A Measurement of the Certainty Effect

In order to measure the certainty effect, the present paper tries to develop an axiomatic model of decision under risk which can accommodate the certainty effect and is, apart from this property, equivalent to expected utility. This leads to a new concept denoted by certainty preference which implies that a higher utility index is assigned to a consequence in the case of certainty than to the same consequence in the presence of risk. Now, a notion of comparative certainty preference can be obtained which will be characterized in terms of properties of the derived utility representation and allows for a generalization of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.     

Group Cohesion, Attitude Projection, and Opinion Certainty: Beyond Interaction.

This experiment investigated the effects of group cohesiveness and estimations of consensus on opinion certainty. Members of high- or low-cohesive groups indicated their own attitude positions on 6 civic issues in a context removed from the task-oriented situation in which the groups were developed. Each person then estimated the positions of in-group or out-group members or participated in a no-projection control condition. As expected, estimation of the attitudes of either target group conferred opinion certainty onto cohesive members compared with levels found in the no-projection condition or among low-cohesive participants. Furthermore, perceptions that coworker input was facilitated and encouraged during group development mediated the effect of the experimental manipulation of cohesion on opinion certainty following attitude projection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Different levels of cognitive dissonance, information seeking, and information avoidance.

An experiment with 122 15–17 yr olds tested the curvilinear relationship between the amount of dissonance and the tendency to seek consonant information and avoid dissonant information. The dependent variables, information seeking and information avoidance, were measured separately, and additional data were collected about the perceived probability of revising the decision and about changes of decision certainty. Results show that Ss' preference for information consonant with the decision was highest when they had neither won nor lost large amounts of money. With increasing gains or losses, the opposite tendency emerged. This pattern held both for the number of consonant pieces of information chosen and for the difference in desirability ratings for reading consonant vs dissonant communications. Independent of the amount of money won or lost, more dissonant than consonant information was avoided. Data are explained within the framework of dissonance theory as well as choice-certainty theory. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of alcohol, gender, and sensation seeking on the gambling choices of social drinkers.

The preference-reversal, or the reflection, effect occurs when the valence of the decision option influences risk preference (A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 1981-31998-001). The present study examined 3 possible moderators of gambling choices—alcohol, gender, and sensation seeking—among 108 healthy male and female volunteers. After receiving a moderate dose of alcohol, a placebo, or a no-alcohol control beverage, participants completed a betting task in which they could risk a monetary bonus by selecting and playing out a potential gain and a potential loss. Results indicated a preference-reversal effect among high sensation seekers only. The finding that individual differences moderated gambling choices is more consistent with L. L. Lopes's (see record 1987-98851-006) security-potential/aspiration (SP/A) theory of decision making than with prospect theory. As in previous experimental studies, no significant effects were found for a moderate dose of alcohol. Using SP/A and risk homeostasis theory, the methodological and conceptual reasons for a consistent lack of an effect of alcohol on gambling choices across several studies are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Certainty of judgment and resistance to social influence.

The present note presents evidence on the importance of certainty, obtained under conditions where there are marked individual differences in reactions to a given stimulus and associated differences in certainty of judgment. The method involved the use of phenylthiourea (also known as phenylthiocarbamide), referred to as PTU. The subjects, Yale University upperclassmen, were told that we were trying to find out "whether there are absolute values for these tastes or whether there are individual differences in ratings of them." He was then given a form, asked to taste Label A, and instructed to give it a rating of 5 (average) on the scale of pleasantness. He was then asked to taste B and C, and to rate each one in relation to A. After rating B, he was asked to rate his certainty that B should be given the pleasantness rating he had given it. A similar procedure was followed for C. On the basis of these private judgments, the Ss were scheduled in 30 three-man groups, half composed of one taster and two nontasters and half, of two tasters and one nontaster. The instructions were similar to those used earlier, except that certainty ratings were not requested and the Ss were asked to announce their ratings publicly, each one first giving his rating of B, and then of C. Each time, the majority persons, whether tasters or nontasters, were asked to announce their ratings first. When it came his turn on B, the minority person usually found that the others had given ratings similar to his private ones. But on C, he found that their ratings were markedly different from his own evaluation. It was found that the effects of majority opinion were markedly different depending upon whether the minority persons were tasters or nontasters of PTU. The data suggest that this asymmetric effect, whereby nontasters are more susceptible to majority influence, may be attributable to the stronger reactions tasters have to PTU and the resulting greater certainty they have about their judgments of the substance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Collective narcissism and its social consequences.

This article introduces the concept of collective narcissism—an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about the in group’s greatness—aiming to explain how feelings about an ingroup shape a tendency to aggress against outgroups. The results of 5 studies indicate that collective, but not individual, narcissism predicts intergroup aggressiveness. Collective narcissism is related to high private and low public collective self-esteem and low implicit group esteem. It predicts perceived threat from outgroups, unwillingness to forgive outgroups, preference for military aggression over and above social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and blind patriotism. The relationship between collective narcissism and aggressiveness is mediated by perceived threat from outgroups and perceived insult to the ingroup. In sum, the results indicate that collective narcissism is a form of high but ambivalent group esteem related to sensitivity to threats to the ingroup’s image and retaliatory aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some effects of decision and discussion on coalescence, change, and effectiveness.

Differential effects of group decision, group discussion, and their interaction were examined, using discussion-no decision, decision-no discussion, discussion-decision and no discussion-no decision treatments. 20 groups of 5 Ss per group were divided randomly into the 4 treatment categories. "The results… . coalescence was increased by group discussion, group decision and most of all by the combination of both treatments." Greatest opinion change also occurred when both discussion and decision were permitted. The findings are consistent with the assumption that changes and effectiveness in groups primarily result from interaction among members. 15 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adherence to RIASEC structure as a key career decision construct.

The present study examined the relation between individual cognitive structure and several key career decision variables. Specifically, in a sample of college students enrolled in a career development class, the usage of the RIASEC (Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional) circumplex (adherence) was examined as it varied across individuals and with career certainty, career decision-making self-efficacy, and interest-occupation congruence. Individual adherence to the RIASEC circumplex as a cognitive structure was related to better career decision outcomes. Changes in adherence as a function of taking a career class were found to be associated with changes in career certainty, career decision-making self-efficacy, and interest-occupation congruence. The results support the importance of thinking about careers in a manner similar to the RIASEC circumplex and the potential value of direct instruction of this model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Group similarity, public self-awareness, and opinion extremity: A social projection explanation of deindividuation effects.

Suggests that when a person reacts to an opinion, he/she will project an identical reaction onto similar others—in effect, self-generating a consensus that serves to polarize the opinion. Public self-awareness is assumed to individuate and to moderate opinions only when projection is disrupted. Two experiments, with 169 undergraduates, tested derivations from this theory. Exp I varied self-confidence induced by ability feedback (positive vs negative) and self-awareness induced by being or not being observed by camera. Results show that heightened self-awareness moderated opinions regardless of the S's initial level of self-confidence. Exp II varied group similarity (similar, dissimilar, or no information) and level of self-awareness (heightened vs low) using a 3?×?2 design in which opinion extremity was measured. Results confirm the prediction that opinions fluctuate systematically (polarize and moderate) with level of self-awareness only when the person is in a similar group. Low self-awareness tended to polarize opinions, whereas heightened self-awareness moderated them. The assumed direct relation between opinion intensity and behavioral extremity is discussed within the context of projection-predicted intensification effects of prosocial behavior. (42 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Group decisions as social inference heuristics.

Three experiments investigated whether people use group decision outcomes as heuristic cues to judge group members' attitudes. In Experiment 1, Ss read a vignette in which a group's decision either was explicitly stated or in which Ss were compelled to infer the decision from other relevant information. It was hypothesized that Ss would be more likely to use the group decision outcome as an inference heuristic when the outcome was provided for them than when they were forced to generate that outcome. The results confirmed our hypothesis. In Experiment 2, a group decision was presented to Ss for whom the decision was either high or low in personal relevance. The results showed that Ss displayed a stronger correspondence bias for group decisions low in personal relevance than for ones high in personal relevance. Moreover, the decision outcome was better remembered over time than other decision-relevant information. Experiment 3 replicated this result for a nondichotomous decision outcome and also found that the more likely Ss were to remember the outcome over time, the more correspondent their inferences became. These and other data are shown to support a heuristic model of the social inference process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual expectations for group decision processes: Evidence for overestimation of majority influence.

Individuals experience numerous group decision situations during their lives. As a result, they may develop accurate expectations of the social processes and effects of context on group decision situations. Four decision-making situations were constructed that were expected to elicit different group decision processes. Individuals were presented with these hypothetical scenarios in which group size and the preferences of group members varied systematically. Participants’ expectations were elicited from their predictions regarding which alternative the group would choose on the basis of the information presented. The comparison of these judgments with the predicted decision distributions derived from models of group decision making showed that participants had a general sensitivity to changes in contexts, but that they overestimated the effect of the majority opinion on the final decisions. Individuals may have general notions of how groups make decisions but are less sensitive to the subtleties involved in the process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing speed and memory mediate age-related differences in decision making.

Decision making under risk changes with age. Increases in risk aversion with age have been most commonly characterized, although older adults may be risk seeking in some decision contexts. An important, and unanswered, question is whether these changes in decision making reflect a direct effect of aging or, alternatively, an indirect effect caused by age-related changes in specific cognitive processes. In the current study, older adults (M = 71 years) and younger adults (M = 24 years) completed a battery of tests of cognitive capacities and decision-making preferences. The results indicated systematic effects of age upon decision quality—with both increased risk seeking and increased risk aversion observed in different tasks—consistent with prior studies. Path analyses, however, revealed that age-related effects were mediated by individual differences in processing speed and memory. When those variables were included in the model, age was no longer a significant predictor of decision quality. The authors conclude that the reduction in decision quality and associated changes in risk preferences commonly ascribed to aging are instead mediated by age-related changes in underlying cognitive capacities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Brain evoked potentials reflect how emotional faces influence our decision making.

Emotion is usually not discussed as a relevant variable in rational models of decision making—but may be one. The present electroencephalographic study demonstrates the influence of emotional primes (angry, happy faces) on purchase decisions. In a within-subject design, pictures of an apartment were shown to participants who then had to make Go/NoGo decisions on whether to rent it. Their decision should be based either on its price or on its brightness. In two thirds of the trials, emotional prime pictures of happy versus unhappy faces preceded the purchase target (apartment); in one third of the trials no prime was given. Response certainty was evaluated by means of reaction times (RT) and peak amplitude of the event-related potential N200. Facial primes accelerated decisions (RT) irrespective of affective expression. Positive face primes elicited larger N200 amplitudes during purchase decision compared to negative ones. Price-based decisions were made faster and elicited larger N200 than brightness-based decisions. These results support the cognitive-tuning model of decision making and validate the N200 as sensitive measure for the interplay of cognitive and affective aspects in decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Belief revision in children: Serial judgment in social cognition and decision-making domains.

Belief revision in 5- to 9-year-olds was studied with an information integration approach. In the social task, children judged niceness of story children, having heard about their good and bad deeds. In the decision task, of parallel structure, they judged what proportion of a group of turtles' catch of starfish was red or gold. In both tasks, 4–5 samples were presented successively, with children adjusting their judgment after each. All ages took sample composition into account, and judgments could be described by a serial integration model previously supported for adults. Recency effects were found as well and were stronger for younger children and in the social task. Further model analysis showed, however, that much of this recency was short-lived and that a stable opinion, to which early and later informers contributed more evenly, developed underneath. Overall, similar processes may underlie serial belief formation across the age range and across domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cross-cultural differences in children's use of decision rules: A comparison between Japan and Australia.

Tested the hypothesis that children in collectivist and individualist cultures would differ in the decision rules used for the distribution of rewards between a majority and minority in the group. A decision game was developed for classroom administration in primary schools. 149 12-yr-olds in Osaka, Japan, and 162 12-yr-olds in Adelaide, Australia, were assigned randomly to a large group (majority) or to a small group (minority) in the classroom. They were told that only 1 group—large group or small group—could obtain chocolate rewards on each trial. Ss were asked to indicate how many chances (out of 6 trials) each group should have to obtain the rewards in a hypothetical game and in a real-life game. Ss then completed a social attitudes questionnaire assessing attitudes toward group loyalty and personal interests, acceptance of various decision rules for resolving competing interests in a group, and beliefs about people's willingness to be helpful and altruistic. Results show that in the real-life game, in both the majority and minority conditions, Japanese Ss were more likely to adopt an "equal-say" rule, while Australian Ss tended to use decision rules that followed self-interest and favored their own group. Findings support the hypothesis. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Impact of group consensus and social support on stimulus meaning: Mediation of conformity by cognitive restructuring.

Three experiments with a total of 163 undergraduates tested the hypothesis that a person reinterprets the meaning of the stimulus object when facing unpopular responses from a unanimous group and that this change in meaning leads to a shift in response toward the group's position. In Exp I, several opinion items were presented, and either Ss observed unpopular responses, supposedly made earlier by a unanimous group (UG) or by a group having 1 dissenter (social support), or they observed no response at all (control). Ss merely gave their interpretation of the meaning of a key word or phrase in each opinion statement—they did not give their own opinions. Results show that UG Ss gave more uncommon meanings to the stimuli than did Ss in the other 2 conditions. Exp II ruled out the possibility that the shift in meaning was due to Ss' adhering to the interpretation they assumed to be held by the majority. In Exp III, Ss were exposed to scores representing the meanings that were produced by the unanimous group and control conditions in Exp I. Results show that after observing the consensually produced meanings for these items, the Ss shifted their own opinions toward the position held by the UG in Exp I. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assumed similarity and opinion certainty.

To examine the effect of projected attitude similarity on certainty of own attitude, 2 samples of male undergraduates (N?=?40), commuters and fraternity members, indicated their own attitudinal position on 8 issues and then served in 1 of 4 opinion projection conditions: estimating the positions of those in their in-group, a student out-group, an irrelevant out-group (old veterans), or a no-target group. They then indicated their certainty about their previously expressed positions. In both studies, in-group targets elicited the most assumed similarity, and the irrelevant out-group elicited the least. Certainty of S's own position was greater after estimation of the positions of in-group Ss than after estimation of the opinions of relevant or irrelevant out-group Ss, or when given no opportunity to project. These certainty effects were due primarily to those issues Ss considered important. Additional analyses provided empirical support for 2 orthogonal components of assumed similarity, item content similarity and elevation similarity. The importance of a strong group identity as a basis for the increment in certainty conferred by assumed in-group similarity is discussed. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an uncertain environment.

Decision field theory provides for a mathematical foundation leading to a dynamic, stochastic theory of decision behavior in an uncertain environment. This theory is used to explain (1) violations of stochastic dominance, (2) violations of strong stochastic transitivity, (3) violations of independence between alternatives, (4) serial position effects on preference, (5) speed–accuracy trade-off effects in decision making, (6) the inverse relation between choice probability and decision time, (7) changes in the direction of preference under time pressure, (8) slower decision times for avoidance as compared with approach conflicts, and (9) preference reversals between choice and selling price measures of preference. The proposed theory is compared with 4 other theories of decision making under uncertainty. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social projection and social comparison of opinions.

Using the notion of "social projection," in which a person self-generates a consensus for his or her own opinion, Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison processes was reformulated, and predictions derived from the new model were tested. A 2?×?3 factorial design that cross-cut two levels of background similarity of a comparison other (similar, dissimilar) and three levels of comparison information (agree, disagree, no information control) on a legal case was used. The subject, believing that he or she was paired with another subject who either shared (similar) or did not share (dissimilar) a common background, subsequently compared his or her opinion on the case with the other's opinion. Emotional and cognitive reactions were measured using questionnaire and skin resistance. Results supported the predictions: Only disagreement with a similar other produced a negatively toned emotional response as well as decreases in opinion confidence, opinion importance, and readiness to act on the opinion. Positively toned reactions generated by agreement with a dissimilar other are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)