Age-related priming effects in social judgments.

Two experiments investigated adult age differences in the impact of previously activated (and thus easily accessible) trait-related information on judgments about people. The authors hypothesized that age-related declines in the efficiency of controlled processing mechanisms during adulthood would be associated with increased susceptibility to judgment biases associated with such information. In each study, different-aged adults made impression judgments about a target, and assimilation of these judgments to trait constructs activated in a previous, unrelated task were examined. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, older adults were likely to form impressions that were biased toward the primed trait constructs. In contrast, younger adults exhibited greater awareness of the primed information and were more likely to correct for its perceived influence, especially when distinctive contextual cues regarding the source of the primes were available. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Informational social influence and product quality judgments.

Eight groups of 15 college females each rated the quality of 1 paper plate while exposed to simulated quality evaluations of other raters. Others' evaluations were manipulated by presenting the modal evaluation as higher or lower than the control (no influence) mean rating and by varying the uniformity of others' ratings at 2 levels of dispersion. The availability of intrinsic (product composition) cues during prerating examination of the plate was manipulated by making available, or withholding, 2 comparison plates. Others' modal evaluations significantly affected the Ss' quality ratings of the plate. This effect was substantially stronger when others' evaluations were more uniform. The presence or absence of comparison plates had no effect on the influence conditions. Results are interpreted, in conjunction with those of J. B. Cohen and E. Golden (see record 1972-11926-001) as providing support for the effect of informational social influence on ratings of product quality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's social judgments concerning emotionally disturbed peers.

Analysis of 31 4th and 6th graders' judgments of observable behavior (presented in vignettes) showed that Ss made distinctions between normal and disturbed central figures and among 4 disturbed central figures on degree of perceived disturbance. Liking and disliking were not related to each other or to degree of perceived disturbance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developing biased social judgments: The false-consensus effect.

Research with adults has demonstrated a false-consensus bias, a tendency to overestimate peer agreement with one's own choices and or behaviors. To test this effect with children, summer campers divided into 3 mean-age groups, including 71 7-yr-old, 40 9-yr-old, and 76 10-yr-old children, voted for their favorite camp activities and then guessed how the vote would turn out for either same-age, younger, or older peers. Results indicate a strong false-consensus bias, which declined with age for Ss whose preferences were in the minority. Ss whose own preferences were consistently in the minority (i.e., nonconformers) exhibited a stronger bias, especially when they were predicting the preferences of older peers. Results were discussed in light of 3 competing explanations for the false consensus effect: egocentrism, ego-defensiveness, and attributional/information processing explanations. None of these theoretical perspectives could account for all of the findings, suggesting that the false-consensus bias may have multiple causes. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A social relations analysis of agreement in liking judgments.

Using a round-robin design in which every subject served both as judge and target, subjects made liking judgments, trait ratings, and physical attractiveness ratings of each other on each of 4 days. Although there was some agreement in the liking judgments, most of the variance was due to idiosyncratic preferences for different targets. Differences in evaluations were due to at least 2 factors: disagreements in how targets were perceived (is this person honest?) and disagreements in how to weight the trait attributes that predicted liking (is honesty more important than friendliness?) When evaluating the targets in specific roles (as a study partner), judgments showed much greater agreement, as did the weights of the trait attributes. A 2nd study confirmed the differential weighting of trait attributes when rating liking in general and the increased agreement when rating specific roles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How automatic are social judgments?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 50(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10961-001). There are errors in the labeling of the ordinates of the figures. The correct labeling is provided in the erratum.] Adapted the encoding-specificity paradigm developed by D. Thomson and E. Tulving (see record 1971-03487-001) to test 3 operational indicants of automatism (absence of intention, of interference from other mental activity, and of awareness). Recruited for a digit-recall study, 95 undergraduate students read sentences describing actions during the retention interval of either an easy or a difficult digit-recall task. Later, sentence recall was cued by (a) disposition cues, (b) strong semantic associates to the sentence actor, or (c) words representing the gist of the sentence, or (d) sentence recall was not cued. Awareness was measured immediately after the last sentence was read. Disposition-cued recall was higher than (b) or (d) and was unaffected by digit recall difficulty. Awareness of making dispositional inferences was only weakly correlated with disposition-cued recall. Results suggest that disposition inferences occurred at encoding, without intention, without interference by differential drain on processing capacity, and with little awareness. Thus, making dispositional inferences seems to be largely, but not entirely, automatic. (50 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Direct and indirect social influence on children's legal judgments.

Attempted to replicate the recent indirect influence phenomenon (H. D. Saltzstein et al, see record 1966-07558-001) with children and to demonstrate that direct influence declines with age while indirect influence increases with age. 176 3rd-8th graders from 2 parochial schools were required to make prison-sentence judgments based on tape recordings of 2 specially prepared criminal cases. Experimental Ss made initial judgments about sentence length in Case 1, were informed of the judge's sentence of 11 yrs and 6 mo, and made final decisions about sentence length. Experimental Ss then made decisions about sentence length for Case 2, were informed of the judge's sentence of 11 yrs 6 mo, and made final decisions about sentence length. Controls also made initial and final judgments for both cases but were not apprised of the judge's decision in either. Change from the initial to final sentence in Case 1 was the direct influence measure, while change from the initial sentence in Case 1 and Case 2 was the indirect influence measure. Data analysis revealed that there was a significant decline in direct influence with grade but no difference in indirect influence. Further research contrasting tests of indirect influence where the S either does or does not anticipate encounters with an influence agent is suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mood, memory, and social judgments in children.

The influence of positive and negative moods on children's recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments was investigated in a two-list experimental design. A total of 161 schoolchildren, 8 to 10 years old, were presented with audiovisual information containing positive and negative details about 2 target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both; (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood; (c) the 2 target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative impression-formation judgments. Results are contrasted with experimental data obtained with normal or depressed adults, and implications are considered for contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition and for social-developmental research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Influence of social comparisons of outcomes and procedures on fairness judgments.

This study investigated the effects of social comparisons of outcomes and procedures on fairness judgments. Participants performed 1 of 2 tasks with which they could earn a bonus. Three variables were manipulated: participant's control over task choice (present vs. absent), comparison other's control over task choice (present vs. absent), and comparison other's outcome (high vs. low). All participants were informed that they themselves earned a low outcome. The dependent variable was participants' judgments of the fairness of the way in which the experiment was conducted. Two 2-way interactions were predicted and found, one involving the participant's control and the comparison other's outcome and the other involving the participant's control and the comparison other's control. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unwanted thought: Age differences in the correction of social judgments.

This study used a false information paradigm to study age differences in the correction of social judgments. Younger and older adults read 2 criminal reports, with true information printed in black and false information in red. Following the reports, all participants were asked to recommend prison terms among other ratings. Age differences in baseline measures were also assessed by corresponding control groups who read only true information. Compared with younger adults under full attention, older adults under full attention and younger adults under divided attention were reliably influenced by the nature of the false statements (either extenuating or exacerbating the severity of the crimes). When contrasted with their relevant control groups, older adults under full attention and younger adults under divided attention failed to correct their social judgments. This study lends support to a processing resource explanation for age differences in the correction process for social judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ethical ideology and judgments of social psychological research: Multidimensional analysis.

24 undergraduates completed the 1st author's ethics position questionnaire and then compared the ethical similarity of 15 experiments through a series of 105 paired comparisons. Through multidimensional scaling, 3 factors—potential harm to experiment participants, use of manipulative illegitimate procedures, and the ratio between benefits and risks—were identified as the key characteristics associated with moral judgments of social psychological studies. Ss who endorsed different ethical ideologies, however, differed in their emphasis of these factors. "Situationists" emphasized risks relative to benefits and the potential harm to experiment participants. "Absolutists" based their judgments on costs created for participants and the riskiness of the procedures. Judgments by "subjectivists" were associated with the harmfulness, legitimacy, and invasiveness of the procedures. "Exceptionists" emphasized the consequentiality of the research, as well as scientific legitimacy, magnitude of costs, and deception. Findings are in general consistent with a taxonomy of ethical ideologies based on individual differences in relativism and idealism and have implications for current debates concerning the ethics of social psychological research. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hidden covariation detection produces faster, not slower, social judgments.

In P. Lewicki's (1986b) demonstration of hidden covariation detection (HCD), responses of participants were slower to faces that corresponded with a covariation encountered previously than to faces with novel covariations. This slowing contrasts with the typical finding that priming leads to faster responding and suggests that HCD is a unique type of implicit process. The authors extended Lewicki's methodology and showed that participants exposed to nonsalient covariations between hair length and personality were subsequently faster to respond to faces with those covariations than to faces without, despite lack of awareness of the critical covariations. This result confirms that people can detect subtle relationships between features of stimuli and that, as with other types of implicit cognition, this detection facilitates responding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 50(2) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10962-001). There are errors in the labeling of Figure 1 on p. 244. The ordinate percentages should be three times greater than indicated. In addition, the algebraic formula in the note for Table 2 on p. 245 is incorrect. The correct ordinate percentages and the correct algebraic formula are provided in the erratum.] Adapted E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson's (see record 2005-09647-002) encoding specificity paradigm for 2 recall experiments with 153 undergraduates to investigate whether Ss would make trait inferences without intentions or instructions at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information. Under memory instructions only, Ss read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, Ss recalled each sentence under 1 of 3 cuing conditions: a dispositional cue (e.g., generous); a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or no cue. Results show that recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Ss were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, findings indicate that Ss unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. It is suggested that attributions are made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: An analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities.

Reexamined the findings of A. Locksley et al (see record 1981-28048-001) that Ss fall prey to the baserate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments and that Ss ignore their stereotypes when trait judgments are made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. A replication of Study 2 by Locksley et al, using 99 undergraduates, was conducted to examine 2 issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with Ss' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs individual) of Ss' judgments. Results show no support for the baserate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each S based on the S's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that Ss ignored or underused their stereotypes as the baserate fallacy predicts. (35 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The susceptibility of chronic schizophrenics to social influence in the formation of perceptual judgments.

To test the hypothesis that the schizophrenic process may be characterized by a progressive withdrawal from contact with and hence influenced by the social environment, regressed schizophrenics, partially remitted schizophrenics, and a control group of hospitalized TB patients (all VA) were tested in the Asch (1956) conformity-to-group-judgment situation. Schizophrenics were seen to respond to social stimuli, but their responses had little apparent relationship to the physical or social reality of the situation. From Psyc Abstracts 36:02:2JQ48S. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contrast effects and judgments of physical attractiveness: When beauty becomes a social problem.

Conducted 3 studies to test the hypothesis that judgments of average females' attractiveness or dating desirability will be adversely affected by exposing judges to extremely attractive prior stimuli (i.e., judgments will show a "contrast effect"). Study 1 was a field study in which 81 male dormitory residents watching a popular TV show, whose main characters were 3 strikingly attractive females, were asked to rate a photo of an average female (described as a potential blind date for another dorm resident). These Ss rated the target female as significantly less attractive than did a comparable control group. Two other studies with 146 undergraduates demonstrated analogous effects in a more controlled laboratory setting. In addition, the 3rd study indicated a direct effect of informational social influence on physical attractiveness judgments. Implications are discussed with particular attention to mass media impact. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fundamental dimensions of social judgment: Understanding the relations between judgments of competence and warmth.

In seems there are two dimensions that underlie most judgments of traits, people, groups, and cultures. Although the definitions vary, the first makes reference to attributes such as competence, agency, and individualism, and the second to warmth, communality, and collectivism. But the relationship between the two dimensions seems unclear. In trait and person judgment, they are often positively related; in group and cultural stereotypes, they are often negatively related. The authors report 4 studies that examine the dynamic relationship between these two dimensions, experimentally manipulating the location of a target of judgment on one and examining the consequences for the other. In general, the authors' data suggest a negative dynamic relationship between the two, moderated by factors the impact of which they explore. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Turning up the contrast: Self-enhancement motives prompt egocentric contrast effects in social judgments.

Contrast effects occur when people judge the behavior and attitudes of others relative to their own. We tested a motivational account suggesting that these effects arise because people tailor their judgments of others to affirm their own self-worth. Consistent with that interpretation, participants displayed more egocentric contrast in their judgments of another person's intelligence (i.e., their evaluation of his score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test was more negatively related to their own score) after their self-esteem was threatened than after it was bolstered (Studies 1 and 2). High-self-esteem individuals displayed more judgmental contrast overall than did their low-esteem counterparts (Study 2). Strongly pro-choice participants whose esteem was threatened also displayed more contrast in their judgments of another person's attitude on abortion, relative to esteem-bolstered participants (Study 3). Discussion centers on the implications of these findings for theory on social comparison, self-affirmation, and social judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Uncertainty orientation and persuasion: Individual differences in the effects of personal relevance on social judgments.

In two studies we investigated the effects of personal relevance on attitude change as a function of one's uncertainty orientation. We predicted that, unlike uncertainty-oriented persons, high personal relevance would make certainty-oriented persons less careful or systematic in their processing of message arguments and more dependent on heuristics, or persuasion cues, than would low personal relevance. Results from both studies, within and across 2-week time periods, supported predictions. In Study 1, high personal relevance led to higher persuasiveness of two-sided communications and lower persuasiveness of one-sided communications than low personal relevance for uncertainty-oriented persons, but the reverse occurred for certainty-oriented persons. In Study 2, high personal relevance led to higher persuasive impact of strong arguments and lower impact for source expertise than did low personal relevance for uncertainty-oriented persons, but, again, the reverse occurred for certainty-oriented persons. We discuss implications for current theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)