Structural properties of stereotypic knowledge and their influences on the construal of social situations.

This research focused on the role that higher order structural properties of stereotypic knowledge play in the processing of social information. It is argued that stereotypic assumptions about cause–effect relations provide important constraints for the causal structure underlying the perceiver's subjective representation of social information. Experiment 1 shows how, within the context of a jury decision experiment, the causal structure underlying stereotypic knowledge about African Americans influences the construal of causality in a situation involving a member of that group. Results from 2 additional experiments indicate that this construal effect is based in part on stereotypic knowledge affecting the encoding of the trial evidence instead of on biasing responses at the output stage. The implications of these findings are discussed, and a theoretical framework is offered according to which the application of category knowledge involves not only the matching of stereotypic attributes but also the alignment of structural relations in the environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affective influences on self-disclosure: Mood effects on the intimacy and reciprocity of disclosing personal information.

How does mood influence people's willingness to disclose intimate information about themselves? Based on recent affect–cognition theories and research on interpersonal behavior, 3 experiments predicted and found that people in a positive mood disclosed more intimate, more varied, and more abstract information about themselves. In contrast, people in a negative mood were more attentive to the behavior of others and reciprocated self-disclosure from their partners more accurately. This effect was obtained in hypothetical situations (Experiments 1 and 2) and in realistic computer-mediated interactions as well (Experiment 3). Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed that mood effects on self-disclosure were mediated by information processing style. The role of affect in information processing and relationship behaviors in particular is discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday interaction strategies and for contemporary affect–cognition theorizing are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Using cross-modal lexical decision tasks to investigate sentence processing.

Recent investigations of sentence processing have used the cross-modal lexical decision task to show that the antecedent of a phonologically empty noun phrase (specifically, WH-trace) is reactivated at the trace position. G. McKoon et al (see record 1995-04309-001) claimed that (1) a design feature concerning the choice of related and unrelated targets is a possible confound in this work and (2) the conclusions drawn from this previous research are therefore called into question. These claims are considered in light of both the McKoon et al experimental findings and the results of the J. L. Nicol et al experiments in which linguistic materials are tested. Nicol et al argue that their results may be due to the nature of their materials, and that a follow-up experiment reported by McKoon and R. Ratcliff (see record 1995-04308-001) used a technique that is not comparable to the cross-modal lexical decision task. It is concluded that current evidence supports the claim that structural information is used during on-line sentence processing and that the cross-modal technique is sensitive to this. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Markon et al. (2011).

Reports an error in "The reliability and validity of discrete and continuous measures of psychopathology: A quantitative review" by Kristian E. Markon, Michael Chmielewski and Christopher J. Miller (Psychological Bulletin, 2011[Sep], Vol 137[5], 856-879). In the Samples section of Meta-Analysis 1: Reliability, third paragraph, the number of studies reporting data on clinical samples is incorrect. The sentence “Four studies included clinical samples, and eight studies included nonclinical samples” should read “Twenty-four studies included clinical samples, and eight studies included nonclinical samples.” (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-09705-001.) In 2 meta-analyses involving 58 studies and 59,575 participants, we quantitatively summarized the relative reliability and validity of continuous (i.e., dimensional) and discrete (i.e., categorical) measures of psychopathology. Overall, results suggest an expected 15% increase in reliability and 37% increase in validity through adoption of a continuous over discrete measure of psychopathology alone. This increase occurs across all types of samples and forms of psychopathology, with little evidence for exceptions. For typical observed effect sizes, the increase in validity is sufficient to almost halve sample sizes necessary to achieve standard power levels. With important caveats, the current results, considered with previous research, provide sufficient empirical and theoretical basis to assume a priori that continuous measurement of psychopathology is more reliable and valid. Use of continuous measures in psychopathology assessment has widespread theoretical and practical benefits in research and clinical settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 118(3) of Psychological Review (see record 2011-07436-001). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference and the correct reference are provided in the erratum.] [Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported online in Psychological Review on April 11 2011 (see record 2011-07436-001). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference is: Osman, B. (2004). Quality assessment, verification, and validation of modeling and simulation applications. Proceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation Conference, 122–129. The correct reference is: Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 998–1010.] A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

“Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles”: Correction to Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011).

Reports an error in "Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles" by Arie W. Kruglanski and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2011[Jan], Vol 118[1], 97-109). An incorrect reference was given in the reference list. The incorrect reference and the correct reference are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-00732-006.) A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments.

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency—that is, the speed with which objects are recognized—will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Verbal reports as data.

Proposes that verbal reports are data and that accounting for them, as well as for other kinds of data, requires explication of the mechanisms by which the reports are generated, and the ways in which they are sensitive to experimental factors (instructions, tasks, etc). Within the theoretical framework of human information processing, different types of processes underlying verbalization are discussed, and a model is presented of how Ss, in response to an instruction to think aloud, verbalize information that they are attending to in short-term memory (STM). Verbalizing information is shown to affect cognitive processes only if the instructions require verbalization of information that would not otherwise be attended to. From an analysis of what would be in STM at the time of report, the model predicts what could be reliably reported. The inaccurate reports found by other research are shown to result from requesting information that was never directly heeded, thus forcing Ss to infer rather than remember their mental processes. (112 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Levels of processing: A retrospective commentary on a framework for memory research.

Reviews literature showing how the levels of processing framework (F. I. Craik and R. S. Lockhart; see record 1973-20189-001) has influenced memory research since 1972. Principles underlying the framework include the claim that the memory trace should be understood as a by-product or record of normal cognitive processes (e.g., comprehension, categorization). Subsequent research has confirmed the value of much of the framework. It is now generally accepted that memory performance is directly and strongly linked to the nature of processing underlying the original experience, and theories of memory now include an analysis of these processing operations. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Time Course of Linguistic Information Extraction From Consecutive Words During Eye Fixations in Reading.

Sequential attention shift models of reading predict that an attended (typically fixated) word must be recognized before useful linguistic information can be obtained from the following (parafoveal) word. These models also predict that linguistic information is obtained from a parafoveal word immediately prior to a saccade toward it. To test these assumptions, sentences were constructed with a critical pretarget-target word sequence, and the temporal availability of the (parafoveal) target preview was manipulated while the pretarget word was fixated. Target viewing effects, examined as a function of prior target visibility, revealed that extraction of linguistic target information began 70-140 ms after the onset of pretarget viewing. Critically, acquisition of useful linguistic information from a target was not confined to the ending period of pretarget viewing. These results favor theoretical conceptions in which there is some temporal overlap in the linguistic processing of a fixated and parafoveally visible word during reading. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Binocular information acquisition and visual memory.

Mechanisms underlying the binocular combination of visual information were investigated within the context of a visual information acquisition theory proposed by G. R. Loftus et al (e.g., as described by T. A. Busey and G. R. Loftus, 1994). A central assumption of the theory is that of a sensory threshold, which engenders an information loss such that information processing subsequent to the threshold is assumed to occur only when the magnitude of a sensory representation triggered by the stimulus exceeds the threshold. The presumed sensory threshold may be situated prior to or subsequent to the point at which the information from the two eyes combines. The location of this threshold was investigated in 3 experiments that provided conclusions about the location of the sensory thresholds and the mechanisms of binocular combination. It is concluded that a linear summation mechanism, an independent sampling information acquisition model, and both pre- and postcombinatorial sources of information loss are required to account for the data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Temporal processing of emotional stimuli: The capture and release of attention by angry faces.

Neuroimaging data suggest that emotional information, especially threatening faces, automatically captures attention and receives rapid processing. While this is consistent with the majority of behavioral data, behavioral studies of the attentional blink (AB) additionally reveal that aversive emotional first target (T1) stimuli are associated with prolonged attentional engagement or “dwell” time. One explanation for this difference is that few AB studies have utilized manipulations of facial emotion as the T1. To address this, schematic faces varying in expression (neutral, angry, happy) served as the T1 in the current research. Results revealed that the blink associated with an angry T1 face was, primarily, of greater magnitude than that associated with either a neutral or happy T1 face, and also that initial recovery from this processing bias was faster following angry, compared with happy, T1 faces. The current data therefore provide important information regarding the time-course of attentional capture by angry faces: Angry faces are associated with both the rapid capture and rapid release of attention. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multireference adaptive noise cancellation applied to somatosensory evoked potentials

Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEP's) contain information that is useful in diagnosing various physiological disorders. However, surface measurements of these potentials suffer from very poor Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) resulting in imperceptible SEP waveforms. This factor motivates the employment of dedicated signal processing techniques to improve the quality of the waveform. The objective of this research work is to improve the SNR of SEP by eliminating the predominant myoelectric interference. The strategy followed to achieve this goal is to process the SEP signal by MultiReference Adaptive Noise Cancellation (MRANC). A theoretical model for the MRANC is presented and its performance under the influence of various factors is investigated and compared with other signal processing techniques. The performance of the MRANC is then evaluated by processing simulated and in vivo SEP data. It is found that the MRANC gives a significant improvement in the SNR of the SEP.     

Crossed categorization beyond the two-group model.

Four studies examined processing of in-group and out-group information with stimuli that are more complex than those used in previous crossed categorization studies. A diverse set of predictions is generated by previous theoretical work to account for how participants will integrate information stemming from multiple group memberships. Heuristic, threshold-based processing of information was supported over algebraic processing. Participants appeared to divide stimuli into "in-grouplike" and "out-grouplike" metacategories. However, the threshold at which this distinction was made, and whether it was based on in-group favoritism or out-group derogation, was influenced by the nature of the situation and the task participants performed. Advantages of crossed categorization research that moves beyond the traditional two-group model are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The reliability and validity of discrete and continuous measures of psychopathology: A quantitative review.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 137(6) of Psychological Bulletin (see record 2011-24066-002). In the Samples section of Meta-Analysis 1: Reliability, third paragraph, the number of studies reporting data on clinical samples is incorrect. The sentence “Four studies included clinical samples, and eight studies included nonclinical samples” should read “Twenty-four studies included clinical samples, and eight studies included nonclinical samples.”] In 2 meta-analyses involving 58 studies and 59,575 participants, we quantitatively summarized the relative reliability and validity of continuous (i.e., dimensional) and discrete (i.e., categorical) measures of psychopathology. Overall, results suggest an expected 15% increase in reliability and 37% increase in validity through adoption of a continuous over discrete measure of psychopathology alone. This increase occurs across all types of samples and forms of psychopathology, with little evidence for exceptions. For typical observed effect sizes, the increase in validity is sufficient to almost halve sample sizes necessary to achieve standard power levels. With important caveats, the current results, considered with previous research, provide sufficient empirical and theoretical basis to assume a priori that continuous measurement of psychopathology is more reliable and valid. Use of continuous measures in psychopathology assessment has widespread theoretical and practical benefits in research and clinical settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Examining conflict between components of attitudes: Ambivalence and inconsistency are distinct constructs.

Past research has shown that attitudes can be based on different types of psychological information or components. It has also been suggested that the amount of ambivalence and inconsistency between and within these components are important aspects of attitude structure. In this paper, the authors discuss the relation between ambivalence and inconsistency, and the effects on message processing. To test predictions about the independence of ambivalence and inconsistency, the authors reanalyzed the data from their previous experiment (G. R. Maio et al, 1996; see record 1996-06722-001). The new analyses focused on intercomponent ambivalence and attiduinal inconsistency, in addition to intracomponent ambivalence. Using open-ended measures, the authors calculated indices of ambivalence and inconsistency within Canadian college students' attitudes toward Oriental people. The relations between these constructs were then examined, as were their effects on the processing of strong and weak persuasive messages advocating immigration from Hong Kong. Based on past theorizing and research, and on reanalyses of data, the authors conclude that ambivalence and inconsistency are distinct constructs, which are empirically unrelated and produce different effects on message processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive styles in the context of modern psychology: Toward an integrated framework of cognitive style.

The goals of this article are to elucidate trends and perspectives in the field of cognitive style research and to propose an integrated framework to guide future research. This is accomplished by means of a comprehensive literature review of the major advances and the theoretical and experimental problems that have accumulated over the years and by a discussion of the promising theoretical models that can be further developed, in part, with modern neuroscience techniques and with research from different psychological fields. On the basis of the research reviewed in this article, the author suggests that cognitive styles represent heuristics that individuals use to process information about their environment. These heuristics can be identified at multiple levels of information processing, from perceptual to metacognitive, and they can be grouped according to the type of regulatory function they exert on processes ranging from automatic data encoding to conscious executive allocation of cognitive resources. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessment of covariation by humans and animals: The joint influence of prior expectations and current situational information.

Proposes a theoretical framework for understanding and integrating people's and animals' covariation assessment. It is argued that covariation perception is determined by the interaction between 2 sources of information: (a) the organism's prior expectations about the covariation between 2 events and (b) current situational information provided by the environment about the objective contingency between the events. Both accuracies and errors in people's and animals' covariation assessments are analyzed within this interactional theoretical framework. Four lines of research are reviewed in support of this analysis. The issue of accuracy vs rationality in covariation assessment is considered. (8 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rational learning and information sampling: On the “naivety” assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases.

Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are “naive”: They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this “naivety” assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why positive information is processed faster: The density hypothesis.

The authors postulate and show a speed advantage in the processing of positive information and hypothesize that this advantage is caused by the higher density of positive information in memory: Positive information is more similar to other positive information, in comparison with the similarity of negative information to other negative information. This "density" hypothesis is supported by multidimensional scaling of evaluative stimuli and response latency experiments. The relevance and explanatory power of the hypothesis is demonstrated by secondary data analyses of prior research in the evaluative priming paradigm. The final discussion is concerned with further theoretical implications of the density hypothesis, its generality and limitations, and its relation to other theoretical conceptions and applications. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)