Reply to Rodgers and Rowe (2002).

That a theory fits data is meaningful only if it was plausible that the theory would not fit. S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000; see record 2000-15248-005) knew of no enduring theories initially supported by good fits alone (good fits, i.e., where it was not clear that the theory could have plausibly failed to fit). J. L. Rodgers and D. C. Rowe (2002; see record 2002-13781-008) claimed to provide 6 examples. Their 3 nonpsychological examples (Kepler, etc.) are instances of good practice: How the theory constrained outcomes was evident, so it was clear that the theory could have plausibly failed to fit. Their 3 psychological examples are flawed in various ways. It remains possible that no examples exist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory development should begin (but not end) with good empirical fits: A comment on Roberts and Pashler (2000).

S. Roberts and H. Pashler (2000) argued against using goodness of fit as evidence to support theories. The authors agree with their suggestions for how to go beyond good fits but disagree with their starting point. In this comment, the authors argue that good fits are part and parcel of theory development, that they are part and parcel of the processes suggested by S. Roberts and H. Pashler, and that they must be the starting point (though far from the ending point) in theoretical development. The authors discuss historical examples of scientific theory development, recent examples of psychological theory development, and development of a particular theory (social contagion theory; J. L. Rodgers & D. C. Rowe, 1993) that S. Roberts and H. Pashler criticized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A funny thing happened on the way to my American Psychologist publication.

Replies to comments made by various authors in reference to S. O. Lilienfeld's (see record 2002-10795-003) article published in response to, and in criticism of, the controversies surrounding the publication of the article by B. Rind et al (see record 1998-04232-002). Here Lilienfeld examines the original controversy as well as a secondary controversy which arose from his published criticism of the American Psychological Association's (APA) handling of the controversy spawned by the Rind et al article. Of particular interest to Lilienfeld is the article concerning the 'editor's dilemma" described in comments published by R. McCarty (see record 2002-10795-006). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working memory load and decision making: A reply to Franco-Watkins, Pashler, and Rickard (2006).

A. M. Franco-Watkins, H. Pashler, and T. C. Rickard (2006; see record 2006-03562-020) discussed some interesting issues about the interpretation of working memory load effects and decision making in their reanalysis of our previously published data (J. M. Hinson, T. L. Jameson, & P. Whitney, 2003). Nonetheless, there is sufficiently strong evidence to sustain our original conclusion that working memory load affects decision making in the delay discounting paradigm and that these changes can be characterized as more impulsive decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Only a God can save us: reply to Slavin (2002).

Malcolm Stavin's (2002) understanding of "Shattered Worlds/ Psychotic States" (G. E. Atwood, D. M. Orange, & R. D. Stolorow, 2002) is both sympathetic and accurate (see record 2002-12574-003). His article (see record 2002-12574-004) makes an important contribution in its own right to the clarification of the role of Cartesian thinking in psychoanalysis. Only a God can save us. -Martin Heidegger (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Glassgold et al. (2002).

Replies to comments by J. M. Glassgold et al (see record 2003-06066-010) on the current authors' original article (see record 2002-13988-007) which identified the ethical issues in efforts to ban reorientation therapies. Glassgold et al commented that the original article failed to represent the issues accurately and comprehensively. The current authors elaborate on the context in which their article was written and then comment on a couple of the points of criticism served by Glassgold et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the pursuit of sound science for the betterment of the American Indian community: Reply to Beals et al. (2009).

The authors of this reply argue that ongoing criticism of existing theories, the development of alternative theories, and empirical theory tests offer the best chance for advancing American Indian research. The authors therefore note their appreciation for the comments of J. Beals et al. (see record 2009-02580-012). The authors nevertheless disagree with many of the specific claims of Beals et al., noting that in their original article (see record 2007-06095-002), (a) the characterization of the existing literature on reservation-dwelling American Indian drinking was accurate; (b) no argument made by Beals et al. undermines their theoretical contention that there is a relative lack of contingency between access to basic life reinforcers and sobriety on many reservations; (c) the theory was developed in a responsible manner, specifically by a reservation-tied American Indian, and was reviewed by a reservation leadership team, a cultural consultant, and reviewers for this journal, at least one of whom consulted leaders of other reservations; and (d) the theory was based on previous interdisciplinary theory development. The authors encourage the development and testing of new, alternative theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The practice of psychological science.

Replies to comments made by Tebes (see record 2007-12413-003) and Guyll and Madon (see record 2007-12413-004) on Sue's original article (see record 1999-15532-003), which noted the the paucity of publications and funding for research on ethnic minority populations. It is my belief that theories, models, and assessment instruments should all be rated according to adequacy with different populations. Those that have been used and found to be appropriate and applicable to many different populations should be considered as being more adequate, meeting more stringent requirements, and having greater goodness of fit to human beings than those that have been applied to only a few populations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Once again, the origins of sex differences.

Responds to comments by B. X. Friedman et al (see record 2000-05933-013), D. T. Kenrick and N. Li (see record 2000-05933-014), and E. Kleyman (see record 2000-05933-015) on the article by A. H. Eagly and W. Wood (see record 1999-05337-002) which examined the origins of sex differences in human behavior. Eagly and Wood argued that social structural theory can explain the origin of psychological sex differences. In the present article, Eagly and Wood defend their original article against criticism made by the aforementioned authors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On grandiosity in personality psychology.

Responds to the comments by A. Wood and S. Joseph (see record 2006-23492-015); S. R. Maddi (see record 2006-23492-016); and S. Epstein (see record 2006-23492-017) on the current author's original article (see record 2006-03947-002) "A New Big Five: Fundamental Principles for an Integrative Science of Personality" (McAdams & Pals, April 2006). Here, McAdams responds to the objections raised in the three commentaries to his and Pals' characterization of the grand theories of personality provided by Freud, Jung, Rogers, and other luminaries from the first half of the 20th century. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Resolution now! Reply to Riccio, Richardson, and Ebner (1999).

The authors' original article reviewing the status of the context-forgetting paradox (Bouton, Nelson, & Rosas; see record 1999-10106-001) made 2 general points: an empirical one (previous reviews had overstated the impact of published findings) and a conceptual one (the paradox can be resolved by assuming that a superordinate temporal context can control retrieval of physical context cues). In their comment, Riccio, Richardson, and Ebner (see record 1999-10106-002) have (a) offered only a partial criticism of the former point and (b) ignored the latter one. It is therefore not possible to accept their claim that the contextual cues paradox is still unresolved. This argument is presented and amplified. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evidence against early selection: Stimulus quality effects in previewed displays.

H. Pashler (see record 1985-05791-001) reported that when Ss identified a probed letter in a display of 8 characters, the effect of stimulus quality on reaction time (RT) persisted full blown even when Ss had 300 msec to preprocess the display. Pashler argued that these results are incompatible with theories of late selection but that they are naturally accommodated by the ones of early selection. The authors report 14 experiments using Pashler's methodology in which the effects of stimulus quality were reliably attenuated with a preview of the letter array. Pashler's results were also replicated, but only under a narrow set of conditions. Several "early selection" accounts of the interaction of probe delay with stimulus quality were examined and rejected in favor of a late selection account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Six-month-old infants rely on explanatory inference when relating communication to people and manipulatory actions to inanimate objects: Reply to Gergely (2001).

Responds to G. Gergely's (see record 2001-11105-001) criticism of the interpretation of the results in the author's earlier study (see record 2000-15399-008). Six-month-old infants expect people to talk to persons, but they expect people to manipulate objects (M. Legerstee, J. Barna, & C. DiAdamo, 2000). This interpretation of the behavior of 6-month-olds is consistent with both (a) the task requirements in M. Legerstee et al.'s (2000) study and (b) previous empirical and theoretical work that supports the conclusion that infants use explanatory inferences to make sense of the world during the first 6 months of life. The ability to understand that people communicate with persons but act on objects is a precursor to the infant's subsequent understanding that people communicate about objects (intentional communication) at 9–12 months of age. Studies by G. Gergely and his colleagues (Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; G. Gergely, Z. Nadasdy, G. Csibra, & S. Biró, 1995) showing that infants attend differently to types of movements of inanimate objects do not shed light on the infant's conceptual understanding of people. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Eating for optimal health: how much should we eat?": Comment.

Responds to commentaries by K. M. Vitousek and J. Gray (see record 2002-12932-011) and F. P. Manke and K. M. Vitousek (see record 2002-12932-012) on the original article (see record 2000-02781-002) that argued that because of the scarcity and unpredictability of food in nature, humans and other animals have evolved to eat to their physiological limits when food is readily available, so that excess energy can be stored in the body as a buffer against future food shortages. The current authors state that neither of the two commentaries challenged the main thesis of their article; they focused instead on its potential implications for good health. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005).

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, see record 2005-11504-008) suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler (see record 2005-11504-009) suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to outpredict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: Reply to Wiens and ?hman (2002) and Manns et al (2002).

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (see record 2002-00340-002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, see record 2002-00340-001) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (see record 2002-00340-003) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias in defining test bias: Reply to Darlington.

Argues that R. B. Darlington's response (see record 1979-22558-001) to the present authors' original criticism (see record 1977-20109-001) is not satisfactory. It is suggested that Darlington's "rational" viewpoint cannot reconcile the issue of individual rights vs quotas and that his contention that the present authors' article was contradictory is incorrect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spatial precues affect target discrimination in the absence of visual noise.

In 2 earlier sets of experiments, the author reported that shape discrimination in an otherwise empty visual field is facilitated when the target shape is preceded by a valid spatial precue (J. M. Henderson, see record 78:17400; J. M. Henderson & A. D. Macquistan, see record 80:32246). L. Shiu and H. Pashler (see record 1995-08196-001) recently suggested that these earlier results were due to the presence of multiple posttarget pattern masks. They concluded that precue effects are observed only when visual noise is present. The author reviews the existing evidence and presents new data supporting the view that spatial precues influence shape discrimination in the absence of visual noise, consistent with a limited capacity conception of visual–spatial attention. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)