Arizona's tobacco control initiative illustrates the need for continuing oversight by tobacco control advocates

BACKGROUND: In 1994, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200 which increased the tobacco tax and earmarked 23% of the new revenues for tobacco education programmes. OBJECTIVE: To describe the campaign to pass Proposition 200, the legislative debate that followed the passage of the initiative, and the development and implementation of the tobacco control programme. DESIGN: This is a case study. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key players in the initiative campaign and in the tobacco education programme, and written records (campaign material, newspapers, memoranda, public records). RESULTS: Despite opposition from the tobacco industry, Arizonans approved an increase in the tobacco tax. At the legislature, health advocates in Arizona successfully fought the tobacco industry attempts to divert the health education funds and pass preemptive legislation. The executive branch limited the scope of the programme to adolescents and pregnant women. It also prevented the programme from attacking the tobacco industry or focusing on secondhand smoke. Health advocates did not put enough pressure at the executive branch to force it to develop a comprehensive tobacco education programme. CONCLUSIONS: It is not enough for health advocates to campaign for an increase in tobacco tax and to protect the funds at the legislature. Tobacco control advocates must closely monitor the development and implementation of tax-funded tobacco education programmes at the administrative level and be willing to press the executive to implement effective programmes.     

Tobacco industry litigation strategies to oppose tobacco control media campaigns

Objective

To document the tobacco industry''s litigation strategy to impede tobacco control media campaigns.

Methods

Data were collected from news and reports, tobacco industry documents, and interviews with health advocates and media campaign staff.

Results

RJ Reynolds and Lorillard attempted to halt California''s Media Campaign alleging that the campaign polluted jury pools and violated First Amendment rights because they were compelled to pay for anti‐industry ads. The American Legacy Foundation was accused of violating the Master Settlement Agreement''s vilification clause because its ads attacked the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies lost these legal challenges.

Conclusion

The tobacco industry has expanded its efforts to oppose tobacco control media campaigns through litigation strategies. While litigation is a part of tobacco industry business, it imposes a financial burden and impediment to media campaigns'' productivity. Tobacco control professionals need to anticipate these challenges and be prepared to defend against them.     

British Columbia capital regional district 100% smokefree bylaw: a successful public health campaign despite industry opposition

Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it. Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research. Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement. Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.     

Development and destruction of the first state funded anti-smoking campaign in the USA

Background: Minnesota was the first state in the USA to implement a large state funded tobacco control programme (in 1985). Despite evidence of effectiveness, it was dismantled in 1993.

Objective: To describe and analyse how and why these events transpired and identify lessons for tobacco control advocates facing similar challenges in the 21st century.

Design: Case study based on previously secret tobacco industry documents, news reports, research reports, official documents, and interviews with health advocates and state government officials.

Results: Unable to defeat funding for this campaign in 1985, the tobacco industry organised groups which eliminated it later. Despite the programme's documented effectiveness, it was dismantled based on claims of fiscal crisis. These claims were not true; the real debate was what to do with the state's surplus. Health advocates failed to challenge the claim of fiscal crisis or mobilise public support for the programme.

Conclusions: Simply quoting evidence that a tobacco control programme is effective does not ensure its continuing survival. Claims of fiscal crisis are an effective cover for tobacco industry efforts to dismantle successful programmes, particularly if health advocates accept these claims and fail to mobilise political pressure to defend the programme.

     

Investing in youth tobacco control: a review of smoking prevention and control strategies

OBJECTIVE: To provide a comprehensive review of interventions and policies aimed at reducing youth cigarette smoking in the United States, including strategies that have undergone evaluation and emerging innovations that have not yet been assessed for efficacy. DATA SOURCES: Medline literature searches, books, reports, electronic list servers, and interviews with tobacco control advocates. DATA SYNTHESIS: Interventions and policy approaches that have been assessed or evaluated were categorised using a typology with seven categories (school based, community interventions, mass media/public education, advertising restrictions, youth access restrictions, tobacco excise taxes, and direct restrictions on smoking). Novel and largely untested interventions were described using nine categories. CONCLUSIONS: Youth smoking prevention and control efforts have had mixed results. However, this review suggests a number of prevention strategies that are promising, especially if conducted in a coordinated way to take advantage of potential synergies across interventions. Several types of strategies warrant additional attention and evaluation, including aggressive media campaigns, teen smoking cessation programmes, social environment changes, community interventions, and increasing cigarette prices. A significant proportion of the resources obtained from the recent settlement between 46 US states and the tobacco industry should be devoted to expanding, improving and evaluating "youth centred" tobacco prevention and control activities.     

Courtesy and the challenges of implementing smoke-free policies in Japan.

For decades, the tobacco companies have developed a worldwide campaign to oppose the creation of smoke-free environments. Public health efforts to promote clean indoor air have been uneven throughout the world, and in few places have such efforts faced as many challenges as in Japan. The Japanese market is dominated by Japan Tobacco, which is partly owned by the government, and Philip Morris International is also present in Japan. Japan Tobacco and Philip Morris International have developed campaigns promoting courtesy and tolerance that, until recently, seem to have resonated well with the public. The companies also have supported research promoting ventilation and have funded consultants to act as experts in the area of second-hand smoke exposure. Japan is a critical country to study, partly because of the strength of Japan Tobacco in the country and the growth of Japan Tobacco International in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, and partly because of Japan's ratification of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to provide an overview of the tobacco industry's scientific and political efforts to stifle the development of clean indoor measures in Japan. Learning past industry strategies may assist policymakers and advocates in the development of future public health activities.     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Working to make an image: an analysis of three Philip Morris corporate image media campaigns

Objective

To describe the nature and timing of, and population exposure to, Philip Morris USA''s three explicit corporate image television advertising campaigns and explore the motivations behind each campaign.

Methods

: Analysis of television ratings from the largest 75 media markets in the United States, which measure the reach and frequency of population exposure to advertising; copies of all televised commercials produced by Philip Morris; and tobacco industry documents, which provide insights into the specific goals of each campaign.

Findings

Household exposure to the “Working to Make a Difference: the People of Philip Morris” averaged 5.37 ads/month for 27 months from 1999–2001; the “Tobacco Settlement” campaign averaged 10.05 ads/month for three months in 2000; and “PMUSA” averaged 3.11 ads/month for the last six months in 2003. The percentage of advertising exposure that was purchased in news programming in order to reach opinion leaders increased over the three campaigns from 20%, 39% and 60%, respectively. These public relations campaigns were designed to counter negative images, increase brand recognition, and improve the financial viability of the company.

Conclusions

Only one early media campaign focused on issues other than tobacco, whereas subsequent campaigns have been specifically concerned with tobacco issues, and more targeted to opinion leaders. The size and timing of the advertising buys appeared to be strategically crafted to maximise advertising exposure for these population subgroups during critical threats to Philip Morris''s public image.     

Tobacco interests or the public interest: 20 years of industry strategies to undermine airline smoking restrictions

Objectives

To understand the evolution of 20 years of tobacco industry strategies to undermine federal restrictions of smoking on aircraft in the United States.

Design

We searched and analysed internal tobacco industry records, public documents, and other related research.

Results

The industry viewed these restrictions as a serious threat to the social acceptability of smoking. Its initial efforts included covert letter‐writing campaigns and lobbying of the airline industry, but with the emergence of proposals to ban smoking, the tobacco companies engaged in ever increasing efforts to forestall further restrictions. Tactics to dominate the public record became especially rigorous. The industry launched an aggressive public relations campaign that began with the promotion of industry sponsored petition drives and public opinion surveys. Results from polling research that produced findings contrary to the industry''s position were suppressed. In order to demonstrate smoker outrage against a ban, later efforts included the sponsorship of smokers'' rights and other front groups. Congressional allies and industry consultants sought to discredit the science underlying proposals to ban smoking and individual tobacco companies conducted their own cabin air quality research. Faced with the potential of a ban on all domestic flights, the industry sought to intimidate an air carrier and a prominent policymaker. Despite the intensification of tactics over time, including mobilisation of an army of lobbyists and Congressional allies, the tobacco industry was ultimately defeated.

Conclusions

Our longitudinal analysis provides insights into how and when the industry changed its plans and provides public health advocates with potential counterstrategies.     

Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health

Objective: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992.

Data sources: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties.

Study selection: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

Data extraction: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents.

Data synthesis: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference.

Results and conclusion: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.

     

Marketing to the marginalised: tobacco industry targeting of the homeless and mentally ill

Objectives: To describe the tobacco industry''s relationships with and influence on homeless and mentally ill smokers and organisations providing services to them. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents and journal articles. Results: The tobacco industry has marketed cigarettes to the homeless and seriously mentally ill, part of its "downscale" market, and has developed relationships with homeless shelters and advocacy groups, gaining positive media coverage and political support. Discussion: Tobacco control advocates and public health organisations should consider how to target programmes to homeless and seriously mentally ill individuals. Education of service providers about tobacco industry efforts to cultivate this market may help in reducing smoking in these populations.     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

Tobacco industry successfully prevented tobacco control legislation in Argentina

Objective: To evaluate how transnational tobacco companies, working through their local affiliates, influenced tobacco control policymaking in Argentina between 1966 and 2005. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, local newspapers and magazines, internet resources, bills from the Argentinean National Congress Library, and interviews with key individuals in Argentina. Results: Transnational tobacco companies (Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International) have been actively influencing public health policymaking in Argentina since the early 1970s. As in other countries, in 1977 the tobacco industry created a weak voluntary self regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on advertising. In addition to direct lobbying by the tobacco companies, these efforts involved use of third party allies, public relations campaigns, and scientific and medical consultants. During the 1980s and 1990s efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified, but the organised tobacco industry prevented its enactment. There has been no national activity to decrease exposure to secondhand smoke. Conclusions: The tobacco industry, working through its local subsidiaries, has subverted meaningful tobacco control legislation in Argentina using the same strategies as in the USA and other countries. As a result, tobacco control in Argentina remains governed by a national law that is weak and restricted in its scope.     

Public health foundations and the tobacco industry: lessons from Minnesota

Objective: To investigate whether private foundations can be created in a way that will insulate them from attacks by the tobacco industry, using the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco (MPAAT) as a case study.

Design: Information was collected from internal tobacco industry documents, court documents, newspapers, and interviews with health advocates and elected officials.

Results: The creation of MPAAT as an independent foundation did not insulate it from attacks by tobacco industry allies. During 2001–2002, MPAAT was repeatedly attacked by Attorney General Mike Hatch and major media, using standard tobacco industry rhetoric. This strategy of attack and demands for information were reminiscent of previous attacks on Minnesota's Plan for Nonsmoking and Health and the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST). MPAAT was ultimately forced to restructure its programme to abandon effective community norm change interventions around smoke-free policies and replace them with less effective individual cessation interventions. Neither MPAAT nor other health advocates mounted an effective public response to these attacks, instead relying on the insider strategy of responding in court.

Conclusion: It is not possible to avoid attacks by the tobacco industry or its political allies. Like programmes administered by government agencies, tobacco control foundations must be prepared for these attacks, including a proactive plan to educate the public about the principles of community based tobacco control. Public health advocates also need to be willing to take prompt action to defend these programmes and hold public officials who attack tobacco control programmes accountable for their actions.

     

How state counter-industry campaigns help prime perceptions of tobacco industry practices to promote reductions in youth smoking

Methods: Rates of youth smoking were compared in three groups of states: (1) those with long funded counter-industry campaigns (California, Florida, and Massachusetts); (2) states with more recently funded counter-industry media campaigns (Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, and New Jersey); and (3) other states. An analysis was performed for a series of national telephone surveys of 12–17 year olds between 1999 and 2002, controlling for differences in demographic background, the price of cigarettes, and exposure to the national truth^® campaign. Results: Between 1999 and 2002, rates of current smoking and established smoking decreased significantly faster in states with established or more newly funded counter-industry campaigns than in other states. State counter-industry campaigns appear to prime, or make more salient, negative perceptions about tobacco industry practices. Conclusion: Results highlight the value of continued state counter-industry campaigns.     

Adults' response to Massachusetts anti-tobacco television advertisements: impact of viewer and advertisement characteristics

OBJECTIVE: To assess adults' receptivity to the Massachusetts television anti-tobacco campaign. Reactions were examined as a function of respondents' demographics, baseline tobacco control attitudes, changes in smoking status during the campaign, and advertisements' affective qualities. DESIGN: A random digit dial telephone survey in 1993 at the start of the media campaign and re-interview in 1996 of respondents to the baseline survey. PARTICIPANTS: Respondents were 1544 adults who completed the baseline and follow up interview. INTERVENTION: By the time the follow up survey was completed, approximately $49 million had been spent on the media campaign. Approximately 66 spots had been aired. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Reported exposure to television advertisements; perceived effectiveness of nine specific advertisements each. RESULTS: 56% of respondents reported seeing anti-tobacco advertisements at least once a week during the preceding three years. The average effectiveness rating for all advertisements recalled on a 0-10 scale was 7.29, and did not differ by smoking status group. Advertisements eliciting strong negative emotions (sadness and fear) were rated most effective by quitters, non-smokers, and by smokers who at baseline were planning to quit soon. Humorous, entertaining advertisements were seen as ineffective by all groups. CONCLUSION: The Massachusetts anti-tobacco campaign achieved high levels of penetration into the population and was well received by both smokers and non-smokers. The results suggest that advertisements depicting suffering as a result of tobacco use may be instrumental in promoting cessation or reinforcing the decision to quit. Further research is needed to lend additional support to the link between perceived effectiveness and smoking behaviour change.     

Effectiveness of comprehensive tobacco control programmes in reducing teenage smoking in the USA

OBJECTIVE: To describe the extent to which comprehensive statewide tobacco control programmes in the USA have made progress toward reducing teenage smoking. DATA SOURCES: Literature search of Medline for reviews of effectiveness of programme and policy elements, plus journal articles and personal request for copies of publicly released reports and working papers from evaluation staff in each of the state programmes of California, Massachusetts, Arizona, Oregon, and Florida. STUDY SELECTION: All studies, reports, and commentaries that provided information on aspects of programme implementation and evaluation. DATA SYNTHESIS: Statewide comprehensive programmes show high levels of advertising recall and generally positive improvement in smoking related beliefs and attitudes among teenagers. More fully funded programmes lead to increased mass media campaign advertising and community initiatives; a greater capacity to implement school based smoking prevention programmes; and an increase in the passage of local ordinances that create smoke free indoor environments and reduce cigarette sales to youth. The combination of programme activity and increased tobacco tax reduce cigarette consumption more than expected as a result of price increases alone, and these effects seem to apply to adolescents as well as adults. Programmes are associated with a decline in adult smoking prevalence, with these effects observed to date in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Arizona and Florida have yet to examine change in adult prevalence associated with programme exposure. California and Massachusetts have demonstrated relative beneficial effects in teenage smoking prevalence, and Florida has reported promising indications of reduced prevalence. Arizona has yet to report follow up data, and Oregon has found no change in teenage smoking, but has only two years of follow up available. One of the most critical factors in programme success is the extent of programme funding, and consequent level of programme implementation, and the degree to which this is undermined by the tobacco industry and other competitors for funding. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the different strengths and combinations of programme messages and strategies used in these comprehensive programmes, there is evidence that they lead to change in factors that influence teenage smoking, and to reductions in teenage smoking.     

African American leadership groups: smoking with the enemy

BACKGROUND: Among all racial and ethnic groups in the USA, African Americans bear the greatest burden from tobacco related disease. The tobacco industry has been highly influential in the African American community for decades, providing funding and other resources to community leaders and emphasising publicly its support for civil rights causes and groups, while ignoring the negative health effects of its products on those it claims to support. However, the industry's private business reasons for providing such support were unknown. OBJECTIVE: To understand how and for what purposes the tobacco industry sought to establish and maintain relationships with African American leaders. METHODS: Review and analysis of over 700 previously secret internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet. RESULTS: The tobacco industry established relationships with virtually every African American leadership organisation and built longstanding social connections with the community, for three specific business reasons: to increase African American tobacco use, to use African Americans as a frontline force to defend industry policy positions, and to defuse tobacco control efforts. CONCLUSION: As the tobacco industry expands its global reach, public health advocates should anticipate similar industry efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups. The apparent generosity, inclusion, and friendship proffered by the industry extract a price from groups in the health of their members. Helping groups anticipate such efforts, confront industry co-optation, and understand the hidden costs of accepting tobacco industry largesse should be part of worldwide tobacco control efforts.     

Eyes on the prize: transnational tobacco companies in China 1976-1997

Internal tobacco industry documents relevant to China as published on www.tobaccoarchives.com located between 31 May and 1 August 1999 were searched. Documents describing the ambitions and conduct of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in China between 1976 and 1997 were located and reviewed in three sections: part A-early identification of market potential and attempts to enter the market, and improve trade and technology; part B-marketing and promotion efforts; part C-efforts to pre-empt legislation, control the smoking and health debate, and undermine the anti-tobacco lobby.     

Fiscal versus social responsibility: how Philip Morris shaped the public funds divestment debate

Calls for institutional investors to divest (sell off) tobacco stocks threaten the industry's share values, publicise its bad behaviour, and label it as a politically unacceptable ally. US tobacco control advocates began urging government investment and pension funds to divest as a matter of responsible social policy in 1990. Following the initiation of Medicaid recovery lawsuits in 1994, advocates highlighted the contradictions between state justice departments suing the industry, and state health departments expanding tobacco control programmes, while state treasurers invested in tobacco companies. Philip Morris (PM), the most exposed US company, led the divestment opposition, consistently framing the issue as one of responsible fiscal policy. It insisted that funds had to be managed for the exclusive interest of beneficiaries, not the public at large, and for high share returns above all. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to show how PM sought to frame both the rhetorical contents and the legal contexts of the divestment debate. While tobacco stock divestment was eventually limited to only seven (but highly visible) states, US advocates focused public attention on the issue in at least 18 others plus various local jurisdictions. This added to ongoing, effective campaigns to denormalise and delegitimise the tobacco industry, dividing it from key allies. Divestment as a delegitimisation tool could have both advantages and disadvantages as a tobacco control strategy in other countries.