Print media coverage of California's smokefree bar law

OBJECTIVE: To assess the print media coverage of California's smokefree bar law in the state of California. DESIGN: Content analysis of newspaper, trade journal, and magazine items. SUBJECTS: Items regarding the smokefree bar law published seven months before and one year following the implementation of the smokefree bar law (June 1997 to December 1998). Items consisted of news articles (n = 446), opinion editorials (n = 31), editorials (n = 104), letters to the editor (n = 240), and cartoons (n = 10). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Number and timing of publication of items, presence of tobacco industry arguments or public health arguments regarding law, positive, negative, and neutral views of opinion items published. RESULTS: 53% of items published concerning the smokefree bar law were news articles, 47% were opinion items. 45% of items regarding the smokefree bar law were published during the first month of implementation. The tobacco industry dominated coverage in most categories (economics, choice, enforcement, ventilation, legislation, individual quotes), except for categories public health used the most frequently (government role, tactics, organisational quotes). Anti-law editorials and letters to the editor were published more than pro-law editorials and letters. Region of the state, paper size, presence of local clean indoor air legislation, and voting on tobacco related ballot initiatives did not have an impact on the presence of opinion items. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco industry succeeded in obtaining more coverage of the smokefree bar law, both in news items and opinion items. The tobacco industry used historical arguments of restricting freedom of choice and economic ramifications in fighting the smokefree bar law, while public health groups focused on the worker protection issue, and exposed tobacco industry tactics. Despite the skewed coverage, public health groups obtained adequate attention to their arguments to keep the law in effect.     

Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry used the "accommodation" message to mount an aggressive and effective worldwide campaign to recruit hospitality associations, such as restaurant associations, to serve as the tobacco industry's surrogate in fighting against smoke-free environments. METHODS: We analysed tobacco industry documents publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA. Documents were accessed between January and November 2001. RESULTS: The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, made financial contributions to existing hospitality associations or, when it did not find an association willing to work for tobacco interests, created its own "association" in order to prevent the growth of smoke-free environments. The industry also used hospitality associations as a vehicle for programmes promoting "accommodation" of smokers and non-smokers, which ignore the health risks of second hand smoke for employees and patrons of hospitality venues. CONCLUSION: Through the myth of lost profits, the tobacco industry has fooled the hospitality industry into embracing expensive ventilation equipment, while in reality 100% smoke-free laws have been shown to have no effect on business revenues, or even to improve them. The tobacco industry has effectively turned the hospitality industry into its de facto lobbying arm on clean indoor air. Public health advocates need to understand that, with rare exceptions, when they talk to organised restaurant associations they are effectively talking to the tobacco industry and must act accordingly.     

Arizona's tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight by tobacco control advocates

BACKGROUND: In 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 which increased the tobacco tax and earmarked 23% of the new revenues for tobacco education programmes. OBJECTIVE: To describe the campaign to pass Proposition 200, the legislative debate that followed the passage of the initiative, and the development and implementation of the tobacco control programme. DESIGN: This is a case study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key players in the initiative campaign and in the tobacco education programme, and written records (campaign material, newspapers, memoranda, public records). RESULTS: Despite opposition from the tobacco industry, Arizonans approved an increase in the tobacco tax. At the legislature, health advocates in Arizona successfully fought the tobacco industry attempts to divert the health education funds and pass preemptive legislation. The executive branch limited the scope of the programme to adolescents and pregnant women. It also prevented the programme from attacking the tobacco industry or focusing on secondhand smoke. Health advocates did not put enough pressure at the executive branch to force it to develop a comprehensive tobacco education programme. CONCLUSIONS: It is not enough for health advocates to campaign for an increase in tobacco tax and to protect the funds at the legislature. Tobacco control advocates must closely monitor the development and implementation of tax-funded tobacco education programmes at the administrative level and be willing to press the executive to implement effective programmes.     

Tobacco control advocates must demand high-quality media campaigns: the California experience

OBJECTIVE: To document efforts on the part of public officials in California to soften the media campaign's attack on the tobacco industry and to analyse strategies to counter those efforts on the part of tobacco control advocates. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with programme participants, direct observation, written materials, and media stories. In addition, internal documents were released by the state's Department of Health Services in response to requests made under the California Public Records Act by Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights. Finally, a draft of the paper was circulated to 11 key players for their comments. RESULTS: In 1988 california voters enacted Proposition 99, an initiative that raised the tobacco tax by $0.25 and allocated 20% of the revenues to anti-tobacco education. A media campaign, which was part of the education programme, directly attacked the tobacco industry, exposing the media campaign to politically based efforts to shut it down or soften it. Through use of outsider strategies such as advertising, press conferences, and public meetings, programme advocates were able to counter the efforts to soften the campaign. CONCLUSION: Anti-tobacco media campaigns that expose industry manipulation are a key component of an effective tobacco control programme. The effectiveness of these campaigns, however, makes them a target for elimination by the tobacco industry. The experience from California demonstrates the need for continuing, aggressive intervention by nongovernmental organisations in order to maintain the quality of anti-tobacco media campaigns.     

Tobacco industry success in preventing regulation of secondhand smoke in Latin America: the "Latin Project"

OBJECTIVE: To examine the tobacco industry's strategy to avoid regulations on secondhand smoke exposure in Latin America. METHODS: Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available through the internet. All available materials, including confidential reports regarding research, lobbying, and internal memoranda exchanged between the tobacco industry representatives, tobacco industry lawyers, and key players in Latin America. RESULTS: In Latin America, Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco, working through the law firm Covington & Burling, developed a network of well placed physicians and scientists through their "Latin Project" to generate scientific arguments minimising secondhand smoke as a health hazard, produce low estimates of exposure, and to lobby against smoke-free workplaces and public places. The tobacco industry's role was not disclosed. CONCLUSIONS: The strategies used by the industry have been successful in hindering development of public health programmes on secondhand smoke. Latin American health professionals need to be aware of this industry involvement and must take steps to counter it to halt the tobacco epidemic in Latin America.     

Tobacco control implications of the first European product liability suit

Objective: To examine tobacco control implication of the first European product liability suit in Finland.

Methods: Systematic search of internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet and at the British American Tobacco Guildford Depository.

Results: Despite legal loss, the litigation contributed to subsequent tobacco control legislation in Finland. The proceedings revealed that the industry had concealed the health hazards of its products and, despite indisputable evidence, continued to deny them. The positions taken by the industry rocked its reliability as a social actor and thus weakened its chances of influencing tobacco policy. Despite fierce opposition from the tobacco industry, tobacco products were included in the product liability legislation, tobacco was entered on the Finnish list of carcinogens, and an extensive Tobacco Act was passed in Parliament.

Conclusions: Tobacco litigation might not stand alone as a tool for public health policymaking but it may well stimulate national debate over the role of smoking in society and influence the policy agenda.

     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health

Objective: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992.

Data sources: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties.

Study selection: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

Data extraction: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents.

Data synthesis: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference.

Results and conclusion: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.

     

"Creative Solutions": selling cigarettes in a smoke-free world

Objective: To analyse the development and execution of the "Creative Solutions" Benson & Hedges advertising campaign to understand its social, political, and commercial implications. Methods: Searches of the Philip Morris documents and Legacy Tobacco Documents websites for relevant materials; Lexis/Nexis searches of major news and business publications; and denotative and connotative analyses of the advertising imagery. Results: Philip Morris developed the Creative Solutions campaign in an effort to directly confront the successes of the tobacco control movement in establishing new laws and norms that promoted clean indoor air. The campaign''s imagery attempted to help smokers and potential smokers overcome the physical and social downsides of smoking cigarettes by managing risk and resolving internal conflict. The slogans suggested a variety of ways for smokers to respond to restrictions on their habit. The campaign also featured information about the Accommodation Program, Philip Morris''s attempt to organise opposition to clean indoor air laws. Conclusion: The campaign was a commercial failure, with little impact on sales of the brand. Philip Morris got some exposure for the Accommodation Program and its anti-regulatory position. The lack of commercial response to the ads suggests that they were unable to successfully resolve the contradictions that smokers were increasingly experiencing and confirms the power of changing social norms to counter tobacco industry tactics.     

Exposure of hospitality workers to environmental tobacco smoke

OBJECTIVE: To determine quantitatively the extent of exposure of hospitality workers to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) exposure during the course of a work shift, and to relate these results to the customer smoking policy of the workplace. SUBJECTS: Three categories of non-smoking workers were recruited: (1) staff from hospitality premises (bars and restaurants) that permitted smoking by customers; (2) staff from smokefree hospitality premises; and (3) government employees in smokefree workplaces. All participants met with a member of the study team before they began work, and again at the end of their shift or work day. At each meeting, participants answered questions from a standardised questionnaire and supplied a saliva sample. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Saliva samples were analysed for cotinine. The difference between the first and second saliva sample cotinine concentrations indicated the degree of exposure to ETS over the course of the work shift. RESULTS: Hospitality workers in premises allowing smoking by customers had significantly greater increases in cotinine than workers in smokefree premises. Workers in hospitality premises with no restrictions on customer smoking were more highly exposed to ETS than workers in premises permitting smoking only in designated areas. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, there was a clear association between within-shift cotinine concentration change and smoking policy. Workers in premises permitting customer smoking reported a higher prevalence of respiratory and irritation symptoms than workers in smokefree workplaces. Concentrations of salivary cotinine found in exposed workers in this study have been associated with substantial involuntary risks for cancer and heart disease.     

Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA

Background: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993.

Objective: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century.

Design: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials.

Results: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme.

Conclusions: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.

     

Tobacco industry successfully prevented tobacco control legislation in Argentina

Objective: To evaluate how transnational tobacco companies, working through their local affiliates, influenced tobacco control policymaking in Argentina between 1966 and 2005. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, local newspapers and magazines, internet resources, bills from the Argentinean National Congress Library, and interviews with key individuals in Argentina. Results: Transnational tobacco companies (Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International) have been actively influencing public health policymaking in Argentina since the early 1970s. As in other countries, in 1977 the tobacco industry created a weak voluntary self regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on advertising. In addition to direct lobbying by the tobacco companies, these efforts involved use of third party allies, public relations campaigns, and scientific and medical consultants. During the 1980s and 1990s efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified, but the organised tobacco industry prevented its enactment. There has been no national activity to decrease exposure to secondhand smoke. Conclusions: The tobacco industry, working through its local subsidiaries, has subverted meaningful tobacco control legislation in Argentina using the same strategies as in the USA and other countries. As a result, tobacco control in Argentina remains governed by a national law that is weak and restricted in its scope.     

Tobacco industry efforts hindering enforcement of the ban on tobacco sales to minors: actions speak louder than words

OBJECTIVE: The tobacco manufacturers state that they want to see laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco to minors enacted and enforced. Our purpose was to compare these public statements with the US tobacco industry's legislative agenda at the federal and state levels. DESIGN: A review of the industry's comments to the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regarding proposed federal regulations, and an analysis of pro-tobacco state legislation concerning tobacco sales to minors. RESULTS: The industry is strongly opposed to federal regulations requiring states to effectively enforce their laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors. A food industry newsletter reports that the Tobacco Institute has circulated a model state bill concerning underage tobacco sales. Striking similarities between bills from several states would seem to confirm this report. These bills strip communities of enforcement authority while making effective enforcement by state officials virtually impossible. CONCLUSION: The evidence strongly suggests an industry strategy to undermine efforts to enforce laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors. As has been the case in the past, the tobacco industry is publicly endorsing a socially responsible goal while apparently taking action behind the scenes to ensure that the goal is not achieved.


     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Push or be punished: tobacco industry documents reveal aggression against businesses that discourage tobacco use

OBJECTIVE: To learn how the tobacco industry reacted to businesses' voluntarily enacting policies to discourage tobacco use and minimise exposure of employees and patrons to secondhand smoke. DATA SOURCES: Internal tobacco industry documents discovered among those posted on the internet. Approximately 24 million documents have been posted as of this writing. Information in this article was culled from among these documents, which have been made public as a unique requirement of the state of Minnesota's settlement with the industry. STUDY SELECTION: Those documents were used that offered insight into, and which gave a perspective on, the industry's attitudes and reactions toward other businesses as they adopted tobacco-free policies. CONCLUSIONS: In the wake of widespread acceptance that tobacco use causes illness and death, many individual businesses (and even entire industries) took positive steps to eliminate employees', customers', and facilities' exposure to tobacco smoke. Steps were also taken to discourage tobacco use among employees. Internal tobacco industry documents show that the industry reacted with aggression, and in some cases with retribution, against businesses that voluntarily adopted policies to discourage tobacco use. The intent of these actions appears to be to reverse these policies, with a broader goal of neutralising large scale public and private trends that reflect the decreasing social acceptability of tobacco use.     

Industry Front Groups: A Tobacco Case Study

We consider how industries use front groups to combat public health measures by relating the history of “Get Government Off Our Back”, a coalition created by the tobacco industry to fight government regulation. Using tobacco industry documents, contemporaneous media reports, journal articles, and press releases, we review the establishment by RJ Reynolds of an industry front group, Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) in 1994. The group’s goal was to advocate against U.S. federal regulation of tobacco. By keeping its involvement secret, RJ Reynolds was able to draw public and legislative support toward limiting government regulation of tobacco without having to address the tobacco industry’s reputation for misrepresenting evidence. Unfortunately, the tobacco industry”s use of front groups is not unique; other industries use front groups to fight measures designed to protect public health. Research on the background and funding of advocacy organizations could help identify industry front groups and make them less useful to their creators. Received: July 2, 2007; Accepted: July 4, 2007     

Tobacco industry influence on the definition of tobacco related disorders by the American Psychiatric Association

Objective: The Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition (DSM-III), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1980, included the first official definitions by the APA of tobacco dependence and tobacco withdrawal. Tobacco industry efforts to influence the DSM-III were investigated. Method: Searches of previously secret tobacco industry documents, primarily the University of California San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and British American Tobacco collections. Additional information was collected through discussions with editors of DSM-III, and library and general internet searches. Results: The tobacco companies regarded the inclusion of tobacco dependence as a diagnosis in DSM-III as an adverse event. It worked to influence the content of the DSM-III and its impact following publication. These efforts included public statements and private lobbying of DSM-III editors and high ranking APA officers by prominent US psychiatrists with undisclosed ties to the tobacco industry. Following publication of DSM-III, tobacco companies contracted with two US professors of psychiatry to organise a conference and publish a monograph detailing controversies surrounding DSM-III. Conclusions: The tobacco industry and its allies lobbied to narrow the definition of tobacco dependence in serial revisions of DSM-III. Following publication of DSM-III, the industry took steps to try to mitigate its impact. These actions mirror industry tactics to influence medical research and policy in various contexts worldwide. Such tactics slow the spread of a professional and public understanding of smoking and health that otherwise would reduce smoking, smoking induced disease, and tobacco company profits.     

Gesundheitliche Risiken durch Tabakrauchbelastung in Gastronomiebetrieben

Tobacco smoke is a complex mixture of thousands of components. Some 250 of these are toxic or carcinogenic. Exposure to second-hand smoke is associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular diseases, stroke, respiratory diseases, and lung cancer. In Germany every year more than 3300 persons are dying from diseases caused by second-hand smoke. In German hospitality venues, where actually smoking is allowed, there is a high exposure to second-hand smoke. Experience from other countries, where the hospitality industry is already smoke-free, shows that smoke-free policies ameliorate the air quality and the health of hospitality workers. Separated smoking rooms as well as ventilation and filtration means are no alternative to completely smokefree environments. Eingegangen: 21. Mai 2007; angenommen 30. Mai 2007     

Impediments to the enforcement of youth access laws

OBJECTIVE: To recognise obstacles to the implementation of the effective enforcement of tobacco sales laws and to identify measures that could be taken to overcome these obstacles. DESIGN: Interviews were conducted with health department officials in Massachusetts communities to determine why their efforts to prevent illegal sales of tobacco to minors had been only partially successful. SETTING: Urban, suburban, and rural communities in Massachusetts, USA. RESULTS: Organisational problems, court challenges to citations, budgetary threats, and political pressure all combined to reduce the frequency of enforcement inspections to half the intended rate. Political pressure resulted in the exclusion of older youths from compliance tests, further undermining enforcement efficacy. CONCLUSIONS: Suggestions for addressing the problems include obtaining support from the community, keeping elected and court officials informed about plans for merchant education and law enforcement, using efficient enforcement protocols, setting merchant compliance goals, and advising the public and government officials about progress towards those goals, using older youths to make purchase attempts, and testing all merchants frequently.