Conditional reasoning and conditionalization.

In solving conditional reasoning problems, reasoners are assumed to compute the probability of the conclusion, conditionalizing first on the categorical premise, giving the knowledge-based component, and conditionalizing then on the conditional-statement premise, from which the assumption-based component is derived. Because reasoners find it difficult to compute the second-step conditionalization except when the conditional-statement premise is found to be related to the result of the first-step conditionalization as for modus ponens or, possibly, for modus tollens, the knowledge-based component generally dominates reasoning performance. After representing all the possible cases in which conditional-argument forms may appear, this approach was found to be consistent with the results from the 3 experiments reported in this study, whereas 2 alternative hypotheses account for only some of the results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning in children.

Conditional reasoning ability is analyzed in the context of Piaget's logical operational system. It is argued that facility in concrete operations is necessary and sufficient for competence in the simple syllogistic forms, though dealing with conditional statements in certain more complex contexts requires formal operations. Data from 3 studies are presented in support of these assertions. Using a total of 120 Ss in Grades 1–5, results of Exps I and II show that presentation of statements in a concrete conversational context elicited substantially more correct conditional reasoning than has been found in earlier studies. Results of Exp III, which used a total of 154 Ss in Grades 2, 4, 6, and 8, indicate that a distinction is drawn between comprehension that p (not p) entails the possibility of q (given If p, then q) and comprehension that q entails the possibility of p. The former is less difficult than the latter, and only the latter requires concrete operations. A methodological implication of these studies is that in the assessment of logical competence, results depend heavily on the exact manner of presentation, as well as on the specific logical operation being assessed. Implications for the theory of formal operations and for the study of traditional syllogistic reasoning are also discussed. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning: The necessary and sufficient conditions.

Five experiments, with 163 university students, investigated 2 theories of conditional reasoning (CDR). The pragmatic schema theory posits that CDR is mediated by context-sensitive inference rules. According to the contextual cuing theory, inferences are based on a mental model that represents necessity and sufficiency relations. Both schematic relations and necessity relations predicted responses on a 4-card selection task. In contrast, after the effects of perceived necessity had been partialled out, schematic relations did not predict responses to either a conditional arguments task or a task in which Ss judged the similarity of "if then" and "only if" statements. Findings question the assumption that reasoning is mediated by schematic rules, which presumably apply regardless of task. A reconceptualization of the pragmatic reasoning schema is proposed. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning, representation, and level of abstraction.

This study examined the idea that (1) reasoning involves construction of mental representations (models) of premises and that (2) there is a developmental progression in the ability of Ss to reason with models containing concrete and abstract elements. Exp 1 found that for 13- and 16-yr-old Ss, reasoning with abstract content was more difficult than with concrete content. Younger Ss appeared to rely more on concrete representations that used real-world knowledge than on more general abstract representations. Exp 2 explored order effects in the presentation of concrete and abstract problems. Abstract followed by concrete problems led to reduced concrete-problem performance for high school students but did not affect performance for university students. These results support the hypotheses and suggest that development of formal reasoning abilities goes through 2 levels. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning in autism: Activation and integration of knowledge and belief.

Everyday conditional reasoning is typically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 26) were less influenced by background knowledge than typically developing adolescents (N = 38) when engaged in conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences (p = .01) and invalid inferences (p = .01) compared with the typical group. In a secondary probability judgment task, no significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in the ability to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to exhibit a “yes” response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everyday reasoning. These findings are discussed with reference to weak central coherence theory and the conditional reasoning literature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Familiarity with content and conditional reasoning.

Examined the relationship between familiarity of content and conditional reasoning. It was hypothesized that there would be an interaction between Ss' familiarity with content in the premises and their conditional reasoning performance. 43 graduate students in education and 53 1st-yr dentistry students took a 30-item test of conditional reasoning that was based on 5 logical arguments each repeated twice with symbolic, lay dental, and professional dental content. Data were analyzed using a 2-way multivariate analysis of variance with repeated measures with the 5 arguments as dependent variables. The interaction between student type and content was not supported. Significant main effects for content were attributed to the lay and professional vs symbolic contrast. It is concluded that conditional reasoning performance was not influenced by Ss' familiarity content in the premises. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The perceptual and inferential effects of situational inducements on dispositional attribution.

On the basis of a two-stage attribution model (Trope, 1986), we predicted that behavioral ambiguity increases the situation's contextual effect on the perception of behavior but decreases the situation's subtractive effect on the attribution of behavior. Three experiments with undergraduate subjects were designed to test these predictions. In Experiment 1 we presented ambiguous and unambiguous emotional reactions to different emotion-eliciting situations and measured subjects' emotion identification and dispositional attribution. In Experiment 2 we extended the test of the model to attribution of causality to the situation and to the actor's personality. In Experiment 3 we tested the predictions with respect to voluntary action. Subjects heard an actor's ambiguous or unambiguous evaluative statements about a likable or a dislikable person. On the basis of this information, subjects indicated their perceptions and attributions of the actor's evaluative statements. Despite differences in stimulus materials, design, and measures, results of all three experiments confirmed the predictions of the two-stage model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relations between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning.

One of the most important open questions in reasoning research is how inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning are related. In an effort to address this question, we applied methods and concepts from memory research. We used 2 experiments to examine the effects of logical validity and premise–conclusion similarity on evaluation of arguments. Experiment 1 showed 2 dissociations: For a common set of arguments, deduction judgments were more affected by validity, and induction judgments were more affected by similarity. Moreover, Experiment 2 showed that fast deduction judgments were like induction judgments—in terms of being more influenced by similarity and less influenced by validity, compared with slow deduction judgments. These novel results pose challenges for a 1-process account of reasoning and are interpreted in terms of a 2-process account of reasoning, which was implemented as a multidimensional signal detection model and applied to receiver operating characteristic data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning, causality, and the structure of semantic memory: strength of association as a predictive factor for content effects

Available evidence indicates that responses to conditional inferences using concrete causal premises is affected by the relative number of available alternate causes (Cummins, D.D., 1995. Memory and Cognition 23 (5), 646-658). We propose that another important factor that may influence the kinds of inferences made to causal conditionals is the relative strength of association between such causes and the consequent term. We present a study with adult participants that examines the effect of strength of association on performance on a conditional reasoning task using causal premises for which there exist one highly associated potential cause for the given consequent term. We predicted that adults would produce a greater proportion of biconditional responses to invalid forms with strongly associated premises than weakly associated ones, while valid forms would not be affected by strength of association. The results are consistent with this hypothesis.     

Conditional immunomodulation following training with cyclophosphamide.

In 5 experiments, paired-group rats received a conditional stimulus (CS) paired with the immunosuppressive drug cyclophosphamide (CY). In Experiments 1–3, the CS was saccharin (SAC). Consistent with previous reports, these rats acquired a SAC aversion. However, there was no evidence of conditional immunosuppression. Rather, when reexposed to SAC in conjunction with an antigenic challenge, paired-group rats evidenced hemagglutination antibody titers similar to those seen in rats that never received the immunosuppressant. That is, the usual effect of CY in compromising immunological functioning was attenuated or eliminated by the CY-paired flavor. The findings of Experiments 1–3 were confirmed in Experiments 4–5, which used nongustatory CS. Both audiovisual (noise and flashing-light) and pharmacological (pentobarbital) cues were also effective signals for CY injection. Following pairing with CY, these cues protected animals from the immunosuppressive effects of the drug. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal-oriented critical reasoning and individual differences in critical reasoning biases.

In 4 experiments, the relationship among critical reasoning, personal goals, general intellectual ability, and information-processing style were explored. Three critical reasoning competencies were investigated: the law of large numbers, the intuitive analysis of covariance, and the ability to detect flaws in experimental designs. Participants were presented problems that involved goal-enhancing, goal-neutral, and goal-threatening evidence. There were 2 main findings: (a) Although general ability predicted 2 components of critical reasoning, biases in reasoning were better predicted by information processing style (i.e., rational vs. intuitive). (b) Reasoning on the goal-enhancing and neutral problems was less sophisticated than reasoning on threatening problems. Depth of processing seems to be a primary mechanism underlying motivated reasoning. In addition, information processing style is an individual difference variable that moderates the extent of reasoning biases. Similar results were obtained across different forms of critical thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Promised and delivered inducements and contributions: An integrated view of psychological contract appraisal.

The reciprocal exchange of employees' work for pay that is central to employment relationships is viewed here through the lens of the psychological contract. A psychological contract involves promised inducements, promised contributions, delivered inducements, and delivered contributions: How an employee cognitively integrates these 4 elements is a central question in psychological contract theory. Three alternative approaches for integrating the 4 elements were drawn from discrepancy theory, from equity theory, and from need theories of satisfaction, respectively. Experimental findings disconfirmed the discrepancy and equity approaches. Findings were consistent with the premise of the needs model, which is that appraisal is driven by how psychological contract elements facilitate or hinder an employee's effort to fulfill personal needs. Results showed that promised and delivered pay and work contribute uniquely to appraisal but that they vary in their influence on appraisal. These findings were consistent with the needs model principle that elements proximal to need satisfaction matter more than distal elements. That is, what is delivered (for pay and for work) matters more than what is promised, and pay matters more than work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Heuristic and analytic processes in propositional reasoning with negatives.

The authors report 4 studies on heuristic and analytic processes in conditional reasoning with negations and show that a heuristic negative conclusion bias cannot account for the effects observed on problem solving latencies derived from eye-movement measures (Experiment 1) and a novel mouse-tracking methodology (Experiment 2). A double negation elimination process can account for both the latency and response-frequency effects of a negation in the clause about which an inference is made. It is further shown that other negation effects cannot be explained by an affirmative premise bias proposed in the literature. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that a novel availability hypothesis provides a viable alternative. It is argued that extant analytic theories need to be extended to incorporate a validating search for counter examples and need to specify how pragmatic and comprehension processes influence such a search. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The development of reasoning with causal conditionals.

A total of 512 children in Grades 1 through 6 received a conditional inference task using causal conditionals (If cause P, then effect Q) and a generation of alternatives task. The inference task used premises for which there were few or many possible alternative causes. Results show a steady age-related increase in uncertainty responses to the two uncertain logical forms, affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA), and an increase in production of disabling conditions for modus ponens. More uncertainty responses were produced to AC and DA with premises with many possible alternatives. Individual differences in inference production were related to numbers of alternatives produced in the generation task. Results support the idea that both developmental and individual differences in reasoning can be at least partially explained by differential access to knowledge stored in long-term memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some advice, sage and otherwise

This is a report about complications after myelography with Dimer-X. Three cases of transient and 1 case of permanent damage are described.     

Delusions and delusional reasoning.

In 2 studies, delusional participants assigned higher probabilities to narratives of actual delusions than participants with no history of delusions; previously delusional participants did not differ significantly from delusional participants or participants with no history of delusions. In Study 2, the authors found that this reasoning bias was specific to delusions and did not generalize to neutral text. Familiarity with the content of the delusional narratives played a mediating role in the estimation of their probability, but delusional status also had a significant, independent effect. These findings are consistent with the Bayesian model of delusion formation proposed by D. R. Hemsley and P. A. Garety (1986), and with R. P. Bentall, P. Kinderman, and S. Kaney's (1994) concept of emotional saliency. A productive area of future research might be to further determine the elements of emotional saliency and their impact on the individual steps of the Bayesian model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)