Kardinalität und die Aufspaltung von Höhen- und Risikopräferenz beim Bernoulli-Prinzip

As a conclusion to a long-lasting discussion in german literature about expected utility theory, a separation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function into two parts is proposed: One part measures the preferences under certainty, the other part the pure risk preferences. This separation is proven to be a necessary and sufficient condition for an expanded expected utility to measure the strength of preference under uncertainty.     

Optimal option purchase decision of a loss-averse retailer under emergent replenishment

This paper studies the optimal option purchase of a loss-averse retailer under emergent replenishment. It is assumed that all or part of the excess demands in a stock-out situation can be replenished, and the loss-averse retailer's optimal option purchase quantity is investigated. It is found that the loss-averse retailer should not purchase options and only needs to replenish the inventory under certain conditions. When maximizing the expected utility without shortage cost, the loss-averse retailer's optimal option purchase quantity is decreasing in the loss aversion coefficient. To maximise the expected utility with shortage cost, a larger shortage cost implies a bigger option purchase quantity. If the shortage cost exists, there will be a loss on the expected profit and utility for the loss-averse retailer who selects an optimal option purchase quantity without shortage cost. Given the optimal option purchase quantity, it is proven that the loss-averse retailer's expected profit is decreasing in the loss aversion coefficient. Therefore the retailer should choose a proper loss aversion preference to balance between the two objectives of profit maximization and loss aversion preference. As a result of these findings, some management insights are recommended to the loss-averse retailer in selecting the option purchase quantity.     

基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响。运用博弈论中个人理性和激励相容原则建立单渠道和双渠道供应链需求模型,得出均衡情况下供应链各成员的最优决策及社会福利。研究发现,仅当决策者风险规避度和直销渠道销售成本满足一定条件时,制造商开通直销渠道有利可图;且直销渠道并非总侵蚀零售商效用。当决策者风险规避度较大且直销渠道成本适中时,供应链价值减少。社会福利总随着制造商风险规避度的增大呈现先减少后增加的趋势。     

Optimal risk allocation in alliance infrastructure projects: A social preference perspective

The mechanism of risk allocation is designed to protect all stakeholders, and it is vital to project success. Qualitative and quantitative ways of optimizing risk allocation have been well documented in extant literature (e.g., allocation principles, models, and solutions), and the foci of existing research are usually the maximization of rational utility. Few research has focused on partners’ social preferences affecting the output of risk allocation. This study presents a quantitative approach based on modeling alliance member (AM)’s inequity aversion (IA) to analyze risk-sharing arrangements in an alliance project. Fehr and Schmidt’s inequity-aversion model is integrated into modeling partner’s utility. This paper derives results for an alliance leader (AL)’s optimal risk-sharing ratio and AM’s optimal risk-management effort simultaneously. The derivation is based on solving a restrained optimization problem using the conception and methods from Stackelberg game theory. Results show that an AM’s IA significantly affects risk allocation between AL and AM. Specifically, envious preference is positively related to AL’s optimal risk-sharing ratio, whereas guilty preference negatively affects AL’s optimal risk-sharing ratio. These findings will be of interest to academics and practitioners involved in designing alliance negotiations.     

政府干预下考虑双重行为偏好特征的闭环供应链决策与协调

将供应链成员双重行为偏好特征考虑到政府奖惩干预下的闭环供应链决策模型中,采用均值-标准差风险度量准则探讨了决策者行为偏好对闭环供应链最优决策和协调性的影响。结论表明：公平关切行为只是闭环供应链系统内部利润分配的一种手段,零售商和回收商公平关切行为会促使制造商出让部分利润,从而有利于自身利润的提高;回收商风险偏好行为影响回收转移价和回收价,当供应链成员以效用最大化为决策目标时,回收商越喜好风险,对制造商越不利,越厌恶风险,对零售商越不利;有效协调区域受到双重行为偏好特征的影响,供应链成员过度公平关切以及过度喜好风险或过度规避风险都将使收益共享-费用分担契约难以实现供应链协调,当供应链成员的行为偏好在各成员可接受的合理范围内,收益共享-费用分担契约能够实现闭环供应链Pareto改善。     

多个损失厌恶零售商共存的一对多供应链 回购契约及其协调机理

为实现供应链的整体运作绩效最大,本文以一个风险中性的供应商和多个损失厌恶的零售商组成的两阶段供应链为研究对象,基于前景理论对损失厌恶的界定,采用考虑零售商损失厌恶系数的供应链回购契约模型。论证得出,多个存在竞争关系的损失厌恶零售商存在唯一的纳什均衡总订购量使其期望效用最大;在零售商的损失厌恶程度较大或者数量较少的情况下,通过供应链回购契约的协调,存在唯一的回购价格使得供应链的整体运作绩效最大,实现供应链协调。     

考虑零售商风险态度的绿色供应链契约协调模型

以风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑风险规避度和产品绿色度等因素,建立了集中决策博弈模型和制造商领导Stackelberg博弈模型。比较了两博弈模型中,产品绿色度、转移价格、产品价格与风险规避度的相互影响,以及风险规避度对制造商利润和零售商效用的影响。研究表明：(1)在集中决策模型中,零售商的单位产品利润和总利润均为零;(2)在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中,随着零售商风险规避度的提高,产品价格会逐渐降低;制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中的转移价格大于集中决策模型中的转移价格;(3)收益共享契约能够协调绿色供应链。     

非对称风险态度下的企业间知识转移效果研究

为了最优化存在知识流失风险的企业间知识转移效果,分析了受双方信任程度影响的知识发送方风险态度披露决策和知识接收方信息处理决策,及其对知识转移的影响,探讨了政府应如何促进知识转移效果最优,并用算例验证了结论。研究表明风险厌恶方和知识接收方会积极最优化知识转移效果;风险厌恶方期望收益比风险偏好方高时,知识转移效果较易最优化;政府应制定政策调整知识发送方索要的赔偿金及监督成本,促进知识转移效果最优。     

考虑搭便车和风险规避的零售商定价、渠道选择策略

针对一个风险规避型零售商和一个风险中性制造商组成的供应链,考虑消费者服务“搭便车”行为,构建单渠道和零售商双渠道下零售商主导的均值-方差模型。通过逆向求解,得到并对比供应链成员的最优决策。最后通过算例分析验证表明,零售商双渠道价格与零售商的风险态度和市场需求波动呈反比,制造商批发价格变化则相反;零售商风险规避程度在一定范围内时,集中决策下的期望效用比分散决策下的高;零售商在“搭便车”下开通网络渠道不一定总是有利的,且存在搭便车比例、促销努力系数和风险规避度的取值区间使得零售商开通网络渠道有利可图;相反,在最优区间之外时,则会对利润造成负增长,因此企业应合理地控制自身风险规避程度和成本系数才能更好地在双渠道模式下获得超额利润。     

老龄化债券在累积和分配阶段的固定缴款养老金中的作用（英）

近年来，老龄化风险在金融数学和金融工程领域引起了人们极大的关注．为了对冲老龄化风险，老龄化债券在金融市场上应运而生．为了研究老龄化债券是否能有效地对冲固定缴款养老金账户所面临的老龄化风险，本文分别对累积阶段和分配阶段的固定缴款养老金进行了随机最优管理问题的研究．在两个阶段中，最优控制的目标都是通过对金融市场上老龄化债券、零息票债券和无风险资产的投资来最大化终端财富值的期望效用．应用动态规划原理并通过解相应的 HJB 方程，本文分别得到了两个阶段的最优投资策略的显式表达．在合理的假设前提下，结果表明无论是在累积阶段还是在分配阶段，对老龄化债券的投资都有利于提高投资效果，并最终得到更高的财富值的期望效用．     

Certainty equivalent citation: generalized classes of citation indexes

Drawing from the existing literature on risk and inequality measurement, we implement the notion of “certainty equivalent citation” in order (i) to generalize most of the h-type citation indexes (h-, g-, $\tilde{g},$ t-, f-, w-index), and (ii) to highlight the centrality of the decision-maker’s preferences on distributive aspects (concentration aversion) for the ranking of citation profiles. In order to highlight the sensitivity of citation orderings with respect to concentration aversion, an application to both simulated and real citation profiles is presented.     

异质行为偏好对供应链决策及协调的影响

考虑零售商的异质行为偏好,研究供应链的生产决策及协调问题。引入新的决策参考点探究异质行为偏好问题,构建考虑损失规避及公平关切的效用函数,研究零售商损失规避及公平关切对供应链最优决策及供应链协调性的影响。理论分析及数值算例表明：当批发价格满足不同条件时,零售商的损失规避及公平关切行为对其最优订货量的影响是不同的;在分散情形下,供应链不能达到系统最优,引进保险契约可以使供应链双方达到Pareto最优。     

On the newsvendor model with conditional Value-at-Risk of opportunity loss

To manage the risk arising from uncertainty in market demand, this paper introduces the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure into the decision framework of the newsvendor who aims to minimise his opportunity loss. It is found under the CVaR measure that the newsvendor’s optimal order quantity is increasing in the confidence level when the understock loss is bigger than the overstock loss. This implies that an over-ordering may be even more caused by the newsvendor’s risk aversion about opportunity loss than risk seeking behaviour. Under this optimal order quantity, it is proved that the newsvendor’s expected profit and expected opportunity loss are decreasing and increasing in the confidence level, respectively. Furthermore, some management insights are presented to facilitate the risk management of the newsvendor model.     

考虑通胀风险的个人最优行为投资决策

通胀风险是影响投资决策的一个重要因素,同时,投资者的行为特质因素对投资决策的影响也不容忽视．本文将探讨考虑通胀风险的个人最优行为的投资决策问题．首先,在金融市场中,引入通胀指数债券来对冲通胀风险．并且假设投资者具有损失厌恶的行为特质,建立了考虑通胀风险的个人最优行为投资组合模型．其次,最大化投资者最终财富值超过参考点部分的期望效用,通过鞅方法求解出最优投资策略以及最终财富的解析解,并对最优投资策略进行了性质分析和数值模拟．最后,分析结果表明,通胀风险以及投资者的损失厌恶行为特质会对最优投资策略产生较大的影响．     

潜在市场需求不确定下的风险厌恶供应链决策

考虑新产品投入市场时潜在市场需求不确定下的供应链风险厌恶,构造了一个考虑制造商和零售商的效用函数,建立了基于广告费用、服务水平以及销售价格的最优短期决策模型,分析了需求风险和供应链成员风险容忍水平对供应链最优短期决策的影响,采用数值仿真分析了供应链最优长期决策。研究结果表明：最优广告费用分别是需求风险和风险容忍水平的单调递增和递减函数,最优销售价格和服务水平则因行业等因素不同与需求风险和风险容忍水平呈U型或倒U型关系;当市场环境变化时,销售价格和服务水平在不同市场条件下应做出不同调整,而广告费用调整与市场特征无关;从长期来看制造商可以达到效用最大化,而零售商效用只能次优。a     

CVaR准则下季节性产品市场运作策略

研究了风险规避型零售商在面对季节性产品随机市场需求受销售价格和广告费用共同影响时的最优运作策略。通过乘法需求形式将销售价格、广告费用对需求的影响引入报童问题中,以CVaR作为风险度量准则,建立了风险规避型零售商销售价格、广告费用及订货量联合决策的随机模型;并进一步揭示了零售商的风险规避程度对其最优运作策略的影响;通过数值实例对模型的求解过程和理论结果进行了验证分析。研究结果为季节性产品零售商市场运作策略的制定提供了一定的参考。     

CIR模型下保险公司最优投资再保险策略研究

本文主要研究Cox-Ingersoll-Ross（CIR）随机利率模型下保险公司的最优投资和再保险问题．假设保险公司投资于金融市场中的无风险资产、零息债券和多种股票．此外保险公司购买比例再保险合约以转移承保风险．模型中,我们用仿射过程刻画随机利率,通过扩散过程模拟保险公司盈余过程,即用连续过程近似跳过程．保险公司的目标是通过保险投资最大化终端财富的期望幂效用．由于保险公司的财富过程不是自融资过程,在求解过程中,我们先将原优化问题转化为自融资问题,通过随机最优控制方法导出相应的HJB方程,进而得到最优投资、再保险策略和幂效用函数下的最优值函数．我们发现随着风险厌恶系数的增大,公司投资于股票的比例会降低,初始利率越高,保险公司终端财富的值函数越大．最后,我们给出了保费率、利率参数和风险厌恶系数对投资策略、投资效用的敏感性分析．     

Risk as a primitive: A survey of measures of perceived risk

The concept of risk is essential to many problems in economics and business. Usually, risk is treated in the traditional expected utility framework where it is defined only indirectly through the shape of the utility function. The purpose of utility functions, however, is to model preferences. In this paper, we review those approaches which directly model risk judgements. After a short review of naive risk measures used in earlier economic literature, we present recent theoretical and empirical developments.     

Integrated fuzzy preference relations with decision utilities for construction contractor selection

The construction contractor selection process aims to choose the most appropriate bidder to complete construction projects within predefined constraints and achieve expected economic advantages. How to avoid elevated risk of not implementing contracted obligation is an important task in contractor selection. This article proposes a ‘Multi-Criteria Prospect Model’ to support a construction contractor selection process in which two considered criteria are the same as defined in the European Union Legislation and the construction cost and completion time are taken into account. Through this transparent competition model, not only utility but also implementation probability (as provided in the bidder's tender promise) can be effectively evaluated by clients. In the model, implementation probabilities are evaluated using fuzzy preference relations, and predefined decision utility curves allow each bid to provide utility to the client. Both probability and utility are integrated using the cumulative prospect theorem. Finally, an empirical case is studied to illustrate the proposed model.