Attributions, false consensus, and valence: Two field studies.

Two studies, with 1,056 Ss, investigated attitudes, knowledge, and behavior with regard to several environmental issues. Findings demonstrate that observers tend to perceive a false consensus with respect to the relative commonness of their own behavioral choices. This phenomenon was replicated across a variety of behaviors. This bias was not related, however, to Ss' trait inferences of the typical person who would choose a particular alternative. Neither estimated commonness of responses nor Ss' own behavioral choice provided an adequate explanation of the obtained differences in attributional inferences. Results show that Ss made more extreme and confident trait ratings about evaluatively positive behavior, irrespective of their own behavioral choice. Ss' trait ratings were in accordance with L. Ross's (1977) proposal, that Ss make more extreme ratings about dissimilar others, only when Ss rated their own behavioral choice relatively unfavorably compared with the behavioral alternative. Implications for previous investigations dealing with the false consensus effect are outlined, and evaluative and motivational mechanisms are proposed for research on social inference and attributional processes. (33 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Savings in relearning: II. On the formation of behavior-based trait associations and inferences.

Five experiments based on Carlston and Skowronski's (1994) relearning paradigm suggest that people spontaneously derive trait knowledge about actors from behaviors but that this knowledge may reflect either explicit trait inference processes or implicit actor–trait associations. Experiments 1 and 2 found that inference-instructed and control Ss showed equivalent savings in subsequent efforts to learn actor–trait pairs but not when instructed Ss initially inferred the wrong trait. Experiment 3 showed that savings were equivalent for stimuli from different sources, and Experiment 4 showed that savings effects persisted even when the target was only incidentally associated with a stimulus behavior. Finally, Experiment 5 suggests that after several days, even explicit trait inferences can become inaccessible to intentional retrieval, although the earlier experiments show that they continue to exert an implicit effect on learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and others.

Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1–3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions." In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly," again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unintended effects of goals on unintended inferences.

Three studies, with a total of 290 undergraduates, investigated unintended effects of goals on spontaneous trait inferences (STIs). Ss read trait-implying sentences to memorize them, to analyze sentence features, or to make social judgments. Cued recall revealed unintended (spontaneous) trait and behavioral-gist inferences. They were equally frequent with all the social judgment goals and absent or infrequent with feature analysis goals. Memorizing the sentences while ignoring their meaning reduced, but did not eliminate, STIs. Goals also affected whether traits were linked directly to actors in explicit memory. Social inferences can occur without intentions or awareness, even when meanings are intentionally ignored, as incidental results of analyzing stimulus details, and as intermediate but unnoticed results of other social judgments. Goals affect these inference likelihoods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When stereotypes get in the way: Stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences.

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spontaneous trait inferences as self-generated primes: Implications for conscious social judgment.

The priming literature has documented the influence of trait terms held outside of conscious awareness on later judgment relevant to the primed trait dimension. The present research demonstrated that spontaneous trait inferences can serve as self-generated primes. In Exp 1, Ss instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences (thus spontaneously inferring traits outside of consciousness) showed assimilation effects in judgment. Ss instructed to form inferences from these sentences (thus consciously inferring traits) showed contrast effects. Exp 2 demonstrated that these findings were due to semantic activation rather than to a general evaluative response. When evaluatively inconsistent trait constructs were primed, similar patterns of assimilation and contrast were found. Implications for the ubiquitous occurrence of priming through the process of social categorization are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory.

Conducted 4 experiments with a total of 331 undergraduates to investigate inferences about another person's attributes (e.g., his or her political attitudes) on the basis of information (e.g., the person's voting behavior) retrieved by Ss from their own memory. The inference task required integration of 2 kinds of uncertainty: uncertainty generated by imperfect diagnosticity of the information regarding the attributes under consideration. Results show that Ss relied almost exclusively on the diagnosticity of the information retrieved. The reliability with which the information was retrieved had a small and inconsistent effect on judgment. As a result, the inferences were considerably more extreme than those justified by normative considerations. Findings are interpreted in terms of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky's (see record 1974-02325-001) "representativeness heuristic," and implications of the results with regard to overconfidence in attributing personality traits are discussed. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Traits as goal-based categories: The importance of goals in the coherence of dispositional categories.

It is argued that goals are central to the meaning and structure of many traits and help define the prototypicality structure of those traits. Partly on the basis of L. W. Barsalou's (1985) work on goal-derived categories, it was predicted that goals help define the judged prototypicality of many trait-related behaviors and the confidence with which people make trait inferences from those behaviors. Consistent with this hypothesis, ratings of the extent to which behaviors achieved the goal associated with a trait strongly predicted the typicality of the behaviors. Furthermore, the rated goal-relatedness of a behavior also strongly predicted the confidence with which people would make a trait inference from that behavior. It is suggested that goals play a major role in the conceptual coherence of traits and other social categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences": Correction to Winter and Uleman.

Reports an error in "When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences" by Laraine Winter and James S. Uleman (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1984[Aug], Vol 47[2], 237-252). There are errors in the labeling of Figure 1 on p. 244. The ordinate percentages should be three times greater than indicated. In addition, the algebraic formula in the note for Table 2 on p. 245 is incorrect. The correct ordinate percentages and the correct algebraic formula are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1985-01259-001.) Adapted E. Tulving and D. M. Thomson's (see record 2005-09647-002) encoding specificity paradigm for 2 recall experiments with 153 undergraduates to investigate whether Ss would make trait inferences without intentions or instructions at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information. Under memory instructions only, Ss read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, Ss recalled each sentence under 1 of 3 cuing conditions: a dispositional cue (e.g., generous); a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or no cue. Results show that recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Ss were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, findings indicate that Ss unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. It is suggested that attributions are made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferring a trait from a behavior has long-term, highly specific effects.

In 2 experiments, Ss judged whether numerous behaviors implied a target trait (intelligent or friendly) and then, on an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire, evaluated the overall desirability of some behaviors. Repeated behaviors were judged more quickly than new ones, even with 7 days between presentations. In addition, evaluations of previously judged behaviors that had evaluatively mixed implications were dominated by their implications for the practiced trait. This implicit memory effect occurred over a 7-day delay, even when Ss did not recognize that they had previously seen the behavior. Just as a general construct (e.g., a trait) can be made accessible by an individual's past experiences, a specific cue–construct linkage (e.g., a tendency to interpret a specific behavior in terms of a particular trait) can be facilitated for a long time, independent of conscious awareness, by making a single judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inferring the characteristics of other people: Categories and attribute accessibility.

Investigated how the social inference process operates once a perceiver has activated a particular social category. Three models were tested in an RT paradigm. These models make differing predictions about how the degree of category–attribute association affects the speed and confidence with which an inference is made. In Phase 1, 37 undergraduates assessed the degree of association between a series of life-style attributes and 2 occupational prototypes. In Phase 2, 12 Ss made yes–no judgments about whether these attributes were true of a prototypical category member, and their response latencies and confidence levels were recorded. The "differential accessibility plus contradictions" model was strongly supported. This model states that perceivers make affirming inferences more quickly and confidently about highly associated attributes. When perceivers infer that an attribute is not true of a typical category member, low-associate characteristics can be rejected more quickly and confidently. Inter-S agreement was greater for highly associated attributes. Implications for social perception are discussed. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blurry words and fuzzy deeds: The attribution of obscure behavior.

When people attempt to infer the existence of traits from another's behavior, they categorize the behavior, characterize the actor in trait terms, and then correct that inference with information about situational constraints. The 1st 2 stages require fewer attentional resources than does the 3rd. However, when behavior is obscure (i.e., difficult to categorize because its features are not easily apprehended), the 1st stage should consume resources on which the 3rd stage depends, and undercorrected inferences should result. In 2 experiments, behavior was made obscure by distorting its visual or acoustical parameters. Although the obscure behaviors could logically have been attributed to the constraining situations in which they occurred, Ss who observed such behaviors were especially unlikely to correct their trait characterizations of the actors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Impact of context on spontaneous trait and situational attributions.

The role of background information in the generation of spontaneous inferences regarding a target's behavior was examined. Ss received background information designed to facilitate dispositional inferences, information to facilitate situational inferences, or no background information. All Ss memorized a series of digit lists. After each list, a short paragraph of background information and a single sentence were presented. Cognitive capacity for processing the paragraphs and sentences was manipulated by presenting either difficult or easy digit lists. Cued recall revealed that dispositional background information facilitated trait inferences but did not affect situational inferences. Similarly, situational information facilitated situational inferences about the actor's behavior but had no impact on trait inferences. The ability of dispositional information to facilitate trait-cued recall was not influenced by Ss' cognitive capacity, whereas situational information boosted situational-cued recall only when Ss enjoyed ample capacity. The relevance of this evidence to the 3-stage model of person perception proposed by D. T. Gilbert, B. W. Pelham, and D. S. Krull (see record 1988-26492-001) is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)