Subjective confidence in one's answers: The consensuality principle.

In answering general-information questions, a within-person confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlation is typically observed, suggesting that people can monitor the correctness of their knowledge. However, because the correct answer is generally the consensual answer--the one endorsed by most participants--confidence judgment may actually monitor the consensuality of the answer rather than its correctness. Indeed, the C-A correlation was positive for items with a consensually correct answer but negative for items with a consensually wrong answer. Results suggest that the consensuality-confidence correlation may be mediated by 2 internal mnemonic cues that are correlated with consensuality: Consensual answers are reached faster and are selected more consistently by the same person on different occasions than nonconsensual answers. The results argue against a direct-access view of confidence judgments and suggest that such judgments will be accurate only as long as people's responses are by and large correct across the sampled items, thus stressing the criticality of a representative design. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An application of the Poisson race model to confidence calibration.

In tasks as diverse as stock market predictions and jury deliberations, a person's feelings of confidence in the appropriateness of different choices often impact that person's final choice. The current study examines the mathematical modeling of confidence calibration in a simple dual-choice task. Experiments are motivated by an accumulator model, which proposes that information supporting each alternative accrues on separate counters. The observer responds in favor of whichever alternative's counter first hits a designated threshold. Confidence can then be scaled from the difference between the counters at the time that the observer makes a response. The authors examine the overconfidence result in general and present new findings dealing with the effect of response bias on confidence calibration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing architectures of the decision–confidence relation.

Two experiments examined the effect of rendering confidence judgments on the properties of the comparative decision process. In Exp 1, participants worked for 12 sessions that required 2-alternative perceptual, line-length comparisons. For sessions 1–4 and sessions 9–12, confidence judgments were not required. For sessions 5–8, participants provided confidence reports following each comparative judgment. The requirement of confidence judgments significantly increased decisional response time, suggesting that some confidence processing occurs in parallel with the primary decision process. Concomitantly, an examination of the properties of the time to determine confidence during sessions 5–8 revealed clear evidence of postdecisional confidence processing. These results were replicated in a 2nd experiment requiring 2 alternative comparative judgments of Canadian city populations. The authors conclude that confidence processing occurs both during the decision process and postdecisionally, and discuss the implications of the present findings for current theories of confidence in human judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence" by Timothy J. Pleskac and Jerome R. Busemeyer (Psychological Review, 2010[Jul], Vol 117[3], 864-901). The name of the philosopher Charles Peirce was misspelled throughout as Charles Pierce. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-14834-006.) The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory—2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory—that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The realism in older people's confidence judgments of answers to general knowledge questions.

The study investigated 2 aspects of the accuracy (i.e., realism) of confidence judgments of persons age 60–93 years (N = 1,384) regarding their answers to general knowledge questions. These aspects are the level of confidence (calibration) in relation to the proportion of correct answers and the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers by means of confidence judgments. No age differences were found for either of the 2 aspects. Gender differences were found for proportion of correct answers and confidence but not for the realism in the confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

REPETITIVE TASK FAILURE AND SOCIOMETRIC CHOICE.

"This study was designed to study two predictions: a) that if failing-persons' expectations of a failing choice of a successful-person were made ambiguous, their choices would shift from choices among each other to choices of successful-persons, and b) that in sequences of tasks and grouping choices, task success is initially dominant over choice success motivation." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mathematics self-efficacy and mathematics performances: The need for specificity of assessment.

In this study, 391 students were asked to provide 3 types of mathematics self-efficacy judgments: confidence to solve mathematics problems, confidence to succeed in math-related courses, and confidence to perform math-related tasks. Criterial tasks were solution of math problems and choice of math-related majors. As hypothesized, students' reported confidence to solve the problems they were later asked to solve was a more powerful predictor of that performance than was either their confidence to perform math-related tasks or to succeed in math-related courses. Similarly, confidence to succeed in math-related courses was a stronger predictor of choice of math-related majors than was either confidence to solve problems or to perform math-related tasks. Results support A. Bandura's (1986) contention that, because judgments of self-efficacy are task specific, measures of self-efficacy should be tailored to the criterial task being assessed and the domain of functioning being analyzed to increase prediction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of three predictors of an individual's memory performance: The individual's feeling of knowing versus the normative feeling of knowing versus base-rate item difficulty.

Compared the memory performance predictions of 168 undergraduates with normative item-difficulty predictions and with normative feeling-of-knowing (FOK) predictions. Ss attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions, made FOK judgments on nonrecalled items, and were subsequently administered a criterion test (relearning, perceptual identification, or 1 of 2 versions of recognition). Results indicate that, for predicting an S's criterion performance, the S's own FOK predictions were intermediate between 2 kinds of normative predictions: Ss' FOK predictions were more accurate than predictions derived from normative FOK ratings but were less accurate than predictions derived from base-rate item difficulty (normative probabilities of correct recall). Subsidiary analyses showed that factors other than unreliability were responsible for the partial inaccuracy of Ss' FOK. Possible ways to improve the accuracy of an individual's FOK predictions are discussed. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Size matters: Impact of item size and quantity on array choice by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

The authors previously reported that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) showed a striking bias to select the larger of 2 candy arrays, despite a reversed reward contingency in which the animals received the smaller, nonselected array as a reward, except when Arabic numerals were used as stimuli. A perceptual or incentive-based interference occurred that was overcome by symbolic stimuli. The authors of the present study examined the impact of element size in choice arrays, using 1 to 5 large and small candies. Five test-sophisticated chimpanzees selected an array from the 2 presented during each trial. Their responses were not optimal, as animals generally selected arrays with larger total mass; thus, they received the smaller remaining array as a reward. When choice stimuli differed in size and quantity, element size was more heavily weighted, although choices reflected total candy mass. These results replicate previous findings showing chimpanzees' difficulties with quantity judgments under reverse reward contingencies and also show that individual item size exerts a more powerful interference effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the genesis of confidence.

Confidence in personality impressions is proposed to stem from the richness of people's mental representations of others. Representational richness produces confidence because it enhances the fluency with which people can make judgments, and it increases confidence even when it does not result in more accurate impressions. Results of 3 experiments support these propositions. A 4th experiment suggests that representational richness is increased by both pseudorelevant and relevant information, but not by irrelevant information. A 5th experiment suggests that representational richness has effects on confidence above and beyond the effects of metainformation (i.e., extracontent aspects of information). The implications of these findings for evaluating evidence of error in person perception and for reducing stereotyping and prejudice are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of virtual sample size on confidence and causal-strength judgments.

The authors investigated whether confidence in causal judgments varies with virtual sample size--the frequency of cases in which the outcome is (a) absent before the introduction of a generative cause or (b) present before the introduction of a preventive cause. Participants were asked to evaluate the influence of various candidate causes on an outcome as well as to rate their confidence in those judgments. They were presented with information on the relative frequencies of the outcome given the presence and absence of various candidate causes. These relative frequencies, sample size, and the direction of the causal influence (generative vs. preventive) were manipulated. It was found that both virtual and actual sample size affected confidence. Further, confidence affected estimates of strength, but confidence and strength are dissociable. The results enable a consistent explanation of the puzzling previous finding that observed causal-strength ratings often deviated from the predictions of both of the 2 dominant models of causal strength. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting the near and distant future.

Four studies investigated individuals' confidence in predicting near future and distant future outcomes. Study 1 found that participants were more confident in theory-based predictions of psychological experiments when these experiments were expected to take place in the more distant future. Studies 2-4 examined participants' confidence in predicting their performance on near and distant future tests. These studies found that in predicting their more distant future performance, participants disregarded the format of the questions (e.g., multiple choice vs. open ended) and relied, instead, on their perceived general knowledge (e.g., history knowledge). Together, the present studies demonstrate that predictions of the more distant future are based on relatively abstract information. Individuals feel more confident in predicting the distant future than the near future when the predictions concern outcomes that are implied by relatively abstract information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Measuring performance efficiency and consistency in visual discriminations with noisy images.

These experiments measured the efficiency of disk discrimination performance, relative to an "ideal" observer, and compared 2 visually dissimilar tasks in which noisy image stimuli were identical for a physical calculation yielding optimum decisions. Performance consistency was measured by estimating the assumed underlying correlation in an observer's judgments about the same individual "frozen noise" images across independent replications of each condition. Larger disk sizes on the stimulus images considerably reduced observer performance efficiency (by a factor of 10) in both discrimination tasks, regardless of the image viewing distance. But even when efficiency was very low (5% or less), performance consistency still remained quite high (about 50%). About half of each observer's inefficiency appeared to reflect consistent (but suboptimal) perceptual "miscalculations" of the noisy stimulus information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why does vivid imagery hurt colour memory?

Earlier findings have shown that Ss with vivid visual imagery (by self-report) perform less accurately on tasks of color memory. In the current experiment, an attempt was made to replicate these results and to examine the underlying mechanism by asking about the error pattern. 14 college students were run through multiple iterations of a procedure requiring short-term memory for color. Ss reporting vivid visual imagery performed less well than other Ss. Data indicate that the high-vividness imagers are not accepting a wider range of choices. Instead, high- and low-vividness imagers show comparable self-consistency, but the high-vividness imagers are choosing responses more distant from the correct choice. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do different metamemory judgments tap the same underlying aspects of memory?

We compared the predictions from several kinds of metamemory judgments (on the same set of items), both in terms of their predictive accuracy and in terms of the commonality of predictions. Undergraduates made judgments about the ease with which they could learn each item in a list (ease-of-learning judgments); then they learned every item, either to a minimal criterion of learning or with overlearning, and made judgments about how well they knew each item (judgments of knowing); finally, they returned 4 weeks later for a retention session and made feeling-of-knowing judgments on every time they could not recall, after which a recognition test assessed predictive accuracy. Ease-of-learning judgments had the least predictive accuracy. Surprisingly, however, the recognition of nonrecalled items was predicted equally well by judgments of knowing (made 4 weeks earlier) as by feeling-of-knowing judgments (made immediately prior to recognition). Moreover, those two kinds of judgments were only weakly correlated with each other, which implies that they do not tap memory in the same way. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hierarchical modeling of paired comparison data.

The method of paired comparisons belongs to a small group of techniques that provide explicit information about the consistency of individual and aggregated choices. This article investigates the link between the individual- and group-level judgments by extending R. D. Luce's (1959) model, which was originally developed for individual choice behavior, to a mixed-effects paired comparison model. It is shown that standard multilevel software for binary data can be used to estimate the model. The interpretation of the paired comparison parameters and statistical model tests are discussed in detail. An extensive analysis of an experimental study illustrates the usefulness of a hierarchical approach in modeling multiple pairwise judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning.

The feeling of knowing (FOK) refers to predictions about subsequent memory performance on previously nonrecalled items. The present research explored predictive accuracy with 2 new FOK criterion tests (in addition to recognition): relearning and perceptual identification. In 2 experiments, Ss attempted to recall the answers to general information questions, then made FOK predictions for all nonrecalled answers, and finally had a criterion test to assess the accuracy of the FOK predictions. Exp I, conducted with 32 undergraduates, demonstrated that perceptual identification can be employed successfully as a criterion test for the feeling of knowing FOK. This opens a new way for metamemory research via perception. Moreover, the FOK accuracy for predicting perceptual identification was not significantly correlated with the FOK accuracy for predicting recognition, in accord with the idea that these 2 tests assess memory differently. Exp II, conducted with 77 undergraduates, demonstrated that relearning performance can also be predicted by FOK judgments. Overall results show that there is a positive relationship between the FOK and the amount of time elapsing before a memory search is terminated during recall. (76 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of emergent features on judgments of quantity in configural and separable displays.

Two experiments investigated effects of emergent features on perceptual judgments of comparative magnitude in three diagrammatic representations: kiviat charts, bar graphs, and line graphs. Experiment 1 required participants to compare individual values; whereas in Experiment 2 participants had to integrate several values to produce a global comparison. In Experiment 1, emergent features of the diagrams resulted in significant distortions of magnitude judgments, each related to a common geometric illusion. Emergent features are also widely believed to underlie the general superiority of configural displays, such as kiviat charts, for tasks requiring the integration of information. Experiment 2 tested the extent of this benefit using diagrams with a wide range of values. Contrary to the results of previous studies, the configural display produced the poorest performance compared to the more separable displays. Moreover, the pattern of responses suggests that kiviat users switched from an integration strategy to a sequential one depending on the shape of the diagram. The experiments demonstrate the powerful interaction between emergent visual properties and cognition and reveal limits to the benefits of configural displays for integration tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fatigue, sleep loss, and confidence in judgment.

Sixty-four adults participated in a study examining the accuracy of metacognitive judgments during 28 hr of sleep deprivation (SD) and continuous cognitive work. Three tasks were studied (perceptual comparison, general knowledge, and mental addition), collectively spanning a range of cognitive abilities and levels of susceptibility to SD. Subjective and objective measures of sleepiness confirmed the expected patterns of increasing fatigue with SD. Participants displayed differing levels of metacognitive abilities across tasks, but traditional indices of the confidence-accuracy relation (i.e., calibration, resolution, over- and underconfidence), as well as the accuracy of pre- and posttask estimates of performance, remained stable over the SD period. The findings suggest that people can accurately assess their own cognitive performance when deprived of 1 night of sleep and that this ability need not be based on subjective estimates of sleepiness. The implications and limitations of the study are discussed and directions for future research are proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributing study effort to data-driven and goal-driven effects: Implications for metacognitive judgments.

In self-paced learning, when the regulation of effort is goal driven (e.g., allocated to different items according to their relative importance), judgments of learning (JOLs) increase with study time. When it is data driven (i.e., determined by the ease of committing the item to memory), JOLs decrease with study time (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). Because the amount of effort invested in different items is conjointly determined by data-driven and goal-driven regulation, an attribution process must be postulated in which variations in effort are attributed by the learner to data-driven or goal-driven regulation before the implications for metacognitive judgments are determined. To support the reality of this process, the authors asked learners to adopt a facial expression that creates a feeling of effort and induced them to attribute that effort either to data-driven or to goal-driven regulation. This manipulation was found to determine the direction in which experienced effort affected metacognitive judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)