Effects of interest–major congruence, motivation, and academic performance on timely degree attainment.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 57(2) of Journal of Counseling Psychology (see record 2010-06436-009). The link to the supplemental material was incorrect. The correct link is provided in the erratum.] Using longitudinal student data from 15 four-year (n = 3,072) and 13 (n = 788) two-year postsecondary institutions, the authors tested the effects of interest–major congruence, motivation, and 1st-year academic performance on timely degree completion. Findings suggest that interest–major congruence has a direct effect on timely degree completion at both institutional settings and that motivation has indirect effects (via 1st-year academic performance). The total effects of both interest–major congruence and motivation on timely degree completion underscore the importance of both constructs in understanding student adjustment and postsecondary success. Implications for theory and counseling practice are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of reward on intrinsic motivation—Negative, neutral, and positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999).

Comments on the meta-analytic review by E. L. Deci et al (see record 1999-01567-001) concerning the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Meta-analyses indicated that rewards increase perceived self-determination and that rewards' effects on intrinsic motivation depend on the performance requirement. Reward for meeting vague performance standards reduced the subsequent choice to carry out the task and did not affect self-reported interest. Reward for meeting absolute performance standards did not affect free choice but increased self-reported interest. Reward for exceeding others increased both free choice and self-reported interest. Applied studies commonly found positive or null relationships between reward and intrinsic motivation. The findings suggest that reward procedures requiring ill-defined or minimal performance convey task triviality, thereby decreasing intrinsic motivation. Reward procedures requiring specific high task performance convey a task's personal or social significance, increasing intrinsic motivation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Are there shared environmental influences on attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder? Reply to Wood, Buitelaar, Rijsdijk, Asherson, and Kuntsi (2010)": Correction to Burt (2010).

Reports an error in "Are there shared environmental influences on attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder? Reply to Wood, Buitelaar, Rijsdijk, Asherson, and Kuntsi (2010)" by S. Alexandra Burt (Psychological Bulletin, 2010[May], Vol 136[3], 341-343). In the article, the surname of Jonna Kuntsi is misspelled throughout. The online versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-07936-002.) A recent large-scale meta-analysis of twin and adoption studies indicated that shared environmental influences make important contributions to most forms of child and adolescent psychopathology (Burt, 2009b). The sole exception to this robust pattern of results was observed for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which appeared to be largely genetic (and particularly nonadditive genetic) in origin, with no observable influence of the shared environment. The central thesis of Wood, Buitelaar, Rijsdijk, Asherson, and Kuntsi (2010) is that, contrary to these findings, shared environmental influences are important for ADHD. As evidence for this thesis, Wood et al. presented a summary of prior twin studies, followed by a discussion of 4 methodological issues that may account for my findings in Burt (2009b). I argue that, although the methodological concerns raised by Wood et al. are very important, they do not undermine my earlier results (Burt, 2009b). I close with a discussion of 2 issues that may allow for some shared environmental influences on ADHD. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Faith and unfaithfulness: Can praying for your partner reduce infidelity?": Correction to Fincham, Lambert, and Beach (2010).

Reports an error in "Faith and unfaithfulness: Can praying for your partner reduce infidelity" by Frank D. Fincham, Nathaniel M. Lambert and Steven R. H. Beach (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, , , np). The article contained an error in Table 2, in the third column table heading. The correct table heading is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-16989-001.) Because religion and/or spirituality is integral to the lives of a majority of the world population, we conducted 3 studies on the role of prayer in romantic relationships. Study 1 (N = 375) showed that prayer for the partner predicted lower levels of extradyadic romantic behavior over a 6-week period, over and beyond relationship satisfaction, and initial levels of extradyadic romantic behavior. In Study 2 (N = 83), we used an experimental design to show that participants assigned to pray for each day for 4 weeks engaged in lower levels of extradyadic romantic behavior during that time, compared with those who engaged in daily positive thoughts about the partner or a neutral activity. Perception of the relationship as sacred mediated the relation between experimentally manipulated prayer and later infidelity. Study 3 (N = 23) showed that objective observers rated participants who had been praying for their partner for 4 weeks as more committed to their romantic relationship than control participants. The implications of these results are then discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Effects of optimism, pessimism, and trait anxiety on ambulatory blood pressure and mood during everyday life": Correction to R?ikk?nen et al. (1999).

Reports an error in the original article by K. R?ikk?nen et al (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76(1), 104–113). Table 4 on page 111 contained an error. The 4 sets of column heads ("Adjusted" and "Unadjusted") were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1999-00166-008): This study tested whether dispositional measures of optimism, pessimism, and anxiety affected ambulatory blood pressure (BP) and mood and whether any cardiovascular effects of dispositions were moderated by mood. Pessimistic and anxious adults had higher BP levels and felt more negative and less positive than did optimists or low anxious adults throughout the monitoring. The few times that optimists did feel negative were associated with levels of BP as high as those observed among pessimists or anxious individuals, regardless of their mood. To the extent that trait anxiety measures neuroticism, these findings suggest that neuroticism is directly related to health indicators rather than simply to illness behavior. Furthermore, the results suggest that pessimism has broad physiological and psychological consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive processes, trauma, and dissociation—Misconceptions and misrepresentations: Reply to Bremner (2010).

In a recent review (see record 2008-11487-001), we critically evaluated the research literature on cognitive processes in dissociation. In a comment, Bremner (see record 2009-24669-001) has voiced reservations about our contention that evidence for the causal role of trauma in dissociation is limited. In this reply, we argue that Bremner’s arguments are unconvincing and that a closer examination of the dissociation literature only strengthens the basis for our conclusions. Specifically, we show that dissociation exhibits a robust association with fantasy proneness and that Bremner’s criticisms regarding our operationalization of dissociation are unfounded. Moreover, we demonstrate that heightened levels of fantasy proneness, suggestibility, and cognitive failures are related to the propensity to develop pseudomemories, which in turn may account for why dissociation is related to self-reported, but not objective, trauma. We conclude that there is little evidence for the gross cognitive deficits (e.g., interidentity amnesia, memory fragmentation) that many scholars have claimed accompany dissociative symptoms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Are individuals’ reputations related to their history of behavior?": Correction to Anderson and Shirako (2008).

Reports an error in "Are individuals' reputations related to their history of behavior" by Cameron Anderson and Aiwa Shirako (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008[Feb], Vol 94[2], 320-333). Coefficient alpha reliabilities for the social connectedness variable were reported as .97 and .78 in Studies 2 and 3, respectively. Instead, they should have been reported as intraclass correlations (ICC) of .87 and .74, respectively. In the original reliability analyses, the authors included self-ratings of social connectedness and thus omitted participants from the analysis who did not provide a self-rating. Similarly, the authors included self-ratings when assessing the reliability of social connectedness in an unreported classroom sample (n=36) that was collected at the same time as the data reported in Study 2. In that unreported sample, they originally obtained a coefficient that was far below satisfactory levels, leading them to exclude that data set. However, after taking out the self-ratings in that unreported sample, the ICC was .82. The erratum summarizes the correlations reported in Study 2 for the unreported and included data sets combined. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-00466-010.) Functional theories of reputation imply that individuals' reputations are tied to their history of behavior. However, indirect evidence suggests that the relation between reputation and behavior might be tenuous at best. In 3 studies, the authors tracked the development of reputations among individuals who engaged in multiple negotiation tasks across several weeks. The authors found that on average, individuals' reputations were only mildly related to their history of behavior. However, the link between reputation and behavior was stronger for some individuals than others--specifically, for individuals who were more well-known and received more social attention in the community. In contrast, for less well-known individuals, their behavior had little impact on their reputation. The findings have implications for psychologists' understanding of reputations, person perceptions in larger groups, and the costs and benefits of social visibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Comparing perceived injustices from supervisors and romantic partners as predictors of aggression": Correction to Dupré et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "Comparing perceived injustices from supervisors and romantic partners as predictors of aggression" by Kathryne E. Dupré, Nick Turner, Julian Barling and Chris B. Stride (Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, np). Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/ a0020520), the order of authorship was listed incorrectly. The correct order of authorship follows: Kathryne E. Dupré, Julian Barling, Nick Turner, and Chris B. Stride All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-19351-001.) To examine the predictive effects of perceived injustice in two different interpersonal relationships (i.e., working relationship with a supervisor, romantic relationship with a partner) on aggression enacted in those relationships, we computed a series of multilevel regressions on 62 heterosexual couples with all 124 partners employed part-time and working for different supervisors. Higher levels of perceived supervisor injustice predicted higher supervisor-directed aggression, whereas higher levels of perceived partner injustice predicted lower supervisor-directed aggression. An interaction between perceived partner injustice and anger predicted higher levels of partner-directed aggression. Implications and recommendations for future research on the relationship specificity of perceived injustice are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"How interchangeable are different estimators of effect size?": Correction to Ray and Shadish (1996).

Reports an error in the original article by J. W. Ray and W. R. Shadish (Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1996[Dec], Vol 64(6), 1316–1325). On page 1325, a correction is made to column 1, lines 25–26. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1996-07086-021). The computation of effect sizes is a key feature of meta-analysis. In treatment outcome meta-analyses, the standardized mean difference statistic on posttest scores (d) is usually the effect size statistic used. However, when primary studies do not report the statistics needed to compute d, many methods for estimating d from other data have been developed. Little is known about the accuracy of these estimates, yet meta-analysts frequently use them on the assumption that they are estimating the same population parameter as d. This study investigates that assumption empirically. On a sample of 140 psychosocial treatment or prevention studies from a variety of areas, the present study shows that these estimates yield results that are often not equivalent to d in either mean or variance. The frequent mixing of d and other estimates of d in past meta-analyses, therefore, may have led to biased effect size estimates and inaccurate significance tests. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Issues in dimensional structure of affect—Effects of descriptors, measurement error, and response formats: Comment on Russell and Carroll (1999).

In their article "On the Bipolarity of Positive and Negative Affect," J. A. Russell and J. M. Carroll (1999; see record 1998-03256-001) correctly noted that several factors—including the use of a strictly unipolar item response format—can obscure the underlying bipolarity of certain positive and negative affect pairs. However, some of their other conclusions require clarification. First, bipolarity is evident even in uncorrected data obtained with unipolar formats. Second, polychoric correlations and appropriate item-analytic models can circumvent problems that may be associated with unipolar scales; consequently, it is unnecessary (and undesirable) to use bipolar formats in affect assessment. Third, no evidence supports their claim that general mood ratings are less valid than other measures of long-term affect. Finally, aspects of their circumplex model are not well supported by the data; in its place, the authors suggest a more inclusive 3-level hierarchical structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From perceptual rags to metaphoric riches—Bodily, social, and cultural constraints on sociocognitive metaphors: Comment on Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010).

What leads people to describe some of their interpersonal relationships as “close” and “warm” and others as “distant” and “cold”? Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) proposed that conceptual metaphors facilitate social cognition by allowing people to use knowledge from a relatively concrete (source) domain (e.g., physical distance) in understanding a different, usually more abstract (target) concept (e.g., love). We concur that such a notion of metaphors can greatly enrich the field of social cognition. At the same time, we believe it is important to devote greater theoretical attention to the nature of metaphorical representations in social cognition. We believe that Landau et al. place too much emphasis on sociocognitive metaphors as top-down knowledge structures and pay too little attention to the constraints that shape metaphors from the bottom up. In the present contribution, we highlight important bottom-up constraints, imposed through bodily constraints and social scaffolds. Sociocognitive metaphors do not exist just for mental representation but for action as well. We discuss the relevance of grounding sociocognitive metaphors for broader motivational purposes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).

Reports an error in "Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles" by Arie W. Kruglanski and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2011[Jan], Vol 118[1], 97-109). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference and the correct reference are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-00732-006.) A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What counts in the development of young children's number knowledge?": Correction to Levine et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "What counts in the development of young children's number knowledge" by Susan C. Levine, Linda Whealton Suriyakham, Meredith L. Rowe, Janellen Huttenlocher and Elizabeth A. Gunderson (Developmental Psychology, 2010[Sep], Vol 46[5], 1309-1319). A coding error resulted in incorrect item-level data being reported on the point-to-x task (not the children‘s overall performance on this task) in Table 2 and in the section of the Results headed Point-to-X Task Performance (second column, p. 1314). In the first paragraph in the section, the correct average score for knowledge of cardinal meanings of the number words. In the second paragraph in the section, there is an example illustrating children’s greater performance on items involving a target and a distractor that were one digit apart. An additional adjustment in the second paragraph involves the finding that children performed better when at least one of two choice sets was a small number (1–3) than when both choice sets were greater than or equal to 4. More information for the corrections and the corrected table are given in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-17955-026.) Prior studies indicate that children vary widely in their mathematical knowledge by the time they enter preschool and that this variation predicts levels of achievement in elementary school. In a longitudinal study of a diverse sample of 44 preschool children, we examined the extent to which their understanding of the cardinal meanings of the number words (e.g., knowing that the word “four” refers to sets with 4 items) is predicted by the “number talk” they hear from their primary caregiver in the early home environment. Results from 5 visits showed substantial variation in parents' number talk to children between the ages of 14 and 30 months. Moreover, this variation predicted children's knowledge of the cardinal meanings of number words at 46 months, even when socioeconomic status and other measures of parent and child talk were controlled. These findings suggest that encouraging parents to talk about number with their toddlers, and providing them with effective ways to do so, may positively impact children's school achievement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas": Correction to Weber and Murnighan (2008).

Reports an error in "Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas" by J. Mark Weber and J. Keith Murnighan (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008[Dec], Vol 95[6], 1340-1353). An incorrect DOI was printed. The correct DOI is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-16429-007.) Groups and organizations face a fundamental problem: They need cooperation but their members have incentives to free ride. Empirical research on this problem has often been discouraging, and economic models suggest that solutions are unlikely or unstable. In contrast, the authors present a model and 4 studies that show that an unwaveringly consistent contributor can effectively catalyze cooperation in social dilemmas. The studies indicate that consistent contributors occur naturally, and their presence in a group causes others to contribute more and cooperate more often, with no apparent cost to the consistent contributor and often gain. These positive effects seem to result from a consistent contributor's impact on group members' cooperative inferences about group norms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Perceiving unfairness in the family: Cause or consequence of marital distress?": Correction to Grote and Clark (2001).

Reports an error in "Perceiving unfairness in the family: Cause or consequence of marital distress" by Nancy K. Grote and Margaret S. Clark (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2001[Feb], Vol 80[2], 281-293). The key coefficients on the diagonal paths were incorrect. The corrected figures in their entirety appear in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2001-16163-008.) This research tests a model suggesting that marital distress leads individuals to scrutinize of what is given and received in the relationship. This scrutiny elicits perceptions of unfairness that maintain or exacerbate marital distress. In a 3-panel longitudinal study tracking married couples across the transition to parenthood, both wives' and husbands' reports of marital conflict and wives' marital dissatisfaction at Time 1 positively predicted perceived unfairness of the allocation of household tasks at Time 2, controlling for earlier perceptions of unfairness. In addition, there was evidence of perceived unfairness of division of labor at Time 2 predicting marital conflict and marital dissatisfaction for wives at Time 3, controlling for earlier conflict and dissatisfaction. This model of relationship distress and perceptions of unfairness is contrasted with prior interpretations of links between perceived injustice and distress in relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Meta-analysis of free-response studies, 1992–2008: Assessing the noise reduction model in parapsychology”: Correction to Storm, Tressoldi, and Di Risio (2010).

Reports an error in Meta-analysis of free-response studies, 1992–2008: Assessing the noise reduction model in parapsychology by Lance Storm, Patrizio E. Tressoldi and Lorenzo Di Risio (Psychological Bulletin, 2010[Jul], Vol 136[4], 471-485). In the article, the second to last sentence of the abstract (p. 471) was stated incorrectly. The sentence should read as follows: “The mean effect size value of the ganzfeld database was significantly higher than the mean effect size of the standard free-response database but was not higher than the effect size of the nonganzfeld noise reduction database.” (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-12718-001.) We report the results of meta-analyses on 3 types of free-response study: (a) ganzfeld (a technique that enhances a communication anomaly referred to as “psi”); (b) nonganzfeld noise reduction using alleged psi-enhancing techniques such as dream psi, meditation, relaxation, or hypnosis; and (c) standard free response (nonganzfeld, no noise reduction). For the period 1997–2008, a homogeneous data set of 29 ganzfeld studies yielded a mean effect size of 0.142 (Stouffer Z = 5.48, p = 2.13 × 10?8). A homogeneous nonganzfeld noise reduction data set of 16 studies yielded a mean effect size of 0.110 (Stouffer Z = 3.35, p = 2.08 × 10?4), and a homogeneous data set of 14 standard free-response studies produced a weak negative mean effect size of ?0.029 (Stouffer Z = ?2.29, p = .989). The mean effect size value of the ganzfeld database were significantly higher than the mean effect size of the nonganzfeld noise reduction and the standard free-response databases. We also found that selected participants (believers in the paranormal, meditators, etc.) had a performance advantage over unselected participants, but only if they were in the ganzfeld condition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Predicting student attitudes about racial diversity and gender equity”: Correction to Cokley et al. (2010).

Reports an error in Predicting student attitudes about racial diversity and gender equity by Kevin O. Cokley, Kimberly Tran, Brittany Hall-Clark, Collette Chapman, Luana Bessa, Angela Finley and Michael Martinez (Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, 2010[Sep], Vol 3[3], 187-199). There are two errors in Table 2 under the RWA heading and the Cog-gender heading. The necessary changes are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-18201-006.) Factors related to attitudes about racial diversity and gender equity were examined in an ethnically diverse sample of 432 college students (167 European Americans, 83 African Americans, 81 Asian Americans, and 82 Hispanic Americans). In addition to variables of self-interest (i.e., ethnicity, gender, and political views), social ideology (i.e., social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism) and personality traits (openness to experience) were uniquely predictive of attitudes about racial diversity and gender equity. Hierarchical regressions revealed that social dominance orientation most strongly predicted racial attitudes, while right-wing authoritarianism most strongly predicted gender attitudes. Implications for diversity education efforts related to prejudice reduction are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness: Correction to Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, and Savino (2011).

Reports an error in Can seeking happiness make people happy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness by Iris B. Mauss, Maya Tamir, Craig L. Anderson and Nicole S. Savino (Emotion, 2011, np). There was an error in the title. The title of the article should read, “Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness.” All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-08397-001.) Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Examining the impact of Culture’s Consequences: A three-decade, multilevel, meta-analytic review of Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions: Correction to Taras, Kirkman, and Steel (2010).

Reports an error in Examining the impact of Culture's consequences: A three-decade, multilevel, meta-analytic review of Hofstede's cultural value dimensions by Vas Taras, Bradley L. Kirkman and Piers Steel (Journal of Applied Psychology, 2010[May], Vol 95[3], 405-439). Tables 1 and 2 were printed incorrectly due to errors in the production process. In Table 1 (p. 414), row 2 (vote count, data point count) the table incorrectly lists 0s for categories in which data points were not available; therefore the data cells should in fact be empty. In Table 2 (pp. 416–423), due to formatting errors some of the columns were incorrectly shifted either one or two columns to the right (i.e., in row 1, the “4” should be aligned under the “k,” not the “r”). The formatting errors in Tables 1 and 2, however, do not affect the values in the tables. Corrected versions of both Table 1 and Table 2 can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020939 .supp. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-09357-001.) Using data from 598 studies representing over 200,000 individuals, we meta-analyzed the relationship between G. Hofstede's (1980a) original 4 cultural value dimensions and a variety of organizationally relevant outcomes. First, values predict outcomes with similar strength (with an overall absolute weighted effect size of ρ = 0.18) at the individual level of analysis. Second, the predictive power of the cultural values was significantly lower than that of personality traits and demographics for certain outcomes (e.g., job performance, absenteeism, turnover) but was significantly higher for others (e.g., organizational commitment, identification, citizenship behavior, team-related attitudes, feedback seeking). Third, cultural values were most strongly related to emotions, followed by attitudes, then behaviors, and finally job performance. Fourth, cultural values were more strongly related to outcomes for managers (rather than students) and for older, male, and more educated respondents. Fifth, findings were stronger for primary, rather than secondary, data. Finally, we provide support for M. Gelfand, L. H. Nishii, and J. L. Raver's (2006) conceptualization of societal tightness–looseness, finding significantly stronger effects in culturally tighter, rather than looser, countries. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Verbal working memory and language production: Common approaches to the serial ordering of verbal information”: Correction to Acheson and MacDonald (2009).

Reports an error in Verbal working memory and language production: Common approaches to the serial ordering of verbal information by Daniel J. Acheson and Maryellen C. MacDonald (Psychological Bulletin, 2009[Jan], Vol 135[1], 50-68). In the article “Verbal Working Memory and Language Production: Common Approaches to the Serial Ordering of Verbal Information” by Daniel J. Acheson and Maryellen C. MacDonald (Psychological Bulletin, 2009, Vol. 135, No. 1, pp. 50–68), the initial sentence of the text of the article (p. 50) contains an error. The first name of the researcher Andrew W. Ellis was listed incorrectly. The sentence should read as follows: Nearly 30 years ago, Andrew W. Ellis (1980) observed that errors on tests of verbal working memory (WM) paralleled those that occur naturally in speech production. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-18777-007.) Verbal working memory (WM) tasks typically involve the language production architecture for recall; however, language production processes have had a minimal role in theorizing about WM. A framework for understanding verbal WM results is presented here. In this framework, domain-specific mechanisms for serial ordering in verbal WM are provided by the language production architecture, in which positional, lexical, and phonological similarity constraints are highly similar to those identified in the WM literature. These behavioral similarities are paralleled in computational modeling of serial ordering in both fields. The role of long-term learning in serial ordering performance is emphasized, in contrast to some models of verbal WM. Classic WM findings are discussed in terms of the language production architecture. The integration of principles from both fields illuminates the maintenance and ordering mechanisms for verbal information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)