For want of a nail: How absences cause events.

Causation by omission is instantiated when an effect occurs from an absence, as in The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal or Not watering the plant caused it to wilt. The phenomenon has been viewed as an insurmountable problem for process theories of causation, which specify causation in terms of conserved quantities, like force, but not for theories that specify causation in terms of statistical or counterfactual dependencies. A new account of causation challenges these assumptions. According to the force theory, absences are causal when the removal of a force leads to an effect. Evidence in support of this account was found in 3 experiments in which people classified animations of complex causal chains involving force removal, as well as chains involving virtual forces, that is, forces that were anticipated but never realized. In a 4th experiment, the force theory's ability to predict synonymy relationships between different types of causal expressions provided further evidence for this theory over dependency theories. The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences, are causal. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing Interactive Causal Influence.

The discovery of conjunctive causes--factors that act in concert to produce or prevent an effect--has been explained by purely covariational theories. Such theories assume that concomitant variations in observable events directly license causal inferences, without postulating the existence of unobservable causal relations. This article discusses problems with these theories, proposes a causal-power theory that overcomes the problems, and reports empirical evidence favoring the new theory. Unlike earlier models, the new theory derives (a) the conditions under which covariation implies conjunctive causation and (b) functions relating observable events to unobservable conjunctive causal strength. This psychological theory, which concerns simple cases involving 2 binary candidate causes and a binary effect, raises questions about normative statistics for testing causal hypotheses regarding categorical data resulting from discrete variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Specification and estimation of causal models in social psychology: Comment on Tesser and Paulhus.

A. Tesser and D. L. Paulhus (see record 1978-31808-001) proposed a "causal model" of the relations, including reciprocal causation, among love and several other variables. The present author contends that the model is wrongly specified in several respects, and as a result the procedure used to estimate its parameters, ordinary least squares regression, produces biased and inconsistent results. Careful attention to the assumptions of a model is essential for the use of structural equation modeling techniques in any field. Existing theories in many areas of social psychology may not be strong enough to support the use of such techniques with nonexperimental data, and several alternative methods are available to attack problems like that of Tesser and Paulhus. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal reasoning in the social and nonsocial realms.

Examines the literature on the development of causal reasoning about social and physical phenomena. Contrary to previous claims, causal reasoning is neither identical nor substantially different across these 2 realms. Instead, there is fundamental overlap that derives from the fact that both social and physical causation are interpreted in generative, rather than empiricist, terms. Differences stem from the fact that the mechanism of causal generation differs in the 2 arenas. Physical effects are generated by transmissions of energy, whereas social or behavioral effects are generated by the enactment of intentions. Some causal inference rules are restricted to one domain or the other, while other rules are common to both domains. Young children were found not to confuse social and physical causation as previously claimed. (French abstract) (67 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judging probable cause.

Argues that people use systematic rules for assessing cause, both in science and everyday inference. By explicating the processes that underlie the judgment of causation, the authors review and integrate various theories of causality proposed by psychologists, philosophers, statisticians, and others. Because causal judgment involves inference and uncertainty, the literature on judgment under uncertainty is also considered. It is suggested that the idea of a "causal field" is central for determining causal relevance, differentiating causes from conditions, determining the salience of alternative explanations, and affecting molar versus molecular explanations. Various "cues-to-causality" such as covariation, temporal order, contiguity in time and space, and similarity of cause and effect are discussed, and it is shown how these cues can conflict with probabilistic ideas. A model for combining the cues and the causal field is outlined that explicates methodological issues such as spurious correlation, "causalation," and causal inference in case studies. The discounting of an explanation by specific alternatives is discussed as a special case of the sequential updating of beliefs. Conjunctive explanations in multiple causation are also considered. (120 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Psychogenesis of the Self and the Emergence of Ethical Relatedness: Klein in Light of Merleau-Ponty.

This paper presents a theory of the emergence of ethical relatedness, which is developed through a synthetic reading of the developmental theories of Melanie Klein and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Klein's theory of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are found to roughly parallel Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the "lived" and the "symbolic." With the additional contributions of Thomas Ogden and Martin C. Dillon, the theories of Klein and Merleau-Ponty are refined to accommodate the insights of each developmental perspective. Implications of the paper's analysis include: Opportunities to clarify key concepts in object relations theory, including projective identification; insight into the development of self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt, embarrassment and gratitude; the articulation of a phenomenologically oriented object relations perspective which allows for human agency and therefore genuine altruism and compassion; and, finally, a validation of previous assertions that theory cannot and should not be meaningfully distinguished from ethics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A psychotherapist's lessons from the philosophy of science.

A number of issues are discussed, but the major themes have to do with the way causation is understood in psychology, the resultant image of humanity as mechanical rather than teleological, and the fact that psychologists can and should be framing people as freely willing agents in their theories even as these views are submitted to rigorous empirical testing in the traditional scientific method. Although the scientific method unavoidably commits the fallacy of "affirming the consequent" in an if–then sequence of logical reasoning, the author opposes adopting substitutes for this approach to knowledge. Teleology needs to be furthered in psychotherapy because it is a genuinely accurate portrayal of human beings and because there is a pressing need for improvement in ethico-moral realms of behavior that mechanical models fail to capture. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How causal knowledge affects classification: A generative theory of categorization.

Several theories have been proposed regarding how causal relations among features of objects affect how those objects are classified. The assumptions of these theories were tested in 3 experiments that manipulated the causal knowledge associated with novel categories. There were 3 results. The 1st was a multiple cause effect in which a feature's importance increases with its number of causes. The 2nd was a coherence effect in which good category members are those whose features jointly corroborate the category's causal knowledge. These 2 effects can be accounted for by assuming that good category members are those likely to be generated by a category's causal laws. The 3rd result was a primary cause effect, in which primary causes are more important to category membership. This effect can also be explained by a generative account with an additional assumption: that categories often are perceived to have hidden generative causes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceived necessity explains the dissociation between logic and meaning: The case of "Only If."

The purpose of this article was to investigate why sentences of the form "p only if q" often appear to have a different meaning than sentences of the form "if p, then q," despite their logical equivalence. The results of 3 experiments indicate that when "if…then" statements were equated with respect to necessity and temporal relations, different pragmatic relations (such as permission, causation, etc.) elicited similar "only if" judgments. However, different necessity relations elicited different "only if" judgments, regardless of the type of pragmatic relation expressed in the "if then" statement. These data suggest that "only if" judgements are primarily mediated by necessity and temporal relations and that pragmatic contexts may play a more indirect role, such as in the interpretation of necessity and temporal relations. Suggestions for how these findings might be incorporated into pragmatic scheme theory (P. W. Cheng & K. J. Holyoak; see record 73:29075; P. W. Cheng, K. J. Holyoak, R. E. Nisbett, & L. M. Oliver; see record 73:8193) and mental models theory (P. N. Johnson-Laird & R. M. J. Byrne, 1991) are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Representing causation.

The dynamics model, which is based on L. Talmy's (1988) theory of force dynamics, characterizes causation as a pattern of forces and a position vector. In contrast to counterfactual and probabilistic models, the dynamics model naturally distinguishes between different cause-related concepts and explains the induction of causal relationships from single observations. Support for the model is provided in experiments in which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. Experiments 1-3 showed that causal judgments are based on several forces, not just one. Experiment 4 demonstrated that people compute the resultant of forces using a qualitative decision rule. Experiments 5 and 6 showed that a dynamics approach extends to the representation of social causation. Implications for the relationship between causation and time are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal processing: Origins and development.

Reviews evidence on the origins and development of causal processing. Research suggests that causal processing first occurs around 3 months of age, in perception of motion continuity across two objects, as in one ball colliding with another. The temporal integration limit to the perception of continuity and, hence, causal relation may be set by the temporal integration function of iconic processing. Events of this kind may form the basis for the use of cues of temporal contiguity, spatial contiguity, temporal order, and similarity in causal processing at later ages and higher levels. The same cues underlie causal processing of event relations made for functional reasons between plans or intentions and behavioral outcomes. Causal processing is probably automatic, rather than controlled, to begin with. Other suggestions for the origins of causal processing include concrete, familiar event sequences; human intended action; generative relations; and observation of regularity and covariation. Evidence suggests that each of these plays a role in the development of causal processing. Perception of generative relations may be the most basic of them, and observation of regularity and covariation is probably the last of the four, developmentally, to be used in causal processing. Virtually nothing is known about how different types of causal processing may be developmentally linked or how they originate and develop. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Subjective well-being.

Reviews the literature since 1967 on subjective well-being (SWB [including happiness, life satisfaction, and positive affect]) in 3 areas: measurement, causal factors, and theory. Most measures of SWB correlate moderately with each other and have adequate temporal reliability and internal consistency; the global concept of happiness is being replaced with more specific and well-defined concepts, and measuring instruments are being developed with theoretical advances; multi-item scales are promising but need adequate testing. SWB is probably determined by a large number of factors that can be conceptualized at several levels of analysis, and it may be unrealistic to hope that a few variables will be of overwhelming importance. Several psychological theories related to happiness have been proposed; they include telic, pleasure and pain, activity, top–down vs bottom–up, associanistic, and judgment theories. It is suggested that there is a great need to more closely connect theory and research. (7 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Extension of the Kelley attribution model: The role of comparison-object consensus, target-object consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency.

Conducted 2 experiments with 544 university students to demonstrate the desirability of refining H. H. Kelley's (see record 1973-24800-001) causal attribution model. The 1st experiment demonstrated the importance of comparison-object consensus as well as the usual factors of target-object consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. These 4 factors all follow from a "diamond" model that delineates 4 elements (person, target object, other people, comparison object) and the possible relations between all possible pairs of these elements. The 2nd experiment described the types of causal explanations that Ss offer and studied the situations in which causal attributions are formulated. A classification scheme was developed to describe the various types of causal attributions. Ss made more causal attributions in those situations in which person causes were more salient. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.

Because causal relations are neither observable nor deducible, they must be induced from observable events. The 2 dominant approaches to the psychology of causal induction—the covariation approach and the causal power approach—are each crippled by fundamental problems. This article proposes an integration of these approaches that overcomes these problems. The proposal is that reasoners innately treat the relation between covariation (a function defined in terms of observable events) and causal power (an unobservable entity) as that between scientists' law or model and their theory explaining the model. This solution is formalized in the power PC theory, a causal power theory of the probabilistic contrast model (P. W. Cheng & L. R. Novick, 1990). The article reviews diverse old and new empirical tests discriminating this theory from previous models, none of which is justified by a theory. The results uniquely support the power PC theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social learning theory and the dynamics of interaction.

The recent controversy between A. Bandura (see record 1983-22326-001) and D. C. Phillips and R. Orton (see record 1983-22341-001) about the causal relations involved in social interactions prompted a discussion of the proper role for formal models in the analysis of social interactions. The present author argues that (a) Bandura's attempt at formal modeling of patterns of causation is vague and misleading; (b) internal variables, such as expectation and self-monitoring, can easily be handled by formal models; (c) simple deterministic models can behave in unexpectedly complex ways and cannot be ruled out in principle as explanations for social interaction; and (d) unaided verbal reasoning cannot hope to come to grips with the dynamics of even simple interacting systems. (7 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From Covariation to Causation: A Test of the Assumption of Causal Power.

How humans infer causation from covariation has been the subject of a vigorous debate, most recently between the computational causal power account (P. W. Cheng, 1997) and associative learning theorists (e.g., K. Lober & D. R. Shanks, 2000). Whereas most researchers in the subject area agree that causal power as computed by the power PC theory offers a normative account of the inductive process. Lober and Shanks, among others, have questioned the empirical validity of the theory. This article offers a full report and additional analyses of the original study featured in Lober and Shanks's critique (M. J. Buehner & P. W. Cheng, 1997) and reports tests of Lober and Shanks's and other explanations of the pattern of causal judgments. Deviations from normativity, including the outcome-density bias, were found to be misperceptions of the input or other artifacts of the experimental procedures rather than inherent to the process of causal induction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Campbell and Rubin: A primer and comparison of their approaches to causal inference in field settings.

This article compares Donald Campbell’s and Donald Rubin’s work on causal inference in field settings on issues of epistemology, theories of cause and effect, methodology, statistics, generalization, and terminology. The two approaches are quite different but compatible, differing mostly in matters of bandwidth versus fidelity. Campbell’s work demonstrates broad narrative scope that covers a wide array of concepts related to causation, with a powerful appreciation for human fallibility in making causal judgments, with a more elaborate theory of cause and generalization, and with a preference for design over analysis. Rubin’s approach is a more narrow and formal quantitative analysis of effect estimation, sharing a preference for design but best known for analysis, with compelling quantitative approaches to obtaining unbiased quantitative effect estimates from nonrandomized designs and with comparatively little to say about generalization. Much could be gained by joining the emphasis on design in Campbell with the emphasis on analysis in Rubin. However, the 2 approaches also speak modestly different languages that leave some questions about their total commensurability that only continued dialogue can fully clarify. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociating Processes Supporting Causal Perception and Causal Inference in the Brain.

An understanding of relations between causes and effects is essential for making sense of the dynamic physical world. It has been argued that this understanding of causality depends on both perceptual and inferential components. To investigate whether causal perception and causal inference rely on common or on distinct processes, the authors tested 2 callosotomy (split-brain) patients and a group of neurologically intact participants. The authors show that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality depend on different hemispheres of the divided brain. This finding implies that understanding causality is not a unitary process and that causal perception and causal inference can proceed independently. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Structures conceptuelles, représentation des objets et des relations entre les objets.

This article provides an overview of psychological studies of object concepts, highlighting the more recent re-conceptualizations, and the latest developments in research in this field. These developments have tended to focus on the notion of context, as well as on the notion of causal relations between features. Our theoretical analysis of this field is backed up by experimental illustrations. We complete with an examination of "category-specific impairments" studies, in the light of the evolution of concept theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)