What happened to efficiency in electricity industries after reforms?

The last two decades have witnessed widespread power market reforms in both developed and developing countries that have cost billions of dollars. Among the key aims (and assumptions) of these reforms, there has always been realization of improvements in power sector efficiency. This paper questions the validity of this hypothesis. Using panel data from 92 countries covering the period 1982–2008, empirical models are developed and analyzed. The research findings suggest that the impact of the reforms on electricity industry performance is statistically significant but also limited. The results imply that, after controlling for country-specific variables, application of liberal market models in electricity industries slightly increases efficiency in power sector. Besides, we detect a positive relationship between reform process and the percentage share of network (transmission and distribution) losses in total electricity supplied, meaning that as countries take more reform steps the network losses as a fraction of power generated tend to increase. Moreover, the study puts forward that income level and other country specific features are more important determinants of industry efficiency than the reform process. Overall, contrary to expectations of substantial increases in sector efficiency, the paper concludes that introducing a decentralized market model with competition in the electricity sector has a limited increasing effect on power industry performance.     

Analysis of competition and market power in the wholesale electricity market in India

The electricity reforms were initiated in India with the objective of promoting competition in the electricity market. In order to promote competition, the Electricity Act 2003 was enacted and various policy initiatives were taken by the Government of India. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) also facilitated competition through the regulatory framework of availability based tariff, Indian Electricity Grid Code, open access in inter-state transmission, inter-state trading and power exchanges. Despite these initiatives, electricity prices increased in the Wholesale Electricity Market in India (WEMI). This paper analyses the market structure and competitiveness in the WEMI. There are, of course, various potential reasons for the rise in the electricity price. This paper seeks to investigate, if market power was one of the reasons for increase in market prices. Concentration ratio, Herfindahl–Hirschman index, Supply Margin Assessment, and Residual Supply Index have been used to measure market power. This paper also uses the price–cost mark-up to examine, if exercise of market power led to higher margins. The analysis suggests that market power of firms may be part of the reason for the increase in electricity prices in WEMI. The study suggests various measures to increase competition in the WEMI.     

China's large-scale power shortages of 2004 and 2011 after the electricity market reforms of 2002: Explanations and differences

Since the electricity market reforms of 2002, two large-scale power shortages, one occurring in 2004 and one in 2011, exerted a tremendous impact on the economic development of China and also gave rise to a fierce discussion regarding electricity system reforms. In this paper, the background and the influence scale of the two power shortages are described. Second, reasons for these two large-scale power shortages are analyzed from the perspectives of power generation, power consumption and coordination of power sources and grid network construction investments. Characteristics of these two large-scale power shortages are then summarized by comparatively analyzing the performance and the formation of the reasons behind these two large-scale power shortages. Finally, some effective measures that take into account the current status of electricity market reforms in China are suggested. This paper concludes that to eliminate power shortages in China, both the supply and the demand should be considered, and these considerations should be accompanied by supervisory policies and incentive mechanisms.     

Electricity industry restructuring revisited: the case of Korea

In 2004, the Korean Government suspended its electricity market reform based on the two-thirds majority recommendation of a six-member joint study team. This suspension effectively interrupts the basic plan adopted in 1998 by the previous administration to divest and privatize Korea Electric Power Corporation's (KEPCO's) generation segment in 2000–2002, implement transmission open access and wholesale competition by 2008, and introduce retail competition thereafter. This policy-decision followed the controversial debate on electricity market reform in Korea. Reform proponents claim that electricity can be treated as ordinary goods exchangeable in the competitive market, and any problems caused by the transition to the market system are manageable. By contrast, reform opponents argue that effective competition of the power industry is not yet feasible due to the idiosyncratic nature of electricity (e.g., low-price elasticity of demand and not being storable at low cost) as well as the country's isolated electricity network. In suspending the electricity reform, the current administration accepted the final conclusion of the joint study team in the Tripartite Commission on the ground that the alleged benefits of reform are theoretical and uncertain, while the real costs and risks are substantial.     

The British Model in Britain: Failing slowly

In 1990, Britain reorganised its electricity industry to run on competitive lines. The British reforms are widely regarded as successful and the model used provides the basis for reforms of electricity industries worldwide. The main reason for this perception of success is major reductions in the real price of electricity with no reduction in service quality. This paper examines whether the reputation of the British reforms is justified. It concludes that the reputation is not justified and that serious fundamental problems are beginning to emerge. The central question is: have the British reforms resulted in the creation of efficient wholesale and retail markets? On this criterion, the reforms have failed. The wholesale market is dominated by obscure long-term contracts, privileged access to the market and self-dealing within integrated generator/retailers, leaving the spot markets with minimal liquidity and unreliable prices. The failure to develop an efficient wholesale market places the onus on consumers to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly. Small consumers will not do this and they are paying too much for their power. For the future, there is a serious risk that the electricity industry will become a weakly regulated oligopoly with a veneer of competition.     

Power sector reform in India: current issues and prospects

Power sector reforms in India were initiated at a juncture when the sector was plagued with commercial losses and burgeoning subsidy burden. Investment in the sector was not able to keep pace with growing demand for electricity. This paper takes stock of pre-reform situation in Indian power sector and identifies key concerns that led to initiation of the process of reform. The paper discusses major policy and regulatory changes undertaken since the early 1990s. The paper also illustrates changes in the market structure as we move along the reform process. We also discuss some of the major provisions of the recently enacted Electricity Act 2003 that aims to replace the prevailing acts which govern the functioning of the power sector in the country. In this context, we discuss two issues arising out of it, namely open access and multi-year tariff that we think would have a significant bearing on the performance of the sector in the near future. The paper also evaluates the reform process in the light of some of the regulatory changes undertaken. Finally, the paper briefly discusses the issues involved in introduction of competition in the power sector primarily through development of a market for bulk power.     

Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in developing countries

Electric power sector reforms in the electricity supply industry have had an impact on industrial and household prices in developing countries in Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. Using original panel data for 83 countries during the period from 1985 to 2002, we examine how each policy instrument of the reform measures influenced electricity prices for countries in the above regions. We found that variables such as entry of independent power producers (IPP), unbundling of generation and transmission, establishment of a regulatory agency, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have had a variety of impacts on electricity prices, some of which were not always consistent with expected results. The research findings suggest that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own necessarily reduces the electric power price. In fact, contrary to expectations, there was a tendency for the price to rise. However, coexistent with an independent regulator, unbundling may work to reduce electricity prices. Privatization and the introduction of foreign IPP and retail competition lower electricity prices in some regions, but not all.     

英、美、日电力改革之借鉴

世界各国的电力市场化改革还处于不断探索阶段。目前国际上还设有一个公认的完美的电力市场模式可以适用于各国不同的国情和电网的实际情况。在世界各国的电力市场改革中,英国采用了自上而下的纵向分离的电力市场改革模式;美国采用了更接近于自然历史过程的纵向整合电力市场改革模式;日本则采用了引入有限竞争的单一买家电力市场改革模式。我国的电力市场改革才刚刚起步,英、美、日电力市场的运行实践对我国的电力市场改革有以下启示：①准备充分,先行立法;②统一规划,多方协调;③总体设计,分步实施;④要健全政府监管;⑤建立合理的电价形成机制;⑥电力市场建设要符合市场经济特征;⑦建立电力市场建设的动态调控机制。     

Competition effects of mergers: An event study of the German electricity market

This paper investigates the competition effects of the entry of Vattenfall into the German electricity market. While the competition authorities supported the entry by approving Vattenfall’s acquisition of three regional utilities, other market participants raised concerns over the emergence of an upcoming oligopoly in the German market for power generation. We contrast the efficiency hypothesis postulating pro-competitive effects of mergers with the market power hypothesis postulating anti-competitive effects. For the analysis of the two opposing hypotheses, we use an event study approach to the stock prices of Vattenfall’s competitors in the German market. While we find no empirical evidence for increased market power in the German electricity market due to Vattenfall’s mergers, there is some indication for efficiency increases. We therefore cannot oppose the view of the competition authorities predicting an overall positive effect for consumers as a result of Vattenfall’s entry into the German electricity market.     

Regulatory reform of the electricity industry in Japan: What is the next step of deregulation?

In Japan, competitive bidding for new generating capacity (IPPs) is in progress since 1996. Retail competition was introduced for large customers (contract demand over 2 MW) after March 2000. Although the liberalization is limited in part by the fact that the retail power market has only about 30% share of total electricity demand, the eligible customers now have a choice among the nine major utilities and ten new entrants. Since November 2001, the electricity industry committee has been discussing the next step of liberalization, including the opening of the market for medium-size industrial and commercial high voltage (6 kV) customers from 2004 and 2005 on. This paper presents the experiences so far acquired and the technical issues for further deregulation. The process includes the creation of nationwide power exchange and of a neutral organization to coordinate the transmission system by 2005. The paper deals with the characteristics of the new regulatory reform of the electricity supply industry in Japan during the period of 2003–2007. We show that it is important to understand the complexity of market behavior and design the market reform carefully.     

The politics of regulation in the Turkish electricity market

Turkey began reforming the electricity market in 2001. The regulatory reform aimed to liberalize the market. However, the institutional and political structure was not ready for creating an efficiently working competition. The independent regulator did not have both experience and will to direct the industry to a more competitive environment. Currently, the reform has slowed down and political preferences drive the industry. This paper studies the reasons for the slowdown in the reform efforts by focusing on the relationships between the government, judiciary and the independent regulator. We conclude that strategic behaviors of players in the market, including the judiciary, the government, and the regulator, have made the introduction of competition to the market more costly.     

Electricity securitization in China

This paper discusses the past and the status quo of electricity securitization in China. First, the stranded cost securitization in American electricity industry and the ongoing securitization progress in emerging market countries are investigated, which enlightens the way of electricity securitization in China. Through analysis of electricity industry in China, the paper proposes constructive policy suggestions for regulators who intend to prompt securitization to develop electricity infrastructure, and detailed recommendations for companies who plan to raise money at reduced cost. It is concluded that even though it is at the very beginning stage in China, securitization not only provides financing for investment projects, but also speeds up the reform by stranded cost securitization, a novel idea for electricity industry in China.     

电力市场化改革中的终端电力能源效率问题

提高终端电力能源效率,是实现电力可持续发展的重要保障。然而,从我国电力市场化改革的进程来看,终端电力能源效率问题在很大程度上被忽视,甚至还受到了一定的负面影响。如何将终端电力能源效率问题综合纳入电力改革进程,采取妥善的应对措施促进终端电力能源效率的持续提高,是我国电力改革所面临的一项重大挑战。本文试图分析英、美两国电力市场化改革中针对终端电力能源效率问题所采取的政策措施,并探讨其对我国的启示意义。     

Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets

This paper discusses the main competition issues that arise in electricity systems dominated by hydro generation, arguing that technological differences between hydro and thermal plants may allow hydropower producers to exert market power in different and subtler ways compared to thermal generators. The key for market power in hydro-based systems is the strategic allocation of a given amount of output across periods, rather than a straightforward reduction of total output. The paper examines the interaction between strategic hydro reservoir operation and transmission capacity constraints, and summarizes the implications of market power for system reliability. A review of recent relevant literature is included. Finally, possible interventions to mitigate market power are analysed.     

Power sector reform in Maharashtra,India

In early 1990 the power sector in India required an initial set of reforms due to the scarcity of financial resources and its deteriorating technical and commercial efficiency. The Indian power sector is now going through a second stage of reforms in which restructuring of electric supply utilities has taken place. The Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) initiated reforms in 2005 by dividing the state electricity board into four separate companies. In this paper, the situations that led to the reform of the MSEB and the scope of the work required for an action plan initiated by the state electricity distribution company in the context of the proposed Key Performance Index are discussed. The post-reform status of the distribution company is analyzed with selected key parameters. The study also analyzes the electricity supply model implemented and the effect of a multi-year tariff plan as one of the key milestones of the tariff structure. The various new projects implemented by the distribution company to improve consumer services and the reform experiences of the other states are discussed, along with the future scope of the present reform process.     

我国新电力体制改革酝酿过程的回顾

参照美英电力体制改革模式,我国从2002年开始进行第二轮新的电力体制改革.世界银行要求的电力体制改革是政企分开、公司化改组、商业化运营、法制化管理,并实行自由化、私有化、放松管制、引入竞争机制.这些与英美的电力改革模式是相同的.中国与世界银行合作研究了电力体制改革,认为在中国的环境条件下,政府所有权和政府管理的改革要进行详细的设计,首先应着重于电力企业的商业化和公司化试点.课题研究组到国外考察后认为,中国电力体制改革的方向应该是政企分开、商业化和公司化,建立和健全法律法规.英国的竞争性电力市场必须有合理的电价形成机制、较大富裕的电网输运能力、健全的电力法规体系等,而中国不具备.中国电力部门深化改革座谈会上有两种意见:一种主张跨越单一购买机制模式(因美国加州采用该模式发生了电力危机);另一种主张把单一购买机制模式作为过渡模式.国务院经济改革办公室主办的中国电力行业监管国际研讨会上,世界银行代表建议中国电力体制改革采取单一购买机制模式.2001年3月出版的《英国新电力交易制度》(中译本)分析了单一购买机制模式存在的问题、缺点和不足,指出英国要用新电力交易制度来代替已经运营了十多年的单一购买机制模式.为此,应认识到中国电力改革的艰巨性,复杂性.     

A regulatory policy to promote renewable energy consumption in China: Review and future evolutionary path

Renewable energy has become the world's strategic choice to solve environmental pollution, address the energy crisis and achieve social sustainable development. The establishment of a regulatory system coincides with the development stage of renewable energy and electricity market operation is significant in standardizing the market competition and guaranteeing healthy development of renewable energy in China. This paper analyses the current situation of renewable energy development and the existing renewable energy regulation system in China, pointing out that the main problems restricting renewable energy development are institutional mechanisms and market factors. The existing regulatory mechanisms also have deficiencies, such as the inclination towards economic regulation and the lack of a market adjustment mechanism. This paper proposes that China should comprehensively consider the renewable energy development stage, electricity market trading mechanisms and other factors in electricity regulatory requirements when policy making, actively exploring a new renewable energy regulation model adapted to different development phases. In addition, this paper suggests China's regulatory policy path based on the forecasting of renewable energy developing models.     

Wind power in the Danish liberalised power market—Policy measures,price impact and investor incentives

Wind power has a strong position at the Danish electricity market, mainly caused by high feed-in tariffs in the 1990s. Investments in new wind-power installations on land, however, have declined dramatically after the Danish electricity market was liberalised in 1999. First, the paper describes how policy measures directed towards wind power have been redesigned to match the liberalised market. Then, we estimate the impact of the redesigned tariffs on the electricity prices. Finally, we assess whether the new tariffs make an incentive to invest in wind power. The paper concludes that the new tariffs not by itself make evidence for the actual Danish recession in new wind-power installations after the electricity reform. The main causes could include a combination of problems in spatial planning, high risk aversion of new wind turbine investors and perhaps more favourable support schemes in other countries.     

Study on business models of distributed generation in China

Along with the implementation of electricity sales-side reform and incremental power distribution investment liberalization under China’s new round of electricity market reform, the main subjects of distributed generation investment, construction, and operations have become more various, and the approaches as well as the ways that distributed generation takes part in the market have been more flexible. How to operate distributed generation economically and efficiently in this market environment has become an urgent issue to be addressed. Based on the domestic development situation of China’s distributed generation, this paper introduces typical existing business models of distributed generation, and elaborates the correlation between electricity market reform and business models of distributed generation in depth in combination with the contents of electricity market reform. At last, several business models of distributed generation which are feasible to be implemented in China have been proposed under the new electricity market reform based on successful international distributed generation operation experiences in the terms of stimulating stakeholders’ participation in the investment and operations of distributed generation. Characteristics of these recommended models are compared and analyzed as well.