Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The nature of psychology: The great dilemmas.

Research about the nature of psychology, its subject matter, its level of analysis, its scientific laws, its relationship with other disciplines, and its social relevance has been a matter of great concern and interest during the development of psychology. This problem can be analyzed in terms of the dilemmas of the psychological discipline, which have been choice points, crossroads, alternative decisions that bring psychologists face to face with the following issues: (a) the subject matter of psychology: psyche, mind, or behavior?; (b) the role of scientific methodology: is psychology a natural science, a social/behavioral/human science, or a part of the humanities?; (c) the universality or particularity of scientific laws in psychology: are laws universal or culture-bound and contextual?; and (d) the balance between science and profession: is psychology a basic science, a socially relevant profession, or both? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological methodology: Should it differ from that of natural science?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 13(2) of Canadian Psychologist Psychologie Canadienne (see record 2007-02145-010). The sentence beginning on line 30, p. 514 should read: Such value judgments include: falsifiability of a scientific theory is indispensable; as is logical consistency and (by implication) precise definition of technical terms; comprehensiveness; and parsimony.] By the methodology of a science is intended its mathematical-logical base, its axiomatic foundations or philosophical commitments - not its techniques. Whether psychological methodology differs from that of the natural sciences is considered obliquely by raising the question as to whether value judgments enter psychology in any way unknown to natural science. Six ways values enter psychology are found. Although only one of these does not also intrude upon natural science, this one suffices to require for psychology a new mathematical logic or methodology. The present approach seeks to help disambiguate such phenomenological approaches as Verstehen. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Further extensions of methodological diversity for counseling psychology.

Discusses the state of the art of research methodology in counseling psychology, which consists of the use of diverse methods. However, the diversity is limited to methods consistent with the values and logical framework of science as developed by the physical sciences. A further extension of methodology is required in order to include maturing alternative systems of inquiry such as systemic and structural methods, techniques designed to study goal-directed human action, and hermeneutic and phenomenological approaches. External critique from the philosophy of science and internal dissatisfaction expressed by practitioners are providing a renewed impetus to explore research strategies based in nonformal systems of logic. The need for and theoretical justification of diverse systems of inquiry are becoming more evident, yet a body of research examples or training strategies has not yet developed. It is important for the discipline of counseling psychology to support the development of alternative research strategies and to assume leadership in creating training methods for their use. (65 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of value in the world of psychology.

The mechanistic view of Newtonian science was interpreted by German holism to consist of barren facts and purposeless theories. The assumption that the whole determines the operation of its parts enables holism to provide moral value and existential meaning to human existence. Whereas a positivist view of science assumes that facts cannot logically yield moral values that are right for humankind, holism contends that human values can be revealed in a scientific manner. The same epistemological process that allows holism and humanistic psychology to generate a psychologically demanded morality has also justified Nazi and Communist ideology. The logic of the fact/value dichotomy and the inevitable ascendancy of moral pluralism prevent scientific psychology from serving a democratic society as a pipeline to moral truth or to a positive conception of mental health. Psychological research can estimate the consequences of competing social policies and thus assist a democracy in making informed choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science and morality: The role of values in science and the scientific study of moral phenomena.

This article contributes to the debate over values in science. A critical co-constructivist framework is proposed for conceptualizing the role that debate over values plays in all science. Using the psychological literature on moral development, it is shown that although debate over values is an integral part of all scientific discourse, it plays a more explicit role in fields within the human sciences (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.) that touch on moral phenomena. Debate over values thus raises a central issue for modern science, namely the need to develop consensually agreed-on methods for resolving such debate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Psychological methodology: Should it differ from that of natural science?": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Psychological Methodology: Should it Differ from that of Natural Science" by Lawrence La Fave (Canadian Psychologist/Psychologie Canadienne, 1971[Oct], Vol 12[4], 513-525). The sentence beginning on line 30, p. 514 should read: Such value judgments include: falsifiability of a scientific theory is indispensable; as is logical consistency and (by implication) precise definition of technical terms; comprehensiveness; and parsimony. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2007-02143-006.) By the methodology of a science is intended its mathematical-logical base, its axiomatic foundations or philosophical commitments -- not its techniques. Whether psychological methodology differs from that of the natural sciences is considered obliquely by raising the question as to whether value judgments enter psychology in any way unknown to natural science. Six ways values enter psychology are found. Although only one of these does not also intrude upon natural science, this one suffices to require for psychology a new mathematical logic or methodology. The present approach seeks to help disambiguate such phenomenological approaches as Verstehen. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and the ethics of social policy.

Psychology's ability to resolve or moderate social conflicts stemming from competing moral positions depends on whether psychology is conceptualized as a mental or behavioral science. Knowledge claims from the direct observation of consciousness cannot yield consensual agreement about valid ethical principles or correct social policies. As a behavioral science, psychology is unable to validate moral principles because of the logical impossibility of inferring ethical imperatives from empirical data. Behavioral evidence can nevertheless assist society in choosing among competing social policies by revealing their empirical consequences. To do this successfully, psychology must use natural science methodology with the aim of seeking empirical and theoretical truth, not political goals or ethical ideals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From laws of learning to a science of values: Efficiency and morality in Thorndike's educational psychology.

Edward L. Thorndike's educational psychology was the beginning of an American behavioristic tradition that sought efficient, scientific solutions to educational, moral, and social problems. Thorndike used empirical methodology to explain behavior, intellect, and character. After rejecting developmentalism, he combined laws of learning derived from his experiments on animals with quantitative measurement of individual differences in humans to construct a psychology of education. He applied this educational psychology commercially and developed many widely used tests and texts. Thorndike then proposed a science of values that he hoped might be used as a guide for moral assessment and social policy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Suffering in Psychology: The Demoralization of Psychotherapeutic Practice.

Faced with a chasm of seemingly geological proportions, scientists and practitioners in clinical psychology and psychotherapy must confront the concealed moral conflicts that permeate the field. Our clinical practices reflect and contribute to the search for the good life in contemporary society. The application of the Enlightenment's view of science and rationality to clinical psychology has led to a demoralization of the therapeutic relationship and an atrophy of our sense of human suffering. Human suffering is explored as a complex process involving physical, psychological, and social elements firmly embedded in the moral realm in such a manner as to make the practice of psychotherapy inevitably also the practice of ethics. The positive consequences of the remoralization of clinical practice and professional identity are discussed, as are possible objections to such an endeavor from various theoretical approaches to psychotherapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The rise of qualitative research in psychology.

A study is presented on the rise of qualitative research in psychology over the 20th century. The incidence of qualitative research as indicated by several search terms (i.e., "qualitative research," "grounded theory," "discourse analy*," "empirical phenomenological," and "phenomenological psychology") was traced through the PsycINFO and Dissertation Abstracts International databases. It was found that, with the exception of the search terms having to do with phenomenology, records containing these search terms were basically non-existent until the 1980s, when there was a sharp rise that intensified in the 1990s. The PsycINFO records were sorted according to (1) whether they came from psychology or other social and health science disciplines; (2) region of origin; (3) the types of document to which they referred; and (4) whether they focused on the methodology or the application of qualitative research. A number of interesting differences emerged from this comparative analysis. Implications of the findings for the supposition that a paradigm shift may be underway are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Idols of the psychologist: Johannes Linschoten and the demise of phenomenological psychology in the Netherlands.

Before and after World War II, a loose movement within Dutch psychology solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology. Dutch phenomenological psychologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on Husserlian interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. This movement came to a halt in the 1960s, even though it had been exported to North America and elsewhere as "phenomenological psychology." Frequently referred to as the "Utrecht school," most of the activity of the group was centered at Utrecht University. In this article, the authors examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology: its rise in North America and Europe, and its institutional demise. By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a purely phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his own empirical work, especially his 1956 dissertation published in German, can be seen to be a form of empiricism inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive psychology: A phenomenological critique.

Reviews the general orientation of cognitive psychology, some contemporary difficulties and problems noted by cognitive psychologists, and apparent commonalities between phenomenological and cognitive psychologies. It is argued that the problems of cognitive psychology are inevitable consequences of its natural scientific orientation, which is far more traditional than it is revolutionary. A phenomenologically based, human science approach to psychology is offered as a solution of fundamental disciplinary problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A personal encounter with psychology (1937-2002).

An undergraduate assistantship with Maslow, research with S. Asch, and an indirect exposure to E. Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged H. H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with K. Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife T. Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Basic theoretical concepts of humanistic psychology.

Presents aspects of the new science of humanistic psychology and distinguishes it from its ideological origins in humanistic philosophy. The following elements of humanistic psychology are identified and briefly discussed: (a) the study and understanding of the person as a whole, (b) the need to understand the full life history of the human being, (c) the role of intentionality in human existence, and (d) the importance of the end goal of life for the healthy person. The individual is seen as attempting to integrate the various motives that drive the person to seek self-realization and fulfillment. The relationship of humanistic psychology to psychotherapy and to the field of education is also discussed. (44 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exploring the postmodern: Perils or potentials?

In an attempt to rescue the self from the ravages of postmodern analysis, M. B. Smith (see record 1994-37277-001) called into action traditional investments in science and moral vision. However, not only are the grounds for these investments found wanting, they themselves harbor threats to human well-being. Furthermore, by understanding the postmodern conception of language as relational, a certain place can be made for both empirical research and moral deliberation. At the same time, postmodern thought opens new vistas for psychology and new horizons for the self. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some similarities and differences among phenomenological and other methods of psychological qualitative research.

Compares the research method of phenomenological psychology to other qualitative research methods such as ethnography, participant observation, grounded theory, dramaturgical interviewing, and content analysis. An attempt is made to identify similarities and differences. As a prelude, the major metatheories with which they are associated (phenomenology and symbolic interactionism) and the related differences between natural science and human science are discussed. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Political goals versus scientific truths: A response to Jackson (2003).

Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Happiness Donut: A Confucian Critique of Positive Psychology.

An empirically based version of the good life as proposed by positive psychology is a donut with something missing at the core--the moral map. This paper addresses ramifications of this lacuna, and suggests ways to narrow the gap between science and life. By applying an extended version of the self-regulation theory of Higgins to a cross cultural analysis of the good life as envisioned by Seligman and Confucius, respectively, this paper sheds light on the culturally encapsulated value judgments behind positive psychology, examines issues at stake in an empirically based version of the good life, and suggests, for future research, alternative approaches that may better fulfill the promises of positive psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)