People's hypercorrection of high-confidence errors: Did they know it all along?

This study investigated the “knew it all along” explanation of the hypercorrection effect. The hypercorrection effect refers to the finding that when people are given corrective feedback, errors that are committed with high confidence are easier to correct than low-confidence errors. Experiment 1 showed that people were more likely to claim that they knew it all along when they were given the answers to high-confidence errors as compared with low-confidence errors. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated whether people really did know the correct answers before being told or whether the claim in Experiment 1 was mere hindsight bias. Experiment 2 showed that (a) participants were more likely to choose the correct answer in a 2nd guess multiple-choice test when they had expressed an error with high rather than low confidence and (b) that they were more likely to generate the correct answers to high-confidence as compared with low-confidence errors after being told they were wrong and to try again. Experiment 3 showed that (c) people were more likely to produce the correct answer when given a 2-letter cue to high- rather than low-confidence errors and that (d) when feedback was scaffolded by presenting the target letters 1 by 1, people needed fewer such letter prompts to reach the correct answers when they had committed high- rather than low-confidence errors. These results converge on the conclusion that when people said that they knew it all along, they were right. This knowledge, no doubt, contributes to why they are able to correct those high-confidence errors so easily. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple confidence estimates as indices of eyewitness memory.

Eyewitness identification decisions are vulnerable to various influences on witnesses' decision criteria that contribute to false identifications of innocent suspects and failures to choose perpetrators. An alternative procedure using confidence estimates to assess the degree of match between novel and previously viewed faces was investigated. Classification algorithms were applied to participants' confidence data to determine when a confidence value or pattern of confidence values indicated a positive response. Experiment 1 compared confidence group classification accuracy with a binary decision control group's accuracy on a standard old-new face recognition task and found superior accuracy for the confidence group for target-absent trials but not for target-present trials. Experiment 2 used a face mini-lineup task and found reduced target-present accuracy offset by large gains in target-absent accuracy. Using a standard lineup paradigm, Experiments 3 and 4 also found improved classification accuracy for target-absent lineups and, with a more sophisticated algorithm, for target-present lineups. This demonstrates the accessibility of evidence for recognition memory decisions and points to a more sensitive index of memory quality than is afforded by binary decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Impaired Implicit Memory for Gist Information in Amnesia.

In 2 experiments using a converging associates paradigm, the authors evaluated implicit memory for gist information in amnesic patients. In Experiment 1, participants saw multiple sets of associates, each converging on a nonpresented theme word, and were then tested using an implicit word stem completion test and an explicit cued recall test. Amnesic patients showed intact implicit and impaired explicit memory for studied words, but memory for nonpresented lures was impaired, regardless of retrieval instructions. To evaluate whether impaired implicit memory for lures was due to accelerated forgetting of gist information, short study lists were used in Experiment 2, each consisting of a single set of associates. Amnesics' implicit memory for lures was again impaired. These results point to an inability to encode robust gist representations as the cause of impaired gist memory in amnesia. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Destination memory impairment in older people.

Older adults are assumed to have poor destination memory—knowing to whom they tell particular information—and anecdotes about them repeating stories to the same people are cited as informal evidence for this claim. Experiment 1 assessed young and older adults' destination memory by having participants tell facts (e.g., “A dime has 118 ridges around its edge”) to pictures of famous people (e.g., Oprah Winfrey). Surprise recognition memory tests, which also assessed confidence, revealed that older adults, compared to young adults, were disproportionately impaired on destination memory relative to spared memory for the individual components (i.e., facts, faces) of the episode. Older adults also were more confident that they had not told a fact to a particular person when they actually had (i.e., a miss); this presumably causes them to repeat information more often than young adults. When the direction of information transfer was reversed in Experiment 2, such that the famous people shared information with the participants (i.e., a source memory experiment), age-related memory differences disappeared. In contrast to the destination memory experiment, older adults in the source memory experiment were more confident than young adults that someone had shared a fact with them when a different person actually had shared the fact (i.e., a false alarm). Overall, accuracy and confidence jointly influence age-related changes to destination memory, a fundamental component of successful communication. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distinguishing Age Differences in Knowledge, Strategy Use, and Confidence During Strategic Skill Acquisition.

The authors examined how age differences in strategy selection are related to associative learning deficits and metacognitive variables, including memory ability confidence. In Experiment 1, increases in memory reliance for performance of the noun-pair lookup task were compared with increases in noun-pair memory ability. In Experiment 2, memory reliance was assessed for noun pairs memorized prior to the task. In each experiment, older adults manifested a substantial delay in transition to a retrieval-based strategy despite comparable noun-pair knowledge. In Experiment 3, young and older adults reported comparable confidence ratings for the accuracy of each memory probe response. However, older adults reported lower confidence in their general ability to use the memory retrieval strategy, which correlated with avoidance of the retrieval strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective information seeking after a single encounter.

In 3 experiments, the authors examined whether a single act of testimony can inform children's subsequent information seeking. In Experiment 1, participants saw one informant give a correct and another informant give an incorrect answer to a question, assessed who was right (wrong), and decided to whom to address a 2nd question. Adults and 7-year-olds but not 4-year-olds selected the previously correct informant. In Experiment 2, after assessing which informant was (not) very good at answering, even 4-year-olds selected the previously correct informant. In Experiment 3, in the absence of external demands to evaluate the informants, 7-year-olds and adults still selected the previously correct informant. Thus, a single encounter is sufficient for 7-year-olds and adults to engage in selective information seeking and trait labels enable 4-year-olds to do so too. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Different confidence–accuracy relationships for feature-based and familiarity-based memories.

Participants studied naturalistic pictures presented for varying brief durations and then received a recognition test on which they indicated whether each picture was old or new and rated their confidence. In 1 experiment they indicated whether each “old”/“new” response was based on memory for a specific feature in the picture or instead on the picture's general familiarity; in another experiment, we defined pictures that tended to elicit feature versus familiarity responses. Thus, feature/familiarity was a dependent variable in 1 experiment and an independent variable in the other. In both experiments feature-based responses were more accurate than those that were familiarity based, and confidence and accuracy increased with duration for both response types. However, when confidence was controlled for, mean accuracy was higher for familiarity-based than for feature-based responses. The theoretical implication is that confidence and accuracy arise from different underlying information. The applied implication is that confidence differences should not be taken as implying accuracy differences when the phenomenal basis of the memory reports differ. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strategic regulation of grain size memory reporting.

To increase their report accuracy, rememberers may either withhold information that they feel unsure about or provide relatively coarse information that is unlikely to be wrong. In previous work (A. Koriat & A Goldsmith, 1996c), the authors delineated the metacognitive monitoring and control processes underlying the decision to volunteer or withhold particular items of information (report option) and examined how these processes are used in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy. This article adapts that framework to address control over the grain size (precision- coarseness) of the information that people report. Results show that rememberers strategically regulate the grain of their answers to accommodate the competing goals of accuracy and informativeness. The metacognitive processes underlying this regulation are elucidated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confidence level and feeling of knowing for episodic and semantic memory: an investigation of lorazepam effects on metamemory

The effects of lorazepam (0.026 or 0.038 mg/kg), a benzodiazepine, and of a placebo on metamemory, i.e. knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, were investigated in 36 healthy volunteers. Accuracy of confidence levels (CL) in the correctness of recalled answers and accuracy of feeling of knowing (FOK) the answers when recall fails were measured using a sentence memory task assessing episodic memory and a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Lorazepam impaired episodic memory. Unexpectedly, it also impaired performance in both the recall and recognition phases of the task assessing semantic memory, suggesting that it decreased the ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect information. In episodic memory, lorazepam 0.038 mg/kg-treated subjects exhibited an impaired CL accuracy, compared to placebo-treated subjects, and their FOK accuracy was at chance. In semantic memory, their overall CL and FOK accuracy was apparently spared. However, these subjects selectively overestimated their CL judgements for incorrect answers; moreover, secondary analyses showed that FOK accuracy for a subset of low-accuracy items was virtually nil. These results suggest that lorazepam impairs metamemory for both episodic and semantic memory.     

Memory without awareness: Pigeons do not show metamemory in delayed matching to sample.

Metamemory, the ability to report on memory strength, is clearly established in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) by converging evidence from several paradigms. In contrast, A. Inman and S. J. Shettleworth (1999) found no conclusive evidence of metamemory in pigeons. The authors studied pigeons further in 3 paradigms, with multiple tests of metamemory in each. Pigeons encountered a safe alternative to a matching-to-sample test either before (Experiment 2) or concurrently with (Experiment 3) the matching test. Choices of the safe option did not vary consistently with matching accuracy or change in trials with omitted samples in the way predicted for an animal with metamemory. In Experiment 4, confidence ratings following completion of the matching test also did not vary consistently as predicted by metamemory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Benefits of immediate repetition versus long study presentation on memory in amnesia.

Objective: This study aimed to resolve discrepant findings in the literature regarding the effects of massed repetition and a single long study presentation on memory in amnesia. Method: Experiment 1 assessed recognition memory in 9 amnesic patients and 18 controls following presentation of a study list that contained items shown for a single short study presentation, a single long study presentation, and three massed repetitions. In Experiment 2, the same encoding conditions were presented in a blocked rather than intermixed format to all participants from Experiment 1. Results: In Experiment 1, control participants showed benefits associated with both types of extended exposure, and massed repetition was more beneficial than long study presentation, F(2, 34) = 14.03, p F F(2, 50) = 4.80, p = .012, partial η2 = .16. Amnesic patients showed significant and equivalent benefit associated with both types of extended exposure, F(2, 16) = 5.58, p = .015, partial η2 = .41, but control participants again benefited more from massed repetition than from long study presentation, F(2, 34) = 23.74, p     

The contribution of metamemory deficits to schizophrenia.

A number of recent studies have demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia display knowledge corruption; that is, they hold false information with strong conviction. This aberration in metamemory is thought to stem from poor memory accuracy in conjunction with impaired discrimination of correct and incorrect judgments in terms of confidence. Thirty-one participants with schizophrenia, along with 61 healthy control participants and 48 control participants with other psychiatric conditions, participated in a computerized source memory task. Whereas no differences in memory accuracy were observed between the group with schizophrenia and the group with other psychiatric diagnoses, knowledge corruption was specifically impaired in those with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia participants showed a significantly decreased confidence gap: They were more confident in errors and less confident in correct responses relative to those in the control groups. Knowledge corruption is theorized to be a potential risk factor for the emergence of delusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory for gist and detail information in Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment.

Two experiments examined different forms of gist and detail memory in people with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and those with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI). In Experiment 1, 14 AD, 14 MCI, and 22 control participants were assessed with the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Results indicated that false recognition of nonstudied critical lures (gist memory) was diminished in the AD compared with the MCI and control groups; the two latter cohorts performed similarly. In Experiment 2, 14 AD, 20 MCI, and 26 control participants were tested on a text memory task. Results revealed that recall of both macropropositions (gist information) and micropropositions (detail information) decreased significantly in AD and in MCI as compared with control participants. This experiment also revealed that the impairment was comparable between gist and detail memory. In summary, the results were consistent across experiments in the AD but not in the MCI participants. The discrepancy in MCI participants might be explained by differences in the degree of sensitivity of the experimental procedures and/or by the differences in the cognitive processes these procedures assessed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strong memories are hard to scale.

People are generally skilled at using a confidence scale to rate the strength of their memories over a wide range. Specifically, low-confidence recognition decisions are often associated with close-to-chance accuracy, whereas high-confidence recognition decisions can be associated with close-to-perfect accuracy. However, using a 20-point rating scale, the authors found that the ability to scale memory strength had its limitations in that a high proportion of list items received the highest rating of 20. Efforts to induce participants to differentiate between these strong memories using emphatic instructions and alternative scales were not successful. Remember/know judgments indicated that these strong and hard-to-scale memories were often based on familiarity (not just recollection). Providing error feedback on a plurals discrimination task finally produced a high-confidence criterion shift. The authors suggest that the ability to scale strong (and almost perfectly accurate) memories may be limited because of the absence of differential error feedback for very strong memories in the past (the kind of differential error feedback that may account for the memory-scaling expertise that participants otherwise exhibit). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Short-term memory in autism spectrum disorder.

Three experiments examined verbal short-term memory in comparison and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) participants. Experiment 1 involved forward and backward digit recall. Experiment 2 used a standard immediate serial recall task where, contrary to the digit-span task, items (words) were not repeated from list to list. Hence, this task called more heavily on item memory. Experiment 3 tested short-term order memory with an order recognition test: Each word list was repeated with or without the position of 2 adjacent items swapped. The ASD group showed poorer performance in all 3 experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that group differences were due to memory for the order of the items, not to memory for the items themselves. Confirming these findings, the results of Experiment 3 showed that the ASD group had more difficulty detecting a change in the temporal sequence of the items. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight.

After having received feedback about the correct answer to a question, a memory judgment about one's own past answer, the original judgment (OJ), is often biased toward the feedback. The authors present a multinomial model that explains this hindsight bias effect in terms of both memory impairments and reconstruction biases for nonrecollected OJs. The model was tested in 4 experiments. As predicted, the parameters measuring OJ recollection could be influenced selectively by contrasting items whose OJs were or were not retrieved successfully earlier (Experiment 1). Increasing the feedback-recall delay reduced reconstruction biases exclusively (Experiment 2), whereas discrediting the feedback enhanced recollection of the OJs to feedback items (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, the model's guessing parameters, but no other parameters, varied as a function of the number of response alternatives. The authors discuss implications for hindsight bias theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Applying the attractor field model to social cognition: Perceptual discrimination is facilitated, but memory is impaired for faces displaying evaluatively congruent expressions.

A new model of mental representation is applied to social cognition: the attractor field model. Using the model, the authors predicted and found a perceptual advantage but a memory disadvantage for faces displaying evaluatively congruent expressions. In Experiment 1, participants completed a same/different perceptual discrimination task involving morphed pairs of angry-to-happy Black and White faces. Pairs of faces displaying evaluatively incongruent expressions (i.e., happy Black, angry White) were more likely to be labeled as similar and were less likely to be accurately discriminated from one another than faces displaying evaluatively congruent expressions (i.e., angry Black, happy White). Experiment 2 replicated this finding and showed that objective discriminability of stimuli moderated the impact of attractor field effects on perceptual discrimination accuracy. In Experiment 3, participants completed a recognition task for angry and happy Black and White faces. Consistent with the attractor field model, memory accuracy was better for faces displaying evaluatively incongruent expressions. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Calculator use need not undermine direct-access ability: The roles of retrieval, calculation, and calculator use in the acquisition of arithmetic facts.

Why is subsequent recall sometimes better for self-generated answers than for answers obtained from an external source (e.g., calculator)? In this study, we explore the relative contribution of 2 processes, recall attempts and self-computation, to this generation effect (i.e., enhanced answer recall relative to when problems are practiced with a calculator). Adults (N = 36) practiced unfamiliar alphabet arithmetic problems (A + 4 = ?; answer E), in 3 learning conditions: self-generating answers through recall or counting (self-generate learning), obtaining answers with a customized calculator (calculator-only learning), or using a calculator after first attempting answer recall (retrieve-else-calculator learning). Subsequently, participants were tested without a calculator. Retrieve-else-calculator learning was expected to produce an intermediate level of performance because it captures the benefits of recall attempts but excludes any benefits of the other self-generation process (mental computation). However, retrieve-else-calculator learning proved as effective as self-generation learning (latency, accuracy, and recall rates on test), and both led to a test performance that was superior to calculator-only learning. We suggest that mental generation processes that involve the retrieval of intermediate products may introduce retrieval interference that precludes a strong contribution to the generation effect. However, tedious mental computation may contribute to superior access indirectly, by inciting automatic recall attempts. This effect can be mimicked by imposing a delay prior to calculator use. Our results are compatible with the view that learning contexts that promote recall activities produce a customized type of knowledge to support cued-recall (Rickard & Bajic, 2006). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Practice effects on two memory retrievals from a single cue.

The effects of practice on 2 retrievals from a single cue were investigated. In Experiment 1, participants were given extended single-task practice and were then tested on a dual memory retrieval task. Performance was consistent with a sequential retrieval model proposed by T. C. Rickard and H. Pashler (2003). In Experiment 2, participants practiced both single- and dual-retrieval tasks extensively. Initially, data from all participants indicated sequential retrieval. However, participants who grouped the 2 response outputs were eventually able to perform the dual task with a latency that approached the prediction of a parallel race model. Models that assume a transition from sequential to parallel retrieval with practice, along with other models that assume an immutable retrieval bottleneck at all practice levels, are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preserved Spatial Memory Over Brief Intervals in Older Adults.

Two studies compared young and older adults' memory for location information after brief intervals. Experiment 1 found that accuracy of intentional spatial memory for individual locations was similar in young and older participants for set sizes of 3 and 6. Both groups also encoded individual locations in relation to the larger configuration of locations. Experiment 2 showed that like young adults, older adults' latency to respond to a test probe in a letter working memory task was negatively influenced by spatial information that was irrelevant to the task. This interference effect indicated preserved incidental memory for spatial information in older adults. Together, these data suggest that initial encoding of spatial information for relatively small numbers of items is largely preserved in healthy older adults and that representations of spatial information persist over short intervals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)