The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing.

A model for the basis of feeling of knowing (FOK) is proposed, which combines 2 apparently competing accounts, cue familiarity (L. M. Reder, see record 1987-12470-001) and accessibility (A. Koriat, see record 1994-04361-001). Both cue familiarity and accessibility are assumed to contribute asynchronously to FOK, but whereas the effects of familiarity occur early, those of accessibility occur later and only when cue familiarity is sufficiently high to drive the interrogation of memory for potential answers. General information questions were used to orthogonally manipulate cue familiarity and accessibility. As expected, both familiarity and accessibility enhanced FOK judgments, but the effects of accessibility were found mostly when familiarity was high. This interactive pattern was replicated when FOK judgments were delayed but not when they were immediate. The results support the proposed cascaded model of FOK but also imply a differentiation between 2 variants of the accessibility heuristic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consciousness and metacognition.

This article describes the interplay between psychological and philosophical approaches to consciousness. The role of empirical evidence from psychological research on metacognition is emphasized. The metacognitive approach to subjective reports is helpful for circumventing some fundamental shortcomings in early introspectionist approaches. A central claim of the article is that subjective reports can be useful for testing hypotheses if the way in which they are used is reformulated, and specific reformulations are offered. Illustrative findings about metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control demonstrate how research on metacognition can produce synergy between the psychological and philosophical approaches to consciousness, by furnishing constraints on the range of acceptable theories and by producing clues to inspire new theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reading, memory, and metacognition.

Investigated relations among reading skills, metareading (knowledge about reading), memory, and metamemory (knowledge about memory) as they relate to reading ability (good vs poor readers), operativity, and grade level. 40 2nd graders (aged 7.25–9.83 yrs) and 40 4th graders (aged 9.42–22.00 yrs) were interviewed to assess the reading–memory variables. Significant but low correlations were obtained between metareading and reading, metamemory and memory, metareading and metamemory, and reading and memory. Significant effects of operativity were revealed on all dependent measures. Operative Ss had higher scores on the metareading and metamemory tasks, read at higher levels, and remembered more items on the memory tasks than did nonoperative Ss. Effects of grade level were revealed on most dependent measures. Fourth-grade Ss received higher scores on the metareading and metamemory tasks and read at higher levels than did 2nd-grade Ss. An interaction between operativity and grade level revealed that operative 2nd-grade and both groups of 4th-grade Ss made fewer total reading errors than did nonoperative 2nd-grade Ss. The effects of operativity, experience, and metacognition on reading and memory skills are discussed. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The meta-level versus object-level distinction (and other issues) in formulations of metacognition.

Replies to comments by A. B. Newberg et al (see record 1997-02873-011) and A. D. Kornfeld (see record 1997-02873-012) on T. O. Nelson's paper (see record 83-26608) on consciousness and metacognition. Nelson addresses each of Newberg's comments, and asserts that one can make good use of the distinction between object-level and meta-level processing without taking any stance about an ultimate meta-level. Nelson also explains his disagreement with Kornfeld's comments on Wilhelm Wundt and Dunlap. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can offline metacognition enhance mathematical problem solving?

The effectiveness of a short metacognitive intervention combined with algorithmic cognitive instruction was assessed in an elementary school setting. Two hundred thirty-seven 3rd-grade children were randomly assigned to a 5-session metacognitive strategy instruction, an algorithmic direct cognitive instruction, a motivational program, a quantitative-relational condition, or a spelling condition. Children in the metacognitive program achieved significant gains in trained metacognitive skills compared with the 4 other conditions. Moreover, the children in the metacognitive program performed better on trained cognitive skills than children in the algorithmic condition, with a follow-up effect on domain-specific mathematics problem-solving knowledge. Despite the consistency of findings, no generalization effects were found on transfer of cognitive learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The perceived diversity heuristic: The case of pseudodiversity.

One of the normative ways to decrease the risk of a pool with uncertainty prospects is to diversify its resources. Thus, decision makers are advised not to put all their eggs in one basket. The authors suggest that decision makers use a perceived diversity heuristic (PDH) to evaluate the risk of a pool by intuitively assessing the diversity of its sources. This heuristic yields biased judgments in cases of pseudodiversity, in which the perceived diversity of a pool is enhanced, although this fact does not change the pool's normative values. The first 3 studies introduce 2 independent sources of pseudodiversity—distinctiveness and multiplicity—showing that these two sources can lead to overdiversification under conditions of gain. In another set of 3 studies, the authors examine the effect of framing on diversification level. The results support the PDH predictions, according to which diversity seeking is obtained under conditions of gain, whereas diversity aversion is obtained under conditions of loss. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations: attributional biases and metacognition

BACKGROUND: Cognitive models suggest that auditory hallucinations are experienced when mental events are misattributed to an external source; therefore, this study was designed to examine attributional biases in patients experiencing auditory hallucinations. The study also examined the role of metacognitive beliefs in the experience of auditory hallucinations, as some theories have implicated metacognition in the development and maintenance of auditory hallucinations. METHODS: Fifteen participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia experiencing auditory hallucinations were compared with 15 non-hallucinating schizophrenics and 15 non-psychiatric control subjects on several measures, including an immediate source monitoring task and a questionnaire assessing metacognitive beliefs. RESULTS: Results indicated that patients experiencing hallucinations exhibited the predicted bias towards misattributing internal events to an external source, as measured by ratings of internality of responses in a word association task. All groups had lower perceived levels of internality and control for emotionally salient words, which provides further evidence for the importance of emotional content in hallucinations. Patients experiencing hallucinations were found to score higher than the other two groups on metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and positive beliefs about worry. In addition, a logistic regression analysis showed that beliefs about uncontrollability and danger were predictive of whether subjects experienced auditory hallucinations or not. CONCLUSIONS: These results offer considerable support to cognitive bias models of auditory hallucinations, particularly those that implicate metacognition.     

Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 109(4) of Psychological Review (see record 2010-04336-001). Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in "Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2002, Vol. 109, No. 1, pp. 75-90) overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors (in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 1999, G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd, Eds., pp. 37-59, Oxford University Press) and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic" (D. G. Goldstein, 1998, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 407-411, Erlbaum). In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) was originally published in the book chapter (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) and should have carried a note saying that it was used by permission of Oxford University Press.] One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counter-intuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attentional strategies, attention, and metacognition in Puerto Rican children.

60 2nd-, 5th-, and 8th-grade Puerto Ricans participated in a strategy assessment task and an incidental learning task that provided a measure of attentional performance. Metacognition concerning attention was assessed by asking Ss to predict how much incidental material they would recall. ANOVAs revealed no developmental changes in the use of an efficient attentional strategy, the amount of central recall, the amount of incidental recall, or in metacognitive knowledge. Results differ from a previous study by the 1st author and M. G. Weiss with 60 predominantly White, middle-class Florida children in which attention and strategies became increasingly efficient as a function of age. In comparison to the Florida sample, Puerto Rican 2nd graders' strategies were more efficient and the 8th graders' strategies were less efficient. Attention on the incidental learning task was less selective for the Puerto Rican Ss than the Florida Ss. (9 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognition and metacognition at extreme altitudes on Mount Everest.

The FACTRETRIEVAL2 test battery, which assesses both retrieval of general information from memory and metacognition about that retrieval, was administered to people before and after a recent expedition to Mount Everest and at extreme altitudes above 6,400 m (higher than any mountain in North America or Europe). Major findings were as follows: First, the same extreme altitudes known to impair learning did not affect accuracy or latency of retrieval, and this robustness of retrieval occurred for both recall and forced-choice recognition. Second, extreme altitude did affect metacognition: Climbers showed a decline in their feeling of knowing both while at extreme altitude and after returning to Kathmandu (i.e., both an effect and an aftereffect of extreme altitude). Third, extreme altitude had different effects than alcohol intoxication (previously assessed by T. O. Nelson et al [see PA, Vol 73:29460]). Alcohol intoxication affected retrieval without affecting metacognition, whereas extreme altitude affected metacognition without affecting retrieval; this different pattern for extreme altitude versus alcohol intoxication implies that (a) hypoxia does not always yield the same outcome as alcohol intoxication and (b) neither retrieval nor metacognition is strictly more sensitive than the other for detecting changes in independent variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Context effects on remembering and knowing: The expectancy heuristic.

Three experiments are reported examining the effect of context on remember-know judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, medium-frequency words were intermixed with high-frequency or low-frequency words at study or at test, respectively. Remember responses were greater for medium-frequency targets when they were studied or tested among high-frequency, as compared with low-frequency, words. The authors proposed a decision-based mechanism called "the expectancy heuristic" to explain why remember responses were more likely when items were studied or tested in the context of words that were relatively less distinct. According to the expectancy heuristic, when items on a recognition test exceed an expected level of memorability they will be given a remember judgment but when they do not, but are still more familiar than new words, they will be given a know judgment. Experiment 3, which varied expectancies about the strength of tested targets, demonstrated the use of the expectancy heuristic, indicating that it operates by selectively influencing the remember criterion rather than by influencing recollection of studied items. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental and instructional analyses of children's metacognition and reading comprehension.

Children's understanding of their own cognitive skills, or metacognition, has been hypothesized to play a major role in learning and development. In this study, we examine the developing relation between children's metacognition and reading comprehension. Children in third- and fifth-grade classes were given an experimental curriculum, Informed Strategies for Learning (ISL), designed to increase their awareness and use of effective reading strategies. In both grades, children in experimental classes made significant gains in metacognition and the use of reading strategies compared with children in control classes. The multivariate profiles of reading skills derived from the developmental analyses helped to identify subgroups of children who responded differently to the metacognitive instruction. Although there were specific aptitude-by-treatment interactions, there was a general trend for metacognition and strategic reading to become more congruent from 8 to 10 years of age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False recognition of pictures versus words in Alzheimer's disease: The distinctiveness heuristic.

False recognition of semantic associates can be reduced when older adults also study pictures representing each associate. D. L. Schacter, L. Israel, and C. Racine (1999) attributed this reduction to the operation of a distinctiveness heuristic: a response mode in which participants demand access to detailed recollections to support a positive recognition decision. The authors examined patients with probable Alzheimer's disease (AD) and older adults with this paradigm. Half of the participants studied pictures and auditory words; the other half studied visual and auditory words. Older adults who studied pictures were able to reduce their false alarms compared with those who studied words only. AD patients who studied pictures were unable to reduce their false alarms compared with those who studied words only and, in fact, exhibited trends toward greater false recognition. Implications for understanding semantic memory in AD patients are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: I. The heuristic basis of feelings and familiarity.

B. W. A. Whittlesea and D. L. Williams (see records 1998-02991-002 and 2000-03416-001) proposed the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis to explain the source of feelings of familiarity. By that hypothesis, people chronically evaluate the coherence of their processing. When the quality of processing is perceived as being discrepant from that which could be expected, people engage in an attributional process; the feeling of familiarity occurs when perceived discrepancy is attributed to prior experience. In the present article, the authors provide convergent evidence for that hypothesis and show that it can also explain feelings of familiarity for nonlinguistic stimuli. They demonstrate that the perception of discrepancy is not automatic but instead depends critically on the attitude that people adopt toward their processing, given the task and context. The connection between the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis and the "revelation effect" is also explored (e.g., D. L. Westerman and R. L. Greene, see record 1996-05780-006). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separability of metacognition and cognition: Problem solving in learning disabled and regular students.

Investigated whether metacognition is a separate factor from cognition by measuring the effects of metacognitive factors in problem solving while attempting to hold relevant cognitive factors constant. 24 2nd–6th graders who were disabled in mathematics were matched to 24 regular students on the basis of both Ss' performance on the same set of 10 mathematics problems and their achievement test scores in mathematics. The 2 groups also did not significantly differ on IQ scores. Results show that the learning disabled Ss were less skilled in 2 forms of metacognition with respect to the set of problems: (a) knowledge about cognition, or in this case knowledge about their problem-solving skills; and (b) regulation of cognition, or in this case the ability to monitor their problem-solving performance. Implications of the results and the adequacy of the matching methodology are discussed. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Audience response as a heuristic cue in persuasion.

Previous research on the persuasive impact of an overheard audience has yielded conflicting results. In this study, we attempted to understand such audience effects within the framework of the heuristic model of persuasion. Subjects listened to an audiotaped persuasive message that conveyed arguments of either high or low quality and that was responded to by either an enthusiastic or an unenthusiastic overheard audience. In addition, subject involvement (high vs. low) was varied. Consistent with predictions, the audience response cue influenced postmessage opinions only under low involvement; under high involvement, only argument quality affected persuasion. Analyses that took into account subjects' need for cognition supported the additional hypothesis that individuals lower in need for cognition would be more responsive to the audience manipulation under low involvement. Thought-listing data and regression analyses provided further support for the heuristic model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The intricate relationships between monitoring and control in metacognition: Lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior.

Do we run away because we are frightened, or are we frightened because we run away? The authors address this issue with respect to the relation between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control. When self-regulation is goal driven, monitoring effects control processes so that increased processing effort should enhance feelings of competence and feelings of knowing. In contrast, when self-regulation is data driven, such feelings may be based themselves on the feedback from control processes, in which case they should decrease with increasing effort. Evidence for both monitoring-based control and control-based monitoring occurring even in the same situation is presented. The results are discussed with regard to the issue of the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social influences on metacognition: Effects of colearner questioning on comprehension monitoring.

Four experiments examined social influences on metacognition, testing whether learners' knowledge that colearners have questions about material they are simultaneously viewing affects learners' own judged levels of comprehension. In Experiment 1 (n?=?88), the frequency with which learners indicated they were confused increased with the number of questions they believed colearners had about the material. Experiment 2 (n?=?38) determined that the effect of colearner questioning on self-judged comprehension was not due to distraction or social facilitation. Experiment 3 (n?=?100) replicated the results of Experiment 1 and found that the social impact on learners' judgments of comprehension was less when questions were believed to have come from 3 colearners rather than 1. Experiment 4 (n?=?60) suggested that the number of questions per colearner determines their impact on others' comprehension judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cigarette abstinence impairs memory and metacognition despite administration of 2 mg nicotine gum.

The authors assessed the effects of cigarette abstinence (nonabstinent vs. minimum 8 hours abstinent) and nicotine gum (0 mg vs. 2 mg nicotine) on sustained attention, free recall, and metacognition using a within-subjects design. Moderate smokers (10 women and 22 men) received one training session followed by four test sessions on consecutive days. Nicotine gum improved sustained attention in both abstinent and nonabstinent states, but had no significant effect on predicted or actual recall levels. Cigarette abstinence significantly impaired free recall and reduced the magnitude of participants' predictions of their own performance. In addition, participants were significantly more overconfident about their future memory when abstinent. Thus, nicotine gum can improve smokers' performance in basic aspects of cognition (e.g., sustained attention) but may not alleviate the detrimental effects of cigarette abstinence on higher-level processes such memory and metacognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The mere perception of elaboration creates attitude certainty: Exploring the thoughtfulness heuristic.

Attitude theory has long proposed a mechanism through which antecedents of message elaboration produce attitude strength consequences. However, little direct evidence exists for the intervening process. The proposed thoughtfulness heuristic holds that perceiving that more thought has taken place leads to greater attitude certainty. Two roles were established for this heuristic: first as a mediator of the impact of antecedents of elaboration on attitude certainty and second as a way to influence attitude certainty independent of actual elaboration. In Studies 1 and 2, antecedents of elaboration (need for cognition, distraction) impacted attitude certainty because they impacted the actual amount of processing, which in turn affected perceptions of the amount of processing. In Studies 3 and 4, a manipulation of perceived thought impacted certainty independent of actual thought (i.e., after thinking had already occurred). Furthermore, the thoughtfulness heuristic was shown to influence behavioral intentions, establishing perceived amount of processing as both a mediator and an independent cause of attitude strength consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)