When worlds collide: Therapeutic and forensic roles.

The goal of the article "Irreconcilable Conflict Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles" (S. A. Greenberg & D. W. Shuman, 1997; see record 1997-02162-009) was to help chart a course for the profession that would raise the quality of assistance provided by psychologists both to courts and to patient-litigants, without compromising the quality of either forensic examinations or therapeutic relationships. One solution was conceptually simple: Do not attempt to fulfill both roles for the same person. Although an individual psychologist might be competent in both the provision of therapy and conduct of forensic examination, this does not justify a psychologist providing both services to the same patient-litigant. Knowledge is necessary to provide both types of service. Wisdom is necessary to choose not to provide both services to the same person. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.

Because causal relations are neither observable nor deducible, they must be induced from observable events. The 2 dominant approaches to the psychology of causal induction—the covariation approach and the causal power approach—are each crippled by fundamental problems. This article proposes an integration of these approaches that overcomes these problems. The proposal is that reasoners innately treat the relation between covariation (a function defined in terms of observable events) and causal power (an unobservable entity) as that between scientists' law or model and their theory explaining the model. This solution is formalized in the power PC theory, a causal power theory of the probabilistic contrast model (P. W. Cheng & L. R. Novick, 1990). The article reviews diverse old and new empirical tests discriminating this theory from previous models, none of which is justified by a theory. The results uniquely support the power PC theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inference and action in early causal reasoning.

Two experiments investigated whether a simple-to-embedded-rules account can explain the change in causal reasoning in children between 3 and 4 years of age. A marble-and-ramp apparatus that operated in 2 distinct configurations of straight and across was used throughout. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds were able to predict the path of the marble when there was only 1 input hole (a simple if-then rules task), whereas only 4-year-olds could solve the 2-input version (an embedded or conjoint conditional if-then rules task). Experiment 2 found the same 3- to 4-year age difference when children chose where to insert the marble in the 2-input version, indicating that the same rules may underlie causal action as well as causal prediction for the more complicated task. The results of the 2 experiments are discussed in relation to previous findings on causal reasoning, children's theory of mind, and a theory of cognitive complexity in the preschool period. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contrastive and counterfactual reasoning in causal judgment.

Addressed differences in the use of covariation information implied by counterfactual reasoning, which focuses on the question "Would the event Y have occurred if the candidate X had not?" and contrastive reasoning, which involves comparing the target episode to contrasting background instances and noting distinctive features. Two experiments test hypotheses regarding the use of counterfactual and contrastive thinking under different conditions. Findings suggest that when no candidate has been identified, people are more likely to engage in constrastive thinking, but they may engage in counterfactual thinking when they are asked to evaluate a specific candidate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When principles collide in hard cases: A commonsense moral analysis.

Justice Holmes (Northern Securities Company v. United States, 1904, p. 197) noted that "great cases, like hard cases, make bad law." In a within-subject design, college participants rated the strength of the plaintiffs and defendant's claims, rendered a verdict, and gave their determinative reasons for their decision in each of 45 "hard cases." They subsequently made two modifications to the original vignette, such that their initial verdict would swing the other way or swing further in their initial direction, and gave their cutting-edge reasons for their verdict shifts. Although the cases were judged to be hard overall, variance was evident, including variance with Supreme Court decisions in some of the same cases. In the participants' analyses, rights and duties, qualified by factors relating to the legitimacy of their reach and their underlying motives, were central, but these were understood in a moral rather than legal way. In their moral analysis, perceptions of unfairness triggered a search for a fair solution, as the process revealed instrumental, constitutive, and ethical dimensions to fairness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When goals collide: The interaction between prospective memory and task switching.

The neural correlates of prospective retrieval mode, and the basis of the interaction between prospective memory (PM) and task switching, were examined using event-related brain potentials (ERPs). In two experiments individuals performed pure and mixed blocks of trials where they indicated whether or not a word was a noun or a verb or contained one or two vowels based upon a cue that was presented before the target stimulus. Experiment 1 revealed that prospective retrieval mode was associated with slow wave activity over the frontal and posterior regions of the scalp that differed in topography depending upon whether the PM cues were embedded in pure or mixed blocks of trials. This experiment also revealed that the neural correlates of task set configuration, but not cue encoding, were sensitive to PM load. These data indicate that PM load may effect task switching by influencing an individual's ability to maintain multiple task sets in working memory and to efficiently implement a given task set to guide task performance. Additionally, task switching may effect PM by influencing the degree to which individuals rely on stimulus-independent and stimulus-oriented processing to support the realization of delayed intentions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Component abilities of children's causal reasoning.

Determined, using scalogram analysis, whether there is a constant order in which 84 1st graders mastered skills (e.g., explaining remote and familiar objects) related to 4 component abilities of causal reasoning. Results support a predictable developmental progression in the ability to give naturalistic explanations of remote causal phenomena and suggest that experiences with familiar objects may be necessary before a child can appreciate the role of chance or coincidental factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pornography, social science, and politics: When research and ideology collide.

Discusses controversy surrounding the 1985 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. Critics argue that many of the commissioners lacked necessary credentials and had been selected for ideological reasons, the commission had too little time and money to adequately study the topic, and conclusions drawn by the commission were based on overgeneralizations from social psychological studies were largely laboratory based. The need for more precise definitions for pornography and obscenity and for continued frank participation by psychologists in such policy debates is emphasized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mutability and propensity in causal selection.

We examined differences in causal ratings of 1 factor depending on the mutability (defined as the ease with which a factor can be imagined to be different) and causal propensity (defined as the likelihood that the event would occur in the presence of a factor) of another factor that conjoined to produce the event. In 3 studies, causal ratings of the target factor depended on the interaction of mutability and propensity of the other factor. When the other factor was high in mutability, ratings of the target decreased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased, but when the other was low in mutability, ratings of the target increased as the propensity of the contributing factor increased. Mediation analysis indicated that mutability and propensity affected causal ratings by determining the comparison against which the event was considered. Comparison judgments also mediated beliefs about which factor should have adjusted to the other. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The development of reasoning with causal conditionals.

A total of 512 children in Grades 1 through 6 received a conditional inference task using causal conditionals (If cause P, then effect Q) and a generation of alternatives task. The inference task used premises for which there were few or many possible alternative causes. Results show a steady age-related increase in uncertainty responses to the two uncertain logical forms, affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA), and an increase in production of disabling conditions for modus ponens. More uncertainty responses were produced to AC and DA with premises with many possible alternatives. Individual differences in inference production were related to numbers of alternatives produced in the generation task. Results support the idea that both developmental and individual differences in reasoning can be at least partially explained by differential access to knowledge stored in long-term memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When laws and ethics collide: What should psychologists do?

At times the laws under which psychologists function may appear to contradict generally recognized ethical values and/or good clinical care. When these circumstances arise, psychologists must determine if a conflict really exists and, if so, seek solutions that reconcile respect for the law with their ethical values. At times, psychologists may decide to follow the law despite their ethical concerns. At other times, they may determine that a conscientious objection is warranted. The authors recommend options to consider when these situations arise and offer a decision-making process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blickets and babies: The development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants.

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When seemingly irrelevant details matter: hidden covariation detection reexamined

Hidden covariation detection (HCD) theory states that when personality characteristics are surreptitiously associated with irrelevant features, these features obtain heuristic value for future evaluations of personality characteristics. According to the theory, subjects are not consciously aware of using such heuristics in their evaluations. We tested these hypotheses by confronting participants with statements that were said to belong to separate individuals, in which the apparent level of intelligence was associated with an irrelevant feature of the person who allegedly made these statements. In line with HCD theory, participants appeared to use this association, unconsciously, to guide their subsequent evaluations. Implications of these findings for HCD theory are discussed.     

The special status of actions in causal reasoning in rats.

A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Chronic and temporarily activated causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage.

In 3 studies, we examined the hypothesis that the effects of stereotype usage on target judgments are moderated by causal uncertainty beliefs and related accuracy goal structures. In Study 1, we focused on the role of chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs as predictors of a target's level of guilt for an alleged academic misconduct offense. In Study 2, we examined the role of chronic causal uncertainty reduction goals and a manipulated accuracy goal; in Study 3, we investigated the role of primed causal uncertainty beliefs on guilt judgments. In all 3 studies, we found that activation of causal uncertainty beliefs and accuracy concerns was related to a reduced usage of stereotypes. Moreover, this reduction was not associated with participants' levels of perceived control, depression, state affect, need for cognition, or personal need for structure. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the model of causal uncertainty and, more generally, in terms of the motivational processes underlying stereotype usage. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgment dissociation theory: An analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual and covariational reasoning.

Research suggests that causal judgment is influenced primarily by counterfactual or covariational reasoning. In contrast, the author of this article develops judgment dissociation theory (JDT), which predicts that these types of reasoning differ in function and can lead to divergent judgments. The actuality principle proposes that causal selections focus on antecedents that are sufficient to generate the actual outcome. The substitution principle proposes that ad hoc categorization plays a key role in counterfactual and covariational reasoning such that counterfactual selections focus on antecedents that would have been sufficient to prevent the outcome or something like it and covariational selections focus on antecedents that yield the largest increase in the probability of the outcome or something like it. The findings of 4 experiments support JDT but not the competing counterfactual and covariational accounts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Competition between multiple causes of a single outcome in causal reasoning.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 35(2) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes (see record 2009-05154-015). The URL provided for the supplemental material was incomplete. The complete URL is http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012699.supp] A strong positive predictor of an outcome modulates the causal judgments of a moderate predictor. To study the empirical basis of this modulation, we compared treatments with one and with two strong competing (i.e., modulating) causes. This allowed us to vary the frequency of outcome occurrences or effects paired with the predictors. We investigated causal competition between positive predictors (those signaling the occurrence of the outcome), between negative predictors (those signaling the absence of the outcome) and between predictors of opposite polarity (positive and negative). The results are consistent with a contrast rather than a reduced associative strength or conditional contingency account, because a strong predictor of opposite polarity enhances rather than reduces causal estimates of moderate predictors. In addition, we found competition effects when the strong predictor predicted fewer outcome occurrences than the moderate predictor, thus implying that cue competition is, at least sometimes, a consequence of contingency rather than total cue-outcome pairings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When less is not always more: Stereotype knowledge and reasoning development.

Developmental studies on heuristics and biases have reported controversial findings suggesting that children sometimes reason more logically than do adults. We addressed the controversy by testing the impact of children's knowledge of the heuristic stereotypes that are typically cued in these studies. Five-year-old preschoolers and 8-year-old children were tested with a card game version of the classic base-rate task. Problems were based on stereotypes that were familiar or unfamiliar for preschoolers. We also manipulated whether the cued stereotypical response was consistent (no-conflict problems) or inconsistent (conflict problems) with the correct analytic response that was cued in the problem. Results showed that an age-related performance decrease on the conflict problems was accompanied by an age-related performance increase on the no-conflict problems. These age effects were most pronounced for problems that adopted stereotypes that were unfamiliar for the 5-year-old preschoolers. When preschoolers were familiar with the stereotypes, their performance also started being affected. Findings support the claim that previously reported age-related performance decreases on classic reasoning tasks need to be attributed to the increased need to deal with tempting heuristics and not to a decrease in analytic thinking skills per se. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)