具有风险规避型零售商的闭环供应链网络均衡分析

在随机需求条件下研究了由多个相互竞争的供应商、制造商、零售商和消费市场组成,且零售商具有风险规避特性的再制造闭环供应链网络均衡问题.通过对不同决策层级最优化行为的分析,分别得到各层级和整个供应链网络实现均衡的条件,并建立相关的变分不等式模型.运用拟牛顿算法对变分不等式进行求解,通过仿真分析了随机再制造率和零售商的风险规避程度对网络成员最优行为和闭环供应链网络均衡的影响.     

纵向产品差异的闭环供应链定价策略研究

为了解决闭环供应链中的定价策略问题,根据单一制造商和单一零售商构成的二级闭环供应链系统,应用博弈理论研究新产品与再造品之间存在纵向产品差异时闭环供应链中制造商和零售商的定价策略。得出了一个合作博弈的均衡解（合作决策）和一个非合作博弈（均衡解斯坦克尔伯格）的均衡解（分散决策）,并对两种定价策略作了进一步的比较,得出了一些有价值的结论。     

Financing decisions in supply chains with a capital‐constrained manufacturer: competition and risk

Supply chain finance is a crucial topic. In this paper, we consider that a capital‐constrained manufacturer can borrow money from either a bank (bank credit financing) or a retailer (trade credit financing). Our analysis compares supply chain performance under these two financing schemes. Furthermore, we extend our model to evaluate the impacts of retail competition and supply chain member's risk aversion on supply chains, which consist of one capital‐constrained manufacturer and two competing retailers. We consider three financing schemes: only bank credit financing, dual trade credit financing, and bank and trade credit mix financing. We find that without retail competition, the retailer is always willing to use the trade credit financing; whereas with retail competition, if one retailer provides the trade credit but the other does not, the credit provider could receive the superior profit. Thus, providing an appropriate trade credit financing scheme is critically important for retailers. Moreover, we find that without retail competition, when a trade interest rate is relatively low, both the retailer and manufacturer could reach a win‐win situation in the trade credit financing. However, with retail competition, supply chain members (i.e., two retailers and one manufacturer) will not have an all‐win situation no matter which specific financing scheme is adopted and only a win‐win‐lose situation exists when using the credit mix financing scheme or the dual trade credit financing in supply chains. Last but not least, regardless of risk neutrality or aversion of supply chain members, their pricing decisions among three financing schemes are similar. This implies that the impacts of supply chain members’ risk aversion are limited in supply chain financing scheme selection. More managerial insights are discussed.     

资金约束下的非对称信息供应链协调研究

供应链金融能够有效解决无核心资产的中小企业资金约束的问题。针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链,考虑了零售商自有资金的不同对融资利率变化的影响,研究了在完全信息下采用融资前后联合契约供应链的收益变化,实现供应链协调的参数和各成员收益的变化,将零售商销售成本信息不对称下的情况作为对比,分析零售商私有信息对供应链的影响,通过算例进行了数值分析。结果表明,在完全信息下零售商存在资金约束时,融资服务能够增加供应链各成员的期望收益,回购契约与收益共享契约组成的联合契约能够协调采用融资后的供应链,在非对称信息下,供应链的效率有所减少,而资金充足的零售商会因私有成本信息获得更多的收益,但是在资金约束时,私有信息却失去了价值。     

食品分销网络弹性设计与公平关切行为研究

研究了竞争型供应链弹性网络设计中的行为运作问题,首先建立了集产品制造成本/仓库运营成本/易腐品配送成本/网络节点选择/零售商公平厌恶成本于一体的整体配送框架。利用供应链背景下的一般运作模型,建立了弹性管理下的竞争型多源网络。考虑多源弹性供应网络下各级分销商失效的潜在风险,并分析了零售商公平厌恶下的消极影响。最后考察了一定水平的期望容忍条件、全球供应链和公平关切对于目标函数、正向架构的弹性运作和供应链成员的影响。     

考虑延时效应和记忆效应的供应链广告策略

研究考虑延时效应和记忆效应的供应链广告策略问题,建立泛函微分方程以刻画广告延时和记忆双重效应对产品品牌信誉变化的影响,运用微分对策理论给出制造商和零售商在分散式决策和集中式决策下的最优广告投入水平、广告排期以及相应的产品品牌信誉,并对不同决策机制下供应链成员的均衡策略进行比较分析.研究表明:集中式决策能激励制造商和零售商的广告投入; 延时效应与记忆效应分别影响供应链成员广告时序策略与广告排期策略的制定,同时,还会影响供应链决策机制的选择.     

Analysis of Factors Affecting the Profits of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Members Under Different Subsidy Objects

Based on the research hypothesis in a fully competitive closed-loop supply chain for mixed recycling channels, different closed-loop supply chain pricing models are established for the government’s strategy of adopting different subsidies (consumers, retailers, manufacturers or third-party recyclers). In this work, we use game theory to establish a price formula, and identify the factors affecting the profit of five closed-loop supply chain members. Through solution verification, the sales channel pricing, the recycling channel pricing and the channel member profit change of the closed-loop supply chain under different subsidy objects are compared after changing only one influencing factor. By providing a reference and suggesting how the government can control these factors, this study can assist the government to put subsidies in place, and optimize the operations of the closed-loop supply chain.     

基于多Agent的碳排放权交易机制建模与仿真

以供应链的视角建立不同的碳排放权交易机制模型,研究不同机制的指标对企业运营决策的影响。采用Repast实验仿真平台进行建模,模型中考虑了供应链上原材料供应商、制造商、零售商和消费者等主体,分别研究了不同主体行为下制造商利润和产品价格变化情况。仿真结果表明了碳排放有偿分配机制以及公开拍卖机制对碳排放价格和企业决策的有效影响,初步验证了模型的有效性。     

贸易信用下考虑零售商违约风险的供应链协调问题研究

本文研究延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的供应链协调问题。考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链,市场需求随机,延迟支付下零售商会增加订购数量,但由于其违约风险的存在,供应商会降低其交付量,最终导致供应商交付量小于零售商订购量,降低供应链收益。要求零售商提前支付部分货款则可以有效避免零售商的违约问题,通过建立延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的零售商收益模型和供应商的收益模型,给出了零售商的最优订购量决策和供应商的最优交付量决策,通过调整延迟支付期限和提前支付比例,使得二者相等,并等于供应链整体收益最大化下的生产数量,实现供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数的敏感性等问题。     

Two-period supply chain with flexible trade credit contract

This paper studies a two-period supply chain that consists of a retailer and a supplier. A newsvendor-like retailer is capital constrained and orders products using a supplier's trade credits to satisfy uncertain market demand. Most existing studies show that the retailer always postpones payment until the due date. To recall the loans earlier, we present a case in which the supplier, as a Stackelberg leader, offers an incentive of a discounted wholesale price in the second order to entice the retailer to choose flexible early payment. The proposed incentive is related to the retailer's early payment time in the first period. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we propose a continuous newsvendor model of a two-period supply chain to analyze the decisions involved in the flexible trade credit contract. The analytic forms confirm that such an incentive can improve the decentralized supply chain efficiency and decreases the supplier's trade credit risk. The retailer always prefers early payment to payment around the due date to increase revenues. Furthermore, the action of paying early might help the retailer adjust cash flow between the two periods. We also find that a revenue sharing contract significantly affects the retailer's payment behavior and supplier's wholesale price. The numerical simulations support our results.     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

基于二层规划的供应链定价决策研究

针对一个单一制造商与多个零售商构成的分布控制型供应链,其中制造商作为主导者确定批发价,零售商确定各自的零售价,市场需求量由零售价格决定的问题,利用二层规划模型研究了具有S tacke lberg博弈特征的定价决策,并给出了混沌搜索求解算法,同时给出供应链成员合作的条件.研究结论表明,分布控制型供应链虽然不能保证系统最优,但却能实现成员利益最大化,因而均衡状态下的价格是稳定的.最后通过实例验证了给出的结论.     

回收数量不确定的双重竞争闭环供应链定价研究

为解决双重竞争闭环供应链中回收产品数量不确定对财政干预政策及定价决策影响的问题,运用博弈论和Matlab数值仿真的方法,构建回收产品数量不确定的双重竞争闭环供应链定价决策模型,从4个维度剖析并验证回收产品数量不确定对闭环供应链竞争强度、销售及回收价格、供应链节点企业利润及社会福利、回收率的影响规律,研究结果表明：当回收产品数量波动较大,回收商和再制造商的回收价格及回购价格呈现增加的趋势;闭环供链中回收商利润、销售商利润以及社会福利呈现增加的趋势,但是制造商利润下降,即回收数量不确定直接影响闭环供链中起主导作用的制造商执行再制造的积极性。     

考虑产品运输过程碳排放的供应链契约协调

考虑由制造商、第三方物流供应商和零售商组成的三级绿色供应链,其中制造商负责生产绿色产品,并通过专业第三方物流将其供应给零售商,零售商将这些产品销售给终端消费者。在产品绿色度和碳排放量同时对供应链的产品需求产生影响的基础上,考虑绿色成本共担合同和碳减排成本共担合同两种契约协调机制,采用Stackelberg博弈,研究这两种情形下供应链的最优决策。研究结果表明,引入绿色制造成本共担契约后,产品的绿色度会得到提高,物流运输过程中的碳排放量不变。引入碳减排成本共担契约后,产品的绿色度保持不变,但是碳排放量显著降低;两种合同都可以提高所有成员的利润,有效地协调供应链。     

Construct the stable vendor managed inventory partnership through a profit-sharing approach

In real life, the vendor managed inventory (VMI) model is not always a stable supply chain partnership. This paper proposes a cooperative game based profit-sharing method to stabilize the VMI partnership. Specifically, in a B2C setting, we consider a VMI program including a manufacturer and multiple online retailers. The manufacturer provides the finished product at the equal wholesale price to multiple online retailers. The online retailers face the same customer demand information. We offer the model to compute the increased profits generated by information sharing for total possible VMI coalitions. Using the solution concept of Shapley value, the profit-sharing scheme is produced to fairly divide the total increased profits among the VMI members. We find that under a fair allocation scheme, the higher inventory cost of one VMI member increases the surplus of the other members. Furthermore, the manufacturer is glad to increase the size of VMI coalition, whereas, the retailers are delighted to limit the size of the alliance. Finally, the manufacturer can select the appropriate retailer to boost its surplus, which has no effect on the surplus of the other retailers. The numerical examples indicate that the grand coalition is stable under the proposed allocation scheme.     

供应链风险传播BSR-RP模型仿真研究

在当前经济全球化背景下的复杂供应链网络中,依靠传统供应链风险管理方法难以进行风险管理,而供应链风险的传播模式和影响因素尚不明确,需要借助计算机仿真方法,对供应链风险传播进行仿真实验。为明确供应链上风险的传播模式和影响因素,对供应链风险的传导机理进行了分析,建立了供应链网络风险传播BSR-RP模型。结合计算机仿真方法,利用Netlogo仿真软件,从供应链整体角度对模型进行了仿真分析。通过调整企业影响力、风险初始模糊程度、风险模糊程度递减参数,探究各影响因素对风险传播的影响。结果表明,企业影响力越大、风险模糊程度越高,风险在供应链网络中的传播范围越广、速度越快。模型从企业和风险的特性角度,一定程度上反映了供应链风险传播的特征。     

考虑成员企业风险态度的制造商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对制造商资金约束的闭环供应链,考虑制造商、零售商和回收商面对市场需求不确定性表现出不同的风险态度,研究闭环供应链如何确定其最优定价与回收决策.首先,依据均值-方差法给出制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用函数;然后,基于博弈论的思想分别确定集中式决策下闭环供应链的最优策略和效用,以及分散式决策下制造商、零售商和回收商的最优策略和效用;最后,分析相关参数对最优策略和效用的影响.研究结果表明,制造商、零售商和回收商的风险态度在很大程度上能够影响其最优批发价格、最优零售价格及最优回收率,进而影响其效用.贷款利率能够影响制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用,且对资金约束的制造商的效用影响最为显著.     

Coordinating a three-level supply chain with delay in payments and a discounted interest rate

Both researchers and practitioners recognize the importance of the interactions between financial and inventory decisions in the development of cost effective supply chains. Moreover, achieving effective coordination among the supply chain players has become a pertinent research issue. This paper considers a three-level supply chain, consisting of a capital-constrained supplier, a retailer, and a financial intermediary (bank), coordinating their decisions to minimize the total supply chain costs. Specifically, we consider a retailer managing its cash through the supplier’s bank, in return for permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The bank, benefiting from increasing its cash holdings with the retailer’s cash deposits, offers the supplier a discount on its borrowing rate. We show that the proposed coordination mechanism achieves significant cost reduction, by up to 26.2%, when compared to the non-coordinated model. We also find that, with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, and that a higher return on cash for the retailer leads to a higher order quantity. Furthermore, we empirically validate our proposed coordination mechanism, by showing that banks, retailers, and suppliers have much to gain through collaboration. Thus, using COMPUSTAT datasets for the years 1950 through 2012, we determine the most important factors that affect the behavior of the retailers and suppliers in granting and receiving trade credit. Our results indicate that engaging into such a coordination mechanism is a win–win situation to all parties involved.     

Analytical Framework for the Management of Risk in Supply Chains

In this paper, we develop a framework to classify supply chain risk-management problems and approaches for the solution of these problems. We argue that risk-management problems need to be handled at three levels: 1) strategic, 2) operational, and 3) tactical. In addition, risk within the supply chain might manifest itself in the form of deviations, disruptions, and disasters. To handle unforeseen events in the supply chain, there are two obvious approaches: 1) to design chains with built-in risk tolerance and 2) to contain the damage once the undesirable event has occurred. Both of these approaches require a clear understanding of undesirable events that may take place in the supply chain and the associated consequences and impacts from these events. Having described these approaches, we then focus our efforts on mapping out the propagation of events in the supply chain due to supplier nonperformance, and employ our insight to develop two mathematical programming-based preventive models for strategic level deviation and disruption management. The first model, a simple integer quadratic optimization model, adapted from the Markowitz model, determines optimal partner selection with the objective of minimizing both the operational cost and the variability of total operational cost. The second model, a simple mixed integer programming optimization model, adapted from the credit risk minimization model, determines optimal partner selection such that the supply shortfall is minimized even in the face of supplier disruptions. Hence, both of these models offer possible approaches to robust supply chain design     

滞后效应影响下低碳供应链减排投入与零售定价

考虑减排投资效果滞后效应的影响,构建低碳供应链纵向合作减排微分博弈模型.运用微分对策理论,得到分散式决策和集中式决策下低碳供应链的最优减排努力投入、宣传努力投入和零售定价策略,以及分散式决策下制造商的合作减排支付比例,并对不同决策机制下供应链成员的均衡策略进行比较分析.研究发现:集中式决策下,制造商减排努力投入和零售商宣传努力投入均高于分散式决策下的相应值;滞后时间存在一个阈值,只有滞后时间低于该阈值时,集中式决策才能提升整个供应链系统的经济绩效.