Ontological and Epistemic Claims of Realism and Instrumentalism.

Comment on "Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological Theory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery of Solutions" by John T. Cacioppo, Gun R. Semin and Gary G. Berntson (see record 2004-14303-001). While Lau admires the authors efforts to negotiate symbiosis with seemingly incommensurate realist and instrumentalist positions in science. They focused very intently on hashing out the impetus and motivations for engaging in scientific activity under these two broad perspectives. Although Cacioppo et al. made attempts to highlight the divergent points of realism and instrumentalism and subsequently how the two may be concurrently adopted in an iteratively reflective manner by scientists, the choice to not fully interrogate for the reader the respective underlying ontological and epistemic assumptions serves to oversimplify the possibility for, and create the illusion of, symbiosis. Lau goes on to expand his point and make the reader understand that realists and instrumentalists often have different agendas and these differences are grounded by particular ontological and epistemic assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Scientific Symbiosis Represents the Mutual Benefit of Iteratively Adopting the Perspective of Realism and Instrumentalism.

Comment on "Psychology Needs Realism not Instrumentalism" by B. Haig (see record 2004-14303-015), "Ontological and epistemic claims of realism and instrumentalism" by Lau (see record 2004-14303-016)and "The scientific denial of the real and the dialectic of scientism and humanism" by Ramey and Chrysikou (see record 2004-14303-017) which were all comments on the original article "Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological Theory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery of Solutions" by John T. Cacioppo, Gun R. Semin and Gary G. Berntson (see record 2004-14303-001). Cacioppo, Semin and Bernston address each of the comments on their original article and discuss their views on the subject of scientific symbiosis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Scientific Denial of the Real and the Dialectic of Scientism and Humanism.

Comment on "Realism, Instrumentalism, and Scientific Symbiosis: Psychological Theory as a Search for Truth and the Discovery of Solutions" by John T. Cacioppo, Gun R. Semin and Gary G. Berntson (see record 2004-14303-001). The appeal for the unification of psychology is in fashion and Cacioppo et al.'s term "symbiosis" connotes a cooperative and communal practice that is difficult to criticize without being regarded as quarrelsome and cantankerous. As Cacioppo et al. stated, the ultimate goal for a unification in psychology should be "to approach or approximate scientific realism" (p. 221). Thus, iterative practice or not, there is no symbiosis, only a reductionistic approach with a gesture toward including positive qualities of instrumentalism. Cacioppo et al. essentially proposed a check-and-balance system for scientific realism which is the ultimate victor. Ramey and Chrysikou go on to discuss the differences between scientific realism and instrumentalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Division of Philosophical Psychology.

Comment regarding the necessity of establishing a Division of Philosophical Psychology in the APA. There are several clear indications that other disciplines and particular scholars in our own discipline are taking cognizance of this problem. Feigl's (see record 1960-03715-001) article "Philosophical Embarrassments of Psychology" is suggestive of the growing concern. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Toward a Psychology of the Scientist.

Reviews the book, Toward a Psychology of the Scientist by Sonja C. Graver (1981). The major themes of this highly condensed 92 page book are that all sciences are philosophic and that psychological research provides insight into how scientists formulate and revise theories. The author further contends that the development of science would be enhanced if all scientists (including psychologists) understood the primary importance of the role of theory, imagination and creativity in experimentation. The scientific model suggested is that progress in science occurs by way of reformulations of arbitrary world views, and that scientific activities would be enhanced if the subjective and psychological, particularly cognitive, aspects were stressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gastronomic Realism - A Cautionary Tale.

Moral realism, the view that there are moral facts that are independent of our beliefs about them, has many defenders. But much less has been said about realism concerning other sorts of value. One of these, gastronomic realism (the view that there are facts about how good or bad particular foods and drinks are, and that these facts are similarly independent of our beliefs) is likely to seem implausible on its face. This paper argues, however, that much of the reasoning used to defend moral realism is about as well suited for defending gastronomic realism. Although these considerations do not directly undermine moral realism, they do suggest that the two views should stand or fall together. And they rob moral realists of one ad hominem argument that often emerges in their debate with irrealists, that the irrealists cannot justify their widespread practice of taking their own moral values seriously. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Robinson's Moral Realism and Hermeneutics.

Robinson's defense of moral realism is stimulating, admirable, and convincing in many respects. He is particularly effective in mounting a multi-faceted attack on Mackie's famous "argument from queerness" and other views that deny that moral realities can be part of the furniture of the world. Certain other of his arguments about the ontological standing of moral entities, however, might be seen to open rather a wide gulf between them and ordinary experience. I suggest that hermeneutic philosophy, which I find more consonant with Robinson's project than he does, might step in to heal the breach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology in the northern countries.

"Psychology enjoys a healthy and growing vitality in Finland and in the Scandinavian countries." Emphasis is on "… classical problems and methodology though there is much interest in personality theory and psychometrics." Student selection is rigorous; emphasis is placed on individual work by students; psychological organizations are small; a bimonthly multilingual journal, Nordisk Psykologi, is published. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology, the stalwart profession, faces new challenges and opportunities.

Psychology emerged as a profession following World War II, seemingly out of nowhere and against all odds, through the sheer grit and determination of its early clinical psychology doctoral pioneers, who recognized the economic importance of licensure and third-party reimbursement. After 2 or 3 decades of prosperity in which psychology became the nation's preeminent psychotherapy profession, professional psychologists ignored warnings of impending managed care and the biomedical revolution and have suffered an unfortunate decline in income. Once again healthcare is confronted with double-digit inflation, and draconian reimbursement measures are being put into place that will impact psychological practice. Practicing psychologists need to heed these harbingers and deflect their negative effects while taking advantage of their potential opportunities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Psychology of Worldviews.

A worldview (or "world view") is a set of assumptions about physical and social reality that may have powerful effects on cognition and behavior. Lacking a comprehensive model or formal theory up to now, the construct has been underused. This article advances theory by addressing these gaps. Worldview is defined. Major approaches to worldview are critically reviewed. Lines of evidence are described regarding worldview as a justifiable construct in psychology. Worldviews are distinguished from schemas. A collated model of a worldview's component dimensions is described. An integrated theory of worldview function is outlined, relating worldview to personality traits, motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, and culture. A worldview research agenda is outlined for personality and social psychology (including positive and peace psychology). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amateur Psychology.

Comments on a recent article in The Reporter (Feb. 16, 1962), where Marya Mannes, a staff writer of this publication, praises Joyce Brothers for her ability to answer complex psychological problems in simple language "so simple in fact that she might be a new form of computer." In this computerization into simple language, however, not only the poetry of the problem, but its very individuality is lost. Somebody writes in, or talks to Dr. Brothers and gets the computer answer. The commentator states that such simplicity is easy to achieve because the dispenser of psychological and psychoanalytical generalities, of truisms and "untruisms," has only one theory into which, like into the legendary bed of Procrustes, the unfortunate party must fit. Lastly, according to the commentator, Miss Mannes has some misgivings lest the simplicity might simply be psychological quackery. She asks politely whether these shows are the soil in which wisdom may flower, and she calls this an open question. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mind, brain and explanation.

The question "What constitutes a good explanation of psychological phenomena?" is the most important if not the most commonly asked question facing students of psychology. Often this question is answered, or maybe is cast aside, by adopting the position that any theory that can predict behavior therefore explains the behavior. However, the notion of prediction is not one without controversy. In this article the author has attempted to demonstrate that neither the identity thesis nor functionalism is well suited to providing a framework for psychological explanations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What Can Theoretical Psychology Do?

A wide variety of theoretical tasks is inescapably part of psychological research, practice, and public policy initiatives. A classification and illustrated summary of these theoretical tasks is provided, an important purpose of which is to remind providers and users of psychological research and interventions of important theoretical dimensions of these activities. A larger purpose, however, is the promotion of theoretical psychology as an orientation toward, and a set of understandings and tools with which psychologists might approach, an appropriately contextualized self-understanding of their practices as researchers and practitioners. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Giving Psychology Away Is Expensive.

Comment on "Does Psychology make a significant difference in our lives?" by P. Zimbardo (see record 2004-16479-003). We deeply appreciate the documentation and inspiration provided by Zimbardo on how psychology is reaching out to the public by "giving psychology away" (p. 340). We totally agree that psychology has much, much more to offer that could be used to improve human lives. We believe that in addition to a sincere desire to give psychology away, there needs to be a recognition of the realities of living in a capitalist society. In a market-driven economy, it is the value of intellectual property in the form of revenue generated that will determine whether psychological knowledge is widely disseminated and used. Zimbardo made a very good case for using the media to obtain free advertising; however, we believe a more radical approach is needed. The authors go on to discuss their views. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

浅谈心理学原理在企业安全管理中的科学应用

企业实现生产安全主要取决于人的安全行为和物的安全环境，而人的安全行为与人的安全心理密切相关。因此在企业安全管理的实际工作中，抓住人这一关键环节，科学应用心理学原理通过激励、培养、培训等有效手段，从而激发人的主观能动性，在意识上、行为上由被动参与转变为主动参与，使安全工作做到有预见性和．主动性，企业安全管理才会达到更加条理化、系统化、科学化。     

Racism in out midst: Listening to psychologists of color.

How is racism covertly or overtly active in psychological theory, practice, and policy? The field of psychology has given little attention to addressing this question. Using a qualitative interviewing approach, this study assessed racism in psychology from the unique perspectives of 8 psychologists of color. An analysis of in-depth responses to 3 target questions suggested that although participants believed that the field has made gains, negative appraisals very clearly predominated, and covert acts of racism were cited, providing additional evidence that racism is in psychology's midst. Suggestions for addressing racism within psychology are made. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Carving natural emotions: Kindly from bottom-up but not top-down.

Comment on an article by Peter Zachar (see record 2007-10982-007). To resolve the seemingly perennial battle between naturalistic and cultural approaches to emotions, we should recognize the former works best on primary-process emotions (evolutionarily provided subcortical systems) while the latter better describes how tertiary-processes (socially-constructed, thought-penetrated) emotions arise from higher neocortical brain regions. Emotional learning studies (secondary-process approaches such as classical conditioning) lie somewhere in between. Natural kind semantics may be justified if one works at the cross-species, neuro-evolutionary, naturalistic level, while surely being unsuitable for tertiary-process approaches. For investigators working at rock-bottom neuroscience levels, the conflicts between naturalistic/ethological and constructivist/ componential approaches in human psychology have long seemed sterile and unproductive. An integration of the various levels of analysis should be most productive for lasting knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A triptych on affective science: Response to the commentary.

Reply by the current authors to the comments made by Jaak Panksepps (see record 2009-02352-007), James.A. Russell (see record 2009-02352-008) and Louise Sundararajan (see record 2009-02352-009) on the original article by Peter Zachar (see record 2007-10982-007). I consider the utility of the concept of natural kind, and explore difficulties in applying it reliably. I examine categorical and dimensional approaches to affect with respect to both scientific realism and nominalist approaches to classification. I agree that eliminativist analogies are beneficial but argue that they cannot fully account for the relationship between folk and scientific psychology. I also claim that neither Panksepp's nor Russell's models are incommensurable with Sundararajn's deeper approach to affective science. I suggest that Panksepp's conclusions about the structure of primary affect may be incompatible with the dimensional model, which illustrates the limits of translational work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of a psychological constructionist account of emotion: Reply to Zachar.

Comment on an article by Peter Zachar (see record 2007-10982-007) An account of emotion must include categories and dimensions. Categories because humans categorize reality, and a person's categorization of their own state influences aspects of that state. Dimensions because humans are always in some state of Core Affect, which varies by degree along dimensions of valence (feeling good or bad) and activation (feeling lethargic or energized). In Psychological Construction, Core Affect and a host of other "components" are separate on-going processes, always in some pattern. Occasionally the pattern resembles a prototype of a category of emotion sufficiently to count as an instance of that category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)