The impact of the distance-dependent promotional effect on the promotion cost sharing decision

This paper considers the promotion cost sharing decision between a supplier and a retailer. The customer demand is affected by both national and local promotional effects while the local promotional effect on a customer is dependent on the distance between the retailer and this customer. We propose a continuous approximation approach to modelling the sum of the customer demand in the whole market area served by the retailer. A model is provided to help managers decide on the retail price, the local advertising expenditure, the national advertising expenditure, and the supplier participation rate, with consideration of the influence of distance on the promotional effect. We also find that the supplier's promotion cost sharing rate increases as the market size increases or the influence of distance on the promotional effect decreases. A numerical example is given to show that the nature of distance-dependent promotional effect has a significant impact on the decisions and profits.     

考虑零售商竞争的联合减排与低碳宣传微分对策

借助微分博弈研究由单个制造商与两个零售商组成的供应链系统中长期联合减排和低碳宣传的问题。在消费者需求受产品减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力影响的情况下,构建了3种微分博弈模型。研究发现,在一定条件下,成本分担契约可以实现制造商和零售商利润的Pareto改善,而且处于稳定状态时,随着竞争强度的增加,制造商和整个供应链系统的利润逐渐上升,零售商的利润逐渐下降。最后,通过算例对模型进行了分析。     

Optimal production lot size and reorder point of a two-stage supply chain while random demand is sensitive with sales teams' initiatives

The paper develops a production-inventory model of a two-stage supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study production lot size/order quantity, reorder point sales teams’ initiatives where demand of the end customers is dependent on random variable and sales teams’ initiatives simultaneously. The manufacturer produces the order quantity of the retailer at one lot in which the procurement cost per unit quantity follows a realistic convex function of production lot size. In the chain, the cost of sales team's initiatives/promotion efforts and wholesale price of the manufacturer are negotiated at the points such that their optimum profits reached nearer to their target profits. This study suggests to the management of firms to determine the optimal order quantity/production quantity, reorder point and sales teams’ initiatives/promotional effort in order to achieve their maximum profits. An analytical method is applied to determine the optimal values of the decision variables. Finally, numerical examples with its graphical presentation and sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are presented to illustrate more insights of the model.     

Optimal advertising decisions for promoting retail and online channels in a dynamic framework

Advertising plays an important role in sales promotion in supply chains. In this paper, advertising decisions for retail and online channels respectively, by retailer and manufacturer will be analyzed. The competition between retailer and manufacturer will be modeled by differential game theory, and feedback Nash equilibrium of the game will be obtained. Some insights are provided by using comparative statics. The obtained results show that compatibility factor of a product with online marketing, difference between manufacturer's online price and wholesale price, effectiveness of advertising, marginal profits, and cost of advertising all have significant effects on the advertising decisions in the equilibrium.     

需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析

研究制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下双渠道供应链的合作广告策略, 分析信息不对称及双渠道对供应链合作广告投资决策的影响. 研究表明, 零售商在具有需求信息优势时会谎报需求信息, 并且在一定条件下其谎报决策会降低制造商的利润, 但能提高供应链的利润, 这种情况下制造商无法通过激励合同促使零售商共享信息. 另外, 在最优合作广告策略下, 当直销渠道与分销渠道所占市场份额的分配比例小于一定值时, 制造商采取双渠道会使供应链参与者均受益.

     

基于促销投资的供应链应急协调研究

研究了由单制造商和单零售商组成的供应链中,零售阶段需求依赖于零售商的促销投资水平,当制造商的生产成本和零售商的存货投资成本同时出现扰动时的应急协调问题。通过对生产成本和存货投资成本的扰动程度进行情形分析,提出了不同程度扰动时的最优应对策略和协调机制。该机制为集中供应链系统中的决策者和制造商在面临生产成本和存货投资成本同时扰动时提供了理论决策依据。     

基于微分博弈的双渠道广告合作协调策略研究

研究在制造商开通网上和零售渠道的情形下, 供应链成员的广告合作和成本分担对双渠道协调的影响. 研究结果表明, 无论零售商的广告对品牌形象产生何种影响, 制造商分担零售商的部分广告费用均能使得双方的利润优于分散决策的情形, 但不能完全实现双渠道协调. 此外, 当零售商也分担制造商的部分广告费用时, 双方均可以实现完全的协调. 相比于零售商频繁促销产生负面影响的情形, 在不产生负面影响的情况下, 双方能够实现更多的价值.

     

Optimizing channel profits with threshold incentives and alternative pricing schemes

We analyze manufacturers' trade promotions that are offered in the form of threshold incentives. In such programs, the incentive is given if the retailer's order/sales quantity exceeds a pre‐specified threshold level, and can be offered as a lump‐sum payment or on a per‐unit basis. The manufacturer determines the incentive terms and her wholesale price; in return, the retailer reacts with his profit‐maximizing decisions, which ultimately impact the market demand and total channel profits. Modeling two alternative pricing schemes by the retailer, we investigate the performance of threshold incentives from the channel perspective. We find that the threshold incentives optimize channel profits in equilibrium when the retailer exercises first‐degree price discrimination, but they lead to suboptimal channel efficiency when the retailer implements uniform pricing. We extend our models to address demand uncertainty and an alternative form of incentive scheme, and we generate further insights from numerical examples.     

Pricing games of mixed conventional and e-commerce distribution channels

In this paper, a distribution system is studied, in which a supplier sells a common product through conventional (physical retailer) and e-commerce (e-tailers) channels. We examine two types of Stackelberg pricing games and one type of Nash pricing game in this dual-channel distribution system. We also analyze the effects of several key factors (i.e., the supplier’s pricing mode, game schemes, and efficiency of e-channel in relation to acceptance of channels) on the resulting prices as well as the profits for the supplier and the retailer, respectively. This paper is an effort to examine modeling competition in the multiple-channel environment from a pricing viewpoint. We find that channel acceptance plays a critical role in influencing equilibrium prices and profits in the dual-channel distribution system. When the customer acceptance of one channel exceeds a certain threshold, this channel cannibalizes all retail sales and dominates the distribution system. The supplier can make more profits by adopting a differential pricing strategy; on the contrary, the retailer prefers uniform pricing. Numerical analysis indicates that both the supplier and the retailer are worse off in the Nash game than in the Stackelberg games. The supplier prefers an e-channel with higher efficiency, whereas the physical retailer has to maintain higher channel acceptance to maintain its position in the distribution system.     

互惠偏好下的闭环供应链系统定价决策分析

研究制造商和零售商互惠偏好行为下的最优定价策略和利润, 以及这种互惠偏好对决策行为和渠道效率的影响. 研究发现, 双方的互惠偏好程度对制造商废旧品回收比例呈正面影响; 零售商互惠偏好程度对制造商产品批发价格呈负面影响; 双方互惠偏好程度增加会导致零售商产品售价降低, 从而产品市场需求量增加; 系统成员的互惠偏好程度增加会导致自身收益减少和对方收益增加; 互惠偏好行为有利于闭环供应链系统收益和渠道效率的提高.

     

Pricing decision problem for substitutable products based on uncertainty theory

Increasing studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the power of manufacturers and retailers is reversing. In this paper, we consider a pricing decision problem in which two different manufacturers compete to distribute differentiated but substitutable products through a common retailer under different power structures. The manufacturing costs, sales costs and demands are characterized by uncertain variables. Meanwhile, uncertainty theory and game-theory-based modeling approaches are employed to formulate the pricing decision problem with three different power structures under uncertain environment. How to make the optimal pricing decisions on wholesale prices and retailer markups under three possible scenarios is derived. Numerical experiments are also given to examine the effects of power structures on the equilibrium prices and profits in uncertain environment. It is found that if the sales cost is high, consumers can enjoy lower prices when facing a powerful retailer and the super retailer can also make the supply chain more efficient.     

Dynamic pricing and channel efficiency in the presence of the cost learning effect

This paper investigates the impacts of the supply‐side cost learning effect on dynamic pricing strategies and the channel efficiency in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The unit production cost incurred by the manufacturer declines as the cumulative output increases. With the manufacturer being the price leader, the interactions between the two channel members are modeled as a Stackelberg differential game, where the two channel members dynamically set the wholesale and retail prices over time to optimize their respective profits. We find that while the cost learning effect is beneficial to both channel members in terms of long‐term profitability, such an effect is detrimental to the channel inefficiency caused by price double marginalization. In a setting where the manufacturer sells through competing retailers, we show that the channel efficiency can be improved with the emergence of horizontal competition. Our result also indicates that the channel efficiency with a feedback pricing equilibrium is higher than that with an open‐loop equilibrium.     

制造商竞争下创新投资对零售商信息分享策略的影响

研究在由两个竞争制造商和一个共同零售商组成的二级供应链中,制造商创新投资对零售商信息分享策略的影响.首先构建3种信息分享策略(不分享、部分分享和均分享)下的博弈模型,并对比分析得出零售商最优信息分享策略及不同策略下制造商/供应链利润大小关系;然后,探讨竞争制造商创新投资效率不等和存在横向溢出效应情形下零售商的信息分享策略.研究结果表明:当制造商投资效率相等时,若投资效率较低,则零售商没有动机分享预测信息;若竞争强度较小且投资效率较高,或者竞争强度较大且投资效率适中,则零售商总是倾向于均分享策略;若竞争强度较大且投资效率较高,则零售商选择部分分享策略.当制造商投资效率不等时,零售商更愿意与投资效率较高的制造商分享信息.此外,横向溢出效应更能激励零售商分享信息.     

基于批发价格事前和事后决策的供应链合作促销策略研究

针对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,构建了批发价格事前和事后决策下的合作促销模型,探讨了批发价格事前和事后决策对合作促销的影响,并求得Stackelber主从博弈下的均衡合作促销策略。研究结果表明,在批发价格事前决策且零售商努力影响需求、或批发价格事后决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销均不是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事前决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,只有当促销努力成本共担系数小于一定的阈值时,合作促销才是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事后决策且零售商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销始终是有效的激励策略。最后通过算例分析验证了上述结论的有效性。     

Determination of production run time and warranty length under system maintenance and trade credits

Manufacturers offer a warranty period within which they will fix failed products at no cost to customers. Manufacturers also perform system maintenance when a system is in an out-of-control state. Suppliers provide a credit period to settle the payment to manufacturers. This study considers manufacturer's production and warranty decisions for an imperfect production system under system maintenance and trade credit. Specifically, this study uses the economic production quantity to model the decisions under system maintenance and trade credit. These decisions involve how long the production run time and warranty length should be to maximise total profit. This study provides lemmas for the conditions of optimality and develops a theorem and an algorithm for solving the problems described. Numerical examples illustrate the solution procedures and provide a variety of managerial implications. Results show that simultaneously determining production and warranty decisions is superior to only determining production. This study also discusses the effects of the related parameters on manufacturer's decisions and profits. The results of this study are a useful reference for managerial decision-making and administration.     

Pricing strategy in a dual-channel and remanufacturing supply chain system

This article addresses the pricing strategy problems in a supply chain system where the manufacturer sells original products and remanufactured products via indirect retailer channels and direct Internet channels. Due to the complexity of that system, agent technologies that provide a new way for analysing complex systems are used for modelling. Meanwhile, in order to reduce the computational load of searching procedure for optimal prices and profits, a learning search algorithm is designed and implemented within the multi-agent supply chain model. The simulation results show that the proposed model can find out optimal prices of original products and remanufactured products in both channels, which lead to optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. It is also found that the optimal profits are increased by introducing direct channel and remanufacturing. Furthermore, the effect of customer preference, direct channel cost and remanufactured unit cost on optimal prices and profits are examined.     

Three level partial trade credit with promotional cost sharing

In this paper, an economic ordered quantity (EOQ) model, specifically for a newly launched product has been developed with selling price, customers’ credit period and customers’ credit amount induced demand under three levels of partial trade credit policy, where a supplier, a wholesaler and a retailer offer some credit periods on some fraction of the total purchased amount to the wholesaler, the retailer and the customer respectively. Also, here it is assumed that the retailer obtained a quantity discount from the wholesaler on purchased units above a certain level. In addition, the wholesaler and the retailer both enjoy freight charge discount according to the ordered quantity. Retailer introduces a promotional cost to increase the base demand of the item. Objective of this investigation is to maximize the profit of the retailer as well as the wholesaler. It is established that if the wholesaler contributes some portion of the promotional cost then individual profits as well as the joint profit increases. Due to the uncertainty and vagueness of different inventory costs, the proposed model is also discussed in fuzzy and rough environments. Combining the features of particle swarm optimization (PSO) and simulated annealing (SA) a hybrid algorithm named Particle Swarm-Simulated Annealing (PSSA) is developed to find the most appropriate strategies for the proposed model. Efficiency of this algorithm is tested and compared with PSO and genetic algorithm (GA) for a set of benchmark test problems. The model is illustrated with numerical examples and some managerial insights are outlined.     

考虑产品替代的低碳供应链定价和政府财税

基于低碳经济背景,考虑由政府、制造商和零售商三方博弈构成的供应链,使用Stackelberg博弈和纳什均衡的分析方法求出模型的均衡解,并对比了零售商是否联合两种模式下的社会福利、制造商和零售商利润。结果表明：零售商联合情况下的零售商和制造商利润大于零售商非联合情形,同时产品需求量和社会福利与零售商非联合情形相同。高碳产品市场规模越大,社会福利、零售商和制造商利润会先下降后上升,低碳产品的生产成本增加,社会福利、制造商利润会下降,若零售商不联合,销售高碳产品零售商利润上升,销售低碳产品零售商利润下降,若零售商联合则零售商利润下降。     

Cooperative advertising in a capacitated manufacturer–retailer supply chain: a game‐theoretic approach

To achieve a more realistic understanding of how the supply chain's components interact, it is helpful to consider the operational limitations of the underlying supply chain while analyzing cooperative advertising. This paper studies cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain under the practical operational assumption that the manufacturer's production capacity is limited. The retailer advertises locally, and the manufacturer advertises in national media and supports part of the retailer's promotional costs. Equilibria are determined under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both retailer and manufacturer move simultaneously, while in the second scenario, they move sequentially, with the manufacturer being the leader. The sales function is a bivariate version of the diminishing returns response function. When the production capacity is unlimited, several important properties can be proven, which cannot be shown analytically for the existing sales functions. Considering the production‐capacity constraint leads to new managerial insights into cooperative advertising. For example, only if the production capacity is large enough, both manufacturer and retailer are better off under the second scenario than the first scenario. In other words, the sequential move is not necessarily Pareto‐improving when the production capacity is limited. It is also observed that, under the first scenario, there are multiple equilibria whenever the production capacity is not too high. Under the second scenario, the manufacturer supports the retailer only when the retailer's margin is relatively small compared to the manufacturer's margin and production capacity.     

再制造商公平关切下闭环供应链生产设计决策与协调

研究制造商关注和不关注再制造商公平关切的闭环供应链生产设计决策与协调. 研究表明: 制造商和闭环供应链利润均与公平关切程度负相关; 制造商关注再制造商公平关切时, 公平关切程度越高, 许可费和模块化水平越低, 再制造商利润越高, 且与不关注相比, 新产品与再制造品销量更高, 环境效益更好; 当不关注再制造商公平关切时, 再制造商利润与公平关切程度负相关. 采用再制造收益共享契约对考虑再制造商公平关切的供应链进行协调.