The role of typical diagnosticity in stereotype-based judgments.

The relative impact that categorical information and nondiagnostic individuating information each have on stereotype-based judgments was examined. Three experiments tested and found consistent support for the hypothesis that the impact of Ss' stereotypes on their judgments of target individuals would be diluted significantly more by the presence of individuating information that was nondiagnostic for the judgment task at hand but was relatively high in typical diagnosticity (i.e., useful across many social judgment tasks) than by individuating information that was nondiagnostic for the judgment task at hand and was relatively low in typical diagnosticity (i.e., useful across few social judgment tasks). The authors conclude that the typical diagnosticity of individuating information is an important, although previously overlooked, factor in social perception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond simple pessimism: Effects of sadness and anger on social perception.

In keeping with cognitive appraisal models of emotion, it was hypothesized that sadness and anger would exert different influences on causal judgments. Two experiments provided initial support for this hypothesis. Sad Ss perceived situationally-caused events as more likely (Exp 1) and situational forces more responsible for an ambiguous event (Exp 2) than angry Ss, who, in contrast, perceived events caused by humans as more likely and other people as more responsible. Exps 3, 4, and 5 showed that the experience of these emotions, rather than their cognitive constituents, mediates these effects. The nonemotional exposure to situational or human agency information did not influence causal judgments (Exp 3), whereas the induction of sadness and anger without explicit agency information did (Exps 4 and 5). Discussion is focused on the influence of emotion on social judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of limited recall of variability on intuitive judgments of change.

Two studies tested the hypothesis that reduced recall of variability will alter intuitive judgments of change. In the 1st study, 53 undergraduates received a series of values said to represent the mental health of several individuals and were asked to remember either the average or the range of values for each of the individuals. Either immediately thereafter or 1 wk later, Ss assessed the degree of change represented by a new value, based on their recall of the prior series. It was predicted that when recall was delayed, Ss who had been instructed to remember the average would make greater change judgments than those who had been instructed to remember the variability. Results support the hypothesis. Exp II (81 Ss) replicated these effects with a different type of change judgment (change in a city) and provided evidence that natural encoding operated similarly to average encoding. Implications for a variety of social perception processes are discussed. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: An analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities.

Reexamined the findings of A. Locksley et al (see record 1981-28048-001) that Ss fall prey to the baserate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments and that Ss ignore their stereotypes when trait judgments are made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. A replication of Study 2 by Locksley et al, using 99 undergraduates, was conducted to examine 2 issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with Ss' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs individual) of Ss' judgments. Results show no support for the baserate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each S based on the S's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that Ss ignored or underused their stereotypes as the baserate fallacy predicts. (35 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Base rates can affect individual predictions.

356 college students in 4 experiments learned base-rate information and then participated in a predictive social judgment task. In all experiments, predictive behavior was significantly affected by the relevant base rates. In Exp II, for example, Ss in a high base-rate condition were more likely to predict that a given student planned to enroll for further training than were Ss in a low base-rate condition. The base-rate variable had a greater influence than might have been anticipated from the Ss' confidence ratings or from their replies to a series of postexperimental questions concerning the cues they had relied on in formulating their predictions. Nonetheless, the base-rate data were substantially less influential than a Bayesian model would require. In contrast to D. Kahneman and A. Tversky's (1973) analysis, individuating information that reflected a high (vs low) degree of representativeness did not determine the magnitude of the base-rate effect. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strategy selection in causal reasoning: When beliefs and covariation collide.

Investigated how people combine covariation information with pre-existing beliefs when evaluating causal hypotheses. Ss were 752 college students (aged 17–52 yrs). Three experiments, using both within- and between-Ss designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Exp 2, this interaction was observed when Ss made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Exp 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in Ss' metacognitive judgments: Ss indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Exps 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based views. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The utility of theories in intuitive statistics: The robustness of theory-based judgments.

Research on human judgment demonstrates that people's theories often bias their evaluation of evidence and suggests that people might be more accurate if they were unbiased by prior beliefs. In 2 studies using the covariation estimation problem and the t-test problem, judgments made by Ss who had potentially biasing prior information about data were compared to those made by Ss who were not biased by prior information. 265 undergraduates served as Ss in Study 1; 201 undergraduates were Ss in Study 2. The quality of the data was varied to present Ss with data that were either well-behaved or contaminated with outliers. In both studies, Ss' judgments approximated robust statistical measures rather than the conventional measures typically used as normative criteria. The usual biasing effects of prior beliefs were found, along with an advantage for Ss who had prior theories—even incorrect ones—over Ss who were completely "objective." Potentially biasing beliefs both enhanced Ss' sensitivity to the bulk of the data and reduced the influence atypical scores had on their estimates. Evidence is provided that this robustness results from the fact that prior theories make judgment problems more meaningful. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social reference points.

Conducted 2 experiments in which a total of 324 undergraduates were asked to make similarity judgments about social concepts, varying the direction of the comparison specified by the question. Asymmetries in rated similarity were used to diagnose concepts that function as habitual reference points. In Exp I, after completing the Self-Monitoring Scale, Ss were asked to make directional judgments about themselves vs a friend along various dimensions (social and physical). Ss were found to rate a friend as more similar to themselves than vice versa along both social and physical dimensions, suggesting that the self served as a reference point. In Exp II Ss made global similarity comparisons between themselves and typical examples of various social stereotypes. Directional asymmetries were inversely related to the extent of Ss' knowledge about the stereotypes: The self acted as a reference point with respect to stereotypes with few known attributes but not with respect to those with many attributes. The relation between level of self-monitoring and asymmetry effects was weak and inconsistent in both experiments. Results suggest that concepts serving as social reference points vary across judgment contexts in accord with general cognitive models of similarity comparisons. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conversational conventions, order of information acquisition, and the effect of base rates and individuating information on social judgments.

Numerous studies have shown that people underuse base-rate information in making social judgments and rely instead almost exclusively on individuating information. Seven studies reported here demonstrate that this occurred partly because most past studies gave Ss base-rate information before giving them individuating information. A recency effect in the use of base-rate and individuating information is demonstrated using a set of reasoning problems of varying character. The recency effect is shown to be the result of Ss' inferences (based on conversational conventions) that the experimenter believes that Ss should rely most on the piece of information presented last. Additional evidence discredits the hypothesis that the recency effect is due to heightened availability of more recently acquired information in memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

You can't not believe everything you read.

Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Exps 1 and 2) or a college student (Exp 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Exps 1 and 2) or time pressure (Exp 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nonconscious biasing effects of single instances on subsequent judgments.

Investigated information processing in situations in which there was insufficient evidence to make a judgment and no possibility of avoiding a judgment. The research was inspired by the question-answering model of S. Glucksberg and M. McCloskey (see record 1982-07068-001), which states that if it is important to find an answer to a question, then the failure of a preliminary memory search to find any relevant information leads to additional attempts that may employ gradually looser criteria of relevance than that used originally. It was hypothesized that the criterion of relevance could become loose enough to include a memory representation of a single and not salient instance. The hypothesis was tested in 3 experiments in which 160 college and 70 high school students participated. In Exp I the experience of a single instance was provided to the Ss by means of subliminally exposed words, and the dependent measure was Ss' choice of "better fitting" words. In Exps II and III, Ss were provided with single instances by means of a quasi-natural interaction with a person who was similar to 1 of 2 other persons to whom the Ss were subsequently exposed. The dependent measure was Ss' choice of one of those persons as more friendly, and the choice was made again under quasi-natural conditions. All 3 experiments confirmed the model and indicated that Ss based their judgments on the single instance to which they were exposed. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Speeded tests of implicit knowledge.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that implicit and explicit tasks involve distinct modes of processing. Ss observed rule-ordered letter strings and were asked either to memorize the strings or to try to discover the underlying rules. In Exp 1, they then made well-formedness judgments of novel strings under long-deadline and short-deadline conditions. Rule-discovery Ss, but not memory Ss, were impaired by the short deadline. In Exp 2, all Ss made "similarity" judgments of the novel strings instead of the traditional "rule-based" judgments; there were now no differences between the rule-discovery and memory groups. In Exp 3, Ss explicitly instructed in the rules were significantly more impaired under short deadlines than were memory Ss. An analysis of decision times to individual strings for the rule-trained vs memory groups also showed qualitative differences consistent with the implicit–explicit distinction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-disclosure in a simulated psychiatric interview.

Describes 2 experiments in which a total of 192 undergraduates received 49 items of personal information previously scaled in terms of their intimacy and presented according to the method of constant stimuli. For each item, Ss indicated whether they believed they would have withheld or revealed that information under actual psychiatric interview conditions. Exp. I manipulated the professional role of the interviewer, confidentiality of obtained information, and sex of the interviewee in a 4 * 3 * 2 design. Results indicate that (a) Ss avowedly revealed more personal information to mental health professionals than they would in a control employment interview situation, with no differences between the mental health professionals; (b) informing Ss that the interview was not confidential produced significant information loss from female but not male Ss; and (c) Ss who received no information regarding confidentiality behaved like Ss who were told the information was confidential. In Exp. II, Ss were asked to assume the motivational-attitudinal state of persons either coerced or voluntarily seeking a psychiatric interview because they had violated interpersonal norms. Significant information loss occurred in coerced Ss while confidentiality had no effect on self-disclosure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of out-group cues in determining social identity.

Examined the role of out-group cues in determining social identity and guiding behavior in 2 experiments with 131 undergraduates. In Exp I, Ss were exposed to a cue either of an in-group (Ss' college), a relevant out-group (a rival college), or an irrelevant out-group (a baseball team). Ss examined a list of words and were later asked to recognize those they had seen from a larger list in which words related to the 3 groups were embedded. Results indicate that Ss made more false recognitions of in-group related words when a relevant out-group was salient than when an irrelevant out-group was salient. Exp II tested a behavioral implication of Exp I: Out-group salience increases adherence to an in-group norm. In the 1st phase of Exp II, Ss were divided into 2 groups and deliberated 2 civil suits. Ss' in-group favored the plaintiffs for both cases. Ss were divided into new groups for the 2nd phase, and the same procedure was followed. This time, however, the in-group favored the defendants. In the 3rd phase, Ss were exposed to a cue either of the out-group in Phase 1 or Phase 2. Ss' judgments for 2 new cases were biased in the direction of the norm of the in-group that was associated with the salient out-group. Ss favored the plaintiff (or defendant) when the 1st (or 2nd) out-group was salient. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of performance attributions on others' perceptions of the attributor.

Two studies investigated the effects that performers' attributions actually have on others' impressions. 441 undergraduates served as Ss. "Self-serving" internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure produced slightly higher ability evaluations than did the opposite pattern in 1 of the 2 experiments. However, in both experiments, these self-serving attributions produced lower ratings on a modesty dimension. External attributions were also perceived as relatively dishonest for all Ss in Exp I and for unsuccessful Ss in Exp II. Publicity (Exp I) and task variables (Exp II) did not affect ability, modesty, or honesty judgments made from performance attributions but did strongly affect the influence these dimensions had on overall likability evaluations. In general, Ss who made internal attributions tended to be better liked than those who made external attributions. The implications and limitations of these results are discussed relative to self-presentational considerations. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sampling of similar and dissimilar comparison persons and objects as a function of the generality of attribution goal.

Conducted an information-search procedure in which Ss were asked to seek information regarding persons and objects in order to validate a given person or object cause. Four hypotheses were tested: When asked to validate a person cause, Ss are more likely to select distinctiveness information than target-object consensus information. When asked to validate an object cause, Ss are more likely to select target-object consensus information than distinctiveness information. As the generality of person inference increases, progressively dissimilar object comparisons are sought. As the generality of object inference increases, progressively dissimilar person comparisons are sought. In Exp I, 26 undergraduates read attitude statements and answered judgment goals or questions about the statement's generality or object inference. 52 undergraduates in Exp II completed a similar task. The first 3 hypotheses were supported in both Exp I and Exp II, whereas the 4th hypothesis received only mixed support in Exp I and was not supported in Exp II. Unlike Exp I, Exp II did not include cues suggesting the relevant type of information to be sought. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Retrospective reports on the causes of decisions.

Two experiments examined a person's ability to retrieve valid memories of the causes of prior judgments of preference. In Exp I, 140 high school students and their parents judged profiled colleges in a within-S design, reported his or her reactions to the colleges' features, and guessed the reactions of the other family members. The self-reports were more accurate than the guesses by the observers, implying that the self-reports did not stem from a public theory of the actor. In Exp II, 48 high school sophomores either judged colleges after exposure to information that influenced which features drew strong reactions or received no information. Ss then received either instructions motivating careful retrieval and candid reporting of memories or ones motivating the reporting of certain reactions to impress others. The Ss motivated to try retrieval achieved higher accuracy than 24 graduate student observers who tried to infer the S's reactions from knowledge of the overt judgments. Results suggest that accurate retrieval-based reporting of earlier midjudgment reactions to attributes of a stimulus may be possible. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)