竞争环境中基于异质消费群体的再制造定价策略

针对竞争环境中制造商和再制造商应如何对再制造品定价的问题,建立基于消费者对新产品和再制造品异质需求的两周期模型,求出了制造商对新产品和再制造品采用单一化和差异化定价策略两种情况下制造商和再制造商的最优回收率和最优产品价格,并进行了比较。最后通过数值算例讨论了参数变化对制造商和再制造商的利润的影响。研究表明在单一化定价条件下,再制造品的价格更高,再制造品的总产量更大,制造商和再制造商的利润更高。这一结果说明即使面临再制造商的竞争,制造商采用单一化定价策略仍然优于采用差异化定价策略。     

考虑政府补贴的制造商再制造延保决策北大核心CSSCI

在考虑政府补贴的前提下,研究了一个同时提供生产新产品和再制造品的制造商的延保决策问题;分析了政府补贴对制造商延保服务选择的影响,以及政府补贴在不同延保模式下对再制造产品销量的促进作用。研究表明:(1)不论政府补贴如何设定,制造商为再制造产品提供延保服务都能够增加利润且双延保模式最佳。(2)不论制造商选择哪种延保模式,政府补贴总能增加再制造品的销量与制造商的总利润;但是在市场发展初期,只有政府补贴达到一定程度,双延保模型下再制造品的销量才能超过无延保模型。(3)政府补贴会促进制造商再制造产品减排研发活动,并且研发努力水平随政府补贴力度的提高而增加。     

新产品分销下零售商销售再制造产品的策略研究

考虑消费者对新产品、再制造产品有不同的接受程度,在制造商、第三方再制造商进行再制造模式下,运用Stackelberg博弈分析零售商销售新产品、再制造产品的策略研究.研究表明:与销售制造商再制造产品相比,零售商销售第三方再制造商的产品更有利,同时也有益于第三方再制造商.从市场利润角度看,零售商销售第三方再制造的产品为较优的选择.通过数值仿真,对比分析了零售商销售制造商、第三方再制造产品两种模式下,消费者接受度对新产品、再制造产品批发价、零售价格、销售数量以及零售商利润的影响.     

基于顾客选择行为的再制造产品价格歧视策略

针对考虑消费者选择行为的新产品与再制造品歧视性定价策略问题,通过构建制造商价格决策与消费者购买行为的三阶段动态博弈模型,研究了消费者选择行为和对再制造品的接受程度对最优价格决策、利润以及再制造率的影响,求解得制造商歧视性定价策略和消费者选择行为的子博弈完美均衡.结论表明:消费者行为不仅影响厂商歧视性定价策略与利润,还影...     

制造商和分销商的再制造进入决策研究

低碳经济背景下,再制造是促进经济可持续发展的重要手段,而是否进入再制造是闭环供应链中制造商和分销商的重要决策。首先,建立制造商和分销商的双方演化博弈模型,利用Jacobi矩阵分析制造商和分销商混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:当制造商单位回收品的利润大于制造商销售单位新产品的利润,且分销商单位回收品的利润扣除再制造授权费用后大于分销商销售单位新产品的利润时,系统演化至制造商和分销商均进入再制造的状态。其次,考虑政府补贴对制造商和分销商决策的影响,建立政府补贴情形下制造商和分销商的双方演化博弈模型,利用Jacobi矩阵分析制造商和分销商混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:当制造商单位回收品的利润与政府补贴之和大于制造商销售单位新产品的利润,且分销商单位回收品的利润与政府补贴之和扣除再制造授权费用后大于分销商销售单位新产品的利润时,系统演化至制造商和分销商均进入再制造的状态。最后,通过数值仿真验证相关结论的正确性。     

考虑政府补贴的制造商再制造延保决策

在考虑政府补贴的前提下,研究了一个同时提供生产新产品和再制造品的制造商的延保决策问题;分析了政府补贴对制造商延保服务选择的影响,以及政府补贴在不同延保模式下对再制造产品销量的促进作用。研究表明:(1)不论政府补贴如何设定,制造商为再制造产品提供延保服务都能够增加利润且双延保模式最佳。(2)不论制造商选择哪种延保模式,政府补贴总能增加再制造品的销量与制造商的总利润;但是在市场发展初期,只有政府补贴达到一定程度,双延保模型下再制造品的销量才能超过无延保模型。(3)政府补贴会促进制造商再制造产品减排研发活动,并且研发努力水平随政府补贴力度的提高而增加。     

不确定需求及WTP差异下废弃电子产品再制造闭环供应链奖惩机制研究

考虑新产品和再制造品存在市场不确定需求和消费者支付意愿差异情况下,构建了废弃电子产品再制造闭环供应链的政府奖惩机制决策模型。证明了目标函数存在最优解,给出了求解的优化条件;通过数值仿真求解模型,分析了消费者对再制品的支付意愿以及政府奖惩机制对定价、回收率以及利润的影响。结果表明:政府实施制造商、零售商同时奖惩制度,比只奖惩其中之一效果更好;随着再制造品WTP值增大,再制造品的订购量逐渐替代新产品订购量,供应链整体利润也逐步增加;随着政府对制造商奖励力度的增加,制造商转移支付价格、废弃电子产品的回收率以及供应链整体利润都随之增加;随着政府对零售商奖惩力度的增加,废弃电子产品的回收率随制造商转移支付价格不断上升而增大,制造商的利润呈减少趋势,零售商的利润先减少后增加,拆解企业利润较前两项因素影响情况下最大。     

专利保护下的闭环供应链再制造模式选择策略

研究再制造市场竞争的文献通常认为再制造商的进入会对原制造商形成威胁,而本文在专利保护的背景下发现第三方再制造商的进入有利于制造商利润的增加.在原制造商可向从事再制造的供应链参与方索取专利授权费的背景下,研究了供应链中垄断制造商的最优再制造模式选择问题.研究发现:对零售商而言,零售商再制造模式对其最有利,而第三方再制造模式对其最为不利;对制造商而言,第三方再制造模式下其利润水平最高,第三方再制造时其最有利.处于供应链中领导地位的制造商应当选择第三方再制造企业进行其旧产品的回收再制造.     

基于消费者异质性需求的闭环供应链再制造授权模式研究

在消费者异质性需求的市场中,为了探讨最佳的再制造授权模式,基于原始设备制造商(original equipment manufacturer, OEM)与第三方再制造商((third party remanufacturer, TPR)同时进行再制造的闭环供应链(closed loop supply chain, CLSC),采用博弈论分别讨论TPR独立再制造和OEM专利授权再制造(包括单位费用授权和固定费用授权)的CLSC决策模型,对比3种模型的均衡解及最优利润,并分析TPR再制品市场接受度、再制造成本节约对均衡解及企业利润的影响。研究表明,授权增加了OEM利润,故OEM更倾向于对TPR进行授权,并根据固定授权费的大小来决定授权模式;CLSC总利润在固定费用授权模式下最大,且该模式下消费者的购买成本最低;TPR再制品市场接受度及再制造成本节约的增加可提高TPR利润,但会加大对OEM再制品的挤兑程度,最终导致OEM提高授权费来弥补利润损失。     

再制造系统成本结构与市场结构的关系研究

消费者的自主决策能力和产品组合的成本结构会影响再制造系统的生产决策,进而决定市场结构。本文分析了制造商和第三方制造构成的一个两阶段供应链博弈模型,考虑了消费者基于回售预期和效用评估的自主决策能力,分析成本结构对生产决策、许可契约、产业结构的影响。结果表明,新产品的高成本会使OEM放弃生产策略,转而谋求许可费用最大化;新产品和再制造品的联合低成本是形成混合市场的唯一条件;许可费是把双刃剑,调控消费者在新产品、再制造品之间的分布。     

不同渠道结构下再制造商进入对制造商定价的影响

考虑制造商领导、再制造商领导以及无领导者的3种渠道结构，建立了制造商和再制造商的价格博弈模型，分析了制造商的定价决策。研究表明：再制造商进入对制造商定价的影响同再制造产品与新产品的差异程度密切相关。在渠道结构不同的3种市场中，当产品差异大时，制造商和再制造商均在制造商领导的市场中对产品定价最高，利润也最大；当产品差异小时，双方在再制造商领导的市场中对产品定价最高，利润最大。此外，无论是制造商还是再制造商，其在均衡市场中对产品定价最低，获得的利润最少。     

A robust optimisation model for hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems under uncertain return quality and market demand

In remanufacturing research, most researchers predominantly emphasised on the recovery of whole product (core) rather than at the component level due to its complexity. In contrast, this paper addresses the challenges to focus on remanufacturing through component recovery, so as to solve production planning problems of hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems. To deal with the uncertainties of quality and quantity of product returns, the processing time of remanufacturing, remanufacturing costs, as well as market demands, a robust optimisation model was developed in this research and a case study was used to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. To strengthen this research, a sensitivity analysis of the uncertain parameters and the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s) pricing strategy was also conducted. The research finding shows that the market demand volatility leads to a significant increase in the under fulfilment and a reduction in OEM’s profit. On the other hand, recovery cost reduction, as endogenous cost saving, encourages the OEM to produce more remanufactured products with the increase in market demand. Furthermore, the OEM may risk profit loss if they raise the price of new products, and inversely, they could gain more if the price of remanufactured products is raised.     

Pricing and warranty decisions in a two-period closed-loop supply chain

For a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, Stackelberg game analyses are conducted to examine pricing and warranty decisions under two warranty models depending on who offers warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark models with a warranty for new products only. Next, we identify the conditions under which warranty for remanufactured products is offered and investigate how this warranty affects the CLSC operations. Subsequently, comparative studies are carried out to examine equilibrium decisions, profitability and consumer surplus of the CLSC between the two warranty models. Analytical results show that offering warranty for remanufactured products does not affect new product pricing in period 2, but influences the pricing of new products in period 1 and remanufactured products in period 2, thereby enhancing remanufacturing, individual and channel profitability, and consumer surplus. Compared to the retailer warranty for remanufactured products, the manufacturer warranty can attain a more equitable profit distribution. If the warranty cost advantage of the manufacturer (retailer) is significant relative to that of the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) arises as a natural choice to offer warranty for remanufactured products as this decision enhances both profitability and consumer surplus.     

Optimal core acquisition and pricing strategies for hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing systems

In this study, we combine two aspects of remanufacturing, namely product acquisition management and marketing (pricing) of the remanufactured products. We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who decides on the acquisition prices offered for returns from different quality types and on selling prices of new and remanufactured products, in a single period setting. We develop a procedure for determining the optimal prices and corresponding profit of the OEM, and conduct a sensitivity analysis to understand the effect of different model parameters on the optimal strategies and profit. An important managerial insight is that the optimal solution is not to have the same profit per remanufactured item for all return types, but to if the minimum cost for acquisition and remanufacturing of some core type is lower.     

Optimal configuration of remanufacturing supply network with return quality decision

This research studies the configuration problem of a remanufacturing production network together with the decision for return quality thresholds, in which, the manufacturer has multiple remanufacturing facilities to satisfy different market demands. Quality of returns is stochastic, while demand for remanufactured products is either stochastic or deterministic. The problem we considered is to determine facilities to operate, minimum quality to accept into each operating facility, return quantity and demand allocation simultaneously so that the system’s profit is maximised. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer non-linear programming model. Through the use of a numerical example, the impact of quantity of returns, total spending, quality uncertainty, demand uncertainty and transportation cost on the remanufacturing system is analysed.     

Dynamic pricing for remanufacturing within socially environmental incentives

We study a dual-product dynamic pricing problem for a remanufacturing system in which a manufacturer makes new and remanufactured products competing for a certain market share. The socially environmental incentives, consisting of consumers' environmentally conscious demand and governments' subsidy on remanufactured products, are considered in this study, which encourage the manufacturer to exert production effort toward environmentally friendly remanufacturing. Three models, namely, two-period, multi-period, and infinite-period scenarios, are formulated to investigate the dynamic pricing problem. Analytical results show that the government's subsidy policies, which provide subsidies to consumers or firms, have equivalent effects for the manufacturer in terms of production and profit. Consumers' environmental consciousness and government subsidy are effective incentives to induce the manufacturer to make more remanufactured products. Some threshold policies are proposed to provide decision supports for manufacturers to formulate pricing and production strategies. By comparing the pricing and production strategies of the three models, we find it interesting that the pricing and production strategies of the multi-period model can be ideally characterised by those of the two-period and infinite-period models. This managerial concept is valuable for manufacturers in formulating pricing and production strategies when the precise production planning horizon is unknown.     

专利保护下闭环供应链差别定价及协调

研究了专利保护下制造商授权经销商再制造的特殊闭环供应链。在新产品和再制造品存在差异的情况下,建立了分散决策与联合决策情形下的闭环供应链博弈模型,得出了制造商的最优批发价格和专利许可费、经销商对新产品和再制造产品的差异定价以及双方的最优利润, 并分析了不同参数变化对价格、回收率和利润的影响。最后,采用收益分享合同实现了许可经销商再制造的闭环供应链协调。     

Design for life-cycle profit with simultaneous consideration of initial manufacturing and end-of-life remanufacturing

Remanufacturing is emerging as a promising solution for achieving green, profitable businesses. This article considers a manufacturer that produces new products and also remanufactured versions of the new products that become available at the end of their life cycle. For such a manufacturer, design decisions at the initial design stage determine both the current profit from manufacturing and future profit from remanufacturing. To maximize the total profit, design decisions must carefully consider both ends of product life cycle, i.e. manufacturing and end-of-life stages. This article proposes a decision-support model for the life-cycle design using mixed-integer nonlinear programming. With an aim to maximize the total life-cycle profit, the proposed model searches for an (at least locally) optimal product design (i.e. design specifications and the selling price) for the new and remanufactured products. It optimizes both the initial design and design upgrades at the end-of-life stage and also provides corresponding production strategies, including production quantities and take-back rate. The model is extended to a multi-objective model that maximizes both economic profit and environmental-impact saving. To illustrate, the developed model is demonstrated with an example of a desktop computer.     

Determining end-of-life policy for recoverable products

We address a problem that arises for an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who produces a product both in new and remanufactured forms. A remanufactured product is produced using the parts harvested from recovered products (cores) upon their disassembly, and it may contain some new parts while the excess good parts from cores are salvaged for profit. Other options are available to the OEM for handling cores that do not require disassembly. It follows that the per-unit remanufacturing cost is not constant and it may change depending on the number of recovered cores, good-part reclamation yields, and sales of remanufactured products. We present analytical results for determining an optimal solution with regard to: (i) quantity of cores to collect, (ii) end-of-life (EOL) options for the cores and (iii) product pricing of new and remanufactured products. Our analysis reveals existence of a ‘limiting part’ that dictates the number of cores to collect and a ‘key part’ that determines the number of remanufactured products to make as well as the fact that the availability of cores does not impact the EOL policy type for a product. Our analysis also enables mapping of product characteristics onto corresponding EOL policy types.     

Pricing and production decisions in a closed-loop supply chain considering strategic consumers and technology licensing

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a third party in which the manufacturer licenses the third party to undertake remanufacturing activities in the presence of strategic consumers. We analyse the impacts of strategic consumer behaviour and the third-party remanufacturing cost on three kinds of remanufacturing scenarios, namely no-remanufacturing, partial-remanufacturing and full-remanufacturing. We adopt a Stackelberg game to obtain the equilibrium strategies of each remanufacturing model and show that the demand of new products decreases and the demand of remanufactured products increases as consumers become more strategic. Considering the manufacturer’s profit decrease due to strategic consumer behaviour, the manufacturer suffers a smaller profit loss when he licenses the third party to remanufacture because he can charge a higher licensing fee from the third party to share remanufacturing revenues. Moreover, the manufacturer prefers the third-party remanufacturing mode rather than the manufacturer–remanufacturing mode if the third-party remanufacturing cost is relatively low and remanufacturing can always bring a profit increase to both the manufacturer and the third party.