基于有效退货管理的逆向供应链协调机制研究

本文阐述了逆向供应链的内涵,退货逆向供应链的几个关键环节,从构建信息共享机制、快速反应机制和信任机制等方面对逆向供应链协调机制进行了探讨。     

政府补贴下考虑持股合作战略的供应链减排动态协调方法

在政府补贴政策下,将持股合作战略引入供应链减排决策中,运用微分博弈理论研究供应链的最优决策和动态协调问题.构建集中式决策模型和持股合作前后的分散式决策模型,并分析持股比例和消费者低碳偏好对供应链最优决策、利润和政府补贴政策的影响.研究结果表明:持股合作战略会替代一部分政府补贴政策的作用,且供应链成员合作越密切,政府补贴效果越好.随着持股比例的增加,供应链总利润呈现“U”型变化,只有当持股比例满足一定条件时,供应链成员才愿意选择持股合作,且持股合作战略的实施能够实现供应链协调.消费者低碳偏好的提高会对企业减排产生激励作用,而政府作为政策的制定者不受消费者低碳偏好的影响.     

考虑产品替代的供应链协调问题研究

替代品大大增加了企业间的竞争,使企业难以达到所期望的盈利水平.对供应链进行合理有效的管理可最大限度地促进企业适应当今多变的市场环境.人们对于产品的需求不仅仅取决于产品本身的价格,也取决于互补产品的价格.对此,构建一个以产品替代的供应链协调问题为研究目标,以两种供应链管理模式(集中供应链(CSC)和分散供应链(DSC))...     

限额与交易下考虑战略顾客行为的供应链决策与协调

研究由一个受限额与交易政策约束的制造商和一个面临同质战略顾客的零售商组成的两级供应链决策与协调问题. 分别研究得到了限额与交易政策下一体化(包括理性预期均衡和数量承诺两种情形) 和分散化供应链最优决策和最大期望利润, 并与不考虑限额与交易政策的情形进行对比分析, 发现限额与交易政策使得供应链最优产量降低、最优价格升高、碳排放量减少. 最后, 以数量承诺情形为基准, 基于收益分享合同设计了供应链协调策略.

     

公平关切下考虑企业社会责任的物流服务供应链协调

针对由单个物流服务集成商(LSI)和单个功能型物流服务提供商(FLSP)组成的物流服务供应链(LSSC),考虑LSI的企业社会责任(CSR)和FLSP的物流服务水平,研究LSI和FLSP的公平关切偏好在成本分担契约和成本分担-两部关税的组合契约下对LSSC最优决策、各成员利润和整体利润以及供应链协调性的影响.研究表明:公平关切偏好不影响LSSC在不同契约下的协调状态,但影响LSSC成员的利润;成本分担-两部关税的组合契约能实现LSI和FLSP的双赢.LSI在成本分担契约下应降低自己的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好程度较低的FLSP合作,在成本分担-两部关税的组合契约下应增加自身的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好较低的FLSP合作;FLSP在两种契约下都应该增加自身的公平关切偏好并与公平关切偏好较低的LSI合作.     

考虑风险规避与质量和服务水平的VMI供应链期权协调策略

针对一个考虑风险规避供应商与质量和服务水平的二级VMI供应链,应用条件风险价值(CVaR)准则刻画供应商的风险规避行为,提出由期权和成本分担构成的组合契约,构建以零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链协调策略以及风险规避对供应链协调和利润分配的影响.研究表明,供应商的最优生产量随着其风险规避程度的增加而减小,但最优质量和服务水平与风险规避程度无关;当且仅当供应商风险规避程度较低时供应链才能实现协调,且供应商风险规避程度是影响供应链契约设计和利润分配的关键因素.     

生产商竞争的供应链系统退货决策分析

分析了生产商竞争的供应链系统决策主体的主从性,并基于报童模型和信息揭示原理,建立生产商竞争的供应链系统退货决策模型．通过对模型及其数值仿真分析,指出最优订购量只受信忠隐蔽因素的影响,而与竞争因素无关,但生产商的竞争影响退货补偿率并明显提高销售商的价格决策地位．     

考虑消费者参考效应的双渠道乳制品供应链协调机制设计

将消费者对乳制品新鲜度的参考效应引入第三方物流(third party logistics,TPL)服务商参与的双渠道乳制品供应链中,考虑到乳制品新鲜度受到制造商加工水平和TPL服务商物流服务水平的共同影响,构建分散式、集中式以及引入基于二部定价的成本共担契约下的微分博弈模型,求解并比较3种情形下供应链成员的最优均衡策...     

考虑公平关切的服务供应链协调契约

针对服务集成商公平关切行为, 建立了服务提供商和服务集成商的博弈模型, 分析论证了批发价契约无法实现服务供应链协调的问题, 探讨了“成本共担+收入共享” 组合式契约协调的有效性. 研究结果表明, 成本共担契约和收入共享契约都无法实现服务供应链的协调, 而组合式契约不仅能有效协调服务供应链, 且协调具有一定柔性, 但随着服务集成商公平关切程度的增加, 服务提供商与服务集成商的协调空间变小, 协调柔性减弱, 且对服务提供商更不利.     

质量约束下考虑延保服务的供应链定价与协调

针对零售商提供并销售延保服务,产品质量同时对产品和延保服务需求产生影响的产品服务供应链,研究了有无产品质量约束情形下的产品价格、延保服务价格和产品质量的联合决策,设计了制造商和零售商的协调契约以降低分散决策下的“双重边际效应”问题,分析了产品价格系数、产品质量约束水平等对产品和延保服务定价的影响。研究表明,对产品质量的约束对于防止制造商基于自身利益过度降低产品质量具有重要意义;协调契约可以有效降低产品价格并提高产品质量,并实现制造商、零售商和产品服务供应链系统利润的帕累托改善;产品质量系数和产品价格系数将同时对零售商的产品和延保服务价格策略产生影响。     

Quality disclosure strategy in a decentralized supply chain with consumer returns

We study the quality disclosure strategy of a manufacturer/retailer in a supply chain with consumer returns for new products. In particular, we explicitly model the effect of quality disclosure on the reduction of the returns rate. We identify the condition in which the manufacturer/retailer should reveal product quality in the presence of consumer returns. We find that (1) the manufacturer/retailer has an incentive to choose quality disclosure strategy when the disclosure quality is above a lower bound; (2) if the returns rate of new products is low, the retailer‐disclosure scenario leads to reveal more quality information than that of the manufacturer‐disclosure scenario; otherwise, the manufacturer‐disclosure scenario leads to reveal more quality information; and (3) the manufacturer prefers to reveal a higher level of product quality in the supply chain with a higher refund amount or a lower salvage value per unit of returned product.     

Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating

We consider the component-purchasing problem for a supply chain consisting of one retailer and two complementary suppliers with different lead-times. The retailer purchases a specific component from each supplier for assembling into a fashionable product. After ordering from the long-lead-time supplier (Supplier 1) and before ordering from the short-lead-time supplier (Supplier 2), the retailer can update its demand forecast for the product. The retailer can partially cancel its order from Supplier 1 after forecast updating. By formulating the problem as a dynamic optimization problem, we explore the measures that can be deployed to coordinate the retailer’s ordering decisions with forecast updating. We analytically show that the supply chain can be coordinated if both suppliers offer a returns policy and Supplier 1 charges an order-cancelation penalty to the retailer. We find that the coordination mechanism is independent of demand distribution and the forecast updating process. We further show that it is easier for the suppliers to coordinate the supply chain if market observation indicates the future market demand is sufficiently large. We also study the case where demand is price-dependent and propose a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. We discuss the academic and managerial implications of the theoretical findings.     

Coordinating a two-level supply chain with delay in payments and profit sharing

Achieving effective coordination among suppliers and retailers has become a pertinent research issue in supply chain management. Channel coordination is a joint decision policy achieved by a supplier(s) and a retailer(s) characterized by an agreement on the order quantity and the trade credit scenario (e.g., quantity discounts, delay in payments). This paper proposes a centralized model where players in a two-level (supplier–retailer) supply chain coordinate their orders to minimize their local costs and that of the chain. In the proposed supply chain model the permissible delay in payments is considered as a decision variable and it is adopted as a trade credit scenario to coordinate the order quantity between the two-levels. Computational results indicate that with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, with savings to either both players, or to one in the supply chain. Moreover, a profit-sharing scenario for the distribution of generated net savings among the players in the supply chain is presented. Analytical and experimental results are presented and discussed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.     

非对称需求信息下两阶段供应链协调

针对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链，其成员之间的市场需求信息不对称问题，建立了非对称信息下批发价与订货量的stackelberg博弈模型，给出了零售商和供应商分别拥有需求信息下的博弈均衡．效值实例分析了非对称信息对价格和订货量及利润的影响，同时给出了信息不对称下的供应链协调机制。     

Coordinating a three-level supply chain with delay in payments and a discounted interest rate

Both researchers and practitioners recognize the importance of the interactions between financial and inventory decisions in the development of cost effective supply chains. Moreover, achieving effective coordination among the supply chain players has become a pertinent research issue. This paper considers a three-level supply chain, consisting of a capital-constrained supplier, a retailer, and a financial intermediary (bank), coordinating their decisions to minimize the total supply chain costs. Specifically, we consider a retailer managing its cash through the supplier’s bank, in return for permissible delay in payments from the supplier. The bank, benefiting from increasing its cash holdings with the retailer’s cash deposits, offers the supplier a discount on its borrowing rate. We show that the proposed coordination mechanism achieves significant cost reduction, by up to 26.2%, when compared to the non-coordinated model. We also find that, with coordination, the retailer orders in larger quantities than its economic order quantity, and that a higher return on cash for the retailer leads to a higher order quantity. Furthermore, we empirically validate our proposed coordination mechanism, by showing that banks, retailers, and suppliers have much to gain through collaboration. Thus, using COMPUSTAT datasets for the years 1950 through 2012, we determine the most important factors that affect the behavior of the retailers and suppliers in granting and receiving trade credit. Our results indicate that engaging into such a coordination mechanism is a win–win situation to all parties involved.     

Coordinating decisions by supply chain partners in a vendor-managed inventory relationship

We look into the linked decision making in the vendor-managed inventory (VMI) relationship. It is a supply chain management model, where the retailer decides the retail price while the vendor determines its capacity commitment. In this model, the retailer and the vendor should coordinate their decisions in order to maximize their individual profit or the total profit combining the two participants together. The vendor has to take into account the demand pattern throughout the product life cycle (PLC) when it decides its capacity commitment, which will affect its inventory management cost during the PLC, while the retailer should change the retail price over the PLC so as to maximize the revenues and minimize the inventory cost at the same time. Employing a system dynamics simulation approach based on differential game theory, which also takes into account the product characteristics such as the demand’s innovation and imitation effects, we analyze and confirm the dynamic coordination of key decision variables by the supply chain partners in the VMI relationship.     

Inventory management in a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain with correlated demands and returns

Reverse logistics or closed-loop supply chains where product returns are integrated with traditional forward supply chains have been one of the major topics of research since about the last one and a half decades. In this paper, we address the inventory management issue in closed-loop supply chains, and develop deterministic and stochastic models for a two-echelon system with correlated demands and returns under generalized cost structures. In particular, we address the following questions – Do closed-loop supply chains cost more than traditional forward supply chains? Does a higher rate of return always translate into lower demand variability and hence lower expected costs? What is the relationship between expected costs and correlations between demands and returns? Models developed and numerical examples shown in the paper reveal that although a higher rate of return and a higher correlation between demand and return reduce the variability of net demand, it may not necessarily lead to cost savings; rather the movement of costs will depend on the values of system parameters. We also quantify the cost savings in case the actual demand and return information is available at the time of decision-making. We conclude the paper by providing managerial implications and directions for future research.     

Ordering and returns handling decisions and coordination in a supply chain with demand uncertainty

We develop a newsvendor model to study the retailer's order quantity, the manufacturer's returns handling strategy, and channel coordination. The manufacturer chooses one of two returns handling strategies: manufacturer handling or retailer handling under the coordinated and decentralized scenarios, respectively. Under the coordinated scenario, we find that when consumer's returns handling cost under manufacturer handling or the manufacturer's returns handling cost is small, consumer returns should be handled by the manufacturer. Under the decentralized scenario, when the retailer's returns handling cost or the consumer's returns handling cost under retailer handling is low, the manufacturer will choose manufacturer handling; both the manufacturer and the retailer may be better off using manufacturer handling (a win–win situation). The impact of the returns handling strategy on the retailer's ordering quantity largely depends on its effect on the consumer's returns handling cost. Finally, we also design buyback contracts to coordinate the supply chain and find that both wholesale price and buyback price under manufacturer handling are higher than those under retailer handling.     

Coordinating static and dynamic supply chains with advertising through two-part tariffs

Zaccour (2008) analyses a marketing channel where firms invest in advertising to increase brand equity, showing that an exogenous two-part tariff cannot replicate the vertically integrated performance. I revisit the model proving that a multiplicity of efficient franchising contracts exists. I characterise an optimal two-part tariff specified as a linear function of the upstream firm’s advertising effort, performing this task both in the static and in the dynamic games. An analogous result emerges both in the static game, writing the fixed component of the two-part tariff as a non-linear function of the manufacturer’s advertising effort, and in the dynamic game, using a contract which is linear in the brand equity.     

Scheduling of single stage assembly with air transportation in a consumer electronic supply chain

Consumer electronics supply chain being a booming industry with intensive competition, multinational organizations are rapidly moving towards global manufacturing networks to minimize the costs and improve delivery efficiency. The studies on modeling and scheduling of global supply chains in consumer electronics industry have lead to growing interests in recent years. In this paper, the problem of synchronized scheduling of assembly with air transportation to minimize delivery costs is addressed. The overall problem is decomposed into sub-problems viz., the air transportation allocation problem and assembly scheduling problem. The air transportation allocation problem is shown to have the structure of the regular transportation problem, while the assembly scheduling problem is shown to be NP-hard. We investigate the case of process delays in assembly for reasons such as machine breakdowns, shortages of materials, etc., and present a schedule repair heuristic. We evaluate the performance of the proposed heuristic with industry practice methods by testing the heuristics on randomly generated problems of size varying from 20 to 100 jobs.