The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 batterers—further considerations: Reply to Ornduff et al. (1995), Margolin et al. (1995), and Walker (1995).

The authors address three comments on J. M. Gottman et al. (1995). The authors' Type 1 batterers engage in more severe violence than Type 2 batterers. Type 2 batterers are more likely to have witnessed unilateral husband-to-wife violence in their families of origin. The greater emotional abuse in Type 1 batterers is a robust finding. At certain critical moments of conflict interaction, Type 1 batterers' heart rates do indeed decrease, whereas Type 2s' increase. Type 1s may be vagal reactors (i.e., the heart rate reduction may be parasympathetically driven). Moreover, heart rate deceleration in Type 1s functions to focus their attention. Despite correlations involving physiological reactivity, no empirical finding could in any way exonerate batterers from moral responsibility. Finally, the authors discuss the political, clinical, and research implications of their work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

EBP ≠ EST: Reply to Crits-Christoph et al. (2005) and Weisz et al. (2005).

Replies to Crits-Christoph et al. (see record 2005-04167-007) and Weisz et al (see record 2005-04167-008). Evidence-based practice (EBP) is not a synonym of empirically supported therapies (ESTs). ESTs reflect 1 kind of evidence that should guide EBP. The authors focus in this response on 4 issues: the distinction between 2 functions of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) with very different methodological and clinical implications, problems with the experimental designs used to test ESTs that have unnecessarily limited their clinical and scientific utility, the question of how to integrate findings from RCTs with findings from other empirical methods to guide evidence-based interventions, and what one means by clinicians (i.e., whether clinicians should be paraprofessionals who implement procedures developed by researchers or full-fledged partners in the development and implementation of evidence-based psychological practice). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The use of observational coding in family therapy research: Comment on Alexander et al. (1995).

The author recommends a systematic, context-sensitive method for using observation to increase understanding of how change actually occurs in couples and family therapy. In this method, a task analysis of in-session performances on a specific task leads to the building of a model of the change process. This approach is exemplified in the process of in-session conflict resolution in couples therapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working Memory and Intelligence: Different Constructs. Reply to Oberauer et al. (2005) and Kane et al. (2005).

The authors address agreements and disagreements with the M. J. Kane, D. Z. Hambrick, and A. R. A. Conway (2005; see record 2004-22408-004) and K. Oberauer, R. Schulze, O. Wilhelm, and H.-M. Sü? (2005; see record 2004-22408-003) commentaries on P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002). They discuss the following issues: (a) the relationship between working memory (WM) and general intelligence (g), (b) the reanalyses included in the comments, (c) the use of a fixed-effects model versus a random-effects model for the meta-analysis, (d) the use of structural equation modeling analyses and structural coefficients as equivocal evidence for the relationship between WM and intelligence, and (e) the problem of confirmation bias in research on WM. Although the authors disagree with their commentators about the magnitude of the relationship between WM and g, in the final analysis it appears that all concerned parties agree that WM and intelligence are different constructs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On computational evidence for different types of spatial relations encoding: Reply to Cook et al. (1995).

Computational models in psychology play an increasingly important role in characterizing theoretical distinctions, understanding empirical results, and formulating new predictions. However, the proper use of models is subject to debate and interpretation, as Cook, Früh, and Landis (see record 1995-31404-001) have demonstrated in a critique of neural network simulations reported by Kosslyn, Chabris, Marsolek, and Koenig (see record 1992-37420-001). These simulation results supported a distinction between two types of spatial relations encoding. Cook et al argue that Kosslyn et al's models did not process "spatial" representations and that input–output correlations rather than properties of spatial relations encoding processes explain the performance of the models. This article provides conceptual and analytic rebuttals of those criticisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Structural equation modeling: Reply to Marsh et al. (1994).

In our previous article (B. S. Randhawa et al; see record 1993-23567-001), we concluded that (1) the endogenous latent variable (self-efficacy) mediated the exogenous latent variable (attitude) and the endogenous latent variable (mathematics achievement) and that (2) self-efficacy and attitude were more strongly related to achievement for boys than for girls. H. W. Marsh et al (see record 1995-03503-001) claimed that we inappropriately applied the structure equation modeling and consequently our conclusions are unsubstantiated. We defend our analysis and conclusions. We show that a philosophically different perspective in their reanalysis of the covariance matrices and the fact that their input data were derived from our reported truncated summary results may have been the basis for the differences in their results and conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Our main conclusion stands: Reply to Rohling et al. (2011).

In their comment, M. L. Rohling et al. (2011) accused us of offering a “misleading” review of response bias. In fact, the additional findings they provided on this topic are relevant only to bias assessment in 1 of the domains we discussed, neuropsychological assessment. Furthermore, we contend that, even in that 1 domain, the additional findings they described do not merit revision of our conclusion that the data are insufficient for evaluating the status of bias indicators. We remain hopeful that our review will spur researchers to publish additional tests of the validity of bias indicators in real-world settings and reduce the reliance on analogue studies as an evidence base for their use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to a critique by H. Blanton et al. (see record 2009-06703-001), challenging our previous work demonstrating that an Implicit Association Test designed to assess implicit prejudice reliably predicts intergroup discrimination (see record 2001-11532-008). We outline 3 flawed aspects of the critique. First, we note that claims that an outlier should be eliminated from the original data set are unfounded, and even with the elimination of this outlier, the conclusions of our original work are still strongly supported by the data. Second, we explain that concerns about interjudge reliability are specious and that considerable data support the validity of the judges’ observations reported in our original study. Third, we note that claims of a disconnect between Implicit Association Test scores (argued to show negative bias against Blacks) and behavioral measures (argued to show pro-Black bias) are inappropriate because they neglect the relativistic nature of the key measures. Implications for the relation between implicit attitudes and behavior, for the law, and for future work on implicit attitudes are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparing genuine and simulated suicide notes: Response to Diamond et al. (1995).

G. M. Diamond et al.'s (see record 1995-25469-001) critique of S. T. Black (see record 1993-45704-001) is based on an inflexible and unnecessarily limited model of scientific psychology as a purely theory-driven enterprise. There is more than one way to legitimately contribute scientific knowledge in psychology. This article includes a discussion of the problems associated with their view and a response to methodological and logical criticisms. Research on suicide notes may yet be fruitful and ought not be abandoned. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grouped arrays versus object-based representations: Reply to Kramer et al. (1997).

An important issue in attention research concerns the representational format from which attention selects. S. P. Vecera and M. J. Farah (see record 1994-32352-001) presented results that they argued demonstrated attentional selection from a spatially invariant object representation. In their comment, A. F. Kramer, T. A. Weber, and S. E. Watson (see record 84-18014) questioned the interpretation of these results, and they presented evidence consistent with selection from a grouped location-based representation. In this reply, the author argues that although an absence of spatial, or distance, effects may be ambiguous as to whether attention is selecting from an object-based representation or from a location-based representation, there are computational considerations that favor object-based selection in certain tasks. The author concludes with a discussion of how object-based and location-based representations might interact with one another, thereby providing a possible explanation of Kramer et al.'s results. Such an account may lead to an understanding of how multiple forms of attentional selection may coexist in the visual system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strong rebuttal for weak criticisms: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

We respond to H. Blanton et al.’s (See record 2009-06703-001) critique of J. C. Ziegert & P. J. Hanges (see record 2005-05102-011) and illustrate that their criticisms regarding our study are based on very weak evidence. In this rebuttal, we highlight the appropriateness of our manipulation as well as present reanalyses that illustrate the predictive validity of the Implicit Association Test. In particular, we illustrate that the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior (a) after one eliminates potential outliers using appropriate multivariate methods, (b) across conditions after one controls for the manipulation, (c) when one just examines Black applicants, and (d) after one controls for explicit attitudes. Thus, in this rebuttal, we not only reaffirm the original findings of J. C. Ziegert and P. J. Hanges (2005) but we extend them to illustrate the broader contexts in which the Implicit Association Test is related to discriminatory behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Validity of Dietary Restraint Scales: Reply to van Strien et al. (2006).

In T. van Strien, R. C. M. E. Engels, W. van Staveren, and C. P. Herman's (see record 2006-03905-010) comment, they contested the conclusion that dietary restraint scales are invalid measures of acute dietary restriction (E. Stice, M. Fisher, & M. R. Lowe, 2004). The authors respond to their concerns and conclude that researchers should (a) not have to work this hard to find evidence that these scales correlate with dieting restriction, (b) not settle for scales with only weak validity, and (c) use scales that are consistently valid across settings. The authors also discuss new evidence that most weight loss dieters are not achieving the negative energy balance necessary for weight loss, which seems to explain why these scales do not correlate inversely with caloric intake and why those with the highest dietary restraint scores gain more weight over time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More words but still no lexicon: Reply to Besner et al. (1990).

The major points in the D. Besner et al (see record 1990-27434-001) critique of the M. S. Seidenberg and J. L. McClelland (see record 1990-03520-001) model are addressed. The model's performance differs from that of people in ways that are predictable from an understanding of the limitations of implementation. The principal limitations are the size of the training corpus and the phonological representation. The issue of pseudohomophone effects is discussed, and Besner et al's new data are shown to be consistent with the Seidenberg and McClelland account of lexical decision. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

I am wanting to tell you: Reply to Borgen (1995) and Dawis (1995).

This reply to F. H. Borgen (see record 1995-27394-001) and R. V. Dawis (see record 1995-27395-001)) argues that studying the causes, attributes, and benefits of participants' psychological experiencing of leisure is more likely to advance knowledge of leisure's effects on participants than efforts that recapitulate the study of vocational interests. The conceptual relation of the construct of needs to interests and values is explained, and it is suggested that K. Holmberg, D. Rosen, and J. L. Holland's (1990) taxonomy may lack validity because of its reliance on the armchair judgments of "experts." This article disagrees with Borgen's suggestion that H. E. A. Tinsley and B. D. Eldredge's (see record 1995-27399-001) findings are critical of J. L. Holland's (1985) theory and suggests a procedure for attempting to develop a valid taxonomy of leisure activities using Holland's theory. Nevertheless, Holland's theory largely ignores the amount of exertion intrinsic to an activity, and exertion is the most important dimension for distinguishing among leisure activities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Afterthoughts on counselor theoretical orientation: Reply to Arnkoff (1995) and Gelso (1995).

C. J. Gelso's (see record 1996-07032-001) and D. B. Arnkoff's (see record 1996-07029-001) responses to our review of past research into conceptualizing and measuring counselors' theoretical orientation (J. J. Poznanski & J. McLennan, see record 1996-07039-001) suggest that further conceptual analysis and empirical exploration is required. Counselor theoretical orientation should be seen as multifaceted and incorporating four elements: Theoretical School Affiliation, Espoused Theory, Inferred Theory in Action, and the superordinate component Personal Therapeutic Belief System. Implications for measuring theoretical orientation are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The essential role of behavioral genetics in developmental psychology: Reply to Partridge (2005) and Greenberg (2005).

The authors address the methodological, theoretical, and ideological criticisms of their article on adolescent perceptions of parenting behavior (see record 2005-14938-011) made by G. Greenberg (see record 2005-14938-013) and T. Partridge (see record 2005-14938-012). Behavioral genetic methods have provided unique insights on the origins of individual differences in behavior and, when applied to parenting and other putative psychosocial influences, challenge conventional developmental theory. McGue et al.'s goal was not, as Greenberg and Partridge appeared to believe, to establish the heritability of parenting--that was already known; rather, McGue et al. showed how the relationship between inherited factors and an individual's environment changes during a critical developmental transition. There is a great need for developmental researchers to explore the combined influence of genetic and environmental factors using a range of approaches, including that of McGue et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Schulz et al. (2005).

Reports an error in the original article by Kurt P. Schulz, Cheuk Y. Tang, Jin Fan, David J. Marks, Angeles M. Cheung, Jeffrey H. Newcorn, and Jeffrey M. Halperin ((Neuropsychology, 2005, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 390-402). Some side headings in Tables 2 and 3 were incorrect, and the corrected tables appear here. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2005-05103-013). "The authors examined inhibitory control processes in 8 adolescents diagnosed with attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) during childhood and in 8 adolescent control participants using functional MRI with the Stimulus and Response Conflict Tasks (K. W. Nassauer & J. M. Halperin, 2003). No group differences in performance were evident on measures of interference control and/or response competition created by location and direction stimuli. However, the ADHD group demonstrated significantly greater activation of the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during interference control as well as greater activation of the left anterior cingulate cortex, right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and left basal ganglia during the dual task of interference control and response competition. The magnitude of the prefrontal and basal ganglia activation was positively correlated with severity of ADHD. Response competition alone did not yield group differences in activation." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Darredeau et al. (2009).

Reports an error in "Competition between multiple causes of a single outcome in causal reasoning" by Christine Darredeau, Irina Baetu, Andrew G. Baker and Robin A. Murphy (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 2009[Jan], Vol 35[1], 1-14). The URL provided for the supplemental material was incomplete. The complete URL is http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012699.supp (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2009-00257-001.) A strong positive predictor of an outcome modulates the causal judgments of a moderate predictor. To study the empirical basis of this modulation, we compared treatments with one and with two strong competing (i.e., modulating) causes. This allowed us to vary the frequency of outcome occurrences or effects paired with the predictors. We investigated causal competition between positive predictors (those signaling the occurrence of the outcome), between negative predictors (those signaling the absence of the outcome) and between predictors of opposite polarity (positive and negative). The results are consistent with a contrast rather than a reduced associative strength or conditional contingency account, because a strong predictor of opposite polarity enhances rather than reduces causal estimates of moderate predictors. In addition, we found competition effects when the strong predictor predicted fewer outcome occurrences than the moderate predictor, thus implying that cue competition is, at least sometimes, a consequence of contingency rather than total cue-outcome pairings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Stice et al. (2000).

Reports 2 errors in the original article by E. Stice et al (Psychological Assessment , 2000, vol 12[2], 123–131). On page 130 in Appendix A under heading "Bulimia Nervosa," EDDS Item 8 response should be "greater than or equal to 2." Under heading "Binge-Eating Disorder," EDDS Item 7 response should be "greater than or equal to 2." (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2000-03952-002.): This article describes the development and validation of a brief self-report scale for diagnosing anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, and binge-eating disorder. Study 1 used a panel of eating-disorder experts and provided evidence for the content validity of this scale. Study 2 used data from female participants with and without eating disorders (N?=?367) and suggested that the diagnoses from this scale possessed temporal reliability (mean κ?=?.80) and criterion validity (with interview diagnoses; mean κ?=?.83). In support of convergent validity, individuals with eating disorders identified by this scale showed elevations on validated measures of eating disturbances. The overall symptom composite also showed test–retest reliability (r?=?.87), internal consistency (mean α?=?.89), and convergent validity… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Mikels et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "Following your heart or your head: Focusing on emotions versus information differentially influences the decisions of younger and older adults" by Joseph A. Mikels, Corinna E. L?ckenhoff, Sam J. Maglio, Laura L. Carstensen, Mary K. Goldstein and Alan Garber (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 2010[Mar], Vol 16[1], 87-95). The wrong author order was listed. The correct order is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-06152-007.) Research on aging has indicated that whereas deliberative cognitive processes decline with age, emotional processes are relatively spared. To examine the implications of these divergent trajectories in the context of health care choices, we investigated whether instructional manipulations emphasizing a focus on feelings or details would have differential effects on decision quality among younger and older adults. We presented 60 younger and 60 older adults with health care choices that required them to hold in mind and consider multiple pieces of information. Instructional manipulations in the emotion-focus condition asked participants to focus on their emotional reactions to the options, report their feelings about the options, and then make a choice. In the information-focus condition, participants were instructed to focus on the specific attributes, report the details about the options, and then make a choice. In a control condition, no directives were given. Manipulation checks indicated that the instructions were successful in eliciting different modes of processing. Decision quality data indicate that younger adults performed better in the information-focus than in the control condition whereas older adults performed better in the emotion-focus and control conditions than in the information-focus condition. Findings support and extend extant theorizing on aging and decision making as well as suggest that interventions to improve decision-making quality should take the age of the decision maker into account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)