documents were released by the state's Department of Health Services in response to requests made under the California Public Records Act by Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights. Finally, a draft of the paper was circulated to 11 key players for their comments. RESULTS: In 1988 california voters enacted Proposition 99, an initiative that raised the tobacco tax by $0.25 and allocated 20% of the revenues to anti-tobacco education. A media campaign, which was part of the education programme, directly attacked the tobacco industry, exposing the media campaign to politically based efforts to shut it down or soften it. Through use of outsider strategies such as advertising, press conferences, and public meetings, programme advocates were able to counter the efforts to soften the campaign. CONCLUSION: Anti-tobacco media campaigns that expose industry manipulation are a key component of an effective tobacco control programme. The effectiveness of these campaigns, however, makes them a target for elimination by the tobacco industry. The experience from California demonstrates the need for continuing, aggressive intervention by nongovernmental organisations in order to maintain the quality of anti-tobacco media campaigns.     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

Smoke and mirrors: how Massachusetts diverted millions in tobacco tax revenues

OBJECTIVE: This study examines the politics of appropriating Question 1 tobacco tax revenues in the first budget year after Massachusetts voters passed the ballot initiative in 1992. The initiative increased the tobacco tax on cigarettes by 25 cents per pack and on smokeless tobacco by 25% of the wholesale price. METHODS: Data were collected from newspapers, letters, memoranda, budgets, press releases, legislative floor debates, government documents, legislative journals, personal interviews, and tobacco industry documents that were downloaded from the Tobacco Archives internet site. RESULTS: During the first budget year, programmes mentioned by the initiative that were not exclusively tobacco related accounted for 27% of total Question 1 expenditures, while 50% of the revenues were allocated for programmes that were neither mentioned by the initiative nor provided any tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Only 23% of Question 1 funds were appropriated for programmes that provided exclusively tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Question 1 revenues were also used to supplant funding for pre-existing programmes, which was explicitly prohibited by the initiative. The first budget year became the template for Question 1 appropriations in subsequent fiscal years. CONCLUSION: Politics did not end after voters passed Question 1. Public health advocates lacked a strategy and budget plan to influence the appropriation of Question 1 funds after the passage of this ballot initiative.     

Question 1 tobacco education expenditures in Massachusetts, USA

BACKGROUND: In 1992, voters in Massachusetts (United States) approved Question 1, a state ballot initiative, which raised the state excise tax to provide funds for tobacco education. OBJECTIVE: To examine Question 1 expenditures for tobacco-specific programmes in the 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 fiscal years. DESIGN: This study examined trends in Question 1 expenditures. Data were collected from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and the Massachusetts Department of Revenue for the 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 fiscal years. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The amount of spending on tobacco-specific programmes. RESULTS: Excluding the 1994 fiscal year because the state allocated 18 months of new revenues, from the 1995 fiscal year to the projected 1997 fiscal year, the state will have spent 22% of Question 1 funds for tobacco- specific programmes. Question 1 expenditures for tobacco-specific programmes have declined by 15%, whereas Question 1 expenditures for the other programmes decreased only 0.4%. CONCLUSIONS: The legislature has established a trend that has produced real reductions in Question 1 funding for tobacco education, which appears contrary to the mandate of the voters when they enacted Question 1 in 1992. These reductions undermine the effectiveness of tobacco-specific programmes that are an integral part of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Programme. These results also highlight the fact that the initial compromises made after initiatives such as Question 1 are adopted have important long-term consequences for funding of tobacco control initiatives.


     

Effectiveness of comprehensive tobacco control programmes in reducing teenage smoking in the USA

OBJECTIVE: To describe the extent to which comprehensive statewide tobacco control programmes in the USA have made progress toward reducing teenage smoking. DATA SOURCES: Literature search of Medline for reviews of effectiveness of programme and policy elements, plus journal articles and personal request for copies of publicly released reports and working papers from evaluation staff in each of the state programmes of California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida. STUDY SELECTION: All studies, reports, and commentaries that provided information on aspects of programme implementation and evaluation. DATA SYNTHESIS: Statewide comprehensive programmes show high levels of advertising recall and generally positive improvement in smoking related beliefs and attitudes among teenagers. More fully funded programmes lead to increased mass media campaign advertising and community initiatives; a greater capacity to implement school based smoking prevention programmes; and an increase in the passage of local ordinances that create smoke free indoor environments and reduce cigarette sales to youth. The combination of programme activity and increased tobacco tax reduce cigarette consumption more than expected as a result of price increases alone, and these effects seem to apply to adolescents as well as adults. Programmes are associated with a decline in adult smoking prevalence, with these effects observed to date in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Arizona and Florida have yet to examine change in adult prevalence associated with programme exposure. California and Massachusetts have demonstrated relative beneficial effects in teenage smoking prevalence, and Florida has reported promising indications of reduced prevalence. Arizona has yet to report follow up data, and Oregon has found no change in teenage smoking, but has only two years of follow up available. One of the most critical factors in programme success is the extent of programme funding, and consequent level of programme implementation, and the degree to which this is undermined by the tobacco industry and other competitors for funding. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the different strengths and combinations of programme messages and strategies used in these comprehensive programmes, there is evidence that they lead to change in factors that influence teenage smoking, and to reductions in teenage smoking.     

Public health foundations and the tobacco industry: lessons from Minnesota

Objective: To investigate whether private foundations can be created in a way that will insulate them from attacks by the tobacco industry, using the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco (MPAAT) as a case study.

Design: Information was collected from internal tobacco industry documents, court documents, newspapers, and interviews with health advocates and elected officials.

Results: The creation of MPAAT as an independent foundation did not insulate it from attacks by tobacco industry allies. During 2001–2002, MPAAT was repeatedly attacked by Attorney General Mike Hatch and major media, using standard tobacco industry rhetoric. This strategy of attack and demands for information were reminiscent of previous attacks on Minnesota's Plan for Nonsmoking and Health and the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST). MPAAT was ultimately forced to restructure its programme to abandon effective community norm change interventions around smoke-free policies and replace them with less effective individual cessation interventions. Neither MPAAT nor other health advocates mounted an effective public response to these attacks, instead relying on the insider strategy of responding in court.

Conclusion: It is not possible to avoid attacks by the tobacco industry or its political allies. Like programmes administered by government agencies, tobacco control foundations must be prepared for these attacks, including a proactive plan to educate the public about the principles of community based tobacco control. Public health advocates also need to be willing to take prompt action to defend these programmes and hold public officials who attack tobacco control programmes accountable for their actions.

     

Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA

Background: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993.

Objective: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century.

Design: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials.

Results: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme.

Conclusions: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.

     

An analysis of the successful 1992 Massachusetts tobacco tax initiative

In November 1992, voters in Massachusetts (United States) passed a statewide tax initiative adding an extra 25 cents to the price of a pack of cigarettes. The Massachusetts Coalition for a Healthy Future, led by volunteers from the Massachusetts Division of the American Cancer Society, achieved this victory, despite a public anti-tax mood and $7.3 million spent by the tobacco industry. The tax has since generated millions of dollars for tobacco education and control programmes, leading to acceleration of the decline of tobacco consumption in the state. An analysis of the passage of this initiative should help other states considering this approach to tobacco control.


     

State legislators' perceptions of lobbyists and lobbying on tobacco control issues

OBJECTIVE: To determine state legislators' perceptions about health and tobacco lobbyists, their frequency of contact with these lobbyists, and the amount of campaign contributions from health professional organisations and the tobacco industry. DESIGN: Cross-sectional study. SUBJECTS: State legislators from North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont (USA), serving in 1994. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Perceptions about lobbyists representing the tobacco industry, non-profit health organisations, and state medical societies with respect to their credibility, importance as sources of information, and persuasiveness; extent of lobbying activities; campaign contributions from health professional organisations and the tobacco industry. RESULTS: Almost all legislators reported that medical society and non-profit health organisation lobbyists are credible on tobacco issues and just over half believed that these lobbyists are important sources of information. More legislators said they could be persuaded by medical and health lobbyists than by tobacco lobbyists. Although health professional Political Action Committees (PACs) gave campaign contributions to more state legislators, and gave higher amounts on average, than tobacco PACs, legislators reported less contact with medical society lobbyists than tobacco lobbyists about tobacco issues. CONCLUSIONS: State legislators have positive attitudes toward lobbyists for non-profit health organisations and state medical societies regarding tobacco issues. These groups may be an underused resource for educating legislators about tobacco control measures.


     

Tobacco industry litigation strategies to oppose tobacco control media campaigns

Objective

To document the tobacco industry''s litigation strategy to impede tobacco control media campaigns.

Methods

Data were collected from news and reports, tobacco industry documents, and interviews with health advocates and media campaign staff.

Results

RJ Reynolds and Lorillard attempted to halt California''s Media Campaign alleging that the campaign polluted jury pools and violated First Amendment rights because they were compelled to pay for anti‐industry ads. The American Legacy Foundation was accused of violating the Master Settlement Agreement''s vilification clause because its ads attacked the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies lost these legal challenges.

Conclusion

The tobacco industry has expanded its efforts to oppose tobacco control media campaigns through litigation strategies. While litigation is a part of tobacco industry business, it imposes a financial burden and impediment to media campaigns'' productivity. Tobacco control professionals need to anticipate these challenges and be prepared to defend against them.     

Evolution of a comprehensive tobacco control programme: building system capacity and strategic partnerships--lessons from Massachusetts

BACKGROUND: Since the passage of a voter approved state referendum in 1992 to establish a 25 cent increase on the excise tax on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, Massachusetts has received an average of $40 million annually for its tobacco control programme. This funding allowed Massachusetts to expand and develop its tobacco control programme to become one of the most comprehensive in the world. OBJECTIVES: The development of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program is outlined, focusing on three stages of development: formation, strategic partnership building, and shared leadership. METHODS: The development of management structures, programmatic infrastructure, communication and partnership networks, and advisory structures are tracked throughout the three phases. RESULTS: The use of pre-existing public health resources, implementation of a strong training component, a geographical management structure, the creation of public and private partnerships, and the development of a shared leadership model contributed to building consensus and provided the foundation for coordinated approaches to tobacco control. CONCLUSION: Other states and countries can use lessons learned from Massachusetts about the organisational development of a comprehensive tobacco control programme as they embark upon similar efforts.     

The perimetric boycott: a tool for tobacco control advocacy

Objectives: To propose criteria to help advocates: (1) determine when tobacco related boycotts may be useful; (2) select appropriate targets; and (3) predict and measure boycott success. Methods: Analysis of tobacco focused boycotts retrieved from internal tobacco industry documents websites and other scholarship on boycotts. Results: Tobacco related boycotts may be characterised by boycott target and reason undertaken. Most boycotts targeted the industry itself and were called for political or economic reasons unrelated to tobacco disease, often resulting in settlements that gave the industry marketing and public relations advantages. Even a lengthy health focused boycott of tobacco industry food subsidiaries accomplished little, making demands the industry was unlikely to meet. In contrast, a perimetric boycott (targeting institutions at the perimeter of the core target) of an organisation that was taking tobacco money mobilised its constituency and convinced the organisation to end the practice. Conclusions: Direct boycotts of the industry have rarely advanced tobacco control. Perimetric boycotts of industry allies offer advocates a promising tool for further marginalising the industry. Successful boycotts include a focus on the public health consequences of tobacco use; an accessible point of pressure; a mutual interest between the target and the boycotters; realistic goals; and clear and measurable demands.     

Development of a model of the tobacco industry's interference with tobacco control programmes

Objective: To construct a conceptual model of tobacco industry tactics to undermine tobacco control programmes for the purposes of: (1) developing measures to evaluate industry tactics, (2) improving tobacco control planning, and (3) supplementing current or future frameworks used to classify and analyse tobacco industry documents. Design: Web based concept mapping was conducted, including expert brainstorming, sorting, and rating of statements describing industry tactics. Statistical analyses used multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis. Interpretation of the resulting maps was accomplished by an expert panel during a face-to-face meeting. Subjects: 34 experts, selected because of their previous encounters with industry resistance or because of their research into industry tactics, took part in some or all phases of the project. Results: Maps with eight non-overlapping clusters in two dimensional space were developed, with importance ratings of the statements and clusters. Cluster and quadrant labels were agreed upon by the experts. Conclusions: The conceptual maps summarise the tactics used by the industry and their relationships to each other, and suggest a possible hierarchy for measures that can be used in statistical modelling of industry tactics and for review of industry documents. Finally, the maps enable hypothesis of a likely progression of industry reactions as public health programmes become more successful, and therefore more threatening to industry profits.     

Investing in youth tobacco control: a review of smoking prevention and control strategies

OBJECTIVE: To provide a comprehensive review of interventions and policies aimed at reducing youth cigarette smoking in the United States, including strategies that have undergone evaluation and emerging innovations that have not yet been assessed for efficacy. DATA SOURCES: Medline literature searches, books, reports, electronic list servers, and interviews with tobacco control advocates. DATA SYNTHESIS: Interventions and policy approaches that have been assessed or evaluated were categorised using a typology with seven categories (school based, community interventions, mass media/public education, advertising restrictions, youth access restrictions, tobacco excise taxes, and direct restrictions on smoking). Novel and largely untested interventions were described using nine categories. CONCLUSIONS: Youth smoking prevention and control efforts have had mixed results. However, this review suggests a number of prevention strategies that are promising, especially if conducted in a coordinated way to take advantage of potential synergies across interventions. Several types of strategies warrant additional attention and evaluation, including aggressive media campaigns, teen smoking cessation programmes, social environment changes, community interventions, and increasing cigarette prices. A significant proportion of the resources obtained from the recent settlement between 46 US states and the tobacco industry should be devoted to expanding, improving and evaluating "youth centred" tobacco prevention and control activities.     

British Columbia capital regional district 100% smokefree bylaw: a successful public health campaign despite industry opposition

Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it. Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research. Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement. Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.     

Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry used the "accommodation" message to mount an aggressive and effective worldwide campaign to recruit hospitality associations, such as restaurant associations, to serve as the tobacco industry's surrogate in fighting against smoke-free environments. METHODS: We analysed tobacco industry documents publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA. Documents were accessed between January and November 2001. RESULTS: The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, made financial contributions to existing hospitality associations or, when it did not find an association willing to work for tobacco interests, created its own "association" in order to prevent the growth of smoke-free environments. The industry also used hospitality associations as a vehicle for programmes promoting "accommodation" of smokers and non-smokers, which ignore the health risks of second hand smoke for employees and patrons of hospitality venues. CONCLUSION: Through the myth of lost profits, the tobacco industry has fooled the hospitality industry into embracing expensive ventilation equipment, while in reality 100% smoke-free laws have been shown to have no effect on business revenues, or even to improve them. The tobacco industry has effectively turned the hospitality industry into its de facto lobbying arm on clean indoor air. Public health advocates need to understand that, with rare exceptions, when they talk to organised restaurant associations they are effectively talking to the tobacco industry and must act accordingly.     

Fiscal versus social responsibility: how Philip Morris shaped the public funds divestment debate

Calls for institutional investors to divest (sell off) tobacco stocks threaten the industry's share values, publicise its bad behaviour, and label it as a politically unacceptable ally. US tobacco control advocates began urging government investment and pension funds to divest as a matter of responsible social policy in 1990. Following the initiation of Medicaid recovery lawsuits in 1994, advocates highlighted the contradictions between state justice departments suing the industry, and state health departments expanding tobacco control programmes, while state treasurers invested in tobacco companies. Philip Morris (PM), the most exposed US company, led the divestment opposition, consistently framing the issue as one of responsible fiscal policy. It insisted that funds had to be managed for the exclusive interest of beneficiaries, not the public at large, and for high share returns above all. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to show how PM sought to frame both the rhetorical contents and the legal contexts of the divestment debate. While tobacco stock divestment was eventually limited to only seven (but highly visible) states, US advocates focused public attention on the issue in at least 18 others plus various local jurisdictions. This added to ongoing, effective campaigns to denormalise and delegitimise the tobacco industry, dividing it from key allies. Divestment as a delegitimisation tool could have both advantages and disadvantages as a tobacco control strategy in other countries.     

International trade agreements: a threat to tobacco control policy

International covenants establish a role for governments in ensuring the conditions for human health and wellbeing, which has been recognised as a central human right. International trade agreements, conversely, prioritize the rights of corporations over health and human rights. International trade agreements are threatening existing tobacco control policies and restrict the possibility of implementing new controls. This situation is unrecognised by many tobacco control advocates in signatory nations, especially those in developing countries. Recent agreements on eliminating various trade restrictions, including those on tobacco, have expanded far beyond simply international movement of goods to include internal tobacco distribution regulations and intellectual property rules regulating advertising and labelling. Our analysis shows that to the extent trade agreements protect the tobacco industry, in itself a deadly enterprise, they erode human rights principles and contribute to ill health. The tobacco industry has used trade policy to undermine effective barriers to tobacco importation. Trade negotiations provide an unwarranted opportunity for the tobacco industry to assert its interests without public scrutiny. Trade agreements provide the industry with additional tools to obstruct control policies in both developed and developing countries and at every level. The health community should become involved in reversing these trends, and help promote additional measures to protect public health.     

Tobacco industry successfully prevented tobacco control legislation in Argentina

Objective: To evaluate how transnational tobacco companies, working through their local affiliates, influenced tobacco control policymaking in Argentina between 1966 and 2005. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, local newspapers and magazines, internet resources, bills from the Argentinean National Congress Library, and interviews with key individuals in Argentina. Results: Transnational tobacco companies (Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International) have been actively influencing public health policymaking in Argentina since the early 1970s. As in other countries, in 1977 the tobacco industry created a weak voluntary self regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on advertising. In addition to direct lobbying by the tobacco companies, these efforts involved use of third party allies, public relations campaigns, and scientific and medical consultants. During the 1980s and 1990s efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified, but the organised tobacco industry prevented its enactment. There has been no national activity to decrease exposure to secondhand smoke. Conclusions: The tobacco industry, working through its local subsidiaries, has subverted meaningful tobacco control legislation in Argentina using the same strategies as in the USA and other countries. As a result, tobacco control in Argentina remains governed by a national law that is weak and restricted in its scope.     

Marketing to the marginalised: tobacco industry targeting of the homeless and mentally ill

Objectives: To describe the tobacco industry''s relationships with and influence on homeless and mentally ill smokers and organisations providing services to them. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents and journal articles. Results: The tobacco industry has marketed cigarettes to the homeless and seriously mentally ill, part of its "downscale" market, and has developed relationships with homeless shelters and advocacy groups, gaining positive media coverage and political support. Discussion: Tobacco control advocates and public health organisations should consider how to target programmes to homeless and seriously mentally ill individuals. Education of service providers about tobacco industry efforts to cultivate this market may help in reducing smoking in these populations.