Children's extension of disgust to physical and moral events.

Adults use the terms revolting, gross, and disgusting to describe entities and actions, such as feces, rotten food, and sex with corpses, which elicit a certain visceral response. But adults also apply such expressions to certain sociomoral transgressions, such as cheating on one's spouse or stealing from the poor. Here, the authors explore whether young children associate disgust with physical and moral events by endorsing either verbal or facial expressions of disgust. Results indicate that children in Grades K, 2, and 4 (N = 167) label moral violations "disgusting" more often than nondisgusting physical acts or neutral negative acts but less often than physically disgusting acts. Likewise, children associate facial expressions of disgust with moral violations. These findings are discussed in the context of different theories about the relationship between physical disgust and moral disgust. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality.

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social justifications for moral emotions: When reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger.

In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, versus merely evaluative responses, when explaining their anger, versus disgust. Experiment 2 used a between-participants design; participants explained why they felt either anger or disgust toward seven groups that either violated a sexual or nonsexual norm. Again, elaborated reasons were less prevalent when explaining their disgust versus anger and, in particular, when explaining disgust toward a group that violated a sexual norm. Experiment 3 further established that these findings are due to a lower accessibility of elaborated reasons for bodily disgust, rather than inhibition in using them when provided. From these findings, it can be concluded that communicating external reasons for moral disgust at bodily violations is made more difficult due to the unavailability of those reasons to people. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors.

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harmfree violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust. In Experiment 1, participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo violations, even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post hoc nature of presumption of harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm. In Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post hoc function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load. In general, manipulations of harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, whereas manipulations of taboo predicted disgust better. The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic rather than actual harm when a choice existed. These studies clarify understanding of the relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, offensive acts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neural responses to facial and vocal expressions of fear and disgust

Neuropsychological studies report more impaired responses to facial expressions of fear than disgust in people with amygdala lesions, and vice versa in people with Huntington's disease. Experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have confirmed the role of the amygdala in the response to fearful faces and have implicated the anterior insula in the response to facial expressions of disgust. We used fMRI to extend these studies to the perception of fear and disgust from both facial and vocal expressions. Consistent with neuropsychological findings, both types of fearful stimuli activated the amygdala. Facial expressions of disgust activated the anterior insula and the caudate-putamen; vocal expressions of disgust did not significantly activate either of these regions. All four types of stimuli activated the superior temporal gyrus. Our findings therefore (i) support the differential localization of the neural substrates of fear and disgust; (ii) confirm the involvement of the amygdala in the emotion of fear, whether evoked by facial or vocal expressions; (iii) confirm the involvement of the anterior insula and the striatum in reactions to facial expressions of disgust; and (iv) suggest a possible general role for the perception of emotional expressions for the superior temporal gyrus.     

The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social–functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1–3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A perspective on disgust.

Approaches disgust as a food-related emotion and defines it as revulsion at the prospect of oral incorporation of offensive objects. These objects have contamination properties; if they contact an otherwise acceptable food, they tend to render it inedible. Issues considered include: the nature of the objects of disgust and why they are virtually all of animal origin, the meaning of oral incorporation, the belief that people take on the properties of the foods they eat, the nature of the contamination response and its relation to the laws of sympathetic magic (similarity and contagion), and the ontogeny of disgust, which is believed to develop during the 1st 8 yrs of life. The idea that feces, the universal disgust object, is also the 1st is explored, and the mechanisms for the acquisition of disgust are examined. Disgust is recommended as an easily studiable emotion, a model for cognitive–affective linkages, and a model for the acquisition of values and culture. (103 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Studies on the role of disgust in the acquisition and maintenance of specific phobias

Disgust has been proposed as a possible factor in phobic acquisition and maintenance, particularly in spider phobia. Cognitions and processes concerning disgust were examined in a series of studies with spider phobics, other specific phobics and nonphobic controls. Beliefs about the disgusting nature of their phobic objects were present in phobics but did not contribute to an attentional bias. Measures of global disgust sensitivity were not closely linked to the phobic fear response. The disgust associated with phobic objects appears to have different constituents to the disgust associated with objects that do not evoke the phobic response. In the light of evidence presented here, it seems unlikely that disgust plays a central role in the aetiology or maintenance of spider phobia in particular and specific phobias in general. It is proposed that when stimuli normally associated with disgust become the focus of phobic anxiety the disgust response may be amplified.     

Emotional selection in memes: The case of urban legends.

This article explores how much memes like urban legends succeed on the basis of informational selection (i.e., truth or a moral lesson) and emotional selection (i.e., the ability to evoke emotions like anger, fear, or disgust). The article focuses on disgust because its elicitors have been precisely described. In Study 1, with controls for informational factors like truth, people were more willing to pass along stories that elicited stronger disgust. Study 2 randomly sampled legends and created versions that varied in disgust; people preferred to pass along versions that produced the highest level of disgust. Study 3 coded legends for specific story motifs that produce disgust (e.g., ingestion of a contaminated substance) and found that legends that contained more disgust motifs were distributed more widely on urban legend Web sites. The conclusion discusses implications of emotional selection for the social marketplace of ideas. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contamination fear and effects of disgust on distress in a public restroom.

The present study examined the effect of a disgust mood induction on self-reported distress during exposure to 5 stimuli with increasing potential for contagion in a public restroom among contamination fearful individuals. Participants were 36 adults identified as high in contamination fear (HCF) and 47 adults identified as low in contamination fear (LCF) who were randomly assigned to either a disgust or neutral emotion induction condition. Consistent with predictions, HCF participants exhibited significantly more distress than LCF participants during exposure to the sources of contagion in the restroom. However, this main effect was moderated by type of mood induction and task difficulty. Specifically, significant differences in distress between HCF and LCF participants emerged only for stimuli with low potential for contagion (i.e., touching the inside of the bathroom sink) in the disgust condition, whereas such group differences in distress emerged only for stimuli with a relatively high potential for contagion (i.e., touching the inside of the bathroom toilet) in the neutral condition. The implications of these findings for better understanding the functional role of disgust in contamination fear are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger, disgust, and the negative aesthetic emotions: Expanding an appraisal model of aesthetic experience.

Negative aesthetic emotions, such as disgust and anger, are central to understanding why people reject, deface, and censor art. Psychological theories of aesthetic preferences have little to say about negative aesthetic emotions, however, and the major theories associated with Berlyne and Martindale cannot in principle explain emotions like anger and disgust. The present research uses a recent appraisal model of aesthetic emotions to illuminate negative responses to art. People viewed a set of pictures, which included offensive and controversial works. The predictions were based on the appraisal profiles of anger and disgust. As expected, anger was associated with appraising a picture as incongruent with one's values and as intentionally offensive, and disgust was associated with appraising a picture as incongruent with one's values and as unpleasant. Implications for competing theories of aesthetic emotions are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disgust and disgust sensitivity in blood-injection-injury and spider phobia

Blood-injection-injury (BII) phobics and spider phobics show markedly different cognitive, psychophysiological, and motoric reactions to activating stimuli. These observations have led theorists to question whether the emotion of fear mediates both phobias. The present study examined the role of disgust and disgust sensitivity in these subtypes of specific phobia. BII phobics, spider phobics, and nonphobics completed questionnaires and rated pictures of specific objects on fear and disgust scales. Questionnaire data indicated that phobic participants were higher than nonphobics on fear, and also on disgust sensitivity. The reaction of BII phobics to pictures of medical stimuli was one of disgust, rather than fear. The reaction of spider phobics to pictures of spiders was a combination of fear and disgust, though fear appeared to predominate. Results are discussed in view of current theories of emotional factors in specific phobia.     

Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust.

What is the function of disgust? Whereas traditional models have suggested that disgust serves to protect the self or neutralize reminders of our animal nature, an evolutionary perspective suggests that disgust functions to solve 3 qualitatively different adaptive problems related to pathogen avoidance, mate choice, and social interaction. The authors investigated this 3-domain model of disgust across 4 studies and examined how sensitivity to these functional domains relates to individual differences in other psychological constructs. Consistent with their predictions, factor analyses demonstrated that disgust sensitivity partitions into domains related to pathogens, sexuality, and morality. Further, sensitivity to the 3 domains showed predictable differentiation based on sex, perceived vulnerability to disease, psychopathic tendencies, and Big 5 personality traits. In exploring these 3 domains of disgust, the authors introduce a new measure of disgust sensitivity. Appreciation of the functional heterogeneity of disgust has important implications for research on individual differences in disgust sensitivity, emotion, clinical impairments, and neuroscience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disgust and the moralization of purity.

Guided by appraisal-based models of the influence of emotion upon judgment, we propose that disgust moralizes—that is, amplifies the moral significance of—protecting the purity of the body and soul. Three studies documented that state and trait disgust, but not other negative emotions, moralize the purity moral domain but not the moral domains of justice or harm/care. In Study 1, integral feelings of disgust, but not integral anger, predicted stronger moral condemnation of behaviors violating purity. In Study 2, experimentally induced disgust, compared with induced sadness, increased condemnation of behaviors violating purity and increased approval of behaviors upholding purity. In Study 3, trait disgust, but not trait anger or trait fear, predicted stronger condemnation of purity violations and greater approval of behaviors upholding purity. We found that, confirming the domain specificity of the disgust–purity association, disgust was unrelated to moral judgments about justice (Studies 1 and 2) or harm/care (Study 3). Finally, across studies, individuals of lower socioeconomic status (SES) were more likely than individuals of higher SES to moralize purity but not justice or harm/care. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A taxometric study of the latent structure of disgust sensitivity: Converging evidence for dimensionality.

Disgust sensitivity has recently been implicated as a specific vulnerability factor for several anxiety-related disorders. However, it is not clear whether disgust sensitivity is a dimensional or categorical phenomenon. The present study examined the latent structure of disgust by applying three taxometric procedures (maximum eigenvalue, mean above minus below a cut, and latent-mode factor analysis) to data collected from 2 large nonclinical samples on 2 different measures of disgust sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity in the first sample (n=1,153) was operationalized by disgust reactions to food, animals, body products, sex, body envelope violations, death, hygiene, and sympathetic magic, as assessed by the Disgust Sensitivity Scale (J. Haidt, C. McCauley, & P. Rozin, 1994). Disgust Sensitivity Scale indicators of core, animal reminder, and contamination disgust were also examined in the 1st sample. Disgust sensitivity in the 2nd independent sample (n=1,318) was operationalized by disgust reactions to animals, injections and blood draws, mutilation and death, rotting foods, and odors, as assessed by the Disgust Emotion Scale (R. A. Kleinknecht, E. E. Kleinknecht, & R. M. Thorndike, 1997). Results across both samples provide converging evidence that disgust sensitivity is best conceptualized as a dimensional construct, present to a greater or lesser extent in all individuals. These findings are discussed in relation to the conceptualization and assessment of disgust sensitivity as a specific dimensional vulnerability for certain anxiety and related disorders. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recognizing masked threat: Fear betrays, but disgust you can trust.

If emotions guide consciousness, people may recognize degraded objects in center view more accurately if they either fear the objects or are disgusted by them. Therefore, we studied whether recognition of spiders and snakes correlates with individual differences in spider fear, snake fear, and disgust sensitivity. Female students performed a recognition task with pictures of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms as well as blanks. Pictures were backward masked to reduce picture visibility. Signal detection analyses showed that recognition of spiders and snakes was correlated with disgust sensitivity but not with fear of spiders or snakes. Further, spider fear correlated with the tendency to misinterpret blanks as threatening (response bias). These findings suggest that effects on recognition and response biases to emotional pictures vary for different emotions and emotional traits. Whereas fear may induce response biases, disgust may facilitate recognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do children endorse psychosocial factors in the transmission of illness and disgust?

The present studies examined beliefs concerning the impact of psychosocial factors in the transmission of contagious illness, injuries, and disgust. In Studies 1 and 2, participants ranging from preschoolers through adults judged the likelihood that a character would get sick (or injured) after being contaminated by another individual who was either of no stated relation to the character or who was a best friend, a disliked person, or a family member. Studies 3 and 4 examined effects of psychosocial relatedness on judgments of disgust (a psychological response). Study 5 examined the influence of germs on judgments of disgust. Overall, preschoolers through 2nd graders judged that any type of relatedness decreased the possibility of contracting illness from another person. However, for disgust, preschoolers judged that negative contagion would have a more powerful effect, particularly in the presence of germs. Relatedness had no effect on judgments of injury transmission. These results suggest that young children treat the psychological and biological domains as distinct but mutually interacting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Disgust and its disorders: Theory, assessment, and treatment implications.

Reviews the book, Disgust and its disorders: Theory, assessment, and treatment implications by edited Bunmi O. Olantunji and Dean McKay (see record 2008-14016-000). The fairly recent shift toward a focus on disgust is nicely reflected in the title of this book. The goal of Disgust and its disorders is to assess the current state of disgust-based research and to highlight future suggested research directions to enhance our understanding, and thereby treatment of problems associated with the emotion disgust. Accordingly, this book contains 14 chapters and is divided into three separate but related sections: 1) Theory and Assessment; 2) Response Patterns; and 3) Disorders of Disgust. For the most part there is good flow and continuity across chapters relative to other edited volumes in which disjointedness may be an unwelcomed feature. A consistent theme in the chapters of this book is the call for more and more rigorous research involving the emotion disgust in a context of psychological disorders. Given recent increases in researchers’ interest and understanding of disgust, it seems likely that disgust-based research will continue to grow and foster the proliferation of This volume will certainly have a positive impact in this regard, and future volumes will ideally continue to explore issues raised here within as well as further examine different disgust domains (e.g., moral disgust). In sum, Disgust and its disorders is a delightful read—despite its “disgusting” content. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)