严重事故下安全壳内环境条件计算分析

参照对先进压水堆安全壳的要求,结合恰希玛二期工程严重事故缓解措施,对大破口失水事故(LLOCA)叠加安注失效、小破口失水事故(SLOCA)叠加安注失效、全厂断电(SBO)叠加柴油机驱动的辅助给水失效等严重事故序列可能影响安全壳内环境的条件及缓解措施进行了分析.结果表明,恢复喷淋可以明显地降低安全壳内的压力和温度,有效地改善安全壳内的环境,从而改善各种仪表设备的工作条件.     

严重事故下核电站安全壳内氢气分布及控制分析

使用安全壳分析程序CONTAIN计算分析了百万千瓦级压水堆核电站严重事故下安全壳内的氢气浓度分布.分别对一回路冷段大破口失水(LB-LOCA)叠加应急堆芯冷却系统(ECCS)失效(不包括非能动的安注箱)事故和全厂断电(SBO)叠加汽轮机驱动的应急给水泵失效事故两个严重事故序列进行了计算.计算结果表明,不同严重事故下,安全壳各隔间对氢气控制系统的要求不同.氢气控制系统的设计必须满足不同事故下的法规要求,提高电站的安全性.     

严重事故下封头失效机理分析

严重事故下堆芯熔融物坍塌到下封头,可能造成压力容器失效。本文针对造成压力容器失效的五个机制,运用一体化严重事故分析程序,分析全场断电分别叠加破口失水、主蒸汽输送管线破裂和蒸汽发生器传热管破裂事故对下封头完整性的影响。研究结果表明,三类事故均造成压力容器失效,全场断电叠加中破口失水事故由于破口位于热管段,距离稳压器和压力容器较近,事故响应更快,比全场断电分别叠加蒸汽发生器传热管破裂和主蒸汽输送管线破裂提前失效约20 000 s;全场断电叠加中破口失水事故中作用于贯穿件上的压力载荷超出贯穿件及其焊缝所能承受的最大载荷之和使得贯穿件弹出造成下封头失效;全场断电分别叠加蒸汽发生器传热管破裂和主蒸汽输送管线破裂均是因高温熔融物对下封头节点的损伤份额大于1使得下封头蠕变破裂造成压力容器失效。     

先进压水堆大破口始发严重事故下安全壳内氢气风险分析

本文采用集总参数法,在先进非能动压水堆核电厂严重事故一体化分析模型基础上,考虑先进压水堆非能动安全特性以及严重事故下采取熔融物堆内滞留(IVR)措施等特性对氢气风险的影响,开展了典型严重事故下安全壳内氢气风险分析。分别选取了冷段双端剪切断裂大破口、冷段大破口叠加IRWST重力注水有效以及ADS-4误启动三个典型大破口失水事故序列,对事故进程中的氧化温度、产氢速率以及产氢质量等特性进行了研究。选取产氢量最大的冷段大破口叠加IRWST重力注水有效事故序列,分析了氢气点火器系统的消氢效果。结果表明,堆芯再淹没过程产生大量氢气,采用点火器可有效去除安全壳内的氢气,从而降低氢气燃爆风险。     

压水堆不同尺寸的破口失水事故分析

基于一体化严重事故分析程序MAAP4.0.3(Modular Accident Analysis Program),本文建立了我国现役典型百万千瓦级压水堆(Pressurized-Water Reactor,PWR)核电机组模型,研究了热管段不同面积破口事故叠加安注失效的工况引起的严重事故过程,探讨了如何在恰当的时机采取有效的缓解措施对事故的进程进行干预。研究结果表明:在破口事故中随着破口面积而增大,压力容器会更早失效导致堆芯裸露;一旦压力容器失效,MCCI(Molten Corium Concrete Interaction)过程中氢气产量则会随着破口面积的增大而增大;在破口事故中尽早投入安全注射系统可以有效地缓解事故的进程,避免压力容器失效,并且安全注射系统越早投入对事故的缓解也就越有利。     

先进压水堆核电站氢气风险分析

核电厂在严重事故期间会产生大量氢气并释放到安全壳内,威胁安全壳的完整性。应用氢气风险分析程序GASFLOW对先进压水堆核电站在大破口失水事故叠加应急堆芯冷却系统失效导致的严重事故期间的氢气行为及风险进行分析。结果表明,当气体释放源位于蒸汽发生器隔间时,氢气流动的主要路径为"蒸汽发生器隔间—穹顶空间—操作平台以下隔间";破口隔间的氢气体积浓度分布与源项氢气体积浓度及射流形态有关,非破口区域的氢气体积浓度呈层状分布,在扩散作用下,层状分布向下推移;蒸汽发生器隔间存在着火焰加速(FA)的可能性,但基本可排除燃爆转变(DDT)的可能性,穹顶区域基本可排除FA和DDT的可能性。     

MCCI过程模型开发及验证

概述了严重事故下堆芯熔融物与混凝土相互作用（MCCI）过程的机理性模型,并给出了大亚湾核电厂全厂断电及大破口叠加安注失效等典型初因事故导致的严重事故下的MCCI过程的计算分析结果,并与相同事故序列下的MELCOR计算结果进行对比。计算结果表明,所给出的严重事故下的MCCI过程模型正确合理,计算速度快,能满足在模拟机上应用的要求。     

压水堆核电厂高压熔堆严重事故序列分析

压水堆核电厂的高压熔堆事故覆盖了大部分的严重事故序列,且具有很大的潜在威胁。根据我国900MW压水堆核电厂的概率安全分析（PSA）结果选取了丧失厂外电、未能紧急停堆的预期瞬态、二回路管道破口、一回路小破口和蒸汽发生器传热管破裂5种典型的高压熔堆严重事故序列,并使用SCDAP/RELAP5程序对这些事故序列的进程和后果进行了计算分析。计算结果表明：5种典型高压熔堆事故序列可能导致高压熔喷和安全壳直接加热风险,可能引起安全壳早期失效,很有必要采取相应的一回路卸压措施。     

严重事故下堆芯熔融物与混凝土的相互作用

当反应堆由于始发事件发展到压力容器熔融贯穿时,堆芯熔融物与混凝土相互作用（MCCI）可能引起安全壳晚期失效,包括地基熔穿及不可凝气体引起的安全壳超压失效。本文以600MW轻水堆核电厂为对象,选取全厂断电（SBO）叠加汽动辅助给水泵失效诱发的严重事故序列,应用MELCOR程序研究了该序列下发生MCCI的主要现象,着重关注了混凝土的消融速率及氢气的产生速率,为相应的严重事故管理提供支持。     

AP1000小破口叠加重力注射失效严重事故分析

应用新版MELCOR程序,建立了AP1000一二回路、非能动安全系统及安全壳隔室的热工水力模型,并以热段小破口叠加重力注射系统失效事故为例,对该严重事故进程在压力容器内阶段进行模拟计算,对缓解措施的功能进行了分析和评价。结果表明：自动卸压系统（ADS1～4）的成功实施,可使来自堆芯补水箱和安注箱的冷却水快速有效地注入堆芯,在冷却水完全耗尽前,堆芯始终处于淹没的状态。ADS4爆破阀开启后,使回路压力快速与安全壳压力平衡;非能动安全壳冷却系统对抵御严重事故下由于衰变热和非冷凝气体带来的缓慢升温升压是行之有效的措施;点火器在氢气浓度较低时点火,缓解了安全壳大空间发生全局燃爆而引发安全壳超压失效的风险,但连续点火燃烧会引起局部隔室温升远超出设计温度而危及后备缓解设施的存活。     

Thermal-hydraulic and stress analysis of AP1000 reactor containment during LOCA in dry cooling mode

Some kinds of break in the reactor coolant system may cause the coolant to exit rapidly from the failure site,which leads to the loss of coolant accident (LOCA).In this paper,a stress analysis of an AP1000 reactor containment is performed in an LOCA,with the passive containment cooling system (PCCS) being available and not available for cooling the wall's containment.The variations in the mechanical properties of the wall's containment,including elastic modulus,strength,and stress,are analyzed using the ABAQUS code.A general two-phase model is applied for modeling thermal-hydraulic behavior inside the containment.Obtained pressure and temperature from thermal-hydraulic models are considered as boundary conditions of the ABAQUS code to obtain distributions of temperature and stress across steel shell of the containment in the accident.The results indicate that if the PCCS fails,the peak pressure inside the containment exceeds the design value.However,the stress would still be lower than the yield stress value,and no risk would threaten the integrity of the containment.     

百万千瓦级压水堆严重事故后再注水的有效性评价

根据现有的设计资料,使用一体化严重事故分析程序MELCOR1.8.6建立了核电厂一、二回路系统,非能动堆芯冷却系统和安全壳系统的模型,并模拟冷段2英寸(5.08cm)小破口叠加重力注入失效的严重事故发生后,将冷却剂注入堆芯的情形,分析其对严重事故进程的缓解能力。本文选取3个严重事故的不同阶段,将冷却剂分别以小流量(10kg/s)、中流量(50kg/s)和大流量(200kg/s)的速率注入堆芯,通过比较氢气产生量、堆芯放射性产生量及堆芯温度等数据来评估在严重事故不同阶段再注水的可行性。结果表明:在堆芯损伤初期,可认为10kg/s以上的流量足以冷却百万千瓦级事故安全。而当严重事故发展到堆芯开始坍塌阶段,200kg/s的注水流量可认为是基本可行的,而小于此流量的注水应慎重考虑。     

Estimation of ex-vessel steam explosion pressure loads

An ex-vessel steam explosion may occur when, during a severe reactor accident, the reactor vessel fails and the molten core pours into the water in the reactor cavity. A steam explosion is a fuel coolant interaction process where the heat transfer from the melt to water is so intense and rapid that the timescale for heat transfer is shorter than the timescale for pressure relief. This can lead to the formation of shock waves and production of missiles that may endanger surrounding structures. A strong enough steam explosion in a nuclear power plant could jeopardize the containment integrity and so lead to a direct release of radioactive material to the environment.In this article, different scenarios of ex-vessel steam explosions in a typical pressurized water reactor cavity are analyzed with the code MC3D, which is being developed for the simulation of fuel–coolant interactions. A parametric study was performed varying the location of the melt release (central, right and left side melt pour), the cavity water subcooling, the primary system overpressure at vessel failure and the triggering time for explosion calculations. The main purpose of the study was to establish the influence of the varied parameters on the fuel–coolant interaction behaviour, to determine the most challenging cases and to estimate the expected pressure loadings on the cavity walls. For the most explosive central, right side and left side melt pour scenarios a detailed analysis of the explosion simulation results was performed. The study shows that for some ex-vessel steam explosion scenarios higher pressure loads are predicted than obtained in the OECD programme SERENA phase 1.     

非能动堆芯冷却系统LOCA下冷却能力分析

本文基于机理性分析程序建立了包括反应堆一回路冷却剂系统、专设安全设施及相关二次侧管道系统的先进压水堆分析模型,对典型的小破口失水事故和大破口失水事故开展了全面分析。针对不同破口尺寸、破口位置的失水事故,分析了非能动堆芯冷却系统（PXS）中非能动余热排出系统（PRHRS）、堆芯补水箱（CMT）、安注箱（ACC）、自动卸压系统（ADS）和安全壳内置换料水箱（IRWST）等关键系统的堆芯注水能力和冷却效果。研究表明,虽然破口尺寸、破口位置会影响事故进程发展,但所有事故过程中燃料包壳表面峰值温度不超过1 477 K,且反应堆堆芯处于有效淹没状态。PXS能有效排出堆芯衰变热,将反应堆引导到安全停堆状态,防止事故向严重事故发展。     

Commissioning of the ATLAS thermal-hydraulic integral test facility

KAERI recently constructed a new thermal-hydraulic integral test facility for advanced pressurized water reactors (PWRs) – ATLAS. The ATLAS facility has the following characteristics: (a) 1/2-height&length, 1/288-volume, and full pressure simulation of APR1400, (b) maintaining a geometrical similarity with APR1400 including 2(hot legs) × 4(cold legs) reactor coolant loops, direct vessel injection (DVI) of emergency core cooling water, integrated annular downcomer, etc., (c) incorporation of specific design characteristics of OPR1000 such as cold leg injection and low-pressure safety injection pumps, (d) maximum 10% of the scaled nominal core power. The ATLAS will mainly be used to simulate various accident and transient scenarios for evolutionary PWRs, OPR1000 and APR1400: the simulation capability of broad scenarios including the reflood phase of a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), small-break LOCA scenarios including DVI line breaks, a steam generator tube rupture, a main steam line break, a feed line break, a mid-loop operation, etc. The ATLAS is now in operation after an extensive series of commissioning tests in 2006.     

On the failure modes of alternative containment designs following postulated core meltdown

The containment response to a postulated core meltdown accident in a PWR ice condenser containment, a BWR Mark III containment and a BWR non-inerted Mark I containment has been examined to see if the WASH-1400 containment failure mode judgement for the Surry large, dry containment and the Peach Bottom Mark I inerted-containment are likely to be appropriate for these alternative containment plant designs. For the PWR, the representative accident chosen for the analysis is a large cold leg break accompanied by a loss of all electric power while the BWR representative event chosen is a recirculation line break without adequate core cooling function. Two containment event paths are studied for each of these two cases, depending on whether or not containment vapor suppression function is assumed to be available. Both the core and the containment pressure and temperature response to the accident events are computed for the four time intervals which characterize (a) blowdown of the pipe break, (b) core melt, (c) vessel melt-through, and (d) containment foundation penetration. The calculations are based on a best estimate of the most probable sequence, but certain phenomena and events were followed down multiple tracks. These include the temperature of the non-condensibles escaping the ice condenser into the upper compartment, the performance of the pressure suppression system, the distribution of non-condensibles between compartments, and the degree and rate of combustion of hydrogen generated from metal-water reactions. For the PWR ice condenser case, results indicate that the containment would be breached by (i) steam overpressurization during the blowdown period (time less than 20 sec) if the ice condenser fails to perform its function, (ii) by overpressurization and thermal stress during the core melt period if 25% or more of the core zirconium reacts with water followed by hydrogen burning and, and (iii) by the overpressurization due to non-condensibles before containment floor penetration is completed. For the BWR Mark III case, similar conclusions can be drawn for the loss of vapor suppression, and for the hydrogen burning if the extent of zirconium-water reaction is more than 35% of the core inventory. If the hydrogen burning fails to materialize, the containment can retain its integrity until containment meltthrough provided the melting is confined to the reactor pedestal area. It appears that the non-inerted Mark I containment is not so vulnerable to overpressurization from hydrogen burning as the Mark III; however, acceptable temperatures may be exceeded.     

注水时机对压水堆严重事故进程的影响

以典型的3环路压水堆为参考对象,建立了详细的严重事故计算模型。选择一回路热段当量直径为18 cm的失水事故(LOCA)作为初始事件,采用RELAP5/SCDAP/MOD3.2为分析工具,对无注水、无缓解措施下的基准事故进程进行计算分析,研究3种不同注水时机对严重事故进程的影响。3种注水时机分别为堆芯表面峰值温度达到1100 K、1300 K、1500 K时开始注水。计算结果显示,压水堆严重事故进程对于注水的时机非常敏感。较早阶段的注水对于阻止堆芯熔化十分有效,注水较晚会恶化事故进程,加速堆芯熔化。     

PWR Cold-Leg Small-Break LOCA with Total HPI Failure

Cold-leg small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) tests were performed at the ROSA-IV Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF), a 1/48 volumetrically-scaled model of a pressurized water reactor (PWR). The tests were conducted for break areas ranging 0.5–10% of the scaled cold leg area, and simulated hypothetical total failure of the high pressure injection (HPI) system. One of the tests, conducted with 1% break area, included an intentional depressurization of the primary system that was initiated after the onset of core dryout. A simple prediction model is proposed for prediction of times of major events, namely, loop seal clearing, core dryout, accumulator (ACC) injection and actuation of low pressure injection (LPI) system. Test data and model calculations show that intentional primary system depressurization with use of the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) is effective for break areas of approximately 0.5% or less, is unnecessary for breaks of approximately 5% or more, and might be insufficient for intermediate break areas to maintain adequate core cooling. It is also shown that there might be possibility of core dryout after ACC injection and before LPI injection for break areas less than approximately 2.5%.     

严重事故IVR下反应堆压力容器耦合传热数值模拟分析

堆芯熔化严重事故下保证反应堆压力容器（RPV）完整性非常重要,高温蠕变失效是堆芯熔化严重事故下反应堆压力容器的主要失效模式。在进行严重事故堆芯熔化物堆内包容（IVR）下RPV结构完整性分析中,RPV内外壁和沿高度方向的温度分布以及剩余壁厚是结构分析的重要输入。本文采用CFD分析方法对RPV堆内熔融物、RPV壁以及外部气液两相流动换热进行热-固-流耦合分析,获得耦合情况下的温度场、流场、各相份额分布以及RPV的剩余壁厚,为RPV在严重事故IVR下的结构完整性分析提供依据。     

Power-operated relief valve stuck-open accident and recovery scenarios in the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research integral system test facility

Four scaled small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) tests simulating the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) stuck-open accidents and the recovery actions in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) were performed at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) integral system test (IIST) facility. The objectives of this study are to verify the effectiveness of emergency operating procedure (EOP) and emergency core cooling system (ECCS) on reactor safety. The break sizes were volumetrically scaled down based on one and all three fully-opened PORVs which is equivalent to 0.23% and 0.69% hot leg flow area of the reference plant. The experimental results indicate that in case of high pressure injection (HPI) system failure, the rapid depressurization of the steam generators is proved to be an effective way in the depressurization of the reactor coolant system and the core cooling. In contrast, if only one HPI charging pump operates normally, which injected half (or minimum) flow rate of normal cooling water, the core cooling can be adequately provided without operating the secondary bleeding during PORV stuck-open transient. This paper also presents the scaling methods for the reduced-height, reduced-pressure (RHRP) IIST facility and the test conditions. The validity of the present scaling methodology is confirmed by the results from previous IIST counterpart tests and comparison of the present results with those of the tests performed at the full-height, full-pressure(FHFP) stuck-open tests.