浅谈粉尘爆炸事故的预防

在工业生产过程中,粉尘爆炸事故时有发生.给人们生命和财产造成严重的损害.本文从国内外粉尘爆炸事故案例出发,分析粉尘爆炸的形成的原因及事故预防措施,提高人们对粉尘爆炸危险性、危害性的认识.     

铝粉尘爆炸典型案例分析及安全对策

介绍了铝粉的理化性质和火灾危险性,通过铝粉尘爆炸典型事故案例,分析了铝粉粉尘爆炸的事故特点,铝粉粉尘爆炸的事故原因,探讨了预防铝粉粉尘爆炸的主要技术措施和铝粉粉尘事故发生后一般处置手段和注意事项。     

浅析石油储罐区火灾危险性及消防设计审核标准及监督对策

储罐类事故由于其危险性高、爆炸危险性大,易复燃复爆,处置复杂等特性,越来越频发,给国家财产造成了重大损失。石油灌区因其易燃、可燃液体、液化气体、可燃固体的种类数量众多,生产工艺和装置十分复杂,管道网线纵横交错分布,而且处于高温、高压情况下的容器和设施设备数多,火灾隐患的危险性很大。下面本人结合灭火救援工作实际和学习思考,就如何扑救储罐火灾防火防范谈一些见解。     

浅谈粉尘爆炸燃烧事故的发生及防范

为认真吸取"8·2"江苏昆山工厂爆炸火灾事故教训,本文通过对可燃粉尘爆炸火灾发生的原因、过程和特点等因素进行深入分析,进而对可燃粉尘爆炸燃烧事故提出了一系列防范措施。     

粉尘防爆专项治理全面铺开,专家认为——化工粉尘,科学防范是根本

<正>8月12日,国家安监总局召开"六打六治"打非治违专项行动视频会议,再次要求存在粉尘爆炸危险的企业,进一步提高对粉尘危险性、危害性的认识,深刻吸取江苏昆山中荣公司"8·2"事故教训,开展全面、深入、细致、彻底的排查,扎扎实实抓好粉尘防爆专项治理工作。据了解,化工行业中一些工艺段也存在粉尘,同样存在着可能爆炸的危险性,仅在今年化工类企     

基于可燃粉尘火灾的防火措施探索

可燃粉尘由于自身具有粒度小、易扩散、燃烧放热大等诸多特点,极易在封闭的环境中引发火灾和爆炸。在面粉、木材、煤炭以及金属加工厂等场所,如果不注意对生产环境进行监督和管理,一旦出现通风较差、明火等,就会发生可燃粉尘火灾和爆炸,将会造成严重的人员伤亡和经济损失。因此,应加强对于可燃粉尘火灾原因和机理的研究和探讨。本文以可燃粉尘作为主要研究对象,首先从不同特点出发,明确可燃粉尘的定义和概念,然后对可燃粉尘火灾和爆炸发生的机理进行深入的分析和研究,在此基础上,提出具有针对性的可燃粉尘火灾预防措施和现场处理要点,为我国可燃粉尘火灾的预防和处理提供可参考的理论依据。     

工业企业粉尘爆炸事故的预防及处置

随着我国社会经济与科技水平不断提高,工业生产过程中粉尘爆炸事故不断发生,造成严重损失。因此,提高安全防范是预防和减少工业企业粉尘爆炸事故发生的关键,文章就工业企业粉尘爆炸事故的预防及处置展开探析。     

粉尘爆炸的研究进展

粉尘爆炸作为一种典型的事故类型,对人类的生产生活危害性极大。论述了粉尘爆炸的定义、机理及特点,影响粉尘爆炸的特性参数如环境温度、点火能量、最低爆炸限度、粒径和质量浓度等。并对目前国内粉尘爆炸的防爆措施研究现状进行概括,最后就粉尘爆炸防护措施方面存在的问题提出几点建议。     

粉尘爆炸的研究进展

粉尘爆炸作为一种典型的事故类型,对人类的生产生活危害性极大。论述了粉尘爆炸的定义、机理及特点,影响粉尘爆炸的特性参数如环境温度、点火能量、最低爆炸限度、粒径和质量浓度等。并对目前国内粉尘爆炸的防爆措施研究现状进行概括,最后就粉尘爆炸防护措施方面存在的问题提出几点建议。     

浅谈粉尘爆炸实验装置的主体部分设计

在对管道内粉尘爆炸的特性理论研究的基础上,设计了一套80mm×80mm、长5m的长方体可燃粉尘爆炸实验管道,其为粉尘爆炸实验装置的主体部分。粉尘爆炸实验装置的主体部分包括管道进气口、空气压缩机、实验管道主体部分(点火区,观察区,灭火区)、传感器、管道出气口、送风机,扬尘喷管、燃爆测定系统控制仪、可燃粉尘质量、速度传感器、动态数据采集分析仪和爆炸的点火装置。对粉尘爆炸实验装置的主体部分的设计有利于研究可燃粉尘在管道中的爆燃转爆轰(DDT)过程、压力变化过程等,也有利于可燃粉尘在管道中的爆炸研究。     

Review on the Assessment of Safety and Risks

Historically explosion accidents are linked with energetic materials. There is the further belief, that the proneness to accidents—and their severity—is linked with the sensitivity of these explosives. Consequently there exist seemingly very insensitive materials for which it is believed that their accidental explosion can be ignored, so that safety distances can be reduced to those that apply to materials for which the hazard is assumed to be mass fire rather than mass detonation. Evidence is presented here that shows these assumptions to be invalid. Reports of explosion accidents are gathered here for substances that are not generally considered to be explosives (non UN‐class 1 substances, like ammonium nitrate (AN), neat alkali metal chlorates, and even hypochlorites and nitromethane). In most of these cases the proneness of accidents had not been foreseen by testing. The basic explosion mechanisms are of a more general nature than simply those that apply to high explosives. Explosion is not solely a matter of energy, but of any physical power conversion. In order to prove this, a survey of explosion events is given: Natural events, like the impacts of celestial bodies and volcanic eruptions. Fuel/liquid interactions in nature are industrial risks too, which occur at very different occasions and sites: Cellulose processing, the oil industry, foundries, power stations, explosions of hot cinders, chemical processing, fire extinguishing, and (most common) in the kitchen, and (most catastrophic) in nuclear reactors. Explosions of similar type are Hydraulic Transients, Bubble resonance explosions with the possibility of associated chemical room explosions (BLEVE), Rollovers. Second order effects are sorption/desorption resonance explosions, which most powerful also occur in nature (Nios Lake (CO₂‐release), Kivu Lake, Monoun Lake, 1984, Tanganjika Lake, all in Africa, and the Ocracoke in the Gulf of Mexico (CH₄‐release)—and at the lowest end shaken champagne bottles. All these explosions are “low probability–high risk” explosive phenomena, which are scarcely coverable by risk studies with the present day scientific tools on explosion phenomena. Up to now only in the nuclear branch a quantitative risk of explosion was brought to attention, therefore, the validity of this approach was carefully examinated.     

The ammonium nitrate explosion at West,Texas: A disaster that could have been avoided

On April 17, 2013, an explosion of ammonium nitrate (AN) fertilizer stored at the West Fertilizer Company resulted in 15 deaths, 260 injuries, and the destruction of a sizable portion of the town. AN fertilizer is classified as an oxidizer, not as an explosive; nonetheless, it is a chemical which can detonate, and there is a century's worth of history of such explosions, some of them in manufacturing operations, but many in storage or transport. A review of incidents showed that 100% of AN fertilizer explosions in storage or transport had a single cause—an uncontrolled fire. Thus, AN fertilizer explosions in storage are preventable accidents, because technology to preclude uncontrollable fires also has been available for a century. In the case of transport accidents, uncontrolled fires may not be avoidable. However, technologies exist that can make AN less likely to explode, and to show greatly reduced explosion intensity, if driven to explosion. None of these safety measures were in place for this disaster. Details of necessary fire safety measures and the effectiveness and utility of existing regulations for AN are examined. This is important because most AN storage facilities in the United States are similarly inadequate in their fire safety.     

Explosion hazard analysis in partially confined area

A fuel gas leak in a partially confined area creates a flammable atmosphere and gives rise to an explosion, which is one of the most common accidents in a chemical plant. Observations from accidents suggest that some explosions are caused by a quantity of fuel significantly less than the lower explosion limit (LEL) amount required to fill the whole confined area, which is attributed to inhomogeneous mixing of leaked gas. The minimum amount of leaked gas for explosion is highly dependent on the mixing degree in the area. This paper presents a method for analyzing the explosion hazard in partially confined area with very small amount of leaked gas. Based on explosion limit concentration, the Gaussian distribution model is used to estimate the minimum amount of leak which yields a specified explosion pressure. The method will help in analyzing hazards to develop new safe devices as well as for investigating accidents.     

Development of a web-based emergency preparedness plan system in Korea

The chemical industry treats a huge quantity of hazardous and harmful flammable liquids, combustible gases and toxic materials. Therefore, there is a high potential for fires, conflagrations, explosions and toxic leaks. To minimize the possibility of such hazards, the Korean government has been enforcing an EPP (Emergency Preparedness Plan) in accordance with the Toxic Chemicals Controls Act since 1996. However, 70% of the targeted small and medium-sized enterprises are struggling with the independent implementation of EPP, and 30% of the EPP grades being used are not amenable to approval and further application. As a result, we have developed a web-based emergency preparedness plan system. The main purpose of the program is to provide a safety management system to each facility in order to enable accidents to be prevented and accidents to be immediately controlled. The program also helps government or related agencies to control a number of accidents that occur in small companies throughout the entire country.     

尿素合成塔爆炸原因分析

介绍了国内4家尿素厂水溶液全循环装置尿素合成塔发生的爆炸事故；分析了出料管爆炸原因；对塔内气相空间爆炸两个案例进行了较详细的分析。认为：无论是出料管爆炸还是气相空间爆炸均系化学爆炸。     

Accident simulation as a tool for assessing and controlling environmental risks in chemical process industries: A case study

Accidents involving toxic releases, explosions, and fires in chemical process industries take a heavy toll of property, human lives, and environment quality. If one could forecast the accidents likely to occur and the damage they were likely to cause, one could devise appropriate strategies to prevent the accidents and contain the damage that did occur. Using this concept, we have developed a computer-automated tool for accident simulation. In this paper the applicability of the concept and the tool is described on the basis of a case study of a typical petrochemical industry. The study reveals that out of eight credible accident scenarios, four would be ’stand-alone’ events, whereas four others would also cause secondary or higher order accidents (domino effects). Of the accidents in the former category, the one as per scenario 8 is the worst as it would adversely impact (within the set limit of 50 % probability of causing lethality) larger areas than the other three such accidents. Among the second category, scenario 1 would be the most undesirable because it would simultaneously cause heat radiation, shock waves, and missile effects over a larger area.     

丙酮的工业安全应用研究现状

丙酮在工业生产应用中极易发生泄漏、中毒、火灾、爆炸及环境污染等事故。本文对近二十年的相关文献进行了综述,分别从丙酮浓度的检测与控制、丙酮的毒性与职业健康、丙酮的火灾爆炸危险性研究三方面概括了当前研究现状,总结了工业丙酮的事故发生规律和理论研究成果,为丙酮使用企业的安全生产提供了一定指导和依据。     

乳化炸药热分解研究进展

热稳定性是乳化炸药生产、运输、储存过程中非常重要的安全性能参数,众多乳化炸药爆炸事故的发生都由热分解逐渐发展至爆炸,因此探究乳化炸药的热分解机理对预防此类事故的发生有着重要的意义。综合近年来国内外乳化炸药热分解的研究,分别对油相材料、乳化剂、氧化剂水溶液及添加剂等影响乳化炸药热分解性能的主要因素进行了概述及分析,综述了乳化炸药热分解研究的现状。     

从几起案例谈化学实验室事故及对策

近年来频发的化学实验室事故,为人们敲响了安全警钟,再一次引起人们对实验室安全问题的高度关注。文章介绍了化学实验室事故的类型及其危害,分析了实验室事故频发的主要原因,提出了针对性的安全措施以避免实验室安全事故的发生,力争做到安全生产,安全科研。     

氧化制硝酸危险性及安全预防措施探究

随着我国经济的高速发展,化工企业迅速崛起,化工生产日益发达。由于化工原料、半成品、成品大多具有易燃、易爆、易腐蚀、有毒害等特点,且化工生产装置种类繁多、高度密集、塔釜林立、管道纵横交错、自动化生产程度高、连续性,生产工艺复杂,因此,在生产中极易发生泄漏、着火、爆炸事故。氧化反应在化工生产中有着广泛的应用,以工业催化氧化制硝酸为例,由于氨氧化过程中进行氧化反应的火灾爆炸危险性,使得生产过程中必须重视安全,认识生产工艺的复杂性,充分分析危险性,提出相应的事故预防的有效措施,防止发生爆炸燃烧。