Beyond objectivity and subjectivity.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author comments on the general treatment of objectivity and subjectivity that underlies Krueger's review. Despite repeated appeals to a pragmatic basis for NHST, Krueger seems to have missed a key implication of a pragmatic view of scientific inference in this regard. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why chance is a good theory.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author states that Krueger carelessly included a dubious claim that weakened at least some of his contentions: that the widespread use of NHST represents a ubiquitous ignorance of its logical pitfalls. Contrary to Krueger's claims, the current author believes that within a larger causal framework, the null hypothesis remains the best theory available. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are there benefits from NHST?

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The validity and accuracy of significance testing is addressed by the current author. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bayes rules.

Responds to the F. Schmidt and J. Hunter (see record 2002-10575-012), J. L. Brand (see record 2002-10575-013), R. K. Guenther (see record 2002-10575-014), K. A. Markus (see record 2002-10575-015), and S. G. Hofmann (see record 2002-10575-016) comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Krueger responds to each of the criticisms in turn. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Krueger (2001).

Reports an error in the original article by J. Krueger (American Psychologist, 2001, Vol 56[1], pp. 16-26). In Figure 2, on page 22, two of the curves are labeled "p(H0)=.9" and "p(H0)=.1." These labels should have been reversed. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2001-16601-002.) Null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is the researcher's workhorse for making inductive inferences. This method has often been challenged, has occasionally been defended, and has persistently been used through most of the history of scientific psychology. This article reviews both the criticisms of NHST and the arguments brought to its defense. The review shows that the criticisms address the logical validity of inferences arising from NHST, whereas the defenses stress the pragmatic value of these inferences. The author suggests that both critics and apologists implicitly rely on Bayesian assumptions. When these assumptions are made explicit, the primary challenge for NHST--and any system of induction--can be confronted. The challenge is to find a solution to the question of replicability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In criticism of the null hypothesis statistical test.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) in praise of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). NHST, is, in fact, a probabilistic imitation of modus tollens (or of the mathematical procedure of proof by contradiction). However, once the reasoning is made probabilistic, the inference is no longer valid. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The inscrutable null hypothesis.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) praising the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Hagen's praise of the NHST may be supported on purely technical grounds but it is unfortunate if it prolongs primary reliance on NHST to evaluate quantitative difference and equivalence given the prominent human factors problem of widespread and intractable interpretation errors. Alternative methods are available for these purposes that are far less subject to misinterpretation. The science of psychology can openly benefit by supplementing, if not replacing, NHST practices with these methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic familiarity, relevance, and the development of deductive reasoning.

This study examined the developmental progression of deductive reasoning between Grades 5 and 12 and the role of semantic content relevance in the solution of the Wason selection task. A rating procedure was used to establish the degree of relevance between antecedent and consequent clauses of conditional (if…, then.…) propositions. Results were consistent with the general position that formal deductive reasoning becomes available in adolescence and that relevant propositional content is not a sufficient condition for adequate deductive reasoning performance. High-relevant content enhanced level of performance for those having deductive reasoning competence, and low-relevant content failed to support adequate performance. Findings are interpreted within the distinction between the use of the inference rule competence and the facilitation of relevant semantic content. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Model fitting: A better approach.

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) defending the logic and practice of null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST). It is argued that model fitting provides an approach to data analysis that is more appropriate to the cognitive needs of the researcher than is NHST. Model fitting combines the NHST ability to falsify hypotheses with the parameter-estimation characteristic of confidence intervals in an approach that is simpler to learn, understand, and use. Effect size estimation is central to the approach, and power calculations are vastly simplified relative to NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A further look at wrong reasons to abandon statistical testing.

Responds to comments by W. W. Tryon, R. E. McGrath, R. G. Malgady, R. Falk, B. Thompson, and M. M. Granaas (see records 1998-04417-011, 1998-04417-012, 1998-04417-013, 1998-04417-014, 1998-04417-015, and 1998-04417-016, respectively) on the author's article (see record 1997-02239-002) defending use of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). The logic of NHST has been challenged by 3 claims: (1) the null hypothesis is always false; therefore, a test of the null hypothesis is only a search for what is already known to be true; (2) the form of logic on which NHST rests is flawed; and (3) NHST does not tell one what one wants to know. In attempting to rebut these claims, while there may be good reasons to give up NHST, these particular points are not the reason why. Key points of each commentary are addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In praise of the null hypothesis statistical test.

Jacob Cohen (see record 1995-12080-001) raised a number of questions about the logic and information value of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Specifically, he suggested that: (1) The NHST does not tell us what we want to know; (2) the null hypothesis is always false; and (3) the NHST lacks logical integrity. It is the author's view that although there may be good reasons to give up the NHST, these particular points made by Cohen are not among those reasons. When addressing these points, the author also attempts to demonstrate the elegance and usefulness of the NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multiple explanations for multiply quantified sentences: Are multiple models necessary?

P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see record 1990-03501-001) presented a theory of deductive reasoning for inference problems using multiply quantified premises. The theory classifies such problems into those that require Ss to construct only one mental model and those that require multiple models. Data corroborate the theory and show that the major results of Johnson-Laird et al can be explained without invoking mental models or deductive reasoning at all. Furthermore, reversing the order of the quantifiers in a multiply quantified sentence may produce a sentence that is both more difficult to comprehend and more ambiguous. Some implications for theories of how people understand multiply quantified sentences are noted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the logic and purpose of significance testing.

There has been much recent attention given to the problems involved with the traditional approach to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Many have suggested that, perhaps, NHST should be abandoned altogether in favor of other bases for conclusions such as confidence intervals and effect size estimates (e.g., F. L. Schmidt; see record 83-24994) . The purposes of this article are to (a) review the function that data analysis is supposed to serve in the social sciences, (b) examine the ways in which these functions are performed by NHST, (c) examine the case against NHST, and (d) evaluate interval-based estimation as an alternative to NHST. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding of logical necessity: developmental antecedents and cognitive consequences

Does abstract reasoning develop naturally, and does instruction contribute to its development? In an attempt to answer these questions, this article specifically focuses on effects of prolonged instruction on the development of abstract deductive reasoning and, more specifically, on the development of understanding of logical necessity. It was hypothesized that instructional emphasis on the metalevel of deduction within a knowledge domain can amplify the development of deductive reasoning both within and across this domain. The article presents 2 studies that examine the development of understanding of logical necessity in algebraic and verbal deductive reasoning. In the first study, algebraic and verbal reasoning tasks were administered to 450 younger and older adolescents selected across different instructional settings in England and in Russia. In the second study, algebraic and verbal reasoning tasks were administered to 287 Russian younger and older adolescents selected across different instructional settings. The results support the hypothesis, indicating that prolonged instruction with an emphasis on the metalevel of algebraic deduction contributes to the development of understanding of logical necessity in both algebraic and verbal deductive reasoning. Findings also suggest that many adolescents do not develop an understanding of logical necessity naturally.     

Yes, cavalier attitudes can have pernicious consequences.

Responds to the comments by J. J. Krueger, K. D. Vohs, and R. F. Baumeister (see record 2007-19520-015) on the current authors' original article, "Do people's self-views matter? Self-concept and self-esteem in everyday life" (see record 2007-01685-002). Krueger et al brought up many points with which the current authors agree. Nevertheless, as Krueger et al noted these points of agreement, the current authors focus instead on several points of continued disagreement. In addition, the current authors comment on a few new twists that Krueger et al have added to their argument. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evaluating statistical difference, equivalence, and indeterminancy using inferential confidence intervals: An integrated alternative method of conducting null hypothesis statistical tests.

Null hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) has been debated extensively but always successfully defended. The technical merits of NHST are not disputed in this article. The widespread misuse of NHST has created a human factors problem that this article intends to ameliorate. This article describes an integrated, alternative inferential confidence interval approach to testing for statistical difference, equivalence, and indeterminacy that is algebraically equivalent to standard NHST procedures and therefore exacts the same evidential standard. The combined numeric and graphic tests of statistical difference, equivalence, and indeterminacy are designed to avoid common interpretive problems associated with NHST procedures. Multiple comparisons, power, sample size, test reliability, effect size, and cause-effect ratio are discussed. A section on the proper interpretation of confidence intervals is followed by a decision rule summary and caveats. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The seats of reason? An imaging study of deductive and inductive reasoning

We carried out a neuroimaging study to test the neurophysiological predictions made by different cognitive models of reasoning. Ten normal volunteers performed deductive and inductive reasoning tasks while their regional cerebral blood flow pattern was recorded using [15O]H2O PET imaging. In the control condition subjects semantically comprehended sets of three sentences. In the deductive reasoning condition subjects determined whether the third sentence was entailed by the first two sentences. In the inductive reasoning condition subjects reported whether the third sentence was plausible given the first two sentences. The deduction condition resulted in activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann areas 45, 47). The induction condition resulted in activation of a large area comprised of the left medial frontal gyrus, the left cingulate gyrus, and the left superior frontal gyrus (Brodmann areas 8, 9, 24, 32). Induction was distinguished from deduction by the involvement of the medial aspect of the left superior frontal gyrus (Brodmann areas 8, 9). These results are consistent with cognitive models of reasoning that postulate different mechanisms for inductive and deductive reasoning and view deduction as a formal rule-based process.     

Significance testing: Is there something Better?

Comments on the article by R. L. Hagen (see record 1997-02239-002) supporting use of the null hypothesis statistical test (NHST). Hagen did an admirable job of reminding readers that the NHST represents a brilliant and useful innovation, but does not offer a strong case for its continued use as the primary inferential strategy in psychology. The question is not "Is it useless?" but "Is there something better?" Popular opinion holds that interval estimation represents a superior strategy to NHST in many ways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What are the fundamental facts of a comparison of two treatments' outcomes?

Responds to comments by Stefan G. Hofmann (see record 2011-19228-003), Edward A. Wise (see record 2011-19228-004), Michael J. Lambert (see record 2011-19228-005), and William H. Gottdiener (see record 2011-19228-006) on the authors original article "Statistical significance testing and clinical trials" (see record 2011-19228-002). The original article is one very narrowly focused effort at studying the implications of relying on the null hypothesis significance test (NHST) for determining which psychotherapy randomized clinical trial (RCT) findings to take seriously for clinical purposes. Although there are several approaches for faulting the NHST, the matter is important and complicated enough to justify dealing, in detail, with one approach at a time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene (1992).

Responds to S. B. Greene's (see record 1992-15270-001) argument that assertions of the form "None of the A are in the same place as some of the C" are difficult for Ss to generate and that this explains the results of multiply quantified reasoning without having to invoke mental models or deductive reasoning by P. N. Johnson-Laird et al (see record 1990-03501-001). This article shows (1) that the phenomenon fails to explain most of the principal results; (2) that, far from undermining the theory of mental models, it can actually be explained by the theory; and (3) that the best available account of the results is that Ss both reason and rely on mental models to do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)