Folk psychology or semantic entailment? Comment on Rips and Conrad (1989).

L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) reported a puzzling but consistent result from a series of experiments designed to study folk beliefs about the mind. For example, subjects accept both "Dreaming is a kind of experiencing" and "Experiencing is a part of dreaming." Because this pattern is not observed for objects—"A hammer is a kind of tool" is acceptable, but "A tool is part of a hammer" is not—Rips and Conrad suggested that their results provide clues to differences between folk and scientific psychology. An alternative interpretation developed here holds that their results are not peculiar to terms denoting mental processes and shed no new light on folk theories of the mind; instead, they are quite general and follow from treating verbs as if they were nouns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

One person and two person psychologies and the method of psychoanalysis.

The distinction between a monadic theory of mind (a one-person psychology) and a relational theory of mind (a two-person psychology) is crucial in understanding psychoanalytic concepts. However, some psychoanalytic theorists see these two models as essentially complementary whereas others see them as contradictory and irreconcilable. I argue that the artificial distinction between clinical theory and metapsychology obscures the recognition that the most fundamental psychoanalytic clinical concepts and procedures were formulated and historically understood as one-person phenomena. Transference was not conceptualized as an interpersonal event occurring between two people but was rather understood as a process occurring within the mind of the analysand. The article attempts to extricate fundamental clinical concepts from the quasibiological drive theory that has dominated both our metapsychology and our clinical theory, and to reexamine the value of these clinical concepts within a relational, contextual, and intersubjective framework. The article examines the method of free association in order to illustrate the different implications of one-person and two-person psychologies. I propose that a two-person or relational field theory does not need to neglect or minimize the... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Jungian metapsychology and neurobiological theory

This paper deals with brain research and depth psychology. Because brain research is becoming significantly more sophisticated and increasingly able to assay the neurobiology of subjective (i.e., mental) events in vivo, it is suggested that any school of depth psychology will probably not survive as a mainstream treatment modality if its theory and practice is found to be in frank variance with the findings of the modern neurosciences. Jung's psychology is compared to Freud's and shown to be reasonably consonant with such findings. Historical highlights of Jung's non-reductive way of conceptualizing and working are presented and put in the context of more recent scientifically defensible concepts (emergence, supervenience, complexity theory) from the fields of both philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. These concepts postulate a hierarchical model of reality which permits an exploration of the mind/brain relationship without resorting to reductionism or dualism. A sense of the present struggle is conveyed between the proponents of these and more traditional scientific concepts. Finally, the nature of mind/brain confluence is elucidated by examples from the areas of learning, memory and the capacity to symbolize in order to illustrate how clinical practices and observations familiar to experience depth therapists and also in agreement with Jungian theory are compatible with neuroscientific findings. A research suggestion is offered.     

Review of How people change.

Reviews the book, How people change by Rebecca Curtis and George Stricker (see record 1991-98045-000). This book, subtitled "Inside and Outside Therapy," brings together knowledgeable and thoughtful people from the practitioner domains of clinical/counseling psychology and similarly scholarly individuals from other areas of psychology (such as industrial/organizational and social psychology). Reading this book called to mind a time when we used to consider psychology a single discipline with areas of specialization, not the fragmented puzzle whose pieces do not appear to fit together. The attempts to integrate the ideas related to behavior change are reminiscent of Dollard and Miller's attempts to blend Freudian theory with the data and methodology of learning theory; Rotter's (1954) attempt to incorporate concepts from both learning theory and Lewinian models of social interaction into a theory for clinical psychology. This book serves as evidence that reports of the demise of an integrated body of knowledge we call psychology have been greatly exaggerated. This work will appeal to the careful, thoughtful reader, one who is interested in extrapolating to the larger issues relevant to the issue of how human behavior changes. Curtis and Stricker, following the trail set by integrationists like C. R. Snyer and John Harvey, are to be commended for their work on this volume and for their own written contributions to it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The tree of knowledge system and the theoretical unification of psychology.

The outline for theoretically unified psychology is offered. A new epistemological system is used to provide a unique vantage point to examine how psychological science exists in relationship to the other sciences. This new view suggests that psychology can be thought of as existing between the central insights of B. F. Skinner and Sigmund Freud. Specifically, Skinner's fundamental insight is merged with cognitive neuroscience to understand how mind emerges out of life. This conception is then joined with Freud's fundamental insight to understand the evolutionary changes in mind that gave rise to human culture. By linking life to mind from the bottom and mind to culture from the top, psychology is effectively boxed in between biology and the social sciences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Culture and ideology in Ian Suttie's theory of mind.

The author discusses the comprehensive outlook that shaped Ian Suttie's psychology. Suttie is seen as a background influence behind the British school of psychoanalysis, and his ideas pervade that school and therefore late-modern notions of the mind. The author describes the formation of Suttie's independent theory, and argues that his project was expressly ideological, as he tried to counter what he saw as the reactionary and disruptive influence of Freud's classical theory. Suttie offered an optimistic perception of the mind, which could serve as the basis for a progressive social policy. This perception was rooted in the outlook of early 20th-century reforming liberalism, whose preferences and prejudices it shares. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On Readmitting the Mind.

The author addresses the following question: In what sense of the word "mind" may modern psychology be correctly described as the study of the mind? The author argues that "mind" should be defined as "the organization of behavior" and that psychology is the science of the mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can psychology be a science of mind?

Addresses the question of whether the brain initiates behavior as the mind or self is said to do. This cannot be answered in the body-cum-brain, observed either introspectively or with instruments and methods of psychology. Two sciences that have a bearing on human behavior are discussed. These are physiology and a group of 3 sciences concerned with the variation and selection that determine the condition of the body-cum-brain at any moment: ethology, behavior analysis, and anthropology. Behavior analysis is the youngest of the 3 sciences and the only one to be studied at length in the laboratory. The roles of behaviorism and cognitive psychology in the development of the discipline of psychology are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Premises of interpersonal theory.

Premises of interpersonal theory are elucidated in order to crystallize its foundations and to point up the utility of discussing psychoanalytic theory on the level of premises. In regard to human psychology, interpersonal theory assumes an inextricable interpenetration of biology and external influences. It therefore questions assigning biology or "biologized" concepts predominance in explaining meaning or the contents of the mind. Biology is implicated in many interpersonal concepts, but not in the form implied in such concepts as drive or inherently arising endogenous states. Rather than an unfolding general nature, interpersonal theory assumes an outcome emerging from the interaction of manifold biological potentials with complex social influences. Such a perspective implies further assumptions about human impressibility, social determinism, psycho/social multidimensionality, complexity, and uniqueness. These assumptions lead to a focus on individual psychology, on character, for example, rather than general psychology, and on holistic/field conceptions of causality rather than the causal linkage of relatively isolated dimensions. ... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Citations for outstanding lifetime contribution: August 20, 1993.

Presents R. W. Sperry and H. A. Simon with the American Psychological Association citation for outstanding lifetime contribution to psychology. Sperry, the 1st individual trained in psychology to receive the Nobel prize for medicine/physiology, brought forth original and revolutionary concepts, such as his ideas on the mind–brain problem and consciousness. Simon, who was awarded the Nobel prize for economics, made outstanding contributions to organizational theory, the cognitive character of the decision-making process, and the computer metaphor of rational thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The great struggles of life: Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary psychology.

Darwin envisioned a scientific revolution for psychology. His theories of natural and sexual selection identified two classes of struggles--the struggle for existence and the struggle for mates. The emergence of evolutionary psychology and related disciplines signals the fulfillment of Darwin's vision. Natural selection theory guides scientists to discover adaptations for survival. Sexual selection theory illuminates the sexual struggle, highlighting mate choice and same-sex competition adaptations. Theoretical developments since publication of On the Origin of Species identify important struggles unknown to Darwin, notably, within-families conflicts and conflict between the sexes. Evolutionary psychology synthesizes modern evolutionary biology and psychology to penetrate some of life's deep mysteries: Why do many struggles center around sex? Why is social conflict pervasive? And what are the mechanisms of mind that define human nature? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Editor’s choices.

Reviews the books, Mind regained by Edward Pols (see record 1998-06466-000); Manifesto of a passionate moderate by Susan Haack (1998); and Mind, meaning and mental disorder: The nature of causal explanation in psychology and psychiatry by Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill (see record 1996-98296-000). In different but equally compelling ways, these three books address central problems in philosophical psychology and offer telling replies to more complacent perspectives on the nature of mind and mental life. The first two of the volumes are by philosophers, the third by authors trained in clinical psychology and psychiatry. In different ways, each of the volumes is at war with simplistic conceptions of explanation; each is also careful to distinguish between the correctives needed and a lapse into relativistic and ultimately skeptical positions on the nature of knowledge itself. All three of these volumes would serve as useful, even essential, texts in advanced courses in theory and philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind. But so would they serve in interesting ways the larger aims of courses in Personality and Abnormal Psychology. Together, these books present encouraging reminders of the importance of conceptual analysis to the development and refinement of Psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What primary care psychology has to offer the patient-centered medical home.

The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) proposes a new model to transform the practice of primary health care to one that is patient centered, high quality, continuous, comprehensive, and compassionate. In this paper, the authors provide an updated definition of, and skills needed for, primary care psychology, focused on integrating various psychological approaches with an overarching systemic theory. With this in mind, the authors suggest that primary care psychology can be important to achieving the goals of what some professionals now call the Patient-Centered Health Care Home. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Freud and Wittgenstein: Language and human nature.

One of the dramatic consequences of Sigmund Freud's work is its seminal role in the search for valid answers about the nature of the human mind and individual personality. His search for a scientific basis for understanding undercut nineteenth-century traditions that placed emphasis on primitive conceptions of race. Central to Freud's work is the theory of language and its function in the mind of the individual and in society. Using the historical contexts surrounding the evolution of Freud's theories from The interpretation of dreams to civilization and its discontents, his self-conception as a Jew, and the dynamics of Viennese society and politics, this essay explores the conflicts and correspondences between Freud's theories and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, his near-contemporary and fellow Viennese, on questions of mind, language, and identity. Freud's legacy will be assessed not in the fields of psychology, neuroscience, or hermeneutics, but explored instead in terms of its importance in politics and ethical and social theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk psychology of mental activities.

A central aspect of people's beliefs about the mind is that mental activities—for example, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving—are interrelated, with some activities being kinds or parts of others. In common-sense psychology, reasoning is a kind of thinking and reasoning is part of problem solving. People's conceptions of these mental kinds and parts can furnish clues to the ordinary meaning of these terms and to the differences between folk and scientific psychology. In this article, we use a new technique for deriving partial orders to analyze subjects' decisions about whether one mental activity is a kind or part of another. The resulting taxonomies and partonomies differ from those of common object categories in exhibiting a converse relation in this domain: One mental activity is a part of another if the second is a kind of the first. The derived taxonomies and partonomies also allow us to predict results from further experiments that examine subjects' memory for these activities, their ratings of the activities' importance, and their judgments about whether there could be "possible minds" that possess some of the activities but not others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The psychology of science and the origins of the scientific mind.

Reviews the book, The psychology of science and the origins of the scientific mind by Gregory Feist (see record 2006-02942-000). In this book, Gregory Feist sets out to show two things: that psychology of science can be its own field and that this field has been growing along side of humanity ever since its inception. Feist divides the book into two parts. First, he argues for the legitimacy of the field of psychology of science, addressing relevant research from many sub fields and their applications for the future. Part two delves into the origins and future of the scientific mind. Overall, this book makes one logically consider what science is and is not. It brings about contemplation about how science developed and how humans embraced it. Feist says he wants to take on the applied implications for the formalized study of both the psychology and science and the properties of the scientific mind. His goal is to move the psychology of science from its implicit methods scattered across domains of psychology and make them explicit. He wants to unite researchers scattered across the world to make up a new psychology of science that actively meets, has its own journal, and can educate future researchers. This is all very interesting and indeed possible, as long as the meetings would follow the same integrative genius that is displayed in this book. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The painted dragons in affective science: Can the Chinese notion of ganlei add a transformative detail?

I propose for emotion research a dynamic approach to truth in which folk theories, no matter how much they may be infested with magical thinking and peculiar beliefs, can function as potential competitors and valued interlocutors on the platform of theory construction. For demonstration, I present the ancient Chinese notion of ganlei as a counterpoint to Western metaphysics. Potential contributions of this indigenous belief system to theory and research on emotions include bringing greater clarity to existing concepts of empathy and mind reading and participating meaningfully in the current debates on emotions. More important, ganlei suggests a shift of focus in emotion research from epistemological to ontological categories and from mental representations to intermental transactions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From philosopher to psychologist: The early career of Edwin Ray Guthrie, Jr.

Edwin R. Guthrie rose to prominence as a psychologist in the 1930s. His theoretical outlook was behavioristic. This approach came from his conviction that an objective method could be applied to a scientific treatment of mind. Prior to becoming a psychologist, he was a philosopher of mathematics. Guthrie was initiated into psychology by Stevenson Smith, from whom he learned a psychology of adjustment informed by comparative research, Columbia functionalism, and clinical psychology. Guthrie's first step into psychology was in collaboration with Smith on Chapters in General Psychology (S. Smith & E.R. Guthrie, 1921). To synthesize their own unique position on learning from the contemporary theory and research, they used the principle of association. This article focuses on Guthrie's origin and his development into a learning theorist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)