Psychological mediators of the effects of opposing expert testimony on juror decisions.

This study examined the effectiveness of the opposing expert safeguard against unreliable expert testimony and whether beliefs about experts as hired guns and general acceptance mediate the effect of opposing expert testimony on juror decisions. We found strong evidence that the presence, but not the content, of opposing expert testimony affected jurors’ trial judgments and that these effects were mediated by mock jurors’ beliefs about general acceptance. The presence of an opposing expert affected jurors’ ratings of the general acceptance of research investigating sexual harassment in the workplace. Jurors’ beliefs about general acceptance then affected jurors’ ratings of plaintiff expert competence and research, which affected juror ratings of the probability that the plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The admissibility of expert testimony based upon clinical judgment and scientific research.

In reading the American Psychological Association Final Report on the Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse (J. L. Alpert et al, see record 2000-13581-002), the authors recognized that one of its most important implications for the law is whether and to what extent clinical testimony on recovered repressed memories of childhood abuse should be admitted into evidence in a court of law. A review of the legal literature suggested that the law did not have a satisfactory answer to the question, and that any proposed answer would have to apply to all clinical and scientific expert testimony if it is to accepted and used by the courts. This article uses examples that are far beyond the scope of the Working Group's report, and provides a suggested legal framework for courts to use when addressing both types of proffered testimony across the legal spectrum. It is suggested that the solution proposed is most poignantly illustrated in the case of claims of recovered repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of Daubert and its progeny on the admissibility of behavioral and social science evidence.

Although Daubert (1993) describes a test for admissibility that applies to all proffers of scientific evidence in the federal courts and many state courts, its application has not been uniform across the sciences. To assess Daubert's impact for behavioral and social science evidence, the authors describe and analyze the application of a set of criteria that include whether Daubert has mattered, whether the context in which Daubert is applied should matter, whether one can operationalize the application of the Daubert criteria to predict its outcome in specific cases, whether Daubert can assist in getting admissibility decisions right, and whether there are broader lessons beyond admissibility to be learned from Daubert . (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neuroimages as evidence in a mens rea defense: No impact.

Recent developments in the neuropsychology of criminal behavior have given rise to concerns that neuroimaging evidence (such as MRI and functional MRI [fMRI] images) could unduly influence jurors. Across four experiments, a nationally representative sample of 1,476 jury-eligible participants evaluated written summaries of criminal cases in which expert testimony was presented in support of a mental disorder as exculpatory. The evidence varied in the extent to which it presented neuroscientific explanations and neuroimages in support of the expert's conclusion. Despite suggestive findings from previous research, we found no evidence that neuroimagery affected jurors' judgments (verdicts, sentence recommendations, judgments of the defendant's culpability) over and above verbal neuroscience-based testimony. A meta-analysis of our four experiments confirmed these findings. In addition, we found that neuroscientific evidence was more effective than clinical psychological evidence in persuading jurors that the defendant's disorder reduced his capacity to control his actions, although this effect did not translate into differences in verdicts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessment of the commonsense psychology underlying Daubert: Legal decision makers' abilities to evaluate expert evidence in hostile work environment cases.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court justices relied on commonsense psychological assumptions about the decision-making capabilities of judges and jurors and the effectiveness of safeguards designed to protect the jury from depending on unreliable evidence. This article reviews the empirical evidence on legal decision makers' abilities to evaluate the quality of expert evidence and the effectiveness of procedural safeguards presumed to assist judges and jurors in these evaluations in hostile work environment cases. This evidence suggests that judges, attorneys, and jurors are not particularly skilled in identifying flawed research. Although opposing experts may be able to recognize flawed research, they may be unwilling to testify or their testimony may be ineffective. Suggestions for future research and ways of improving judges' decision-making abilities are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Flexible corrections of juror judgments: Implications for jury instructions.

The Flexible Correction Model (FCM, D. T. Wegener & R. E. Petty, 1997; D. T. Wegener, R. E. Petty, & M. Dunn, 1998) conceptualizes efforts at bias correction (i.e., attempts to remove influences that are perceived as illegitimate or unwanted) as guided by people's naive theories (perceptions) of the influences at work in that judgment setting. In this article, the authors present this model, discuss the general support for this model outside of courtroom judgment, and discuss a variety of implications of this model for courtroom judgment in general and for the impact of judges' instructions to juries in particular. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of jury size, evidence complexity, and note taking on jury process and performance in a civil trial.

A total of 567 jury-eligible men and women who were assigned to 6- or 12-person juries saw a videotaped civil trial that contained either 1 or 4 plaintiffs. Half the juries took notes, whereas the remainder did not. Six-person juries that did not take notes awarded multiple plaintiffs the highest amounts of compensation. Six-person juries also gave the highest punitive damages when they did not take notes and judged multiple plaintiffs. The punitive awards of 6-person juries were highly variable compared with 12-person juries. Multiple plaintiffs also increased the unpredictability of jury punitive awards. Twelve-person juries deliberated longer, recalled more probative information, and relied less than 6-person juries on evaluative statements and nonprobative evidence. Limitations and implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Protecting the integrity of Rorschach expert witnesses: A reply to Grove and Barden (1999) re: The admissibility of testimony under Daubert/Kumho analyses.

The Rorschach Comprehensive System has been considered by W. M. Grove and R. C. Barden (1999) as inadmissible for expert psychological testimony according to the guidelines from the Daubert (1993), Joiner (1997), and Kumho (1999) decisions. This article refutes W. M. Grove and R. C. Barden's conclusions, arguing that the Rorschach Comprehensive System is (a) testable, (b) valid and reliable, (c) extensively peer reviewed, (d) associated with a reasonable error rate, (e) standardized, (f) accepted by a relevant and substantial scientific community, and (g) appropriate for a wide range of forensic issues. In drawing their negative conclusions, W. A Grove and R. C. Barden overlooked or minimized a substantial body of empirical data supporting the reliability and validity of the Rorschach Comprehensive System and misinterpreted the language and intent of the Supreme Court decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The problem of "helpfulness" in applying Daubert to expert testimony: Child custody determinations in family law as an exemplar.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court considered the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 in regard to the admissibility of scientific evidence. In this article, the authors argue that the relevance, reliability, and helpfulness framework adopted by the Court offers little guidance to judges on how to apply its interpretation of FRE 702's admissibility standard. Using child custody decision making as an exemplar, the authors highlight the difficulties inherent in applying the Daubert standard to social science testimony and find no reason to assume that other topics in the behavioral and social sciences will operate differently under Daubert scrutiny. The article concludes by recommending steps that courts can take to improve the ability of judges to apply Daubert to scientific information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Juvenile transfer to adult courts: A look at the prototypes for dangerousness sophistication-maturity and amenability to treatment through a legal lens.

Juvenile court judges are often required to make distinctions as to whether certain adolescents should remain in the juvenile justice system or be transferred to adult courts. Typically, 3 broad factors weigh into juvenile court judges' decision making: (a) the level of danger the juvenile poses to the community, (b) the level of sophistication-maturity of the juvenile, and (c) the extent to which the juvenile is viewed as treatable. In an earlier study, knowledge of forensic and child psychologists was tapped to elucidate core characteristics related to the transfer process (R. T. Salekin et al, 2001). The current study augments that investigation. Judges provided (a) their perspective regarding the core criteria for dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment, and (b) data on the core characteristics of juveniles who were evaluated and subsequently judged to be appropriate for transfer to adult criminal courts. Policy implications for this increasingly critical interface between law and psychology are threefold: (a) Individualized assessments are key; (b) the adoption of a national standard for transfer to adult court is required; and (c) the development of treatment programs to improve the socialization of youth is necessary. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Changes in the standards for admitting expert evidence in federal civil cases since the Daubert decision.

The authors used a sample of federal district court opinions between 1980 and 1999 to examine how judges, plaintiffs, and defendants responded to the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. decision. They found that after Daubert (a) judges were more likely to evaluate the reliability of expert evidence, (b) the standards for admitting expert evidence tightened, and (c) the parties proposing and challenging evidence responded to the change in standards. The authors also examined how "general acceptance" of proposed evidence in the specific expert community enters the reliability assessment and which types of evidence were most affected by Daubert. Even though judges are more actively screening expert evidence, whether they are doing so in ways that produce better outcomes has not been determined. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors' Decisions.

Participants (N=172) were presented with a criminal homicide trial involving a battered woman who had killed her abuser. Within the trial stimulus, the imminence of the batterer's threat was systematically manipulated such that participants were presented with either a case in which the woman killed her abuser during a direct confrontation or while he lay sleeping. Within these two conditions, the presence of expert testimony pertaining to battered women (battered woman syndrome, social/agency, none) was systematically varied. Results indicated that the imminence of the batterer's threat influenced the participants' judgments, but the impact of this variable on judgments interacted with the presence of the expert testimony. The implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of clinical and scientific expert testimony on juror decision making in capital sentencing.

The Supreme Court and many state courts have assumed that jurors are capable of differentiating less accurate clinical opinion expert testimony from expert testimony based on more sound scientific footing and of appropriately weighing these two types of testimony in their decisions. Persuasion and jury decision-making research, however, both suggest that this assumption is dubious. The authors investigated whether mock jurors are more influenced by clinical opinion expert testimony or actuarial expert testimony. Results suggested that jurors are more influenced by clinical opinion expert testimony than by actuarial expert testimony and that this preference for clinical opinion expert testimony remains even after the presentation of adversary procedures. Limited empirical evidence was found for the notion that various types of adversary procedures will have a differential impact on the influence of expert testimony on juror decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Believability of expert and lay witnesses: Implications for trial consultation.

Attorneys are often skeptical, with good reason, about the extent to which research findings and psychological principles may apply to the members of their jury pool. It is important for attorneys as well as psychologists who provide consultation services to have access to base-rate opinions about the consultation issues. This article reports the results of a statewide telephone survey of 488 adult residents who answered questions about the believability of expert witnesses and criminal defendants who testify. The survey questions were designed to provide "local" base-rate data about issues that arise in 3 areas of consultation work with attorneys: public perceptions of witness preparation with criminal defendants, expectations of criminal defendant demeanor, and judgments with respect to expert-witness characteristics that might be associated with being a "hired gun." Implications for psychologists who work as trial consultants and expert witnesses are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Impact of Complainant Sexual History Evidence on Jurors' Decisions: Considerations From a Psychological Perspective.

Although Canada's sexual assault laws have undergone considerable modification and revision since the late 1970s and early 1980s, it has only been within the past decade that a "rape shield" protection has applied to the complainant's prior sexual conduct with the defendant. Although the admission of evidence concerning the complainant's prior sexual conduct with the defendant now receives legislative protection, it can still, under some circumstances, be admitted at trial. Specifically, if the trial judge determines that the evidence pertaining to the complainant's prior sexual conduct with the defendant is of significant probative value to a fact at issue (other than the complainant's consent or credibility) and that this value is not outweighed by any potential prejudicial effects, it may be admitted at trial. Drawing on psychological research investigating the role played by complainant/defendant relational history in people's evaluations of sexual assault, the current article critically examines the potential impact that this evidence may have on jurors' decisions in sexual assault trials. This review suggests that significant dangers are associated with its introduction at trial and also includes a discussion of the legal implications of these research findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding the limits of limiting instructions: Social psychological explanations for the failures of instructions to disregard pretrial publicity and other inadmissible evidence.

Inadmissible information may come in a variety of forms including pretrial publicity and in-court statements made by witnesses or attorneys. A number of remedies have been proposed for controlling the damaging effects of such evidence. When inadmissible information comes in the form of pretrial publicity, judges may issue a continuance or rely on voir dire to remove biased jurors. In addition, it has been argued that deliberations may serve as an effective remedy. Finally, judges may issue an admonition to disregard pretrial publicity or other inadmissible evidence presented in court. Empirical research has demonstrated that such safeguards are relatively ineffective and sometimes produce a backfire effect, resulting in jurors being more likely to rely on inadmissible information after they have been specifically instructed to disregard it. Several social psychological theories provide explanations for the failures of admonitions, including belief perseverance, the hindsight bias, reactance theory, and the theory of ironic processes of mental control. Existing inadmissible evidence research and relevant social psychological theories are reviewed. The article concludes with a discussion of theoretically based policy recommendations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Protecting the integrity of the legal system: The admissibility of testimony from mental health experts under Daubert/Kumho analyses.

The authors discussed to what degree testimony from social science and mental health experts (psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, therapists, others) meets admissibility requirements expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert (1993), Joiner ( General Electric Co. v. Joiner , 1997) and the recent Kumho (1999) decision. They reviewed data on Daubert/Kumho indicia of reliability using 2 exemplar areas of mental health testimony: psychodiagnostic assessment by means of the Rorschach and other "projective" assessment techniques and the diagnoses of posttraumatic stress disorder and multiple personality disorder (dissociative identity disorder). They concluded that some testimony offered by mental health professionals relating to these concepts should not survive scrutiny under the framework of Daubert , Joiner , and Kumho . (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Offside decisions by expert assistant referees in association football: Perception and recall of spatial positions in complex dynamic events.

This study investigated the offside decision-making process in association football. The first aim was to capture the specific offside decision-making skills in complex dynamic events. Second, we analyzed the type of errors to investigate the factors leading to incorrect decisions. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA; n = 29) and Belgian elite (n = 28) assistant referees (ARs) assessed 64 computer-based offside situations. First, an expertise effect was found. The FIFA ARs assessed the trials more accurately than the Belgian ARs (76.4% vs. 67.5%). Second, regarding the type of error, all ARs clearly tended to raise their flag in doubtful situations. This observation could be explained by a perceptual bias associated with the flash-lag effect. Specifically, attackers were perceived ahead of their actual positions, and this tendency was stronger for the Belgian than for the FIFA ARs (11.0 vs. 8.4 pixels), in particular when the difficulty of the trials increased. Further experimentation is needed to examine whether video- and computer-based decision-making training is effective in improving the decision-making skills of ARs during the game. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cross-racial identification testimony and what not to do about it: A comment on the cross-racial jury charge and cross-racial expert identification testimony.

This article argues against adopting cross-racial jury instructions and against allowing cross-racial identification experts to testify at criminal trials. Problems of cross-racial identification evidence are not solved by requiring trial judges to tell juries that all cross-racial identifications are suspect, when that is not necessarily the case, nor by enlisting identification experts to testify at trial that, in general, cross-racial witnesses are less credible than others. Jury instructions and expert testimony on cross-racial identification are flawed insofar as they address generalities; neither can tell a jury anything about the particular identification at issue. Problems inherent in cross-racial identifications are instead best addressed by taking measures to prevent mistaken identifications in the first place, such as improving line-up procedures. Unlike special jury instructions or experts, improved line-up procedures could enhance the reliability of the identification itself and consequently the integrity of the verdict in a criminal trial. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Voice in political decision-making: The effect of group voice on perceived trustworthiness of decision makers and subsequent acceptance of decisions.

The implementation of carbon dioxide capture and storage technology (CCS) is considered an important climate change mitigation strategy, but the viability of this technology will depend on public acceptance of CCS policy decisions. The results of three experiments with students as participants show that whether or not interest groups receive an opportunity to express their opinions in the decision-making process (i.e., group voice) affects acceptance of CCS policy decisions, with inferred trustworthiness of the decision maker mediating this effect. Decision-making procedures providing different interest groups with equal opportunities to voice their opinions instigate more trust in the decision maker and, in turn, lead to greater willingness to accept decisions compared to no-voice procedures (i.e., unilateral decision-making—Study 1) and unequal group-voice procedures (i.e., when one type of interest group receives voice, but another type of interest group does not—Study 2). Study 3 further shows that an individual's own level of knowledge about CCS moderates the desire for an opportunity for members of the general public to voice opinions in the decision-making process, inferred trustworthiness of decision makers, and policy acceptance. These results imply that people care about voice in decision-making even when they are not directly personally involved in the decision-making process. We conclude that people tend to use procedural information when deciding to accept or oppose policy decisions on political complex issues; hence, it is important that policymakers use fair group-voice procedures and that they communicate to the public how they arrive at their decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)