Pre-unified separatism and rapprochement between behaviorism and cognitive psychology: The case of the reinforcer.

Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: (1) lack of cumulative scientific growth and (2) experimental-theoretical overgeneralization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological practitioners have been left to use intervention techniques that are not the most effective or efficient. In order to improve upon this situation, unification is needed between radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology, among other disciplines. However, the issue of the reinforcer is only one of many areas where such unification should be pursued and attained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparative psychology as the praxist views it.

The plight of modern comparative psychology is rooted in part in the destructive effect that early behaviorism had on the field. Early in the 20th century, Mercier, Dunlap, Kuo, and others proposed the creation of a new, multidisciplinary science devoted to the study of behavior. Watson derailed this effort by insisting that psychology should adopt behavior as its subject matter and that it should abandon the study of mind. Watson's proposal isolated the study of behavior from the biological sciences and led to an incessant and unproductive battle between behaviorists and cognitivists, in which the latter have emerged the victors. Because comparative psychology has remained for the most part the comparative study of animal behavior, it has suffered greatly both by the field's isolation from biology and by the emergence of a strong cognitive psychology. The comparative study of mind will undoubtedly flourish in modern psychology, but the comparative study of behavior should be part of a new, comprehensive, multidisciplinary science of behavior, along the lines suggested by Kuo. Efforts are underway to establish such a science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks: From mechanistic to relational accounts.

A substantial portion of Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts (cause, explanation, and theory) are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these 2 conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behaviorism and neuroscience.

The influence of the methods and theories of behaviorism on theory and research in the neurosciences is examined, partly in light of J. B. Watson's (1913; see also PA, Vol 81:27851) original call-to-arms. Behaviorist approaches to animal behavior, particularly in the study of processes of learning and memory, have had a profound and continual influence in the area of neuroscience concerned with animal studies of brain substrates of behavior. Similarly, contemporary behaviorists have not been opposed to the study of neurobiological substrates of behavior. On the other hand, classical behaviorist views of thinking (i.e., as reflex chains) have been largely discounted by developments in neuroscience. Classical behaviorism is viewed by many as being most at odds with the modern fields of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, particularly regarding "mind" and "consciousness." A modest attempt at reconciliation is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behaviorism and the mind: A (limited) call for a return to introspection.

Comments that perhaps few psychologists would now describe themselves as strict behaviorists; however, a review of the literature suggests that methodological and radical behaviorism continue to exert a powerful influence on current research, even in such nominally cognitive areas as imagery and hypothesis learning. In many ways this influence has been healthy, leading to a productive emphasis on the importance of environmental variables in shaping behavior, but some of its consequences have been rather less benign. After reviewing the historical arguments against the use of introspection, the author concludes that most either are invalid or no longer possess their original force, so the benefits from a wider use of introspection now seem likely to outweigh the possible costs. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The challenge from biology to cognitive science.

Concepts from cognitive science have largely replaced behaviorist concepts as the primary explanatory tools of contemporary psychology. However, cognitive science is not without its critics and shortcomings. It would therefore be a mistake for psychologists to uncritically accept cognitive science as it uncritically accepted the logical positivism that undergirded behaviorism for so many decades. Effective philosophical criticisms of cognitive science have been offered by Searle (1980) and Dreyfus (1979). In this paper I will present difficulties with cognitive science that arise from the science of biology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Radical behaviorism misrepresented: A response to Mahoney.

Comments on M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) discussion of scientific psychology (SP) and radical behaviorism (RB). The difference between SP and RB lies not in what Mahoney takes to be RB's failure to be scientific, but in the fact that Mahoney simply equates SP to cognitive psychology. Five misconceptions about fundamental issues in RB are addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Funtionalism, Darwinism, and the psychology of women.

Examines the psychology of women as it was studied from the middle of the 19th century to the 1st 3rd of the 20th century. During that period 3 topics received the most attention: sex differences in brain size and complexity and their implications for cognitive and affective behavior; the hypothesis of greater male variability (a corollary of evolutionary theory) and its social implications; and the expression of maternal instinct. Each topic is examined in relation to evolutionary theory and its influence on the conduct of 19th century science. The antecedents of each topic are traced as is the subsequent redefinition of each within the paradigm of behaviorism. It is proposed that each of these topics functioned as "scientific myth" which justified and explained contemporary cultural values. (71 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An empirical analysis of trends in psychology.

The present research examined trends in the prominence of 4 widely recognized schools in scientific psychology: psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. The results, which replicated across 3 measures of prominence, showed the following trends: (a) psychoanalytic research has been virtually ignored by mainstream scientific psychology over the past several decades; (b) behavioral psychology has declined in prominence and gave way to the ascension of cognitive psychology during the 1970s; (c) cognitive psychology has sustained a steady upward trajectory and continues to be the most prominent school; and (d) neuroscience has seen only a modest increase in prominence in mainstream psychology, despite evidence for its conspicuous growth in general. The authors use these findings as springboard for discussing different views of scientific prominence and conclude that psychologists should evaluate trends in the field empirically, not intuitively. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

George A. Miller, language, and the computer metaphor and mind.

This article asks why the analogy between humans and computers was understood by cognitive psychologists to mean that "minds exist and that it is our job as psychologists to study them." Earlier psychologists, such as Clark Hull, used analogies between humans and complex machines such as telephone switchboards to defend a rigorous behaviorism. How, then, did the computer metaphor of mind come to be seen as the root concept underlying a paradigm shift from behaviorism to cognitivism? To answer this question, this article examines the life and work of George A. Miller, one of the most prominent of a generation of psychologists who began their careers as "good behaviorists" but later came to embrace cognitivism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

There is no room for scientism in scientific psychology: A comment on Mahoney.

Although M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) distinction between scientific psychology (SP) and radical behaviorism (RB) is accurate, Mahoney has underestimated the intolerance engendered by RB and the consequences of resulting scientistic views. It is suggested that if the American Psychological Association is to retain its role as a representative of SP, a distinction between scientific and scientistic activities must be maintained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An existential look at B. F. Skinner.

Perhaps surprisingly, radical behaviorism has much in common with the modern rebellion against classical philosophy known as existentialism. Similarities could have been shaped by a verbal community that included Skinner. Radical behaviorism is seen as part of a discussion becoming increasingly reliable in its treatment of human behavior, and as an effective philosophy of science. The concept of despair is discussed, followed by a consideration of modernist thinking in general. Six dimensions of inquiry on which radical behaviorism and existentialism share similar positions are treated, and the concept of freedom is discussed. Skinner's lifelong devotion to writing is viewed as a bridge linking science with art. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behavioral philosophy in the late 1980’s.

Division 25 (Experimental Analysis of Behavior) is composed of about 1500 behaviorally-oriented psychologists, both applied and basic. It is one of the few divisions defined not by a specific sub-content area of psychology, but by an approach to the whole of psychology. In this sense, Division 25 is probably one of the most philosophically-oriented of all the divisions in APA: the majority of its members are more or less comfortable with behavioral philosophy. Of course, some of our members are not at all philosophically oriented, and are members because of their attraction to behavioral techniques, methodology, or to specific behavioral theories. Further, due to the history of behavioral analysis, there are fundamental disagreements about the nature of behaviorism among behaviorists. Thus, the remainder of what I will say in this paper should be thought of merely as my personal opinion—not as a statement on behalf of the Division. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Which behaviorism? A reply to Mahoney.

Comments on M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) discussion of scientific psychology and radical behaviorism (RB). Although the discussion raises valid points, there are important problems that require clarification to preclude the discussion from being taken as the last word on RB and scientific psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Where did the word "cognitive" come from anyway?

Traces the origins of the term cognitive in the ethical theories of the early 20th century and through the logical positivistic philosophy of science of this century's middle part. In both of these settings, cognitive referred not primarily to the psychological, but rather, to the truth-evaluable. The author argues that cognitivism differs from traditional mentalism in being the study of only those aspects of the mental that can be subjected to truth conditional analysis. This excludes aspects of the mental such as consciousness, qualia, and the subjective aspects of emotion. It is stated that it is important to recognize that one of the original aims of the cognitivist movement was to reintroduce belief and desire into psychology, while still protecting it from the kinds of criticism that behaviorists had used to bring down full-blown mentalism at the beginning of the century. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive psychology: A phenomenological critique.

Reviews the general orientation of cognitive psychology, some contemporary difficulties and problems noted by cognitive psychologists, and apparent commonalities between phenomenological and cognitive psychologies. It is argued that the problems of cognitive psychology are inevitable consequences of its natural scientific orientation, which is far more traditional than it is revolutionary. A phenomenologically based, human science approach to psychology is offered as a solution of fundamental disciplinary problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

You say you had a revolution: Methodological foundations of closed-loop psychology.

To the extent that a scientific revolution represents a fundamental change in a discipline, the cognitive revolution in psychology was not particularly revolutionary. What changed least in this revolution was methodology. The experimental methods used in cognitive psychology are the same as those used in the behaviorism it overthrew. This methodological continuity results from the fact that both behaviorism and cognitive psychology are based on the same paradigm, which is also the basis of experimental psychology: the open-loop causal model of behavioral organization. A truly revolutionary approach to understanding the mind has been largely ignored because it is built on a paradigm that is inconsistent with conventional research methods. This new approach to psychology, called Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), is based on a closed-loop control model of behavioral organization that is tested using control engineering methods that are unfamiliar to most psychologists. This paper introduces the methodological foundations of closed-loop psychology, explains why the closed-loop revolution has not happened yet, and suggests what psychology might look like after the revolution has occurred. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The acquisition and application of knowledge: A symbiotic relation.

Argues that not only does the application of scientific knowledge benefit from advances made in basic science, but also that advances in basic science benefit from contact with the users of information and their unsolved problems. It is shown in particular that most of the major conceptual changes in cognitive psychology over the past 25 yr. have evolved from issues in the realm of scientific application. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes.

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)