风险规避型双渠道供应链的融资和定价决策

在零售商资金约束下,基于CVaR准则构建了风险规避的供应商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价模型。分析了零售商资金充足时,供应商和零售商的最优决策、资金约束情况下零售商的银行借贷融资、延期支付策略和组合融资时零售商和供应商的最优决策以及零售商和供应商的风险规避程度对最优决策变量和收益的影响。通过数值分析,进一步验证了零售商和供应商的风险规避度对三种融资模式下零售商和供应商的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究表明：资金充足和延期支付策略下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;银行借贷和组合融资下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;单一延期支付策略和组合融资优于单一银行借贷融资;组合融资比例大于一定值时,优于单纯延期支付策略。     

Independent Retailer Restocking Choices in Urban Goods Movement and Interaction Effects with Traditional Markets

Traditional markets play a key role in local supply chains in many countries, often influencing retailer decisions due to their inherent attractiveness. In contrast to restocking choices for retailers as part of large chains, choices of independent retailers driven by local traditional markets have not been widely researched and are not well understood. This paper analyses the factors influencing independent retailer restocking choices and investigates the interplay between the presence of traditional markets and retailer choices. Bandung city in Indonesia is chosen for the study where independent retailers are prevalent, and where a number of traditional markets are thriving. A retrospective questionnaire was used to capture independent retailer restocking behaviour and generation models were calibrated to arrive at the trip propensity. Discrete choice models were estimated to explain the retailer preferences for supplier location and transport service choice. Results indicate that trips generated by independent retailers are explained by the presence of traditional markets and retailers’ vehicle ownership, in addition to the standard variables such as number of persons employed, weekly goods demand and average shipment weight. As for restocking location choice, retailers are more likely to choose suppliers within a traditional market where the number of wholesaler units is larger. Furthermore, the choice of traditional markets has a positive influence on whether retailers choose to use their own vehicle to restock their shops.

     

基于成本共担契约的生鲜供应链保鲜努力机制

研究由一个供应商与一个零售商组成的生鲜供应链,在分散式决策与集中式决策下的最优保鲜努力水平.考虑两类成本共担契约方式:一类为零售商单独提供成本共担契约的方式,另一类为供应商与零售商二者博弈制定成本共担契约的方式;同时,比较两类成本共担契约对供应链整体保鲜努力水平的影响.结果表明,成本共担契约对生鲜供应链整体生鲜水平的提高非常有益,且有利于提高供应商、零售商及供应链整体的利润,其中供应商与零售商二者博弈制定成本共担契约的方式最为有效.另外,保鲜成本与消费者生鲜敏感程度分别对供应链的发展起着消极和积极的作用.     

Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing

Achieving effective coordination among suppliers and retailers has become a pertinent research issue in supply chain management. Channel coordination is a joint decision policy achieved by a supplier(s) and a retailer(s) characterized by an agreement on the order quantity and the trade credit scenario (e.g., quantity discounts, delay in payments). This paper proposes a centralized model where players in a two-level (supplier–retailer) supply chain coordinate their orders to minimize their local costs and that of the chain. In the proposed supply chain model the permissible delay in payments is considered as a decision variable and it is adopted as a trade credit scenario to coordinate the order quantity between the two-levels. Computational results indicate that with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, with savings to either both players, or to one in the supply chain. Moreover, a profit-sharing scenario for the distribution of generated net savings among the players in the supply chain is presented. Analytical and experimental results are presented and discussed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.     

Analysis on the effects of stock sharing on supply chain

Considering a two-period, two-part supply chain consisting of one supplier and multi-retailers, this paper studies the effects of stock sharing among retailers on the supply chain. By establishing analysis model and using simulation method, the effects of stock sharing mode and also the traditional mode without stock sharing on retailer, supplier and the whole supply chain’s performance are analyzed. The research results show that when supplier is in a dominant position, although only under certain conditions the stock sharing can stimulate retailer to increase order volume and make supplier to gain a better profit, it always make the profitability of retailer and supplier better than in the traditional mode. When supplier is in a dominant position, stock sharing can always stimulate retailer to increase their order volume, and the profitability of the retailer, supplier and the whole supply chain is always better than the traditional mode situation without stock sharing.     

Multi-item integrated supply chain model for deteriorating items with stock dependent demand under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments

In this paper, we have investigated multi-item integrated production-inventory models of supplier and retailer with a constant rate of deterioration under stock dependent demand. Here we have considered supplier’s production cost as nonlinear function depending on production rate, retailers procurement cost exponentially depends on the credit period and suppliers transportation cost as a non-linear function of the amount of quantity purchased by the retailer. The models are optimized to get the value of the credit periods and total time of the supply chain cycle under the space and budget constraints. The models are also formulated under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments. The ordering cost, procurement cost, selling price of retailer’s and holding costs, production cost, transportation cost, setup cost of the supplier’s and the total storage area and budget are taken in imprecise environments. To show the validity of the proposed models, few sensitivity analyses are also presented under the different rate of deterioration. The models are also discussed in non deteriorating items as a special case of the deteriorating items. The deterministic optimization models are formulated for minimizing the entire monetary value of the supply chain and solved using genetic algorithm (GA). A case study has been performed to illustrate those models numerically.     

带有订单转保理的供应链金融的收益共享博弈模型

当作为供应商的中小企业出现了严重的财务困境问题时,急需有效融资工具和创新管理模式加以解决.订单转保理可以令资质良好的零售商为资金短缺的供应商提供融资担保,有效解决供应商的订单减少和融资难的问题.然而,分散决策的订单转保理融资模式,使得做担保的零售商的收益降低,不能明显改善供应链效率.针对此问题,研究订单转保理模式下的供应链协调模型,并重点研究由供应商与零售商组成的二级供应链的订单转保理收益共享模型.研究发现:收益共享决策模型供应链总收益小于集中决策供应链总收益,大于分散决策的供应链总收益,表明供应链成员相互合作程度越高,越有利于供应链发展,从而表明协调在供应链中发挥重要作用.然而,集中决策模型只能得到供应链最优总收益,无法得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享模型不仅能够提高产品订货量,降低产品批发价格,增加供应商和零售商的收益,而且通过最优的收益共享系数可以得到供应商和零售商的最优收益.收益共享机制能够为供应商和零售商共赢协调发展提供新的运作管理模式.     

Coordinating a three-level supply chain with delay in payments and a discounted interest rate

Both researchers and practitioners recognize the importance of the interactions between financial and inventory decisions in the development of cost effective supply chains. Moreover, achieving effective coordination among the supply chain players has become a pertinent research issue. This paper considers a three-level supply chain, consisting of a capital-constrained supplier, a retailer, and a financial intermediary (bank), coordinating their decisions to minimize the total supply chain costs. Specifically, we consider a retailer managing its cash through the supplier’s bank, in return for permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The bank, benefiting from increasing its cash holdings with the retailer’s cash deposits, offers the supplier a discount on its borrowing rate. We show that the proposed coordination mechanism achieves significant cost reduction, by up to 26.2%, when compared to the non-coordinated model. We also find that, with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, and that a higher return on cash for the retailer leads to a higher order quantity. Furthermore, we empirically validate our proposed coordination mechanism, by showing that banks, retailers, and suppliers have much to gain through collaboration. Thus, using COMPUSTAT datasets for the years 1950 through 2012, we determine the most important factors that affect the behavior of the retailers and suppliers in granting and receiving trade credit. Our results indicate that engaging into such a coordination mechanism is a win–win situation to all parties involved.     

供应商竞争关系下的第三方物流融资及物流服务决策

研究第三方物流企业（3PL）在处于竞争关系中的供应商面临资金约束时的融资策略选择问题。考虑由两个竞争关系的供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,3PL企业为供应链提供代采购、物流及融资服务,分别考虑在代采购中向供应商提供融资能够获得价格折扣和代采购中考虑额外资金成本情况下,3PL融资意愿选择,向供应商提供（不提供）融资。建立3PL、供应商和零售商在不同情况下的收益模型,并给出供应商和零售商的最优定价,以及3PL的最优物流服务收费决策,通过比较融资前后各个企业的收益分析3PL参与供应链融资的积极作用。研究发现3PL向处于竞争环境下的资金短缺供应商提供融资能够增加3PL、零售商和供应链整体的收益,且3PL更愿意在考虑自身资金成本的情况下向供应商提供融资,并且供应商之间竞争越激烈,3PL和零售商的获益越大。     

贸易信用下考虑零售商违约风险的供应链协调问题研究

本文研究延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的供应链协调问题。考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链,市场需求随机,延迟支付下零售商会增加订购数量,但由于其违约风险的存在,供应商会降低其交付量,最终导致供应商交付量小于零售商订购量,降低供应链收益。要求零售商提前支付部分货款则可以有效避免零售商的违约问题,通过建立延迟支付和提前支付同时存在下的零售商收益模型和供应商的收益模型,给出了零售商的最优订购量决策和供应商的最优交付量决策,通过调整延迟支付期限和提前支付比例,使得二者相等,并等于供应链整体收益最大化下的生产数量,实现供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了相关参数的敏感性等问题。     

平台品牌赋能情境下考虑信息不对称的供应链渠道冲突

随着平台型电商企业对供应链合作伙伴的赋能行为迅速增加,对供应链成员的运营决策及收益产生了举足轻重的影响.在平台型电商企业进行品牌赋能的情境下,研究由一个平台型电商企业、一个零售商和一个其他渠道供应商构成的供应链中,如何设计合适的激励机制以缓解供应链成员之间的垂直渠道冲突,并在信息不对称的条件下,剖析作为核心企业的平台型电商企业如何运用机制设计的方法来识别零售商从其他渠道订购产品的质量水平.研究表明,平台型电商企业可以通过设计包括混合策略与分离策略在内的激励机制来提升零售商从平台型电商企业订购产品的数量和比例.若零售商从产品质量较高的其他渠道供应商订购产品的概率较高时,则平台型电商企业采用分离策略更有助于提升零售商的总订购量,反之则应采用混合策略.平台型电商企业在分离策略下获得的期望利润要大于混合策略,并且均大于不向零售商提供激励机制的情形.     

Power-based supplier selection in product development projects

As stronger supplier might exert their power to influence a product development project for their own benefit, business negotiations will be more efficient if the customer has a clear understanding of its power with regards to each of its potential suppliers. This article takes the customer perspective in dealing with supplier selection and proposes a method to estimate the power of a customer versus potential suppliers. Based on an evaluation of their power, potential suppliers are then ranked. This selection procedure is illustrated with an example and evaluated against a case study taken from academic literature.     

考虑低碳推广的供应链合作决策与协调

为了研究不同主导结构下制造商和零售商半合作碳减排和低碳推广问题,构建了制造商和零售商完全合作博弈模型;分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导和无主导的制造商和零售商以相互分担对方低碳活动成本的半合作博弈模型,并对比4种模型的均衡结果;引入Shapley值法对半合作结构进行协调。研究表明：在制造商主导的半合作情形中,制造商愿意为零售商分担更多的低碳推广成本,碳减排水平最低;在零售商主导的半合作情形中,零售商愿意为制造商分担更多的碳减排成本,低碳推广努力程度最低;在无主导的半合作情形中,碳减排水平、低碳推广努力程度和零售价格离完全合作水平最近。     

Cooperative advertising in a capacitated manufacturer–retailer supply chain: a game‐theoretic approach

To achieve a more realistic understanding of how the supply chain's components interact, it is helpful to consider the operational limitations of the underlying supply chain while analyzing cooperative advertising. This paper studies cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain under the practical operational assumption that the manufacturer's production capacity is limited. The retailer advertises locally, and the manufacturer advertises in national media and supports part of the retailer's promotional costs. Equilibria are determined under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both retailer and manufacturer move simultaneously, while in the second scenario, they move sequentially, with the manufacturer being the leader. The sales function is a bivariate version of the diminishing returns response function. When the production capacity is unlimited, several important properties can be proven, which cannot be shown analytically for the existing sales functions. Considering the production‐capacity constraint leads to new managerial insights into cooperative advertising. For example, only if the production capacity is large enough, both manufacturer and retailer are better off under the second scenario than the first scenario. In other words, the sequential move is not necessarily Pareto‐improving when the production capacity is limited. It is also observed that, under the first scenario, there are multiple equilibria whenever the production capacity is not too high. Under the second scenario, the manufacturer supports the retailer only when the retailer's margin is relatively small compared to the manufacturer's margin and production capacity.     

Supply chain coordination based on return contracts with a threshold ordering quantity

Return contracts are commonly used by companies selling products with short life cycles and highly uncertain demand. Current research on return contracts assumes suppliers are responsible for all surplus products. In practice, retailers tend to order more than necessary and leave suppliers with large after‐season returns. To mitigate the problem, a new type of return contract with a threshold ordering quantity has been developed by some enterprises. Under these contracts, suppliers specify a threshold for retailers’ ordering quantity. They buy back only the portion in excess of the threshold. In this paper, we show that this new type of contract can achieve two objectives: (a) the supply chain is coordinated, and (b) both the supplier and the retailer can gain more profit than they can gain under a wholesale‐price‐only contract. The new contract does not require any manipulation of wholesale prices. This makes it more acceptable in practice by supply chain members. We also illustrate our findings in a numerical example.     

A decision rule for coordination of inventory and transportation in a two-stage supply chain with alternative supply sources

This paper deals with a two-stage supply chain that consists of two distribution centers and two retailers. Each member of the supply chain uses a (Q,R) inventory policy, and incurs standard inventory holding and backlog costs, as well as ordering and transportation costs. The distribution centers replenish their inventory from an outside supplier, and the retailers replenish inventory from one of the two distribution centers. When a retailer is ready to replenish its inventory that retailer must decide whether it should replenish from the first or second distribution center. We develop a decision rule that minimizes the total expected cost associated with all outstanding orders at the time of order placement; the retailers then repeatedly use this decision rule as a heuristic. A simulation study which compares the proposed policy to three traditional ordering policies illustrates how the proposed policy performs under different conditions. The numerical analysis shows that, over a large set of scenarios, the proposed policy outperforms the other three policies on average.     

Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating

We consider the component-purchasing problem for a supply chain consisting of one retailer and two complementary suppliers with different lead-times. The retailer purchases a specific component from each supplier for assembling into a fashionable product. After ordering from the long-lead-time supplier (Supplier 1) and before ordering from the short-lead-time supplier (Supplier 2), the retailer can update its demand forecast for the product. The retailer can partially cancel its order from Supplier 1 after forecast updating. By formulating the problem as a dynamic optimization problem, we explore the measures that can be deployed to coordinate the retailer’s ordering decisions with forecast updating. We analytically show that the supply chain can be coordinated if both suppliers offer a returns policy and Supplier 1 charges an order-cancelation penalty to the retailer. We find that the coordination mechanism is independent of demand distribution and the forecast updating process. We further show that it is easier for the suppliers to coordinate the supply chain if market observation indicates the future market demand is sufficiently large. We also study the case where demand is price-dependent and propose a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. We discuss the academic and managerial implications of the theoretical findings.     

A joint model for cash and inventory management for a retailer under delay in payments

As retail companies continue to navigate through the economy downturn, it becomes critical to find innovative cost reduction methods. Cash management is a cost-intensive process for retailers, who are currently focusing on effective cash management, such as deciding on the maximum cash level to keep in their business accounts and how much to borrow to finance inventories and pay suppliers. In this paper, we consider the problem of finding the optimal operational (how much to order and when to pay the supplier) and financial decisions (maximum cash level and loan amount) by integrating the cash management and inventory lot sizing problems. We consider a supplier offering a retailer an interest-free credit period for settling the payment. Beyond this period, the supplier charges interest on the outstanding balance. Whenever the cash exceeds a certain limit, it will be invested in purchasing financial securities. At the time when the retailer pays the supplier for the received order, cash is withdrawn from the account, incuring various financial costs. If the cash level becomes zero or not sufficient, the retailer obtains an asset-based loan at interest. We model this problem as a nonlinear program and propose a solution procedure for finding the optimal solution. We perform a numerical study to analyze the impact of optimal cash management on the inventory decisions. The results indicate that the optimal order quantity decreases as the retailer’s return on cash increases. We compare our model to a model that ignores financial considerations of cash management, and show numerically that our model lowers the retailer’s cost. Also, we illustrate the effect of changing various model parameters on the optimal solution and obtain managerial insights.     

Two-echelon competitive integrated supply chain model with price and credit period dependent demand

This study considers a two-echelon competitive supply chain consisting of two rivaling retailers and one common supplier with trade credit policy. The retailers hope that they can enhance their market demand by offering a credit period to the customers and the supplier also offers a credit period to the retailers. We assume that the market demand of the products of one retailer depends not only on their own market price and offering a credit period to the customers, but also on the market price and offering a credit period of the other retailer. The supplier supplies the product with a common wholesale price and offers the same credit period to the retailers. We study the model under a centralised (integrated) case and a decentralised (Vertical Nash) case and compare them numerically. Finally, we investigate the model by the collected numerical data.     

考虑损失厌恶和锚定心理的供应链订货与协调

为更合理地实现供应链协调的整体最优绩效,以具有损失厌恶和锚定心理的零售商和风险中性的供应商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨回购契约下的供应链订货及协调情况。建立集中和分散决策下考虑零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的回购契约协调模型,分析了零售商最优订货量与批发价格、回购价格之间的关系,以及各契约参数对回购价格和各节点利润的影响,并给出了供应链实现协调需要达成的条件。结果表明,当零售商订购的产品为高利润产品时,能够实现供应链整体最优绩效,达到供应链协调,且利润在供应链双方之间的分配随着批发和回购价格的提升而向供应商倾斜,但零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的加深会使得供应商提升回购价格,使整体供应链的利润下降,成本费用增加。