Inferences about the location of food in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in two sensory modalities.

The authors tested the ability of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to make inferences about hidden food. In Experiment 1, we showed the content of 2 boxes, 1 of which was baited (visual condition, VC) or we shook both boxes producing noise from the baited box (auditory condition, AC). Seven subjects (out of 8) were above chance in the VC, whereas only 1 was above chance in AC. During treatment, by manipulating empty and filled objects subjects experienced the relation between noise and content. When tested again, 7 capuchins were above chance in the VC and 3 in AC. In Experiment 2, we gave visual or auditory information only about the empty box and, consequently, successful choice implied inferential reasoning. All subjects (out of 4) were above chance in the VC, and 2 in the AC. Control tests ruled out the possibility that success resulted from simply avoiding the shaken noiseless box, or from the use of arbitrary auditory information. Similar to apes (Call, 2004), capuchins were capable of inferential reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) spontaneously use visual but not acoustic information to find hidden food items.

Foraging choices in tufted capuchins monkeys are guided by perceptual, cognitive, and motivational factors, but little is known about how these factors might interact. The present study investigates how different types of sensory information affect capuchins' ability to locate hidden food. In two experiments, capuchins were presented with two cups, one baited and one empty. Monkeys were given visual, acoustic, or acoustic-visual information related to the baited cup, the empty cup, or both baited and empty cup. Results show that capuchins spontaneously used visual information to locate food, and that information indicating presence and absence of food led to higher success rates than information indicating only absence of food. In contrast, acoustic information did not lead to success rates above chance levels and failed to enhance performance in combination with visual information. Capuchins spontaneously avoided a visually empty cup, but they did not appear to associate sounds with either the presence or absence of food. Being able to locate food items with the aid of acoustic cues might be a learned process that requires interactive experiences with the task's contingencies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferential reasoning by exclusion in great apes, lesser apes, and spider monkeys.

Using the cups task, in which subjects are presented with limited visual or auditory information that can be used to deduce the location of a hidden reward, Call (2004) found prima facie evidence of inferential reasoning by exclusion in several great ape species. One bonobo (Pan paniscus) and two gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) appeared to make such inferences in both the visual and auditory domains. However, common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) were successful only in the visual domain, and Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in neither. The present research built on this paradigm, and Experiment 1 yielded prima facie evidence of inference by exclusion in both domains for two common chimpanzees, and in the visual domain for two Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii). Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that two specific associative learning explanations could not readily account for these results. Because an important focus of the program of research was to assess the cognitive capacities of lesser apes (family Hylobatidae), we modified Call's original procedures to better suit their attentional and dispositional characteristics. In Experiment 1, testing was also attempted with three gibbon genera (Symphalangus, Nomascus, Hylobates), but none of the subjects completed the standard task. Further testing of three siamangs (Symphalangus syndactylus) and a spider monkey (Ateles geoffroyi) using a faster method yielded prima facie evidence of inferential reasoning by exclusion in the visual domain among the siamangs (Experiment 4). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferences About the Location of Food in the Great Apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus).

Bonobos (Pan paniscus; n = 4), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; n = 12), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla; n = 8), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus; n = 6) were presented with 2 cups (1 baited) and given visual or auditory information about their contents. Visual information consisted of letting subjects look inside the cups. Auditory information consisted of shaking the cup so that the baited cup produced a rattling sound. Subjects correctly selected the baited cup both when they saw or heard the food. Nine individuals were above chance in both visual and auditory conditions. More important, subjects as a group selected the baited cup when only the empty cup was either shown or shaken, which means that subjects chose correctly without having seen or heard the food (i.e., inference by exclusion). Control tests showed that subjects were not more attracted to noisy cups, avoided shaken noiseless cups, or learned to use auditory information as a cue during the study. It is concluded that subjects understood that the food caused the noise, not simply that the noise was associated with the food. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analogical reasoning in a capuchin monkey (Cebus apella).

Previous evidence has suggested that analogical reasoning (recognizing similarities among object relations when the objects themselves are dissimilar) is limited to humans and apes. This study investigated whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can use analogical reasoning to solve a 3-dimensional search task. The task involved hiding a food item under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of different sizes and then allowing subjects to search for food hidden under the cup of analogous size in their own set of cups. Four monkeys were exposed to a series of relational matching tasks. If subjects reached criterion on these tasks, they were exposed to relational transfer tasks involving novel stimuli. Three of the monkeys failed to reach criterion on the basic relational matching tasks and therefore were not tested further. One monkey, however, revealed above-chance performance on a series of transfer tasks with 3 novel stimuli. This evidence suggests that contrary to previous arguments, a member of a New World monkey species can solve an analogical problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The magic cup: Great apes and domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) individuate objects according to their properties.

Despite current interest in dog (Canis familiaris) cognition, very little is known about how dogs represent objects and how they compare with other species, such as the great apes. Therefore, we investigated how dogs and great apes (chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes], bonobos [Pan paniscus], orangutans [Pongo pygmaeus], gorillas [Gorilla gorilla]) individuate objects in a classical violation of expectation paradigm. We used a container (magic cup) with a double bottom that allowed us to change the type of food that subjects had seen being placed in the container. Using a 2 × 2 design, we varied whether subjects received a generally preferred food and whether the food was substituted (surprise trials) or not (baseline trials). Apes showed increased begging and looking behaviors and dogs showed increased smelling behavior. Both species stayed near the experimenter more frequently in the surprise trials compared with baseline trials. Both species reacted to positive (i.e., good food substituted for bad food) and negative (i.e., bad food substituted for good food) surprises. These results suggest that apes and dogs were able to individuate objects according to their properties or type in comparable ways. In addition, we looked for frustration and elation effects, but subjects' behaviors were not influenced by the food they saw and which they received in previous trials. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Searching beneath the shelf in macaque monkeys: Evidence for a gravity bias or a foraging bias?

The reasons underpinning search biases in 2 species of macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Macaca arctoides) were explored over the course of 3 experiments requiring monkeys to search for a hidden food reward. The results reveal that monkeys are adept at exploiting perceptual cues to locate a food reward but are unable to use physical constraints such as solidity as cues to the reward's location. Monkeys prefer to search for a food reward beneath a solid shelf, not because they have an expectation that the reward should be there, but rather because, in the absence of usable cues, this bias emerges as a default search option. It is hypothesized that this bias may have its roots in a history of competition for food resources. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sex differences in audiovisual discrimination learning by Bengalese Finches (Lonchura striata var. domestica).

Both visual and auditory information are important for songbirds, especially in developmental and sexual contexts. To investigate bimodal cognition in songbirds, the authors conducted audiovisual discrimination training in Bengalese finches. The authors used two types of stimulus: an "artificial stimulus," which is a combination of simple figures and sound, and a "biological stimulus," consisting of video images of singing males along with their songs. The authors found that while both sexes predominantly used visual cues in the discrimination tasks, males tended to be more dependent on auditory information for the biological stimulus. Female responses were always dependent on the visual stimulus for both stimulus types. Only males changed their discrimination strategy according to stimulus type. Although males used both visual and auditory cues for the biological stimulus, they responded to the artificial stimulus depending only on visual information, as the females did. These findings suggest a sex difference in innate auditory sensitivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pinna movements of the cat during sound localization

We measured the movements of the external ear, or pinna, using the magnetic search coil technique in cats trained to look at auditory and visual targets for a food reward. No behavioral contingencies were placed on pinna movements. Prominent pinna movements accompany eye movements when the animal orients to either auditory or visual stimuli. In visual trials the pinna movements are coordinated with eye movements, suggesting that they are part of the general orientation response of the animal. In auditory trials the pinna response was composed of two movements: short- and long-latency components. Whereas the long-latency component seemed to occur with the eye movement to the target, the short-latency component was coupled to the onset of the stimulus. The short-latency component ( approximately 25 msec) was highly asymmetrical, being largest in the pinna ipsilateral to the stimuli. In one animal it persisted after >10(5) trials.     

The performance of bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in two versions of an object-choice task.

The object-choice task tests animals’ ability to use human-given cues to find a hidden reward located in 1 of 2 (or more) containers. Great apes are generally unskillful in this task whereas other species including dogs (Canis familiaris) and goats (Capra hircus) can use human-given cues to locate the reward. However, great apes are typically positioned proximal to the containers when receiving the experimenter’s cue whereas other species are invariably positioned distally. The authors investigated how the position of the subject, the human giving the cue and the containers (and the distance among them) affected the performance of 19 captive great apes. Compared to the proximal condition, the distal condition involved larger distances and, critically, it reduced the potential ambiguity of the cues as well as the strong influence that the sight of the containers may have had when subjects received the cue. Subjects were far more successful in the distal compared to the proximal condition. The authors suggest several possibilities to account for this difference and discuss our findings in relation to previous and future object-choice research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Use of human visual attention cues by olive baboons (Papio anubis) in a competitive task.

The ability of 4 olive baboons (Papio anubis) to use human gaze cues during a competitive food task was investigated. Three baboons used head orientation as a cue, and 1 individual also used eye direction alone. As the baboons did not receive prior training with gestural cuts, their performance suggests that the competitive paradigm may be more appropriate for testing nonhuman primates than the standard object-choice paradigm. However, the baboons were insensitive to whether the experimenter could actually perceive the food item, and therefore the use of visual orientation cues may not be indicative of visual perspective-taking abilities. Performance was disrupted by the introduction of a screen and objects to conceal food items and by the absence of movement in cues presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Single unit activity in the rat superior colliculus during reward magnitude task performance.

Long-Evans hooded rats were trained to run an alternation pattern in a t-maze with low reward (1 pellet) in the food cup of one arm and high reward (3 pellets) in the food cup of the other arm. Single units in the intermediate and deep layers of the superior colliculus were recorded using moveable microelectrodes. Most units showed activity that was associated with food retrieval, with a phasic increase in activity either upon the cessation of running or upon the insertion of the snout into the food cup. Some units (16%) showed different activity patterns upon retrieval of the two magnitudes of reward. Although 70% of the units showed either unimodal or multimodal sensory sensitivity, usually in response to tactile stimulation of the snout, this property was not related to activity associated with food retrieval. These data support previous observations that cells in the rat SC exhibit activity related to food retrieval, and indicate that for some of these neurons the coding reflects the characteristics of the reward stimulus. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed reward contingency task II: Transfer to new quantities, long-term retention, and the impact of quantity ratios.

We tested 6 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 3 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), 4 bonobos (Pan paniscus), and 2 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) in the reversed reward contingency task. Individuals were presented with pairs of quantities ranging between 0 and 6 food items. Prior to testing, some experienced apes had solved this task using 2 quantities while others were totally na?ve. Experienced apes transferred their ability to multiple-novel pairs after 6 to 19 months had elapsed since their initial testing. Two out of 6 na?ve apes (1 chimpanzee, 1 bonobo) solved the task--a proportion comparable to that of a previous study using 2 pairs of quantities. Their acquisition speed was also comparable to the successful subjects from that study. The ratio between quantities explained a large portion of the variance but affected na?ve and experienced individuals differently. For smaller ratios, na?ve individuals were well below 50% correct and experienced ones were well above 50%, yet both groups tended to converge toward 50% for larger ratios. Thus, some apes require no procedural modifications to overcome their strong bias for selecting the larger of 2 quantities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Tracking and inferring spatial rotation by children and great apes.

Finding hidden objects in space is a fundamental ability that has received considerable research attention from both a developmental and a comparative perspective. Tracking the rotational displacements of containers and hidden objects is a particularly challenging task. This study investigated the ability of 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children and great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans) to (a) visually track rotational displacements of a baited container on a platform and (b) infer its displacements by using the changes of position or orientation of 3 landmarks: an object on a container, the color of the containers, and the color of the platform on which the containers rested. Great apes and 5-year-old and older children successfully tracked visible rotations, but only children were able to infer the location of a correct cup (with the help of landmarks) after invisible rotations. The ability to use landmarks changed with age so that younger children solved this task only with the most explicit marker on the baited container, whereas older children, particularly 9-year-olds, were able to use landmark orientation to infer correct locations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amygdala inactivation reverses fear's ability to impair divided attention and make time stand still.

The cognitive and emotional effects of amygdala or frontal cortex lesions were compared in rats trained to time both a 50-s visual signal paired with food and an embedded 10- or 20-s auditory signal that was paired with either appetitive (food) or aversive (footshock) outcomes. When both auditory and visual signals were paired with food, control and amygdalar-lesioned rats were able to divide attention and to time both signals simultaneously, whereas when the embedded auditory signal was paired with footshock, control rats were impaired in their ability to divide attention and were able to time only one signal at a time. In contrast, amygdalar inactivation blocked this fear-related impairment and allowed rats to time both signals simultaneously, whereas rats with frontal cortex lesions demonstrated sequential processing under all conditions. These results support the proposal that the frontal cortex exerts executive control over the allocation of attentional resources, but that under stressful conditions the amygdala is crucial for the emergence of fear-evoked increments in selective attention leading to deficits in the ability to time 2 or more signals simultaneously. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nonenculturated Orangutans' (Pongo pygmaeus) Use of Experimenter-Given Manual and Facial Cues in an Object-Choice Task.

Several experiments have been performed, to examine whether nonhuman primates are able to make use of experimenter-given manual and facial (visual) cues to direct their attention to a baited object. Contrary to the performance of prosimians and monkeys, great apes repeatedly have shown task efficiency in experiments such as these. However, many great ape subjects used have been "enculturated" individuals. In the present study, 3 nonenculturated orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) were tested for their ability to use experimenter-given pointing, gazing, and glancing cues in an object-choice task. All subjects readily made use of the pointing gesture. However, when subjects were left with only gazing or glancing cues, their performance deteriorated markedly, and they were not able to complete the task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Great apes' (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus) understanding of tool functional properties after limited experience.

Primates' understanding of tool functionality has been investigated extensively using a paradigm in which subjects are presented with a tool that they must use to obtain an out-of-reach reward. After being given experience on an initial problem, monkeys can transfer their skill to tools of different shapes while ignoring irrelevant tool changes (e.g., color). In contrast, monkeys without initial training perform poorly on the same tasks. Compared to most monkeys, great apes show a clear propensity for tool using and may not require as much experience to succeed on tool functionality tasks. We investigated this question by presenting 171 apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) with several tool-use problems without giving them initial training or familiarizing them with the test materials. Apes succeeded without experience, but only on problems based on basic properties such as the reward being supported by an object. However, only minimal experience was sufficient to allow them to quickly improve their performance on more complex problems in which the reward was not in contact with the tool. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of repeated acquisitions and extinctions on response rate and pattern.

The procedure developed by R. A. Rescorla (2002) was used to study the effects of repeated acquisitions and extinctions of head entry responses into a food cup by rats. In each of 4 20-session phases, food was delivered at the end of particular 30-s auditory and visual stimuli, but not at the end of different 30-s auditory and visual stimuli. Based on response rates to individual stimuli and compound stimuli, the increase in response rate in acquisition occurred more rapidly than the decrease in extinction. Acquisition, but not extinction, occurred faster after successive transitions between acquisition and extinction. Temporal gradients of responding developed during acquisition and remained during extinction. Conclusions based on mean response rate, temporal gradients, and transfer tests were consistent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferences about guessing and knowing by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

The visual perspective-taking ability of 4 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was investigated. The subjects chose between information about the location of hidden food provided by 2 experimenters who randomly alternated between two roles (the guesser and the knower). The knower baited 1 of 4 obscured cups so that the subjects could watch the process but could not see which of the cups contained the reward. The guesser waited outside the room until the food was hidden. Finally, the knower pointed to the correct cup while the guesser pointed to an incorrect one. The chimpanzees quickly learned to respond to the knower. They also showed transfer to a novel variation of the task, in which the guesser remained inside the room and covered his head while the knower stood next to him and watched a third experimenter bait the cups. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of modeling the visual perspectives of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) relational matching: Playing by their own (analogical) rules.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been known to exhibit rudimentary abilities in analogical reasoning (Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider, & Washburn, 2008; Gillian, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; Haun & Call, 2009; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). With a wide array of individual differences, little can be concluded about the species' capacity for analogies, much less their strategies employed for solving such problems. In this study, we examined analogical strategies in 3 chimpanzees using a 3-dimensional search task (e.g., Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008). Food items were hidden under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of varying sizes. Subsequently, chimpanzees searched for food under the cup of the same relative size in their own set of cups—reasoning by analogy. Two chimpanzees initially appeared to fail the first relational phase of the task. Meta-analyses revealed, however, that they were instead using a secondary strategy not rewarded by the contingencies of the task—choosing on the basis of the same relative position in the sample. Although this was not the intended strategy of the task, it was nonetheless analogical. In subsequent phases of the task, chimpanzees eventually learned to shift their analogical reasoning strategy to match the reward contingencies of the task and successfully choose on the basis of relative size. This evidence not only provides support for the analogical ape hypothesis (Thompson & Oden, 2000), but also exemplifies how foundational conceptually mediated analogical behavior may be for the chimpanzee. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)