Quality of decision making and group norms.

Two studies investigated the impact of group norms for maintaining consensus versus norms for critical thought on group decisions in a modification of the biased sampling paradigm (G. Stasser & W. Titus, 1985). Both studies showed that critical norms improved the quality of decisions, whereas consensus norms did not. This effect appeared to be mediated by the perceived value of shared and unshared information: Consensus norm groups valued shared information more highly than critical groups did, and valence was a good predictor of decision outcome. In addition, the 2nd study showed that the group norm manipulation has no impact on individual decisions, consistent with the assumption that this is a group effect. Results suggest that the content of group norms is an important factor influencing the quality of group decision-making processes and that the content of group norms may be related to the group's proneness for groupthink. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of depression on social economic decision making.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 119(3) of Journal of Abnormal Psychology (see record 2010-15289-020). In the article, the last revision received date printed on the final page of the article was incorrect due to an error in the production process. The correct publication dates are as follows: Received April 14, 2009; Revision received November 6, 2009; Accepted November 9, 2009.] Although the role of emotion in social economic decision making has been increasingly recognized, the impact of mood disorders, such as depression, on such decisions has been surprisingly neglected. To address this gap, 15 depressed and 23 nondepressed individuals completed a well-known economic task, in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Although depressed individuals reported a more negative emotional reaction to unfair offers, they accepted significantly more of these offers than did controls. A positive relationship was observed in the depressed group, but not in controls, between acceptance rates of unfair offers and resting cardiac vagal control, a physiological index of emotion regulation capacity. The discrepancy between depressed individuals' increased emotional reactions to unfair offers and their decisions to accept more of these offers contrasts with recent findings that negative mood in nondepressed individuals can lead to lower acceptance rates. This suggests distinct biasing processes in depression, which may be related to higher reliance on regulating negative emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Use and evaluation of discrete test information in decision making.

Elementary decision theory is applied to the problems of evaluating discrete tests or test items used to classify people into several categories, and choosing which of several treatments is best for persons falling within each response category. The technique explicitly considers the base rates of various criterion groups and the relative seriousness of different types of errors of classification, as well as the proportion of each criterion group falling in each response category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal directedness and decision making in infants.

The term goal directed conventionally refers to either of 2 separate process types—motor processes organizing action oriented toward physical targets and decision-making processes that select these targets by integrating desire for and knowledge of action outcomes. Even newborns are goal directed in the first sense, but the status of infants as decision makers (the focus here) is unknown. In this study, 24-month-olds learned to retrieve an object from a box by pressing a button, and then the object’s value was increased. After the object’s subsequent disappearance, these children were more likely to press the button to try to retrieve the object than were control 24-month-olds who had learned to retrieve the object but for whom the object’s value was unchanged. Such sensitivity to outcome value when selecting actions is a hallmark of decision making. However, 14- and 19-month-olds showed no such sensitivity. Possible explanations include that they had not learned the specifics of the action outcome; they had not acquired the necessary desire; or they had acquired both but did not integrate them to make a decision. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing decision making in young adult romantic relationships.

Romantic relationships among young adults are rich with ambiguity and without a clear, universal progression emphasizing the need for active decision making. Lack of active decision making in romantic relationships can lead to increases in constraints (e.g. pregnancy, shared living space or finances) that promote the continuation of relationships that would have otherwise ended, leading to increased risk of relationship distress. Because there is no available assessment of thoughtfulness regarding relationship decisions, the authors of the present studies report data on the development of one such scale, the Relationship Deciding Scale (RDS). Study 1 (N = 995) reveals the factor structure of the RDS and provides reliability data for the emergent subscales. In Study 2 (N = 963), the obtained three-factor structure (Relationship Confidence, Knowledge of Warning Signs, and Deciding) is tested via confirmatory factor analysis, demonstrates convergent and discriminant validity, and is shown to predict relationship characteristics 14 weeks later. Study 3 (N = 805) shows the sensitivity of the three factors to change through examination of the influence of a semester-long intervention targeted at increasing decision making in relationships. Use of this scale for identifying and intervening with couples or individuals who lack active decision making in relationships may decrease their risk for future relationship distress. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Four techniques of group decision making under uncertainty.

4 techniques of group decision-making—authoritarian, leader suggestion, census, and chairman—under risk and uncertainty were compared using a survival situation with 45 aircrews. "1. In a conflict situation, when a group discussion method… is involved, the members' reactions to the alternatives are relatively undifferentiated in contrast to the condition in which the leader alone makes the decision… . 2… . the groups appear to be least favorably disposed toward the authoritarian technique of decision-making… . 3. When the decision-making procedure is group centered the group reaches a decision involving greater personal risk to the members." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Impacts on decision making of executives: Probabilities versus outcomes.

The determinants of decision making of executives are of special interest for companies. For a long time choices have been investigated based on theories that assume an equal impact of expected outcomes and expected probabilities (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953, Savage 1954, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The influence of probabilities in decision processes is, however, questioned by a growing body of research (Rottenstreich and Kivetz 2006, Shapira 1995, March and Shapira 1987, 1992). To monitor the information acquisition process of board members and high-ranking executives in the German insurance industry we conducted 51 personal interviews, which included computer-aided simulations. These simulations clearly and objectively support former statements of executives (Shapira 1995) that they focus more on the amount of decision outcomes than on the corresponding probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nonrational processes in ethical decision making.

Most current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned process for making ethical judgments, but these models are empirically unproven and rely upon assumptions of rational, conscious, and quasilegal reasoning. Such models predominate despite the fact that many nonrational factors influence ethical thought and behavior, including context, perceptions, relationships, emotions, and heuristics. For example, a large body of behavioral research has demonstrated the importance of automatic intuitive and affective processes in decision making and judgment. These processes profoundly affect human behavior and lead to systematic biases and departures from normative theories of rationality. Their influence represents an important but largely unrecognized component of ethical decision making. We selectively review this work; provide various illustrations; and make recommendations for scientists, trainers, and practitioners to aid them in integrating the understanding of nonrational processes with ethical decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Integration of social and utilitarian factors in decision making.

Decision making is influenced by social cues, but there is little understanding of how social information interacts with other cues that determine decisions. To address this quantitatively, participants were asked to learn which of two faces was associated with a higher probability of reward. They were repeatedly presented with two faces, each with a different, unknown probability of reward, and participants attempted to maximize gains by selecting the face that was most often rewarded. Both faces had the same identity, but one face had a happy expression and the other had either an angry or a sad expression. Ideal observer models predict that the facial expressions should not affect the decision-making process. Our results however showed that participants had a prior disposition to select the happy face when it was paired with the angry but not the sad face and overweighted the positive outcomes associated with happy faces and underweighted positive outcomes associated with either angry or sad faces. Nevertheless, participants also integrated the feedback information. As such, their decisions were a composite of social and utilitarian factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emergence of coherence over the course of decision making.

Previous research has indicated that decision making is accompanied by an increase in the coherence of assessments of the factors related to the decision alternatives. In the present study, the authors investigated whether this coherence shift is obtained before people commit to a decision, and whether it is obtained in the course of a number of other processing tasks. College students were presented with a complex legal case involving multiple conflicting arguments. Participants rated agreement with the individual arguments in isolation before seeing the case and after processing it under various initial sets, including playing the role of a judge assigned to decide the case. Coherence shifts were observed when participants were instructed to delay making the decision (Experiment 1), to memorize the case (Experiment 2), and to comprehend the case (Experiment 3). The findings support the hypothesis that a coherence-generating mechanism operates in a variety of processing tasks, including decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clinical decision making in the prediction of falls.

Objective: Examine rehabilitation professionals' capacity to identify risk factors for patient falls. Design: Survey study. Setting: Three academic medical center rehabilitation departments. Participants: Fifty-six rehabilitation specialists representing disciplines typically involved in patient care, including physiatry and occupational, physical, recreation, and speech therapy. Measures: A 2-part, self-report questionnaire with spontaneous and cued rank-order listing of factors related to fall risk. Results: Clinicians did not consider advanced age and history of falling when spontaneously delineating risks for falls. The importance of fall history, but not of advanced age, was recognized through cueing. Conclusions: Clinicians appear aware of strong predictors of fall risk but require cueing to consistently use them. Cueing increased hypothetical predictive accuracy, although clinicians still downplayed some of the most salient predictive factors. Staff education regarding validated fall risk factors and potential errors in clinical decision making can improve patient care. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Integrating fMRI with psychophysiological measurements in the study of decision making.

Neuroimaging techniques have recently been used to examine the neural mechanism of decision making. Nevertheless, most of the neuroimaging studies overlook the importance of emotion and autonomic response in modulating the process of decision making. In this article, the authors discuss how to integrating functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with psychophysiological measurements in studying decision making. They suggest that psychophysiological data would complement with fMRI findings in providing a more comprehensive understanding about the physiological and neural mechanisms of decision making. Also, this technique would yield valuable information in examining the interplay among emotions, autonomic response, and decision making. The discussion is presented in a tutorial format with concrete technical recommendations for researchers who may consider adopting the technique in their study of decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive aging and the adaptive use of recognition in decision making.

The recognition heuristic, which predicts that a recognized object scores higher on some criterion than an unrecognized one, is a simple inference strategy and thus an attractive mental tool for making inferences with limited cognitive resources—for instance, in old age. In spite of its simplicity, the recognition heuristic might be negatively affected in old age by too much knowledge, inaccurate memory, or deficits in its adaptive use. Across 2 studies, we investigated the impact of cognitive aging on the applicability, accuracy, and adaptive use of the recognition heuristic. Our results show that (a) young and old adults’ recognition knowledge was an equally useful cue for making inferences about the world; (b) as with young adults, old adults adjusted their use of the recognition heuristic between environments with high and low recognition validities; and (c) old adults, however, showed constraints in their ability to adaptively suspend the recognition heuristic on specific items. Measures of fluid intelligence mediated these age-related constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple-reason decision making based on automatic processing.

It has been repeatedly shown that in decisions under time constraints, individuals predominantly use noncompensatory strategies rather than complex compensatory ones. The authors argue that these findings might be due not to limitations of cognitive capacity but instead to limitations of information search imposed by the commonly used experimental tool Mouselab (J. W. Payne, J. R. Bettman, & E. J. Johnson, 1988). The authors tested this assumption in 3 experiments. In the 1st experiment, information was openly presented, whereas in the 2nd experiment, the standard Mouselab program was used under different time limits. The results indicate that individuals are able to compute weighted additive decision strategies extremely quickly if information search is not restricted by the experimental procedure. In a 3rd experiment, these results were replicated using more complex decision tasks, and the major alternative explanations that individuals use more complex heuristics or that they merely encode the constellation of cues were ruled out. In sum, the findings challenge the fundaments of bounded rationality and highlight the importance of automatic processes in decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dopamine modulates effort-based decision making in rats.

Previous research has implicated dopamine as a modulating factor in choice behavior based on effort. The purpose of the present study was to determine the individual contribution of different dopamine receptors to effort-based decision making in rats. Rats were trained in a T-maze to choose a large-reward arm that contained 8 pellets of food over a small-reward arm that contained 2 pellets of food. The rats then were trained to climb progressively higher barriers to obtain the food from the large-reward arm. Using a discounting procedure on each test day, it was found that rats were more likely to choose the small-reward arm after treatment with the D1 antagonist, SCH-23390, or the D2 antagonist, haloperidol. The dopamine agonist, D-amphetamine, biased the rats toward choosing the large-reward arm and blunted the effects of SCH-23390 or haloperidol. Treatment with the D3 receptor antagonist, U99194, or the D3 receptor agonist, 7-OH-DPAT, did not alter choice behavior. These data indicate that D1 and D2 receptors are required for decisions based on effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotion regulation and decision making under risk and uncertainty.

It is well established that emotion plays a key role in human social and economic decision making. The recent literature on emotion regulation (ER), however, highlights that humans typically make efforts to control emotion experiences. This leaves open the possibility that decision effects previously attributed to acute emotion may be a consequence of acute ER strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. In Study 1, we manipulated ER of laboratory-induced fear and disgust, and found that the cognitive reappraisal of these negative emotions promotes risky decisions (reduces risk aversion) in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and is associated with increased performance in the prehunch/hunch period of the Iowa Gambling Task. In Study 2, we found that naturally occurring negative emotions also increase risk aversion in Balloon Analogue Risk Task, but the incidental use of cognitive reappraisal of emotions impedes this effect. We offer evidence that the increased effectiveness of cognitive reappraisal in reducing the experience of emotions underlies its beneficial effects on decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychiatric and psychological factors in patient decision making concerning antidepressant use.

The observation that the use of antidepressants has strongly increased during the past decade implies that on a micro level doctors and patients more often decide that antidepressants are the appropriate treatment. Therefore, it is important to increase insight into patients' decision making regarding the use of antidepressants. The decision making model used in the present study was based on A. Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory. Two cohorts of patients were recruited and followed for 9 months. Among patients who use antidepressants (N = 166), the stronger pros and weaker cons of discontinuation and self-efficacy predicted more proximal goal intentions. Goal intentions predicted discontinuation after 9 months. Among patients who had used antidepressants in the past (N = 73), stronger pros of discontinuation and the weaker perceived functions of antidepressants predicted a more positive evaluation of their present state, compared with when they still used antidepressants. These temporal comparisons, in turn, predicted renewed use of antidepressants after 9 months. The results provide a framework for supporting and influencing decision making with regard to the use of antidepressants. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of anticipatory stress on decision making in a gambling task.

Recent research has highlighted the fact that emotion that is intrinsic to a task benefits decision making. The authors tested the converse hypothesis, that unrelated emotion disrupts decision making. Participants played the Iowa Gambling Task, during which only experimental participants anticipated giving a public speech (A. Bechara, D. Tranel, & H. Damasio, 2000). Experimental participants who were anticipating the speech learned the contingencies of the choices more slowly, and there was a gender interaction later in the game, with stressed female participants having more explicit knowledge and more advantageous performance and stressed male participants having poorer explicit knowledge and less advantageous performance. Effects of anticipatory stress on decision making are complex and depend on both the nature of the task and the individual. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ultimate sampling dilemma in experience-based decision making.

Computer simulations and 2 experiments demonstrate the ultimate sampling dilemma, which constitutes a serious obstacle to inductive inferences in a probabilistic world. Participants were asked to take the role of a manager who is to make purchasing decisions based on positive versus negative feedback about 3 providers in 2 different product domains. When information sampling (from a computerized database) was over, they had to make inferences about actual differences in the database from which the sample was drawn (e.g., about the actual superiority of different providers, or about the most likely origins of negatively valenced products). The ultimate sampling dilemma consists in a forced choice between 2 search strategies that both have their advantages and their drawbacks: natural sampling and deliberate sampling of information relevant to the inference task. Both strategies leave the sample unbiased for specific inferences but create errors or biases for other inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amount of participation, coalescence, and profitability of decision making discussions.

51 groups of 255 ROTC cadets, varying in motivation and stratification, were examined in groups of 5 as they discussed the correct rankings of the familiarity of words. Measures of time talked, coalescence, and profit from discussion were collected on each of 10 problems solved by each group. Where members were equal in status, much participation was associates with increased decision accuracy, particularly when members were highly motivated; but the converse was true when groups were stratified, particularly where they were also unmotivated. Coalescence was associated with increased accuracy of decisions in moderately motivated groups, and in unstratified groups. Individual attempts to lead were more likely to be successful where members were motivated and where members varied in status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)