Causes of Delay in Building Construction Projects in Egypt

Delay in construction projects is considered one of the most common problems causing a multitude of negative effects on the project and its participating parties. This paper aims to identify the main causes of delay in construction projects in Egypt from the point of view of contractors, consultants, and owners. A literature review was conducted to compile a list of delay causes that was purged based on appropriateness to Egypt in seven semistructured interviews. The resulting list of delay causes was subjected to a questionnaire survey for quantitative confirmation and identification of the most important causes of delay. The overall results indicated that the most important causes are: financing by contractor during construction, delays in contractor’s payment by owner, design changes by owner or his agent during construction, partial payments during construction, and nonutilization of professional construction/contractual management. The contractor and owner were found to have opposing views, mostly blaming one another for delays, while the consultant was seen as having a more intermediate view. Results’ analyses suggest that in order to significantly reduce delay a joint effort based on teamwork is required. Furthermore, causes of project delay were discussed based on the type and size of the project.     

Contractual Incentives

Contract incentives are the means by which an owner intends to secure certain project goals through the contracting process. Incentive contracting is designed primarily to reduce cost in negotiated contracts through profit sharing ratios, which should improve on the efficiency of cost reimbursable contracts. In the process, financial risk and control are shared by the owner and contractor, according to a ratio which is established in the early stages of project design. Contractual incentives are used frequently in construction to reduce overall project time. However, there is a lack of published research on the theory and consequences of the use of incentives in construction. Studies in government research and development contracts using incentives shows that contractors may not always behave in the fashion intended by owners designing such contracts. The apparent reason is that the risk a contractor assumes under conditions of limited scope and design information biases the setting of targets, so that overruns∕underruns are more dependent on where targets are set, rather than on sharing ratios. In the construction industry this is apparently recognized, and targets are not fixed until design is approximately 40%–60% complete. Moreover, as the contractor and owner attain more knowledge of the project, both parties should attempt to reduce owner risk and control.     

Owner–Contractor Work Structures: Process Approach

This paper describes a process to assist project managers, within owner companies, define work relationships between owners and their contractors for capital project development, and execution. The owner–contractor work structure process was developed by the Construction Industry Institute as a step-by-step process for making rational decisions about the most appropriate owner–contractor work structure for capital projects. A work structure is described by a set of project competencies and the extent of involvement of the owner and contractor in performing, leading, and/or providing input with respect to those project competencies. The process is described using a formal process modeling technique. Three case studies, conducted to validate the owner–contractor work structure process, are discussed. The results from these case studies suggested some basic changes to the process that would enhance its use in practice. A modified owner–contractor work structure process is then presented.     

Finance-Based Scheduling: Tool to Maximize Project Profit Using Improved Genetic Algorithms

Contractor’s ability to procure cash to carry out construction operations represents a crucial factor to run profitable business. Bank overdrafts have always been the major source to finance construction projects. However, it is not uncommon that bankers set a limit on the credit allocated to an established overdraft. Bankers’ interest rates and consequently contractors’ financing costs are basically determined based on the allocated credit limits. Furthermore, project indirect costs are directly proportional to the project duration which is affected by the allocated credit limit. Thus, the credit limit affects project financing costs and indirect costs which in turn affect project profit. However, finance-based scheduling produces financially executable schedules at specified credit limits while maintaining the demand of time minimization. Thus, finance-based scheduling provides a tool to control the credit requirements. This control enables contractors to negotiate lower interest rates which reduce financing costs. Thus, finance-based scheduling enables contractors to reduce project indirect costs and financing costs. This paper utilizes genetic algorithm’s technique to devise finance-based schedules that maximize project profit through minimizing financing costs and indirect costs.     

Cumulative Effect of Project Changes for Electrical and Mechanical Construction

Change is inevitable on construction projects, primarily because of the uniqueness of each project and the limited resources of time and money that can be spent on planning, executing, and delivering the project. Change clauses, which authorize the owner to alter work performed by the contractor, are included in most construction contracts and provide a mechanism for equitable adjustment to the contract price and duration. Even so, owners and contractors do not always agree on the adjusted contract price or the time it will take to incorporate the change. What is needed is a method to quantify the impact that the adjustments required by the change will have on the changed and unchanged work. Owners and our legal system recognize that contractors have a right to an adjustment in contract price for owner changes, including the cost associated with materials, labor, lost profit, and increased overhead due to changes. However, the actions of a contractor can impact a project just as easily as those of an owner. A more complex issue is that of determining the cumulative impact that single or multiple change orders may have over the life of a project. This paper presents a method to quantify the cumulative impact on labor productivity for mechanical and electrical construction resulting from changes in the project. Statistical hypothesis testing and correlation analysis were made to identify factors that affect productivity loss resulting from change orders. A multiple regression model was developed to estimate the cumulative impact of change orders. The model includes six significant factors, namely: Percent change, change order processing time, overmanning, percentage of time the project manager spent on the project, percentage of the changes initiated by the owner, and whether the contractor tracks productivity or not. Sensitivity analysis was performed on the model to study the impact of one factor on the productivity loss (%delta). The model can be used proactively to determine the impacts that management decisions will have on the overall project productivity. They may also be used at the conclusion of the project as a dispute resolution tool. It should be noted that every project is unique, so these tools need to be applied with caution.     

Audit Contract Provisions and Real-Time Cost Reporting in Construction Contracting

With the advent of contracting methods in the construction industry that result in the owner compensating a contractor for “actual costs” as opposed to a lump-sum payment, the owner must protect its interest by taking on the responsibility of confirming amounts actually incurred by the contractor and determining if these amounts are allowable under the terms of the contract. To succeed at such an endeavor, an owner must have a general understanding of contract interpretation, the risk of not incorporating an express audit provision in its contract, and the implications of not implementing a real-time reporting structure. This paper sets forth the benefits of requiring a real-time reporting structure in the owner-contractor agreement.     

A Fuzzy Decision Framework for Contractor Selection

Contractor selection is the process of selecting the most appropriate contractor to deliver the project as specified so that the achievement of the best value for money is ensured. Construction clients are becoming more aware of the fact that selection of a contractor based on tender price alone is quite risky and may lead to the failure of the project in terms of time delay and poor quality standards. Evaluation of contractors based on multiple criteria is, therefore, becoming more popular. Contractor selection in a multicriteria environment is, in essence, largely dependent on the uncertainty inherent in the nature of construction projects and subjective judgment of decision makers (DMs). This paper presents a systematic procedure based on fuzzy set theory to evaluate the capability of a contractor to deliver the project as per the owner’s requirements. The notion of Shapley value is used to determine the global value or relative importance of each criterion in accomplishing the overall objective of the decision-making process. The research reported upon forms part of a larger study that aims to develop a fuzzy decision model for construction contractor selection involving investigating multiple criteria selection tendencies of construction clients, relationship among decision criteria, and construction clients’ preferences of criteria in the contractor selection process. An illustration with a bid evaluation exercise is presented to demonstrate the data requirements and the application of the method in selecting the most appropriate contractor for the project under uncertainty. The proposed model is not intended to supplant the work of decision-making teams in the contractor selection process, but rather to help them make quality evaluations of the available candidate contractors. One major advantage of the proposed method is that it makes the selection process more systematic and realistic as the use of fuzzy set theory allows the DMs to express their assessment of contractors’ performance on decision criteria in linguistic terms rather than as crisp values.     

Conflict Resolution in Construction Disputes Using the Graph Model

A formal approach is presented for systematically resolving construction conflicts. Using an actual case study, a decision support system based on the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR II), is employed to effectively investigate the strategic interactions that took place between an owner and a general contractor concerning the financing of a construction project. The conflict analysis process considers the decision participants, their decision options, and their relative preferences when modeling the dispute. GMCR II is then used to perform an in-depth stability analysis in order to ascertain the possible compromise resolutions or equilibria. In the case study, GMCR II correctly predicts the sequence of decisions that took place in the dispute and furnishes an array of useful strategic insights about the conflict. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is executed to determine how changes in preferences can affect the equilibrium results. This conflict resolution procedure is useful for both researchers and practitioners to better deal with the dispute-prone nature of the construction industry.     

Performance Modeling for Contractor Selection

This paper proposes a contractor selection system that incorporates the contractor’s performance prediction as one of the criteria for selection. This research was developed working with an owner organization that was interested in developing a framework for evaluating contractors for future work. A modeling framework, developed in previous research, was used to develop a conceptual model of a project that depicts a causal structure of the variables, risks, and interactions that affect a contractor’s performance for a specific project from the owner’s point of view. The conceptual model helps to identify information needed for a comprehensive evaluation; some information can be readily available from historical records, while other can be unavailable and can be replaced by estimates based on experience. Ideally, over time, the owner should collect most of the information required for future evaluations. A mathematical component of the model can generate predictions of multiple project performance outcomes for each contractor under evaluation; these predictions and a contractors’ bid prices are then used for contractor evaluation purposes.     

Improving Productivity on a Troubled Bridge Project

This paper presents a case study of a bridge constructed under adverse conditions in rural Florida. The major challenges facing the contractor were clearly identified through analysis. The bridge was constructed by an established, experienced bridge contractor that faced many daunting challenges in the construction of the bridge foundation, ranging from overdesign to the project manager managing his first construction project. However, the biggest challenge was unforeseen site conditions; namely, some of the most difficult clay imaginable through which to drive piles. These challenges forced the contractor into several tactical maneuvers. In sharing both the methods adapted by the contractor and the results of the adaptations, this paper quantifies for researchers and practitioners how a good contractor made sound, fundamental decisions to overcome severe challenges, improve productivity rates midproject, and eventually make the project a success. A seeming disaster early on, the project was eventually completed in less than the contract duration and at a sizable profit for the contractor.     

工程总承包在湘钢燃气电厂项目建设中的应用

业主要求总承包商在超短工期条件下,用10个月的时间完成从合同签订、设计、采购、施工到投产运行全过程。该文详细分析与总结了总承包商是如何运用工程总承包项目管理模式来完成这项工作的。其成功经验可在同类工程中应用。     

Here Comes the Judge—Duties and Responsibilities of Design Professionals When Deciding Disputes

Frequently during the progression of a construction project, the design professional is forced into the role of a judge of project disputes between the owner and contractor. These disputes generally involve substantial claims for extra compensation or extra time and have significant impact on the owner and contractor’s financial position on the project. The architect or engineer will be pressured by the owner, who controls whether the design professional gets paid. The contractor, however, may threaten to pursue legal claims against design professionals if they make the contractor’s job more expensive or fail to give it the appropriate time extension. In many cases, design professionals must admit or deny whether their services were defective in some nature. In addition to these pressures, the design professional is not necessarily trained or comfortable with acting as a judge and interpreting the meaning of contract terms. Generally, when an architect or engineer performs this judicial function, they are immune from any liability for the results of decisions. However, the design professional must make the decision in good faith and with impartiality. In addition, design professionals must only decide those matters that their contract obligates design professionals to decide. This paper will address the nature of the designer’s role as judge and the limits of the designer’s immunity with respect to the designer’s contract obligations and good faith and impartiality requirements.     

Lawyerization of the Engineering and Construction Industry

Lawyerization has become more and more prevalent in the engineering and construction industry. Some would argue the merits of firms’ retaining lawyers on staff as providing cost savings on projects through averting potential litigation. Others view lawyers as increasing project costs due to increased overhead. Therefore, it is important to understand the pros and cons of lawyerization as viewed by the contractor, designer, owner, manufacturer, and supplier. This paper discusses the current role of lawyers in the engineering and construction industry and examines the factors that contribute to the lawyerization of the industry.     

Contractor’s Opportunistic Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Price Level in the Construction Market

The competitive bidding system has been to blame for abnormally low bids, which are considered as one of the main causes of poor project quality. Previous studies have regarded the pricing of bidders as an optimum decision based on contractor’s cost and market competition level. However, the sell to produce characteristic of construction projects may induce contractors to offer a low bid and then make up the amount initially sacrificed from beyond-contractual reward (BCR) gained through cutting corners and claims. System dynamics was adopted in this study to develop a contractor’s pricing model with consideration of the dimensions of cost, market competition, and BCR. The model was then examined by statistical analysis of data collected from 44 highway projects in Taiwan. It was found that the equilibrium market price is significantly associated with BCR, which is assumed to be determined by the strictness of the owner’s construction management, including both soundness of contract and tightness in construction supervision. Research results suggest that contractors divide the market into different segments according to the owner’s strictness of construction management and the equilibrium price level of each market segment varies. The price level for projects with a strict owner is remarkably higher than for those with relatively less strict owners. Improvement in the construction management system of projects is crucial to lower the possibility that contractors gain BCR and do opportunistic bidding, and to further enhance project quality.     

Case Study as to the Effectiveness of Dispute Review Boards on the Central Artery/Tunnel Project

The most prevalent use of the dispute review board (DRB) process in the United States to date is the central artery/tunnel project located in Boston. A DRB is a three-member panel jointly chosen by the contractor and owner that is present throughout the course of the contract, and whose responsibility it is to hear disputes contemporaneously with their occurrence. This paper reviews the efficacy of the DRB on the central artery/tunnel project answering such questions as to whether or not (1) there was any discernable bid savings between DRB and non-DRB contracts; (2) the DRB was successful in resolving all disputes prior to contract completion; (3) were there any barriers to the DRB’s effectiveness, concerning bid savings; and (4) the DRB reduced the costs of resolving disputes. The questions are timely and important in an industry that looks for new ways to reduce construction costs and values timely prevention and resolution to disputes.     

Fuzzy Similarity Consensus Model for Early Alignment of Construction Project Teams on the Extent of Their Roles and Responsibilities

A fuzzy similarity consensus (FSC) model is presented for alignment of construction project owner and contractor project teams to their roles and responsibilities, identifying and reducing fundamental problems of conflicts, duplication, and gaps in roles and responsibilities as early as the project initiation stage. The model achieves its objective by incorporating consensus and quality of construction project teams in aggregating their opinions to decide on the party responsible for every standard task of a construction project. The roles and responsibilities of the owner and contractors are described to different extents using seven linguistic terms defined by triangular membership functions and constructed using a three-step Delphi approach, which allows experts to develop common understanding of the meaning of the terms by determining their overlap on a fuzzy linguistic scale. A modified similarity aggregation method (SAM) aggregates experts’ opinions in a linguistic framework using a consensus weight factor for each expert that is based on the similarity of his or her opinion relative to the other experts to ensure that the experts’ final decision is a result of common agreement. A fuzzy expert system (FES) determines an importance weight factor, representing expert quality for each expert; opinions are aggregated using this factor and the consensus weight factor. The FSC model contributes to the construction industry by solving a fundamental problem for project owners who want to identify and reduce potential conflicts between their project teams on the extent of their roles and responsibilities prior to the construction stage. Also, the FSC model provides an improvement over previous consensus-based approaches, which rely on a subjective assessment of experts’ important weights in aggregating their opinions, and it modifies the SAM to adapt it to a linguistic environment.     

Risk Allocation and Risk Handling of Highway Projects in Taiwan

Risks always exist in construction projects and often cause schedule delay or cost overrun. Risk management is a key issue in project management. The first step of risk management is risk identification. It includes the recognition of potential risk event conditions in the project and the clarification of risk responsibilities. We conducted multiple-case studies using a systematic analytical procedure to identify risks in highway projects in Taiwan, to recognize risk allocation by contract clauses, and to analyze the influence of risk allocation on the contractor’s risk handling strategies. The results show that the owner allocates risks by stipulating specific contract clauses into five kinds of risk allocation conditions. If a risk is more controllable by the contractor, the owner has a greater tendency to allocate the risk to the contractor. Risk allocation determines which kinds of risks the contractor would take and influences the contractor’s risk handling decisions. The analysis furthermore indicates that, if the probability of a certain risk event condition is uncontrollable, then with the increasing possibility of taking the risk, the contractor’s tendency of risk handling changes from actively transferring the risk to passively retaining the risk. In contrast, if a risk is controllable and certainly allocated to the contractor, the contractor tends to take the initiative to reduce the impact caused by the risk event rather than retain the risk.     

No-Damages-for-Delay Clause: Evaluating Contract Delay Risk

In recent years, there have been a number of construction disputes involving no-damages-for-delay clauses in construction contracts. This paper reviews the legal aspects of the no-damages-for-delay clause and presents in an easy-to-use flowchart the issues that need to be addressed to resolve disputes involving the no-damages-for-delay clause. Analysis shows that the clause presents a formidable obstacle for contractors to overcome if monetary damages are to be recovered. The contractor in most instances needs to show that the owner or the owner’s agent caused active hindrance or the owner demonstrated bad faith toward the contractor. The language of the clause is critical to determining the risk it conveys to the contractor. Examples of minimal, intermediate, and maximum risk language are given.     

Analysis of the United States Department of Transportation Prompt Pay Provisions

In recent past the United States Department of Transportation has implemented a number of changes in regulations regarding federal-aid transportation projects. Some of these regulations are designed to help the disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) firms and subcontractors in general, by requiring the general contractors to pay their subcontractors in a timely manner. Further, these regulations require that general contractors pay their subcontractors’ retainage after the subcontracts are completed, even if they have not received their own retainage from the owner. This paper reviews these new regulations and introduces a financial model for quantifying the effect of these new regulations on the contractors’ profit and the cost of transportation projects. The analysis is done using a spreadsheet-based cash flow model that takes into consideration the expenditure curve, the owner and general contractor’s payment and retainage policies, front money, finance charge on negative cash flow, and interest income on positive cash flow, and final payment and return of retainage policies. A survey was conducted among contractors in Massachusetts and their input was used to run the cash flow model. The results of the analysis for eight different projects are presented and it is shown that the new regulations, on average, reduced the contractor’s profit by 4.35%. It is also shown that the average potential cost increase for transportation projects is 0.14%.     

Transportation Agency Use of Owner-Controlled Insurance Programs

Controlled insurance programs are highly efficient risk control mechanisms. With a controlled insurance program, the interest of the owner, designer, construction manager, contractors, and consultants are covered by one insurance arrangement. This paper describes the current state of practice regarding the use of owner-controlled insurance programs by transportation agencies. Departments of transportation that have used controlled insurance programs for their major projects (construction costs greater than $100 million) report that they were satisfied with the results. But contractors are cautious because, when an owner’s controlled insurance program administrator fails to perform, it is the contractor who incurs the residual consequences of increased business cost, and those consequences can extend far into the future.