供应商损失厌恶情形下组装供应链协调

鉴于决策者的风险偏好特性和产品内分工的迅速发展,构建由多个损失厌恶零部件供应商和单个风险中性组装商构成的组装供应链模型,其中各供应商均采用拉式契约向组装商提供一种互补性零部件。首先,给出拉式契约下各节点企业的最优策略,发现拉式契约下各零部件的最优产量均小于集中化情形下的最优产量;然后,通过引入价格补贴策略设计契约协调机制;最后,通过数值分析验证了该契约协调机制的有效性。     

具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链弹性数量契约

研究由风险中性供应商和具有损失厌恶偏好零售商组成的供应链在弹性数量契约条件下的协调问题.揭示了契约参数和零售商损失厌恶特性对零售商最优订货量的影响,发现调整弹性度这一契约参数可使供应链得到协调;同时,当弹性度满足一定条件时,调整批发价格也可实现供应链协调.最后通过数值分析,验证了弹性数量契约在协调供应链中的有效性,并探讨了其中原因.     

损失概率厌恶和损失厌恶行为零售商的供应链网络均衡

研究零售商的损失概率厌恶和损失厌恶有限理性行为对供应链网络均衡的影响. 利用变分不等式和互补理论刻画制造商的最优行为和需求市场的供需均衡; 基于累积前景理论建立零售商的凹前景值函数, 并利用变分不等式刻画零售市场均衡. 零售商有限理性行为对其均衡行为的比较静态分析结果表明: 零售商的最大损失重视程度越大, 其均衡订购量越小; 零售商的最大获利重视程度越大, 其均衡订购量越大; 零售商的损失概率敏感度越大, 其均衡订购量越小; 零售商的损失厌恶程度越大, 其均衡订购量越小.

     

双源供应下损失厌恶零售商的订货及补贴策略

供需不匹配一直是供应链管理领域的难点问题,多源采购策略被企业广泛应用于解决该问题。本研究考虑风险厌恶型零售商向上游两家供应商订货的问题,其中供应商1供应不可靠但价格较低,供应商2供应可靠但价格较高。为了缓解降低供应商1的供应不可靠性,零售商可以通过提前支付部分货款的方式帮助供应商1提高供应链可靠性。本研究首先构建了零售商只采用供应商1或2的采购策略,接着构建了零售商采用双源供应采购策略的模型。本研究发现,在双源供应情况下,随着零售商提前支付比例的增加,零售商将增加供应商1的订货量而降低供应商2的订货量,最优期望效用也随之增加。研究还发现相比于单源采购而言,双源供应条件下零售商所获得的最优期望效用更大。本研究也探讨了双源供应情况下,损失厌恶程度、随机需求对零售商最优策略的影响     

考虑损失厌恶和锚定心理的供应链订货与协调

为更合理地实现供应链协调的整体最优绩效,以具有损失厌恶和锚定心理的零售商和风险中性的供应商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨回购契约下的供应链订货及协调情况.建立集中和分散决策下考虑零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的回购契约协调模型,分析了零售商最优订货量与批发价格、回购价格之间的关系,以及各契约参数对回购价格和各节点利润的影响...     

需求价格敏感下具有损失厌恶零售商的闭环供应链定价与协调

基于零售商回收模式,运用前景理论探讨了价格敏感随机需求下具有损失厌恶零售商参与的两级闭环供应链定价与协调问题。首先针对分散式决策,在两种批发价模式下推导和比较制造商和零售商的最优行为,分析损失厌恶程度对零售商定价和订货联合决策的影响;然后通过与集中式决策的对比验证了分散式供应链存在效率损失,进而设计收益共享契约对分散式供应链进行协调;最后通过算例验证了以上结论,并将回收率对最优决策和成员效用的影响进行了灵敏度分析。     

考虑缺货损失情形下损失厌恶零售商的订货决策

在随机需求情形下考虑缺货损失,基于前景理论建立损失厌恶零售商的效用函数.根据数理模型推导,得到损失厌恶零售商订货量优化模型,分析了损失厌恶零售商订货量与损失厌恶系数、零售价格、采购价格、单位残值、单位缺货损失的关系.主要结论有：订货量随着单位残值、单位缺货损失的增大而增大;但随着损失厌恶系数、零售价格、采购价格的增大,订货量可能增大,也可能减小,这表明损失厌恶会对订货决策产生重要影响.最后,通过算例进行仿真分析.所得结果表明了订货量与损失厌恶系数、零售价格、采购价格、单位残值、单位缺货损失之间关系的正确性.     

损失厌恶下考虑参照利润效应的供应链决策模型

针对由一个风险中性供应商和一个损失厌恶零售商构成的二级供应链,研究随机需求下考虑零售商参照利润效应的供应链决策问题.在回购政策下,建立以供应商为主方、零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从博弈模型.结合参照依赖偏好模型分别得到集中和分散供应链决策,分析供应链最优决策与损失厌恶程度、参照利润强度和零售商乐观水平之间的关系,并进一步设计能够实现供应链完美协调的回购契约机制.研究结果表明,在集中和分散供应链决策下,零售商订货量均随着损失厌恶和乐观程度的增加而减少.而当零售商损失厌恶程度较低时,订货量随参照利润强度的增加而增加;反之,亦成立.对于批发价格决策,则存在一个阈值,当高于该阈值时,批发价格随着零售商损失厌恶、乐观程度和参照利润强度的增大而增加;低于该阈值时,批发价格随着损失厌恶、乐观程度和参照利润强度的增大而降低.     

零售商温和不公平厌恶下的回购合约与渠道协调

以不公平厌恶效用函数作为一个温和不公平厌恶零售商的决策准则,研究采用回购合约协调供应链的问题.对于合约参数的不同取值,分析回购合约定价对零售商公平状况及其最优订购决策的影响,给出达到供应链协调的回购合约,并用数值算例对结果进行进一步讨论.研究发现,存在两种协调供应链的回购合约定价规则.第一种与零售商为公平中性时的协调供应链的回购合约定价规则相同,回购定价区间只与零售商不利不公平的厌恶程度有关;另一种定价规则的利润分配总是公平的,其具体形式依赖于需求的分布及公平的利润分配比例.     

面对损失厌恶顾客的零售商订货定价策略及激励问题

考虑顾客存在损失厌恶,研究零售商的订货和定价策略,以及顾客损失厌恶程度对零售商决策行为的影响,同时探讨零售商通过补偿契约对损失厌恶型顾客的激励问题,得到如下主要结论:顾客损失厌恶导致零售商利润和零售价格下降,订货量和需求量增加;零售商采取补偿契约能够提高零售商利润、零售价格、订货量和需求量,有效弱化了顾客损失厌恶给企业带来的负面影响,并且,只要补偿额不超过一定限度,补偿契约也会增加顾客的效用,实现企业与顾客双赢.     

考虑损失规避型供应商的VMI 供应链协调

给出损失规避型供应商和风险中性零售商组成的二级VMI供应链批发价格契约与协调的理论分析.主要结论是:损失规避型供应商的最优产品生产量可能小于(等于或大于)风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,且最优产品生产量为单位剩余产品净残值(单位缺货成本)的增函数、单位库存成本的减函数、一定条件下的单位批发价格(单位生产成本)的增函数或减函数;批发价格契约在一定条件下可使二级VMI供应链达到协调.     

基于损失厌恶型零售商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约研究

在前景理论框架下,探讨了存在缺货损失下的由损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性型供应商组成的供应链价格补贴契约设计,研究了供应商为风险中性时,损失厌恶型零售商分别在批发价格契约和价格补贴契约下的订货行为.研究结果表明,损失厌恶型的零售商在批发价格契约下的订货可能偏离系统最优订货,供应商通过价格补贴契约可以协调整个供应链.最后通过算例分析,验证了价格补贴契约在协调供应链中的有效性.     

Coordinating a three-level supply chain with delay in payments and a discounted interest rate

Both researchers and practitioners recognize the importance of the interactions between financial and inventory decisions in the development of cost effective supply chains. Moreover, achieving effective coordination among the supply chain players has become a pertinent research issue. This paper considers a three-level supply chain, consisting of a capital-constrained supplier, a retailer, and a financial intermediary (bank), coordinating their decisions to minimize the total supply chain costs. Specifically, we consider a retailer managing its cash through the supplier’s bank, in return for permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The bank, benefiting from increasing its cash holdings with the retailer’s cash deposits, offers the supplier a discount on its borrowing rate. We show that the proposed coordination mechanism achieves significant cost reduction, by up to 26.2%, when compared to the non-coordinated model. We also find that, with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, and that a higher return on cash for the retailer leads to a higher order quantity. Furthermore, we empirically validate our proposed coordination mechanism, by showing that banks, retailers, and suppliers have much to gain through collaboration. Thus, using COMPUSTAT datasets for the years 1950 through 2012, we determine the most important factors that affect the behavior of the retailers and suppliers in granting and receiving trade credit. Our results indicate that engaging into such a coordination mechanism is a win–win situation to all parties involved.     

A joint model for cash and inventory management for a retailer under delay in payments

As retail companies continue to navigate through the economy downturn, it becomes critical to find innovative cost reduction methods. Cash management is a cost-intensive process for retailers, who are currently focusing on effective cash management, such as deciding on the maximum cash level to keep in their business accounts and how much to borrow to finance inventories and pay suppliers. In this paper, we consider the problem of finding the optimal operational (how much to order and when to pay the supplier) and financial decisions (maximum cash level and loan amount) by integrating the cash management and inventory lot sizing problems. We consider a supplier offering a retailer an interest-free credit period for settling the payment. Beyond this period, the supplier charges interest on the outstanding balance. Whenever the cash exceeds a certain limit, it will be invested in purchasing financial securities. At the time when the retailer pays the supplier for the received order, cash is withdrawn from the account, incuring various financial costs. If the cash level becomes zero or not sufficient, the retailer obtains an asset-based loan at interest. We model this problem as a nonlinear program and propose a solution procedure for finding the optimal solution. We perform a numerical study to analyze the impact of optimal cash management on the inventory decisions. The results indicate that the optimal order quantity decreases as the retailer’s return on cash increases. We compare our model to a model that ignores financial considerations of cash management, and show numerically that our model lowers the retailer’s cost. Also, we illustrate the effect of changing various model parameters on the optimal solution and obtain managerial insights.     

基于提前订货折扣和延期支付策略下的两零售商竞争问题研究

在需求不确定的情况下,构建了3个阶段中两零售商利用契约机制进行竞争的模型.通过模型求解,得出各阶段中两零售商各自的最优订货量及契约参数.最后,通过数值例子分析了模型的可行性及解的有效性,并得出当单一零售商采用一种契约机制时,两零售商的整体利润达到最大,实现了优化协调;当两零售商均采用契约机制时,整体利润受损,利润总和达到最小,整体利润的优化协调作用失效.     

Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing

Achieving effective coordination among suppliers and retailers has become a pertinent research issue in supply chain management. Channel coordination is a joint decision policy achieved by a supplier(s) and a retailer(s) characterized by an agreement on the order quantity and the trade credit scenario (e.g., quantity discounts, delay in payments). This paper proposes a centralized model where players in a two-level (supplier–retailer) supply chain coordinate their orders to minimize their local costs and that of the chain. In the proposed supply chain model the permissible delay in payments is considered as a decision variable and it is adopted as a trade credit scenario to coordinate the order quantity between the two-levels. Computational results indicate that with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, with savings to either both players, or to one in the supply chain. Moreover, a profit-sharing scenario for the distribution of generated net savings among the players in the supply chain is presented. Analytical and experimental results are presented and discussed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.     

Two level supply chain coordination with delay in payments for fixed lifetime products

In this paper, a single-vendor, single-buyer supply chain system for fixed lifetime products is considered in the settings of both decentralized and centralized models. In the decentralized model, the vendor is the decision-maker of the supply chain. In particular, we study the coordination between the vendor and the buyer that allows the buyer to delay his payment in compensation for altering his order size. This policy has been studied in the literature for the products with unlimited lifetime. In this paper, we focus on the products with fixed and limited lifetime which is common in practice. To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed delay in payments policy, a centralized decision-making problem is modeled, where there is a common decision-maker for both the vendor and the buyer. We derive analytically tractable solutions to the proposed models. Furthermore, we prove that the decentralized model can achieve the same minimal cost as the centralized model when the vendor and the buyer’s costs of capital are equal. A detailed numerical example is presented to illustrate the benefit of the proposed delay in payments policy.