A communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol

Three-party password authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols allow two users (clients) to establish a session key through an authentication server over an insecure channel. Clients only share an easy-to-remember password with the trusted server. In the related literature, most schemes employ the server public keys to ensure the identities of both the servers and symmetric cryptosystems to encrypt the messages. This paper describes an efficient 3PAKE based on LHL-3PAKE proposed by Lee et al. Our 3PAKE requires neither the server public keys nor symmetric cryptosystems such as DES. The formal proof of security of our 3PAKE is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model along with a parallel version of the proposed 3PAKE. The comparisons have shown that our 3PAKE is more practical than other 3PAKEs.     

A round-optimal three-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol

In this paper, we propose a round-optimal identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol for a three-party setting in which three parties can actually transmit messages simultaneously. We then give its security proof in the random oracle model under the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption.     

A round- and computation-efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol

In three-party authenticated key exchange protocols, each client shares a secret only with a trusted server with assists in generating a session key used for securely sending messages between two communication clients. Compared with two-party authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must share a secret with each other, a three-party protocol does not cause any key management problem for the parties. In the literature, mainly there exist three issues in three-party authenticated key exchange protocols are discussed that need to be further improved: (1) to reduce latency, communication steps in the protocol should be as parallel as possible; (2) as the existence of a security-sensitive table on the server side may cause the server to become compromised, the table should be removed; (3) resources required for computation should be as few as possible to avoid the protocol to become an efficiency bottleneck. In various applications over networks, a quick response is required especially by light-weight clients in the mobile e-commerce. In this paper, a round- and computation-efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed which fulfils all of the above mentioned requirements.     

An novel three-party authenticated key exchange protocol using one-time key

Three-party authenticated key exchange protocol (3PAKE) is an important cryptographic technique for secure communication which allows two parties to agree a new secure session key with the help of a trusted server. In this paper, we propose a new three-party authenticated key exchange protocol which aims to achieve more efficiency with the same security level of other existing 3PAKE protocols. Security analysis and formal verification using AVISPA tools show that the proposed protocol is secure against various known attacks. Comparing with other typical 3PAKE protocols, the proposed protocol is more efficient with less computation complexity.     

Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol

A three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol is a useful mechanism to establish a secure session key in a network. However, most current 3PAKE protocols only achieve “heuristic” security; the underlying hardness assumptions of these protocols are not perfect. We propose a 3PAKE protocol which is provably secure if the Diffie–Hellman problem is computationally infeasible (the CDH assumption), even in the 3eCK model where the adversary is allowed to make more queries and have more freedom than previous models. In our formal proof, we use the trapdoor test technique introduced by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup to construct an efficient decision oracle. As far as we know, our protocol is the first provably secure 3PAKE protocol based on the CDH assumption and the first 3PAKE protocol using the trapdoor test technique for the security proof.     

Efficient three-party authenticated key agreement protocol in certificateless cryptography

Key agreement protocols are multi-party protocols in which entities exchange public information allowing them to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities and which cannot be predetermined by any party. Key agreement can be achieved using a public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography. However, the former suffers from a heavy certificate management burden, while the latter is subject to the so-called key escrow problem. Recently, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced to mitigate these limitations. In this paper, we introduce the notion of three-party authenticated key agreement into CL-PKC and propose a concrete certificateless three-party authenticated key agreement protocol. We show that the proposed protocol is secure (i.e. conforms to defined security attributes) while being efficient.     

Efficient and secure three-party authenticated key exchange protocol for mobile environments

Yang and Chang (2009) proposed a three-party authenticated key exchange protocol for securing communications in mobile-commerce environments. Their protocol reduces computation and communication costs by employing elliptic curve cryptosystems. However, Tan (2010) pointed out that Yang and Chang (2009)’s protocol cannot withstand impersonation and parallel attacks, and further proposed an enhanced protocol to resist these attacks. This paper demonstrates that Tan (2010)’s approach still suffers from impersonation attacks, and presents an efficient and secure three-party authenticated key exchange protocol to overcome shown weaknesses.     

New identity-based three-party authenticated key agreement protocol with provable security

Key agreement allows multi-parties exchanging public information to create a common secret key that is known only to those entities over an insecure network. In the recent years, several identity-based (ID-based) authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed and most of them broken. In this paper, we formalize the security model of ID-based authenticated tripartite key agreement protocol and propose a provably secure ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol for three parties with formal security proof under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Experimental results by using the AVISPA tool show that the proposed protocol is secure against various malicious attacks.     

新的基于椭圆曲线的三方口令认证密钥协商协议

口令认证密钥协商使得参与通信的用户用一个低熵的口令就可以实现实体认证,并能通过不安全的信道安全地生成共享的高熵会话密钥。为此,设计了一种新的基于椭圆曲线的三方口令认证密钥协商协议,新协议将参与者的口令巧妙地隐藏在传输的消息中,确保了口令的安全性。新协议的安全性基于椭圆曲线离散对数问题,服务器并不需要完全可信。安全性分析和性能分析显示,新协议以较低的代价实现了通信双方的安全通信。     

Security weakness in a three-party pairing-based protocol for password authenticated key exchange

Authentication and key exchange are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks. Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange are designed to work even when user authentication is done via the use of passwords drawn from a small known set of values. Recently, Wen et al. (H.-A. Wen, T.-F. Lee, T. Hwang, Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing, IEE Proceedings—Communications 152 (2) (2005) 138-143) proposed a new protocol for password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting, where the clients trying to establish a common secret key do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Wen et al.’s protocol carries a claimed proof of security in a formal model of communication and adversarial capabilities. However, this work shows that the protocol for three-party key exchange is completely insecure and the claim of provable security is seriously incorrect. We conduct a detailed analysis of flaws in the protocol and its security proof, in the hope that no similar mistakes are made in the future.     

新型三方口令认证密钥协商协议的安全性分析与改进

口令认证密钥协商(PAKA)是认证密钥协商(AKA)中的重要分支之一。研究了一种新型三方口令认证密钥协商--3REKA的安全性,发现如果参与双方的验证值丢失,将导致严重的中间人攻击,这一攻击的结果是敌手可以与参与者各自建立独立的会话密钥。描述了这一攻击,并对原协议进行了改进,提出了I-3REKA协议。安全性和性能分析表明,所提出的协议以较低的计算量实现了参与双方的安全通信。     

An efficient password-based three-party authenticated multiple key exchange protocol for wireless mobile networks

With the rapid development of wireless mobile communication, the password-based three-party authenticated key exchange protocol has attracted an increasing amount of attention. To generate more session keys at one time for different applications, Li et al. proposed a password-based three-party authenticated multiple key exchange (3PAMKE) protocol for wireless mobile networks. They claimed that their protocol could withstand various attacks. In this paper, we will show Li et al.’s protocol is not secure off-line password guessing. Furthermore, we proposed an improved 3PAMKE protocol to overcome weakness in Li et al.’s protocol. Security analysis and performance analysis shows our protocol not only overcomes security weakness, but also has better performance. Therefore, our protocol is more suitable for wireless mobile networks.     

Provably secure three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model

Three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is a very practical mechanism to establish secure session key through authenticating each other with the help of a trusted server. Most three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols only guarantee security in the random oracle model. However, a random oracle based cryptographic construction may be insecure when the oracle is replaced by real function. Moreover, some previous unknown attacks appear with the advance of the adversary capability. Therefore, a suitable standard model which can imitate a wider variety of attack scenarios for 3PAKE protocol is needed. Aim at resisting dictionary attack, unknown key-share attack and password-compromise impersonation attack, an expanded standard model for 3PAKE protocol is given. Meanwhile, through applying ElGamal encryption scheme and pseudorandom function, a specific three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed. The security of the proposed protocol is proven in the new standard model. The result shows that the present protocol has stronger security by comparing with other existing protocols, which covers the following security properties: (1) semantic security, (2) key privacy, (3) client-to-server authentication, (4) mutual authentication, (5) resistance to various known attacks, and (6) forward security.     

一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议的安全性分析

2010年,Mohammad等人提出了一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议(MOHAMMAD Z, CHEN Y, HSU C, et al. Cryptanalysis and enhancement of two-pass authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocols. IETE Technical Review, 2010,27(3):252-65)。新协议以较高的运算效率实现了参与者双方的身份认证和密钥协商。对该协议的单轮版本进行了安全性分析,通过模拟协议中某些信息丢失后协议双方的通信过程,发现如果协议中的一些秘密信息丢失,敌手可以发起信息泄露伪装攻击、密钥泄露伪装攻击和一般定义下的伪装攻击,也无法抵抗中间人攻击。这些攻击都可以使得敌手冒充合法参与者发起或回应会话。     

An efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol using elliptic curve cryptography for mobile-commerce environments

For secure communications in public network environments, various three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols are proposed to provide the transaction confidentiality and efficiency. In 2008, Chen et al. proposed a round-efficient 3PAKE protocol to provide the computation and communication efficiency for user authentication and session key exchange. However, we discover that the computation costs and communication loads of their protocol are still high so that it cannot be applied to mobile communications. Therefore, we propose an efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol based upon elliptic curve cryptography for mobile-commerce environments. Because the elliptic curve cryptography is used, the proposed 3PAKE protocol has low computation costs and light communication loads. Compared with Chen et al.’s protocol, the proposed protocol is more suitable and practical for mobile-commerce environments.     

Security analysis and improvements of a communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol

Three-party password-authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols allow two clients to establish secure communication channels over a public network merely by sharing a human-memorable (low-entropy) password with a trusted server. In this paper, we first show that the 3PAKE protocol introduced by Chang, Hwang, and Yang is insecure against even passive attackers. Thereafter, we propose two kinds of improvement that can remedy the security flaw in their protocol. Finally, we present simulations to measure the execution time to show the efficiency of our two improvements.     

Robust biometric-based three-party authenticated key establishment protocols

This paper proposes secure and efficient biometric-based three-party authenticated key establishment (B3AKE) protocols to minimize the computation costs of each participant and fit three-party communication. The proposed B3AKE protocols adopts a three-factor authentication mechanism which uses biometric, token, and passwords for users unlike the related protocols. In addition, the proposed B3AKE protocols are composed of four sub-protocols, which are registration, biometric-based three-party authenticated key transport, biometric-based three-party authenticated key agreement (B3AKA), and password update. In order to exploit the key block size, speed, and security jointly, the proposed B3AKA protocol is based on symmetric key cryptosystems and elliptic curve cryptography. As a result, the proposed B3AKE protocols not only are secure against well-known cryptographical attacks but also provide perfect forward secrecy. Furthermore, the number of rounds is smaller by one round than the related protocols and the asymmetric key encryption/decryption operations do not need to establish a session key and authenticate between two users and a server. Thus, the proposed B3AKE protocols are very useful in limited computation and communication resource environments to access remote information systems since it provides security, reliability, and efficiency.     

基于RLWE的双因子三方认证密钥交换协议

为了使格上Diffie-Hellman式密钥交换协议能够实现认证性并且适用于客户-服务器-客户模式的大规模通信,提出了一个基于环上误差学习RLWE的双因子三方认证密钥交换协议。该协议将口令和生物特征作为客户的长期密钥,实现服务器对客户的显式身份认证。首先利用环上误差学习的困难问题的优势（密钥及密文尺寸短、运行效率高）来构造密码体制;其次服务器通过口令和生物特征的哈希值传递环元素,并结合丁式错误协调机制使得通信方获得随机均匀的会话密钥。最后分析表明,该协议适用于大规模通信,提高了通信量,具有更高的安全属性,可以抵抗口令泄露用户假冒攻击。     

改进的三方口令认证密钥交换协议

基于三方的口令认证密钥交换（3PAKE）协议是客户通过与可信服务器共享一个口令验证元,在两客户进行通信时通过此可信服务器进行会话密钥的建立与共享,从而进行通信。首先对李文敏等人提出的协议进行安全性分析,发现该协议易受离线字典攻击和服务器泄露攻击。提出了一个改进协议,该协议能够提供双向认证、会话密钥机密性和前向安全性,能够有效抵抗多种攻击,包括离线字典攻击和服务器泄露攻击。     

Secure three-party key distribution protocol for fast network access in EAP-based wireless networks

In this paper, we present a solution that reduces the time spent on providing network access in multi-domain mobile networks where the authentication process is based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). The goal is to achieve fast and smooth handoffs by reducing the latency added by the authentication process. This process is typically required when a mobile user moves from one authenticator to another regardless of whether the new authenticator is in the same domain (intra-domain) or different domain (inter-domain). To achieve an efficient solution to this problem, it has been generally recognized that a fast and secure key distribution process is required. We propose a new fast re-authentication architecture that employs a secure three-party key distribution protocol which reduces the number of message exchanges during the network access control process. Our approach is proved to preserve security and verified by means of a formal tool. The resulting performance benefits are shown through our extensive simulations.