Introduction to the special section on the concept of disorder.

Despite the absence of a consensual definition of disorder, considerable research and clinical work is based on the categorization and diagnosis of mental disorder. This article introduces a special section of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology that expands the debate between J. C. Wakefield (1999), who has proposed a "harmful dysfunction" analysis of disorder and S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995, 1999), who offer an alternative "Roschian" or prototype analysis. This introduction summarizes the main arguments of Wakefield's target article and eight critiques and discusses the conceptual value of the debate, especially an integration of diverse viewpoints and stimulation to further consideration of this important topic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Horsefeathers: A commentary on "Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder."

J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) article further develops his harmful dysfunction (HD) model for disorder concepts. This commentary focuses on three areas. The first notes the imbalance in the debate between the S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (see record 1995-43832-001) Roschian model and the HD model for disorder concepts. The second claims that Wakefield's purposes for the HD model have changed over the years and progressed toward irrelevance to psychopathology in general and toward irrelevance to actual nosologic, reimbursement, and sociopolitical controversies about disorder status. Further discussion is on how certain structural elements in Wakefield's arguments and current limitations of evolutionary theory permit a superficially attractive model for psychopathology. These arguments and limitations, however, harbor serious problems when confronted with actual disputes about disorders. The conclusion notes some virtues to Wakefield's inquiry, in style and substance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Essentialism revisited: Evolutionary theory and the concept of mental disorder.

J. C. Wakefield's (1999) elaboration of his harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of mental disorder does little to address previous criticisms (S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995) and instead reveals further conceptual weaknesses in his position. The authors demonstrate that (a) a Roschian analysis can account for the results of all of Wakefield's conceptual experiments and predicts a number of judgments of disorder not predicted by the HDA, (b) the HDA is incapable in many cases of providing a scientifically nonarbitrary distinction between disorder and nondisorder, and (c) the HDA cannot account for failures of cultural exaptations, mismatches between evolutionary design and novel environments, or defenses against threat. The authors argue that the HDA has been convincingly falsified and discuss the failure of essentialistic concepts to resolve controversies in other domains of biological science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nine variations and a coda on the theme of an evolutionary definition of dysfunction.

Nine variations on the theme of J. C. Wakefield's (1999) evolutionary definition of dysfunction show that the concept is not, as he claims, purely causal. It depends also on a teleological element of meaning introduced, in Wakefield's formulation, through an equivocation on the sense in which natural selection explains biological forms. The corollary (presented here briefly as a coda to the theme and variations) is that Wakefield's definition is not, as he also claims, value free. However, contra S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995), this does not place diagnostic judgments of dysfunction outside the scope of science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder.

The harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis of the concept of disorder (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a) holds that disorders are harmful failures of internal mechanisms to perform their naturally selected functions. S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) proposed instead that disorder is a Roschian prototype concept without defining properties. Against the HD analysis, they argued that many disorders are not failures of naturally selected functions because they are either designed reactions (e.g., fever) or failures of functions that are not naturally selected (e.g., reading disorder). The HD analysis is defended here against these and other objections and compared with the Roschian account. It is argued that the objections are based on conceptual confusions and can be turned around to provide strong new support for the HD analysis. A series of conceptual experiments demonstrates the superior explanatory power of the HD analysis and disconfirms the Roschian account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The abduction of disorder in psychiatry.

The evolutionary cornerstone of J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) harmful dysfunction thesis is a faulty assumption of comparability between mental and biological processes that overlooks the unique plasticity and openness of the brain's functioning design. This omission leads Wakefield to an idealized concept of natural mental functions, illusory interpretations of mental disorders as harmful dysfunctions, and exaggerated claims for the validity of his explanatory and stipulative proposals. The authors argue that there are numerous ways in which evolutionarily intact mental and psychological processes, combined with striking discontinuities within and between evolutionary and contemporary social/cultural environments, may cause nondysfunction variants of many widely accepted major mental disorders. These examples undermine many of Wakefield's arguments for adopting a harmful dysfunction concept of mental disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental disorder as a Roschian concept: A critique of Wakefield's "harmful dysfunction" analysis.

J. C. Wakefield (1992a, 1992b, 1993) recently proposed that mental disorder is best conceptualized as a "harmful dysfunction," whereby "harm" is a value judgment regarding the undesirability of a condition, and "dysfunction" is the failure of a system to function as designed by natural selection. The authors maintain, however, that (a) many mental functions are not direct evolutionary adaptations, but rather adaptively neutral by-products of adaptations, (b) Wakefield's concept of the evolutionarily designed response neglects the fact that natural selection almost invariably results in substantial variability across individuals, and (c) many consensual disorders represent evolutionarily adaptive reactions to danger or loss. The authors propose that mental disorder is a Roschian concept characterized by instrinsically fuzzy boundaries and that Wakefield's analysis may only prolong scientific debate on a fundamentally nonscientific issue. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental disorder as a black box essentialist concept.

This is a reply to commentaries on J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1999-03409-002) article on the evolutionary foundations of the concept of mental disorder in defense of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of disorder. The author argues that the HDA is adequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments and is not disconfirmed by any of the claimed counterexamples put forward by the commentators; the commentators' proposed alternatives to the HDA are inadequate to explain disorder and nondisorder judgments; and the concept of natural function is a factual, scientific concept, contrary to K. W. M. Fulford's (see record 1999-03409-004) claim that it is inherently evaluative. The foundations of the HDA are clarified by providing a black box essentialist analysis (H. Putnam, 1975; J. C. Wakefield, 1997, in press) of the concept of natural function that underlies the concept of disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Questions of construct breadth and openness of research in integrity testing.

Responds to comments by D. S. Ones et al and by S. O. Lilienfeld et al (see PA, Vol 82:31500 and 31497) regarding W. J. Camara and D. L. Schneider's (see record 1994-23870-001) article on integrity testing. Camara and Schneider express their ongoing concern about the underlying construct measured by integrity tests. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Factor structure of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI): Findings from a large incarcerated sample.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; S. O. Lilienfeld, 1990; S. O. Lilienfeld & B. P. Andrews, 1996) with a community sample has suggested that the PPI subscales may comprise 2 higher order factors (S. D. Benning, C. J. Patrick, B. M. Hicks, D. M. Blonigen, & R. F. Krueger, 2003). However, substantive and structural evidence raises concerns about the viability of this 2-factor model, particularly in offender populations. The authors attempted to replicate the S. D. Benning et al. 2-factor solution using a large (N = 1,224) incarcerated male sample. Confirmatory factor analysis of this model resulted in poor model fit. Similarly, using the same EFA procedures as did S. D. Benning et al., the authors found little evidence for a 2-factor model. When they followed the recommendations of J.-W. van Prooijen and W. A. van der Kloot (2001) for recovering EFA solutions, model fit results provided some evidence that a 3-factor EFA solution could be recovered via confirmatory factor analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: Reply to Wakefield (1998).

J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an evolutionary taxonomy of treatable conditions.

The definition of disorder as a harmful dysfunction (J. C. Wakefield [see record 1999-03409-002]) is a useful concept, anchored in the recognition that the evolved human architecture consists of a collection of functional mechanisms that may potentially be impaired and whose impairment may be harmful. Because natural selection organized each mechanism to solve a distinct adaptive problem under ancestral conditions, the criteria for whether a mechanism is dysfunctional are supplied by whether the mechanism has become impaired in performing its ancestral function. Because evolutionary function and dysfunction diverge markedly from normal human standards of value, many dysfunctions are beneficial, whereas various mechanisms that are performing their evolved function may cause disturbing outcomes. For this reason, many conditions in addition to disorders may require treatment, and the authors attempt to sketch an evolutionary taxonomy of treatable conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why integrity testing remains controversial.

Comments on W. J. Camara and D. L. Schneider's (see record 1994-23870-001) summary of reports on integrity tests (ITs). S. O. Lilienfeld et al contend that 3 issues remain unresolved: There are virtually no data regarding types of classification errors made by ITs; the extent to which ITs are susceptible to impression management was not addressed; and many writers in the integrity testing field use the same language and logic that are typically applied to ability testing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limits of operationalization: A critique of Spitzer and Endicott's (1978) proposed operational criteria for mental disorder.

R. L. Spitzer and J. Endicott (1978) proposed an operational definition of mental disorder that is a more rigorous version of the brief definitions that appeared in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III) and DSM-III—Revised (DSM-III—R). The heart of their proposal is a translation of the concept of dysfunction into operational terms. J. C. Wakefield argues that their definition fails to capture the concept of dysfunction and is subject to many counterexamples. Wakefield uses his harmful dysfunction account of disorder (e.g., Wakefield, 1992), which interprets dysfunction in evolutionary terms, to explain both the appeal and the problems of Spitzer and Endicott's definition and to provide support for the harmful dysfunction view. Wakefield concludes that the failure of Spitzer and Endicott's sophisticated attempt at operationalization indicates that nonoperational definitions that use functional concepts must play a role in formulating valid diagnostic criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repressed memories: Just the facts.

Responding to comments by S. O. Lilienfeld and E. F. Loftus (see record 1999-01568-013) and M. Pendergrast (see record 1999-01568-014), the authors discuss the evidence supporting the existence of repressed–recovered memories rather than specifically addressing what they see as distortions of their past research. Karon and Widener state that repression is one of the coping mechanisms people use to survive that must be included in the clinical understanding of the dynamics of repression and recovered memories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the Personality Psychopathology Five (PSY-5) in adolescents: New MMPI–A Scales.

The Personality Psychopathology Five (PSY-5; A. R. Harkness & J. L. McNulty, 1994) is a dimensional model of personality. Scales to measure the PSY-5 in adolescents were constructed from Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Adolescents (MMPI–A) items. From the MMPI-2-based PSY-5 scales (A. R. Harkness, J. L. McNulty, & Y. S. Ben-Porath, 1995), 104 items are found in the MMPI–A booklet. Replicated rational selection (A. R. Harkness, J. L. McNulty, & Y. S. Ben-Porath, 1994) was used to identify additional items from questions unique to the MMPI–A. Preliminary scales were refined with internal psychometric analyses using the MMPI–A normative (N?=?1,620; J. N. Butcher, C. L. Williams, J. R. Graham, R. P. Archer, A. Tellegen, Y. S. Ben-Porath, & B. Kaemmer, 1992) and clinical (N?=?713; C. L. Williams & J. N. Butcher, 1989) samples. The median coefficient alpha for the 5 scales was .76 in both samples; the mean absolute scale intercorrelation was .32 in the normative sample and .30 in the clinical sample. Correlations with collateral data supported the construct validity of the scales. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dieting maelstrom or painful evolution?

Comments on K. D. Brownell and J. Rodin's (see record 1995-03008-001) review of the dieting maelstrom, i.e., the debate over the risks and benefits of weight loss dieting. There is much agreement on the "facts," but not on conclusions and recommendations, between this review and that of D. M. Garner and S. C. Wooley (see record 1992-13614-001). Obesity should not go untreated, however. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Multidimensional Look at Religious Involvement and Psychological Well-Being Among Urban Elderly African Americans.

Although the importance of religion in the lives of older African Americans is well documented, this is the 1st study to examine the relations between religious involvement and psychological well-being among a sample comprised exclusively of older African Americans. Eighty-six participants completed multidimensional measures of religious involvement (J. S. Levin, R. J. Taylor & L. M. Chatters, 1995) and well-being (C. D. Ryff & M. J. Essex, 1992). Results indicated that several dimensions of religious involvement (Organizational, Nonorganizational, and Subjective) were associated with several dimensions of psychological well-being (Positive Relations with Others, Self-Acceptance, Environmental Mastery, Purpose in Life, and Personal Growth). Recommendations for future research and implications for counseling are presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and fairness in the diagnosis of primary orgasmic dysfunction in women.

Disagrees with J. C. Wakefield's (see record 1987-28660-001) argument that 2 kinds of sex bias, logical and factual bias, may influence the diagnosis of primary orgasmic dysfunction in women and suggests that instead of bias, there may be errors in the diagnostic criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)