Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds' imitation.

Children are selective and flexible imitators. They combine their own prior experiences and the perceived causal efficacy of the model to determine whether and what to imitate. In Experiment 1, children were randomly assigned to have either a difficult or an easy experience achieving a goal. They then saw an adult use novel means to achieve the goal. Children with a difficult prior experience were more likely to imitate the adult's precise means. Experiment 2 showed further selectivity--children preferentially imitated causally efficacious versus nonefficacious acts. In Experiment 3, even after an easy prior experience led children to think their own means would be effective, they still encoded the novel means performed by the model. When a subsequent manipulation rendered the children's means ineffective, children recalled and imitated the model's means. The research shows that children integrate information from their own prior interventions and their observations of others to guide their imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The importance of eyes: How infants interpret adult looking behavior.

Two studies assessed the gaze following of 12-, 14-, and 18-month-old infants. The experimental manipulation was whether an adult could see the targets. In Experiment 1, the adult turned to targets with either open or closed eyes. Infants at all ages looked at the adult's target more in the open- versus closed-eyes condition. In Experiment 2, an inanimate occluder, a blindfold, was compared with a headband control. Infants 14- and 18-months-old looked more at the adult's target in the headband condition. Infants were not simply responding to adult head turning, which was controlled, but were sensitive to the status of the adult's eyes. In the 2nd year, infants interpreted adult looking as object-directed--an act connecting the gazer and the object. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Audience-tuning effects on memory: The role of shared reality.

After tuning to an audience, communicators' own memories for the topic often reflect the biased view expressed in their messages. Three studies examined explanations for this bias. Memories for a target person were biased when feedback signaled the audience's successful identification of the target but not after failed identification (Experiment 1). Whereas communicators tuning to an in-group audience exhibited the bias, communicators tuning to an out-group audience did not (Experiment 2). These differences did not depend on communicators' mood but were mediated by communicators' trust in their audience's judgment about other people (Experiments 2 and 3). Message and memory were more closely associated for high than for low trusters. Apparently, audience-tuning effects depend on the communicators' experience of a shared reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's appreciation of the mental impact of their communicative signals

This work addresses whether 30-month-olds appreciate that their communicative signals are being understood (or not) by another person. Infants produce a range of behaviors, such as repairing their failed signals, that have been construed as evidence that they have an implicit theory of mind. Such behavior could be interpreted as attempts to obtain some desired goal rather than as attempts to gain listener understanding. This study was designed to separate listener comprehension from obtaining a material goal. In 4 conditions, children either did or did not get what they wanted and the experimenter understood or misunderstood their request. As predicted, children clarified their signal more when the experimenter misunderstood compared to when she understood. Regardless of whether young children achieved their overt goal, they engaged in behaviors to ensure their communicative act had been understood.     

Children's understanding of the knowledge prerequisites of drawing and pretending.

Many young children will claim that someone is pretending to be something even when the person does not know what that something is. To examine whether children's failure to take knowledge prerequisites into account is part of a more fundamental problem in recognizing how mental representations constrain external ones, the authors asked children whether an artist who did not know what something was, yet whose drawing bore resemblance to it, was drawing it. The same questions were asked regarding pretending. Children performed similarly on pretending and drawing questions, and performance on both questions improved when the protagonists' point of view was emphasized. Performance for drawing improved somewhat when alternative goals were stated. Further, cross-sectional data indicated that understanding how knowledge relates to producing external representations increases gradually from age 4 to age 8, suggesting that experiential factors may be crucial to this understanding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

There's more to the picture than meets the eye: young children's difficulty understanding biased interpretation

5 experiments investigated children's understanding that expectations based on prior experience may influence a person's interpretation of ambiguous visual information. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to infer a puppet's interpretation of a small, ambiguous portion of a line drawing after the puppet had been led to have an erroneous expectation about the drawing's identity. Children of both ages failed to ascribe to the puppet an interpretation consistent with the puppet's expectation. Instead, children attributed complete knowledge of the drawing to the puppet. In Experiment 2, the task was modified to reduce memory demands, but 4- and 5-year-olds continued to overlook the puppet's prior expectations when asked to infer the puppet's interpretation of an ambiguous scene. 6-year-olds responded correctly. In Experiment 3, 4- and 5-year-olds correctly reported that an observer who saw a restricted view would not know what was in the drawing, but children did not realize that the observer's interpretation might be mistaken. Experiments 4 and 5 explored the possibility that children's errors reflect difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge when responding. The results are taken as evidence that understanding of interpretation begins at approximately age 6 years.     

The child's understanding of commitment.

We investigated 5- to 10-year-old children's understanding of the conditions under which a person becomes committed to carrying out an intended action in a series of three experiments. We asked subjects to pass moral judgment on story protagonists for not carrying out an action that, if it were carried out, would have prevented a friend's misfortune. In a commitment story the protagonist agreed to act, whereas in a no-commitment story the protagonist only predicted that he would act without understanding that his friend would later rely on this action. Up to the age of 9 years children thought both protagonists equally reprehensible for not acting. By varying the no-commitment story, a developmental sequence emerged in the understanding of when failure to act need not be reprehensible. Even the youngest children did not blame the protagonist if he never had the intention to act or if he was prevented from acting by external force. By the age of 7 years, they did blame the protagonist if he kept his intention to act a secret. Although children from a very early age have the concept of commitment, the understanding of the interpersonal conditions for becoming committed develops later. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is matched in direct matching? Intention attribution modulates motor priming.

Converging evidence has shown that action observation and execution are tightly linked. The observation of an action directly activates an equivalent internal motor representation in the observer (direct matching). However, whether direct matching is primarily driven by basic perceptual features of the observed movement or is influenced by more abstract interpretative processes is an open question. A series of behavioral experiments tested whether direct matching, as measured by motor priming, can be modulated by inferred action goals and attributed intentions. Experiment 1 tested whether observing an unsuccessful attempt to execute an action is sufficient to produce a motor-priming effect. Experiment 2 tested alternative perceptual explanations for the observed findings. Experiment 3 investigated whether the attribution of intention modulates motor priming by comparing motor-priming effects during observation of intended and unintended movements. Experiment 4 tested whether participants' interpretation of the movement as triggered by an external source or the actor's intention modulates the motor-priming effect by a pure instructional manipulation. Our findings support a model in which direct matching can be top-down modulated by the observer's interpretation of the observed movement as intended or not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's memory for drawings based on a false belief.

In 3 studies, preschool children drew or saw another person draw what they wrongly thought were the contents of a box, saw the true contents, and then were asked what had been drawn and what they (or the other person) had thought was in the box. Children were more accurate at recalling drawings than beliefs. Belief judgments were no more accurate than in a control task with no drawing. Both the drawings and the initial belief represented falsely the contents of the box, yet children had much more difficulty with beliefs than with drawings and did not use their more accurate recall of drawings to help recall beliefs. These results are contrary both to the view that children have a general representational deficit and to the view that having a physical counterpart to belief helps children overcome a reality bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Taking fiction seriously: Young children understand the normative structure of joint pretence games.

Joint pretence games are implicit rule-governed activities with a normative structure: Given shared fictional stipulations, some acts are appropriate moves, others are inappropriate (i.e., mistakes). The awareness of 2- and 3-year-old children of this normative structure was explored, as indicated by their ability to not only act according to the rules themselves but to spontaneously protest against 3rd party rule violations. After the child and a 2nd person had set up a pretence scenario, a 3rd character (a puppet controlled by another experimenter) joined the game and performed acts either appropriate or inappropriate to the scenario set-up. Children in both age groups protested specifically against inappropriate acts, indicating they were able to not only follow pretence stipulations and act in accordance with them but to understand their deontic implications. This effect was more pronounced in the 3-year-olds than in the 2-year-olds. The results are discussed in the broader context of the development of social understanding and cultural learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On cognitive busyness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived.

Person perception includes three sequential processes: categorization (what is the actor doing?), characterization (what trait does the action imply?), and correction (what situational constraints may have caused the action?). We argue that correction is less automatic (i.e., more easily disrupted) than either categorization or characterization. In Experiment 1, subjects observed a target behave anxiously in an anxiety-provoking situation. In Experiment 2, subjects listened to a target read a political speech that he had been constrained to write. In both experiments, control subjects used information about situational constraints when drawing inferences about the target, but cognitively busy subjects (who performed an additional cognitive task during encoding) did not. The results (a) suggest that person perception is a combination of lower and higher order processes that differ in their susceptibility to disruption and (b) highlight the fundamental differences between active and passive perceivers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Wanting to be it: children's understanding of intentions underlying pretense

How children understand the mental state of pretense has recently become an active area of inquiry, with some research suggesting that young children do not understand that pretending is based on mentally representing some alternate state of affairs. Because intention is thought to be understood earlier than mental representation generally, these experiments tested whether children understand pretense intentions at an earlier age than they understand pretense mental representations. Children were told about a character's intentions and conflicting actions, and were asked about the character's pretense. Across 5 experiments, children did not demonstrate appreciation that intention is crucial to pretense. Various methodological factors that might have compromised the results were examined, but to no effect.     

Young children’s understanding of joint commitments.

When adults make a joint commitment to act together, they feel an obligation to their partner. In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether young children also understand joint commitments to act together. In the first study, when an adult orchestrated with the child a joint commitment to play a game together and then broke off from their joint activity, 3-year-olds (n = 24) reacted to the break significantly more often (e.g., by trying to re-engage her or waiting for her to restart playing) than when she simply joined the child’s individual activity unbidden. Two-year-olds (n = 24) did not differentiate between these 2 situations. In the second study, 3- and 4-year-old children (n = 30 at each age) were enticed away from their activity with an adult. Children acknowledged their leaving (e.g., by looking to the adult or handing her the object they had been playing with) significantly more often when they had made a joint commitment to act together than when they had not. By 3 years of age, children thus recognize both when an adult is committed and when they themselves are committed to a joint activity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ain't misbehavin': The effects of age and intentionality on judgments about misconduct.

In 2 person perception experiments, young and older perceivers read a scenario about a young or old female target who leaves a store without paying for a hat. In Experiment 1, the target claims she forgot she was wearing the hat when questioned by the manager. Perceivers thought the manager would have greater sympathy, less anger, and would recommend less punishment when the target was old. In Experiment 2, the target clearly forgot to pay for the hat, clearly stole it, or had ambiguous intentions. In the ambiguous condition, perceivers attributed the young target's behavior more to stealing and the old target's behavior more to forgetting. In the forget condition, young perceivers had equal sympathy for the young and old targets and held them similarly responsible, but older perceivers had greater sympathy for the forgetful old target and held her less responsible than they did the forgetful young target. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From child to witness to jury: Effects of suggestion on the transmission and evaluation of hearsay.

Two interlocking experiments simulated the transmission of hearsay from children to adult hearsay witnesses and from the hearsay witnesses to jurors. Thirty-one children (ages 5–6 years) each observed a janitor either clean or play with toys in a laboratory. Each child was interrogated about the janitor in either a neutral manner that elicited an accurate account or a suggestive manner that elicited an inaccurate account of what the janitor had done. In Experiment 1, adult "witnesses" (N?=?112) each observed one of these interrogations and then recounted what the child had said. In Experiment 2, a 2nd group of adults in the role of jurors (N?=?104) each heard the account of one of the hearsay witnesses then made judgments about what the janitor had done. Jurors were sensitive to the quality of the hearsay evidence. They gave no weight to hearsay that recounted the inaccurate statements of a child who was questioned suggestively but gave appropriate weight to hearsay that recounted the accurate statements of children questioned in a neutral manner. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response control and the execution of verbal rules.

Two-year-olds' difficulty with rule execution is robust and pervasive. In Experiment 1, 120 32-month-olds received 1 of 6 tasks: a task assessing knowledge about a series of items; a deductive card sort requiring children to use their knowledge to sort the items by rules; and 4 modifications of the card sort that provided various types of task support. Children performed better on the knowledge task than the other tasks, which did not differ. Errors increased over trials and were typically perseverative. Experiment 2 replicated the finding that children failed to use rules systematically even when items were labeled by the rules' antecedents. Improvements in rule use seem to reflect emerging control over actions rather than increased representational flexibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Final height outcome of growth hormone-deficient patients treated since less than five years of age

Thirteen growth hormone deficient infants underwent substitutive treatment for a least 9 years, since less than 5 years of age until adulthood. They presented with average growth failure reaching 4.1 SDS and attained an adult mean height close to target height. In eight subjects final height exceeded the respective target height and only three patients failed to achieve an end height within the target range. The analysis of the factors conditioning ultimate stature pointed out that height outcome correlated negatively with chronological age at therapy initiation and positively with height at puberty onset. It is concluded that full catch-up growth to target percentile is possible in growth hormone-deficient children, provided that substitutive treatment is begun within the 5 years of life. This conclusion is substantiated for the first time by data on end stature.     

If you can't join them, beat them: Effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior.

Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responses were specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal Congruency in Bimanual Object Manipulation.

In 3 experiments, the authors investigated the impact of action goals on the production of discrete bimanual responses. Similar to a bartender putting 2 glasses simultaneously on a shelf, participants placed 2 objects into either parallel or opposite orientations by carrying out either mirror-symmetrical or mirror-asymmetrical movements. In Experiment 1, performance was strongly affected by the congruency of the intended object orientations but was essentially unaffected by movement symmetry. Experiment 2 replicated this instrumental goal-congruency effect (and the absence of motor-symmetry effects) when actions were cued in advance. Experiment 3 revealed substantial motor-symmetry effects, provided the movements themselves became the action goal. The authors concluded that performance in bimanual choice reaction tasks is constrained by the creation and maintenance of goal codes rather than by properties inherent in the neuromuscular system that carries out these responses. These goals can relate to either body-intrinsic states or to body-extrinsic states according to the actor's current intentions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interference effects in young children's long-term retention.

Classical interference effects were examined in preschool and kindergarten children's paired-associate recall (Experiment 1) and free recall (Experiment 2). Children in the control conditions learned a single picture list, whereas children in the experimental conditions learned 2 picture lists in succession. After 24 hr, children recalled items from the one list they had learned (control conditions), items from only List 1 (retroactive interference conditions), or items from both lists (modified free-recall conditions). Analyses based on the trace-integrity framework indicated that (a) children were susceptible to interference, (b) the locus of interference effects was at storage, (c) both younger (preschool) and older (kindergarten) children experienced similar amounts of interference, and (d) variations in trace strength generally did not modulate the magnitude of interference effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)